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Deterrence and Strategic Superiority *Brent Scowcroft*

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Reflections on the Quarter

Offensive-Defensive Systems and the East-West Strategic Balance

SHORTLY after taking office, the Nixon Administration modified the anti-ballistic missile system proposed by the Johnson Administration. In place of a "thin" system designed to protect major cities, it announced its support for an ABM that could safeguard at least a portion of the U.S. strategic missile force. The Administration reached its decision after weighing the implications of deployment or nondeployment for the nation's strategic posture and international stability over the next decade against the current status of Soviet military development and projections of Soviet strategic capabilities by the mid-1970's.

In the past five years, Soviet spending on offensive and defensive weapons, in absolute terms, has been more than double that of the United States. Military-oriented research and development in the USSR is estimated to exceed similar U.S. expenditures. The Soviet Union will soon have deployed a total of 1,200 land-based ICBM's, and is said to have either deployed or under construction almost 250 SS-9 missiles capable of carrying warheads of 20 to 25 megatons.

In addition to major progress in the development and deployment of offensive strategic systems, the Soviets have registered significant strides in the field of ballistic missile defense. They have already deployed an ABM system around Moscow. There is evidence that they are building a more advanced ABM, as well as an anti-space defense. Such a capability, if the Soviets obtain it, could seriously downgrade the ability of the United States to gather intelligence data from satellites.

In the election campaign of 1960, the Democratic candidate, John F. Kennedy, berated the Republican Administration for having permitted the opening of a "missile gap" that allegedly favored the Soviet Union. In fact, the missile gap of the early 1960's favored the United States, even though large numbers of Soviet IRBM's and ICBM's were poised against Western Europe. During the past decade many of our strategic thinkers have seen the Soviet buildup of capabilities as an essentially stabilizing factor in international relations, reasoning that once the Soviets achieved a form of parity with the United States, they would consider themselves less menaced and would be content to slow, or even halt, the development of strategic weapons systems.

The question now before the United States is whether, through formal arms control agreements, tacit understandings, or decisions taken unilaterally by the superpowers, there can be a dampening

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of the Soviet buildup. Clearly, the early 1970's will be a critical period in U.S.-USSR strategic relationships.

It cannot be assumed that the Soviet Union will be content with parity in offensive and defensive strategic systems. Conceivably, the Soviets view the period before them as an opportunity to press toward strategic superiority. Strategic superiority would serve several purposes: it would assure the defense of the Soviet Union itself; underwrite Soviet support for anti-Western groups in the non-Western world; limit the ability of the United States to come to the aid of its allies abroad; and help to extend the Soviet presence in areas such as the Middle East, where the USSR's influence historically has been minimal. It may even be argued that the Western conception of international stability is alien to Soviet dialectical thought processes derived from Marx and Lenin. For the person trained in dialectical thinking, the world is in constant flux, and stability as we know it does not exist. Given such a mental framework, strategic parity would be but a passing phase between inferiority and superiority.

Some American strategists have maintained that the Soviet strategic buildup of recent years has been primarily in reaction to the development and deployment of weapons systems by the United States. But there appear to have been no crash programs of Soviet weapons development initiated in response to the production of a specific U.S. weapons system. Instead, there has been a sustained, broadly based buildup of both strategic offensive and defensive forces and conventional capabilities, especially the Soviet Navy.

The Soviets appear to have made their strategic weapons choices independent of U.S. decisions. They have emphasized higher payload missiles with larger warheads than their U.S. counterparts. They have developed Fractional Orbital Bombs, a system of nuclear weapons which can strike U.S. Strategic Air Command bases with little warning from low-level orbital trajectories. In contrast to the American delay in deploying an ABM system, the Soviets began a program of ballistic missile defense almost five years ago.

The United States could counter the Soviet strategic buildup by deploying more ICBM's and increasing the production of MIRV's (Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles). But the alternative course of action chosen by the Nixon Administration is to deploy an ABM system. Without a capability for ballistic missile defense by the latter half of the 1970's, the United States in all likelihood would find its land-based deterrent force seriously downgraded. Authoritative projections indicate that by 1975 the Soviet Union will have developed a capability which could destroy the U.S. strategic force unless it is protected against missiles. According to Secretary of Defense Laird's testimony before the subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations on May 22: "Our real concern at this

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time is the prospect that the Soviets might install highly accurate MIRV's on their large ICBM's and greatly improve the accuracy of their small ICBM's. If they were to do so, the survivability of our Minuteman force would be gravely endangered.

"The Soviets have already begun to test multiple re-entry vehicles on their SS-9, three re-entry vehicles (each with payload equivalent to a 5-megaton warhead) per missile, and it is estimated that they might start deploying these weapons in existing silos in the next year or so. A number of these vehicles have been launched thus far, three out to 5,100 nautical miles into the Pacific. Although we still have no conclusive evidence that these multiple re-entry vehicles are independently aimed, the intelligence community considers it likely that the Soviets will go on with the development of MIRV's and install them in a new version of their SS-9 type ICBM's. Should they also greatly improve the accuracy of their small ICBM's, which the intelligence community considers possible, the serviceability of our Minuteman force as presently deployed would be virtually nil by the mid to late 1970's."

Deployment of the Safeguard ABM system, to the extent that it increases the cost to the Soviets of building a force capable of destroying the U.S. retaliatory force, contributes to improved prospects for arms control in the field of offensive strategic weapons systems. The Soviets are unlikely seriously to contemplate negotiations on the reduction of strategic missiles if they have the capability of destroying our strategic force while we have no corresponding capacity, yet such a contingency cannot be discounted if, by the late 1970's, the Soviet Union, but not the United States, has an effective ABM. Moreover, it may be argued, international stability could be enhanced if both the United States and the Soviet Union were to deploy effective ABM systems on a large scale, and if both superpowers had reduced, or perhaps even dismantled, their offensive systems.

In the so-called nth country problem lies another justification for ballistic missile defense. Within the next generation it will become possible for more and more countries to develop at least primitive delivery systems. The much discussed threat that Chinese missiles may pose to the United States, and possibly the Soviet Union, in the 1970's, is a case in point. Clearly, an ABM system would augment the ability of the United States to protect its strategic capability, and perhaps even its major population centers, from nuclear attack from a nation such as China.

The strategic-technological developments that are occurring in both the United States and the Soviet Union will have important implications for the Atlantic Alliance. Over the past generation it has become increasingly difficult, if not impossible, for the West European countries individually to maximize the potential inherent in advanced technology. No single West European country has the financial

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resources or the scientific-technical-managerial manpower needed to compete across the spectrum with either the United States or the Soviet Union. In the absence of a dramatic step toward political union, Western Europe will find it even more difficult in the 1970's to develop advanced weapons systems comparable to those of the superpowers.

Since the departure of President de Gaulle there have been expressions among Europeans of renewed interest in political integration, and in the development of an Anglo-French nuclear force as the nucleus of a European strategic capability. Deployment of ballistic missile defenses on a large scale by the Soviet Union, however, would render obsolete a purely *national* European nuclear force and increase greatly the cost of one more broadly based. At the same time, nondeployment of a U.S. ABM system, insofar as it made the United States more vulnerable to destruction by the Soviet Union, would increase West European (and Soviet) doubts about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Western Europe. This, in turn, could have a highly destabilizing effect on the international system.

Still, some Europeans have expressed apprehension about the United States deploying an ABM system. It is feared that such a system will further strain the U.S. economy; that it may strengthen a "Fortress America" mentality in the United States; that it will lead the Soviet Union to target more of its missiles on a largely defenseless Western Europe, and the United States to target more of its missiles on Eastern Europe. Until recently, Western Europe has been far more heavily targeted by Soviet missiles than the United States.

It may be that deployment of the ABM by both superpowers would reinforce tendencies toward political integration in Western Europe so as to assure to Europe a greater voice in its own defense. But at the very least the ABM is likely to have important implications for U.S.-European relations in the coming decade.

For the foreseeable future, international stability will depend heavily upon the respective capacities for defense and deterrence possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union remains an expansionist power, its development of preponderance in strategic capabilities for deterrence and defense would disturb the international balance. Thus, the case for the preservation of a U.S. strategic posture of nuclear "sufficiency" rests on the need for an essentially defensive power to prevent a would-be challenger from achieving strategic preponderance. In the United States' development and deployment of an effective ABM system lies one approach toward stability in the 1970's.

France's Presidential Election

ON April 28, 1969 President de Gaulle released a terse announcement of his resignation: "I am ceasing the exercise of my functions as president of the re-

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public. This decision takes effect at noon today." Thus, Charles de Gaulle ended his ten-year tenure as Head of State after the French electorate rejected his proposals on the reform of the French Senate and the decentralization of France's governmental structure. Apparently, he wrongly believed that by staking his political future on the referendum, he could assure its success.

Several factors may account for the failure of the electorate to vote decisively in favor of de Gaulle's reforms. Presumably many Frenchmen had tired sufficiently of de Gaulle's grand personal style so that when he linked the referendum to his own political standing, a substantial vote was cast against the President himself. Although, as the ensuing campaign for the presidency indicated, they were not prepared to reject Gaullism, they sensed the prospect that, by replacing de Gaulle with Pompidou, much of Gaullism could be preserved without retaining de Gaulle in office. The fact that Pompidou supported de Gaulle in the referendum provided evidence of this.

From May 28 until the election of Georges Pompidou on June 14, M. Alain Poher, President of the Senate, served as interim President. From a position of comparative obscurity, Poher was thrust into the foreground as a possible successor to de Gaulle. He entered the contest just before the deadline for nominations, after public opinion polls indicated an improvement in his prospects for winning. Even at the outset of the campaign, however, Pompidou seemed the probable victor.

Pompidou campaigned vigorously with a political platform based largely upon Gaullism. Sensing the electorate's mood, he espoused Gaullism, but declared himself independent of de Gaulle. His campaign stressed the stability provided by the Fifth Republic, in marked contrast to the record of the pre-Gaullist Fourth Republic. At the same time, Pompidou indicated that he would not hesitate to deviate from the policies of President de Gaulle. In place of "grandeur," he promised greater pragmatism in French policy.

The Communists and Socialists had benefited from de Gaulle's resignation to the extent that a presidential election before 1972 might provide them with opportunities for electoral gain. But if the impending election created possibilities which together the Socialists and Communists might have exploited, they soon showed themselves unable to collaborate effectively. The Communists wanted a joint candidate representing both parties, but the Socialists endorsed Gaston Deferre, known for his anti-communist views. Since the Communists could not support Deferre, they entered their own candidate, Jacques Duclos. The result of this rift between the two parties was a weakening of their combined strength.

Poher's platform was European union and reconciliation with France's allies. One of his planks was that France should resume her place at the Geneva disarmament

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talks. He promised a profound change in foreign policy and an impartiality in dealing with Middle East problems which had been absent from France's policy in recent years. His principal argument against Pompidou was that the latter had endorsed practically every one of de Gaulle's policies and that he would be unlikely to deviate greatly from the General's position on major issues. Apparently, Poher assumed that when the electorate said "no" to the General, they were saying "no" to Gaullism. Pompidou responded by reassuring the electorate that he was Gaullist but independent of de Gaulle.

In his campaign, Pompidou argued that since Poher could win only with Communist votes, Communist influence might increase if Poher were confirmed in office. In the election of June 1, Duclos, the Communist candidate, received 21 per cent of the vote, a mere 2 per cent less than Poher. Each made an unexpectedly poor showing. With 44 per cent of the vote, Pompidou appeared certain to win the run-off election scheduled for June 14.

Immediately after the June 1 election, many of Poher's supporters and opponents suggested that he withdraw from the race. His prospects dimmed when the Communists instructed their supporters to boycott the run-off in order to show their distaste for both candidates. In the absence of large-scale support from previously uncommitted voters and votes swung from the Communist Party, Poher had slim chance of winning. Moreover, Pompidou's supporters sought to reduce the absenteeism in voting in order to enable their candidate to receive a broadly based mandate. In the run-off election, Pompidou obtained 57.7 per cent of the vote, and thus decisively defeated Poher.

According to Pompidou the electoral campaign afforded France three alternatives: communism, a return to the weaknesses of the Fourth Republic, or both continuity and change under his leadership. He promised greater flexibility in foreign policy. He apparently believes in less governmental control of business, and for this reason had the backing of middle-class merchants. Now Pompidou faces the formidable task of developing policies that will enable France to preserve the stability provided by President de Gaulle, while at the same time resolving the major problems that beset the French government in the final months of de Gaulle's presidency.

New Forces for European Integration?

IN recent years the outlook for progress toward European integration has not been promising. The European Community has faced crises that pitted France against other members over such issues as financial regulations for EEC agricultural policy, the strengthening of Community institutions, and the admission of new members, especially Britain.

In February, relations between Britain and France deteriorated

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sharply as a result of "l'affaire Soames" and the British effort to make use of the WEU Council for discussions designed to strengthen British links with the six nations of the Common Market. On February 21, the British government had made public its version of a February 4 luncheon conversation between President de Gaulle and Britain's Ambassador to France, Christopher Soames. According to the British, de Gaulle proposed that the Common Market be replaced by a more broadly based European free trade area; and the Atlantic Alliance by a European alliance under the leadership of Britain, France, the German Federal Republic and Italy.

Apparently, the British decided to release their version of the discussion because they feared that de Gaulle was preparing a trap for them. British acceptance of such proposals would have alienated support for Britain's Common Market candidacy among other European countries. They also may have chosen to release the details of the conversation because they saw an opportunity to increase opposition to Gaullist policy among France's European allies. The French government, claiming that the British version of the conversation "received no approval in any form" from Paris, insisted that de Gaulle was merely speculating about the shape a future Europe might take.

In addition, the French boycotted meetings of the WEU Council because of displeasure at the British effort to hold consultations within the Council on major foreign policy issues, including the Middle East. The French appear to have seen in British policy not only an attempt to circumvent President de Gaulle's "veto" of Britain's Common Market candidacy, but also a move by Britain to assume a position of leadership in Western Europe.

De Gaulle's resignation gave a new impetus to the European integration movement. On May 6, Prime Minister Wilson reaffirmed that British policy "remains firmly based on our application for full membership of the European Communities." In the weeks following de Gaulle's departure, the British chose a low-keyed approach to the European Community while engaging in discussions with EEC members on the timing for a new series of negotiations on Common Market membership. Such negotiations, it was assumed, could not begin until after the national elections scheduled to be held in the German Federal Republic on September 28. To a far greater extent than in Britain's earlier efforts to join the Common Market, there was public discussion of the question of European political unity. On June 16, Wilson declared that "even greater than the economic arguments for an early and vigorous advance in Europe is the need for unity in this continent."

Moreover, following de Gaulle's resignation, there was renewed discussion of Anglo-French nuclear collaboration. Germany's Finance Minister, Franz-Josef Strauss, called upon Britain and France to form a European nuclear deterrent. Dur-

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ing a visit to the United States in May, Edward Heath, leader of the British Conservative Party, declared that an Anglo-French nuclear force would be a "means of giving Europe a greater say in its own defense." The June meeting of the WEU Assembly provided the occasion for a discussion of the prospects for an integrated European defense effort, including an Anglo-French nuclear force. Conceivably the Pompidou Government would find access to more advanced British nuclear technology attractive at a time when the costs of France's own nuclear program may impose unacceptable economic burdens on the country.

The resurgence of interest in European integration stemmed largely from the widely held belief that the French government after de Gaulle would pose fewer obstacles to the resolution of major "European" problems. The appointment of a "European," Maurice Schumann, as Foreign Minister contributed to this assessment of French policy, as did the indication from the new Prime Minister, Francois Chaban-Delmas, that France's foreign policy "will be characterized by continuity and liberalization." But if France might pose fewer obstacles to British Common Market membership, she was not prepared to abandon *in toto* the premises and interests that guided French foreign policy under de Gaulle. Chaban-Delmas reiterated several familiar Gaullist themes: the Common Market Six themselves must first reach agreement before the opening of negotiations with Britain over EEC entry; British membership must not "dilute the European idea"; and the European Community must register progress toward "completion of the EEC agricultural policy on the basis of Community preference and financial solidarity."

Whatever change may be expected in the outlook of a post-de Gaulle government, many of the problems that have beset the European integration movement remain. In particular, the weakness of the British economy, the future of sterling as a reserve currency, and the impact adopting the EEC farm policy would have on the British economy still pose formidable obstacles to the enlargement of the European Community. In addition, France faces major economic adjustment. In August her government found it necessary to devalue the franc, despite the implications of this action for the Common Market agricultural policy, with its detailed financial arrangements based on existing European exchange rates.

In foreign, defense, and international economic policies and the development of advanced technology and transport programs, Western Europe in the early 1970's is likely to be subject to a series of problems whose solution may call forth new efforts toward coordination. Such collective solutions could lead toward a form of political integration that will enable Europeans to reconcile the persistent forces of nationalism with the perceived need for greater unity.

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THE IMPACT OF CHINESE ICBM'S ON STRATEGIC DETERRENCE

by Harry G. Gelber

THE strategic nuclear postures of the United States have been developed over the last twenty years almost entirely with a view to deterring the Soviet Union. It is the various definitions of this central requirement that have primarily guided decisions on force structures and deployment, as well as alliance policies at the nuclear level. Even the possession of nuclear weapons by Britain and France has been seen in relation to this situation, for the possibility of a British-Soviet or a Franco-Soviet clash which failed to involve the United States has rightly been considered to be extremely remote. The same may not be true of China. China is likely to constitute a unique, and uniquely complicating, factor in the deterrent equation with which other countries have to live. If the Johnson and Nixon administrations are correct,[1] China could possess a modest ICBM force by the mid-1970's. It is not too early to consider what the implications of this may be.

I

The following argument rests on four propositions. The first two are that the Sino-Soviet and Sino-American disputes will continue into the foreseeable future. While the intensity of both may fluctuate from time to time, neither is likely to abate to the point where an armed clash, including a nuclear confrontation, ceases to be a genuine possibility. Third, the Chinese government will, in fact, opt for the construction of an ICBM force capable of inflicting damage upon the continental United States, rather than concentrating on an MRBM force for use in relation to the rimlands of Asia. Fourth, the strategy in accordance with which

[1] *The 1970 Defense Budget and Defense Program for Fiscal Years 1970-74*, statement by Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford, January 15, 1969 (hereafter referred to as *Clifford Statement*), pp. 46, 54; Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, *Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems, Hearings* before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 91st Congress, 1st Session, Part I (hereafter referred to as *Senate ABM Hearings*), p. 178; Secretary Laird, *Safeguard Antiballistic Missile System, Hearings* before the Subcommittees of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 1st Session (hereafter referred to as *House ABM Hearings*), pp. 12-14.

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Chinese nuclear weapons will be employed will include a wish to deter both the Soviet Union and the United States in some situations, notably, but not exclusively, in the case of an apparent threat to the Chinese homeland.

This is not to say that these are the only possible assumptions. China might, even yet, opt out of the ICBM field. A Sino-Soviet reconciliation might, even yet, take place. It is merely to say that the propositions as stated seem the most likely ones at present. None of them requires an assumption of Chinese aggressiveness in any traditional sense, or of Chinese governmental "irrationality,"[2] or even of the adoption by China of high-risk policies. They are entirely compatible with the continuance of a Chinese policy mix of verbal and declaratory violence and practical military caution, and a wish to concentrate on oblique ways of undermining both the U.S. position in Asia and the Soviet position among communist states and in the Third World.

Finally, these assumptions do not amount to firm predictions about the strategic behavior of the Chinese government. This must be so for a variety of reasons. We know little about the patterns of political forces and pressures in Peking or the emerging operational motivations of particular Chinese foreign policy moves. No significant outside power enjoys relations with Peking which would allow it to regulate its relations with China with any confidence or permit detailed forecasts of Chinese behavior. The most likely assumption about China's nuclear strategic doctrine is that it has not yet been fully worked out in Peking. It seems reasonable to accept the view of Professor Allen S. Whiting that

> Peking's determination to gain sufficient military strength to prevent foreign interference in China's internal affairs made the development of nuclear power in China absolutely essential. Whether against American dominance or Soviet dependence, China's nuclear capability would at least provide psychological and political strength, if not an actual strategic stabilizer and equalizer.[3]

But that does not alter the fact that possession of the weapons will

[2]It might, of course, be dangerous to assume that China would never behave in a way Western statesmen considered to be irrational, or that the Chinese could not rationally threaten to be irrational in particular situations. But the notion of a basically irrational Chinese strategic policy is a different matter. See a suggestion by the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, General J. P. McConnell, in *Status of U.S. Strategic Power, Hearings* before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 90th Congress, 2nd Session (hereafter referred to as *Strategic Power Hearings*), p. 205. For a more balanced view, see Alice L. Hsieh, *Communist China's Military Policies, Doctrine and Strategy* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, P-3960, October 1968).

[3]*Senate ABM Hearings*, p. 134.

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compel Peking to work out a strategic doctrine to govern their employment. It seems useful to examine the logic of the situation which may then exist.

If the four initial propositions are accepted, several highly important consequences seem to follow. China will be the only nuclear power with a serious prospect of standing in conflict with the United States or the Soviet Union, or both. Furthermore, a clash between any two of these three will not necessarily involve the third. At the time of the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy declared that a nuclear strike from Cuba against any nation in the Americas would be regarded by the United States as an action requiring a full retaliatory response against the Soviet Union. It seems certain that a clash with China would not be regarded by the United States in the same light. Nor would a Sino-Soviet clash trigger a Soviet response against the United States. It also seems highly unlikely that the third power — the United States in case of a Sino-Soviet clash or the Soviet Union in case of a Sino-American one — would voluntarily involve itself. It would rather stand aside and reap the fruits of abstention.

The Chinese nuclear posture will thus have some unprecedented implications. Small nuclear powers, such as Israel might become, would essentially oppose other small powers. The involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union in such a case would be indirect, and probably ultimately avoidable.[4] If Japan or India were to acquire nuclear weapons it seems improbable, under presently foreseeable policies, that their use would be threatened against either the United States or the USSR. As for Britain and France, though the use of their forces against the Soviet Union is conceivable, such use against the United States is not[5]—and in a Soviet clash with either of them, the Soviets would not be able to count with any confidence upon American noninvolvement.

A further consequence of China's special position is that both the United States and the USSR will, for the first time, confront the possibility that a clash with one nuclear-armed opponent will leave them, at the end of the exchange, still facing another poten-

[4]One would expect both Soviet and American policy planners to react to any acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel or Egypt by seeking to strengthen the option of mutual abstention from a nuclear clash in the Middle East. Such a prospect could prove to be a more compelling anti-proliferation device than the offer of a nonproliferation treaty.

[5]Some Frenchmen at one point tried to overcome this limitation by suggesting a strategy of "*tous azimuts*." But if this was meant to convey that a Franco-U.S. military clash was a genuine possibility, it was always difficult to take it seriously.

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tial opponent thus armed. Once the possibility is admitted that clashes with these two opponents could be not merely simultaneous but sequential, it follows that the deterrence of one may not necessarily imply deterrence of the other, and that both the operational definitions of deterrence and the force structures and deployments of the two great powers will have to be amended to take account of the changed circumstances. So will plans for arms control.

Finally, if a situation were to arise where a clash between any two of the three opponents would not only weaken both in relation to the third but would undermine the subsequent maintenance by either contestant of its deterrence of the third, then each of the three would acquire a much more direct interest than hitherto in a nuclear clash between the other two. Such a development might have dangerous consequences. Interest in this case does not necessarily imply capacity. But each of the three would be tempted to interpret the military and diplomatic policies of the other two in light of the suspicion that either might be trying to foment such an armed clash. It is difficult to see how a situation of that kind could be stabilized without more reliable ways of regulating Peking's relations with Moscow and Washington than now exist. The response, therefore, seems likely to be a strengthened sense of common interest on the part of the two most dangerous nuclear opponents, the United States and the Soviet Union. Such a drawing together would be bound to set additional limits to the ability of either to consider a rapprochement with China, even if one were available, as well as to the range of its strategic choices, both vis-à-vis Peking and with respect to arms limitation agreements.

II

Current estimates suggest that the Chinese could have a force of some fifteen to thirty land-based ICBM's by 1975, with a greater-than-expected possibility of up to seventy-five.[6] They would almost certainly be neither hardened nor mobile. The Department of Defense believes that in the event of a full-scale clash, a Chinese force of twenty-five missiles could inflict up to eleven million deaths upon the United States, and a force of seventy-five

[6]Recent estimates have tended to be at the lower end of the range. See *Clifford Statement*, p. 54; Laird, *House ABM Hearings*, p. 13; Secretary Melvin R. Laird, *Nonproliferation Treaty, Hearings* before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 91st Congress, 1st Session, Part II, p. 391.

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could kill up to twenty-three million. The provision of anti-missile defenses could be expected to reduce the total casualties to one million in the second case and to fewer than one million, with some possibility of no deaths, in the first.[7]

With this first-generation force, the Chinese could theoretically hope for three kinds of damage-inflicting capability against the United States. The first would be the ability to destroy or use up enough American weaponry, including missiles, to leave the United States with too few deliverable warheads to maintain assured destruction against the Soviet Union. This may be the least important possibility. The number of U.S. re-entry vehicles required for a pre-emptive strike against Chinese missile emplacements is unlikely to be significant. The situation with respect to a retaliatory strike against China is more complex. Secretary Laird has suggested that the need to keep enough warheads to maintain deterrence of the Soviet Union would place important limitations on the extent of the damage the United States could threaten to inflict upon China.[8] This presumably in spite of the fact that, in the absence of a full Chinese air defense system, such a retaliatory strike could in many situations be carried out by bombers rather than missiles. On the other hand, a sizeable increase in the number of America's deliverable warheads would be likely to alarm the Soviet Union. Whether these limitations permit the maintenance of a destruction capability sufficient to deter China must be a matter of judgment. For the time being, apparently, they do.

The second possibility would be for China to threaten the destruction of vital parts of the American command and control machinery. A measure of survivability has of course been built into the existing U.S. retaliatory system. But the command and control requirements for the conduct of a counterstrike against the Soviet Union may differ in order of magnitude and complexity from those needed in the period following a Chinese strike against the United States. These differences would be greatest in the immediate post-attack period. Insofar as it seems reasonable to envisage a limited Soviet strike, it would be in the interests of the Soviets themselves to spare much of the American command and control system, including Washington, if only to ensure that the exchange remained limited. In the case of an all-out Soviet attack,

[7]Laird, *House ABM Hearings*, p. 17; *Clifford Statement*, p. 54.
[8]*House ABM Hearings*, p. 60.

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all that the United States would require would be a command system of sufficient capability to operate the mechanics of reprisal. What broader political and command functions would remain to be fulfilled in the post-attack phase of such a cataclysm is unclear. The situation after a Chinese strike would be quite different. The character of the Soviet-American balance is such that the maintenance of stability would require the survival of a machinery of control able to perform almost the whole range of normal governmental functions. In the absence of active defenses to protect this system the Chinese may be able to offer a credible threat to its survival.

But it is the third category which could be crucial: that of casualties and the associated intangibles of morale. It is by no means clear what correlation, if any, exists between any specific level of casualties caused by a Chinese attack and the likelihood of some particular kind of U.S. reaction. Perhaps an exchange with China would break the nuclear taboo and make a subsequent threat to the USSR easier to operate, in spite of the casualties. Perhaps significant casualties would merely lead to a siege mentality and a garrison state. Much also depends on the attack envisaged. No particular level of damage sustained by the United States as the result of a Chinese strike would prevent America from subsequently responding in kind to a direct Soviet attack upon the U.S. homeland. But away from such simple scenarios the uncertainties become great. It is difficult to believe that, following a disaster such as the loss of ten to twenty million people, any American administration would be able to make the thought of another nuclear confrontation with a different enemy, the Soviet Union, bearable in any circumstances except those of a direct Soviet nuclear strike against the United States. Even a much lower level of casualties might make the notion of nuclear arms, and all that goes with them, intolerable.

Peking's initial capability will clearly be quite small. The first concern of a Chinese planner must therefore be to make his force credible against the massive superiority of the Soviet and American strategic forces. For his force to become politically useful, he must be able to circumvent or dispel the assumption that China will invariably have to bow to superpower deterrence. But the role nuclear weapons actually play in affecting particular decisions by particular people is known to be both ambiguous and obscure. This fact would give Peking room for maneuver that might be exploited in various ways.

In the first place, there is no principle of logic or strategic prac-

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tice which says that the notion of Chinese deterrence of the United States need deny the validity of U.S. deterrence of China. The creation of the one does not contradict or remove the other.

Second, the Chinese interpretation of deterrence need not be the same as the American one. The U.S. view has usually combined two factors: the desire to deter an opponent from starting a war, and the maintenance of an ability to fight a war with relative advantage if deterrence should fail. But these two elements are separable. It would be entirely rational for the Chinese to aim for the first, even if they have no hope of achieving the second. The possibility that any first- or second-generation Chinese missile force could seize the initiative and coerce the United States into withdrawing from an established position is remote. It would even be difficult for China to create high confidence in American minds that she would respond in a particular situation with a strike against the Soviet or American homeland. But it may sometimes be possible for a nuclear-armed China, by forcing the initiative upon Washington, to compel the United States to take avoiding action to prevent a Sino-American clash.[9] Peking would be wholly realistic in supposing that the mere existence of the Chinese force, and its ability in a bee-sting attack to inflict significant damage on the United States, would give America pause in a number of situations. The lack of communication between Peking and Washington, and American fears of Chinese unpredictability, could work to China's advantage here. Fears of nuclear accident or misunderstanding, or alarm lest a China pressed into a corner might trigger its missiles for fear of a U.S. pre-emptive strike, could only increase American caution.

Third, the very fact of Peking's appearance on the ICBM scene may compel some important readjustments in the bases of other powers' calculations regarding damage. The assumption in recent years has been that the stability of deterrence between the Soviet Union and the United States largely depends on the ability and perceived willingness of each side to inflict assured retaliatory destruction upon the other.[10] Deployed Chinese ICBM's must raise the possibility that a clash with Peking could erode one ma-

[9]Professor Thomas C. Schelling has discussed this matter of "compellence" in his *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 69 *et seq.*

[10]Dr. Alain C. Enthoven, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, has explained that "In the case of the Soviet Union, we believe that the ability to kill 20 to 25 percent of its population and to destroy 50 percent of its industrial capacity under any foreseeable circumstances is an effective deterrent." *Strategic Power Hearings*, p. 117.

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jor power's ability subsequently to maintain a credible assured destruction capability against the other. Once China possesses ICBM's, the ability of the United States and the USSR to continue to deter each other must come to depend on an assured destruction capability (provided that this continues to be the standard of measurement) that can survive a clash with China as well as a damage-limiting first strike by the major opponent.[11] Whereas the United States and the Soviet Union required forces capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on each other, the Chinese only need a force which, in the event of a clash — and even its own elimination — would unacceptably weaken the United States or the USSR in their subsequent dealings with one another.

In this context, and from China's point of view, what force-levels would be effective? We have seen that even an initial Chinese ICBM capability, likely to be available by the mid-1970's, could threaten the U.S. command and control system and claim from ten to twenty million American lives. These probable damage figures are of major importance in themselves. But the Chinese threat would not be directed solely to the idea that such damage was an adequate deterrent to U.S. action against China. It would be aimed at America's unwillingness to risk having that damage, and its social consequences, undermine Moscow's belief in the continuing determination of the United States to operate the deterrent machinery. It is a commonplace of modern strategic studies that, in matters of deterrence, hardware is in a sense secondary to the opponent's recognition of one's will to use it. As Henry A. Kissinger has written:

> . . . deterrence depends above all on psychological criteria. It seeks to keep an opponent from a given course by posing unacceptable risks. For purposes of deterrence, the opponent's calculations are decisive. . . . For political purposes, the meaningful measurement of military strength is the assessment of it by the other side.[12]

Once America had suffered important damage as the result of a

[11]Similar arguments may not hold if a Soviet-American conflict precedes a confrontation by either side with China. The situation that might follow such a conflict is in detail unpredictable, and the very notion of a controlled confrontation with China might cease to have relevance. But it seems likely that a first-generation Chinese force will be so limited that the United States, even after an exchange with the Soviet Union, would have enough deliverable warheads left over to give her the technical capability to launch a damage-denying first strike against China. Under what circumstances such a threat could be exercised, and by whom, is another matter. It does not affect the point at issue here.

[12]Henry A. Kissinger, "Central Issues of American Foreign Policy," in Kermit Gordon, editor, *Agenda for the Nation* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1968), pp. 590-591.

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nuclear clash with China, would she find it easy to persuade Soviet decision-makers that her willingness to intervene in marginal situations remained entirely unchanged? What posture would be required to produce such a result? What penalties would be incurred if Moscow were not convinced? Could the impression be readily conveyed that the passions aroused by the clash with China were convertible into political determination against the USSR, and, if so, at what rate of exchange? Or would Soviet leaders be more impressed by possible symptoms of weariness and withdrawal within America? Certainly any substantial chance that opinion might veer in the direction of withdrawal, let alone an abrupt rejection of nuclear arms, is a substantial chance that deterrence against the Soviets would be drastically undermined. It follows that any Chinese force which could credibly command that chance would possess a highly important deterrent capability against the United States. Similar arguments could be made for a Chinese deterrent policy against the Soviet Union, though a variety of other factors would come into play here, including the more indirect relationship between Soviet governmental decision-making and public opinion.

Fourth, it is clear that nuclear weapons are not relevant solely to situations of nuclear war. Nuclear-backed deterrence has in the past been thought to be highly relevant to assessments of adversary intentions and the various possibilities for response, including irrational response, even at the sub-nuclear conflict level. In Central Europe, for example, mutual deterrence works as much by the implied threat that any low-level military engagement will uncontrollably escalate, as it does by an explicit and perhaps less credible threat that the United States is willing to incur the penalties of a Soviet strike against its homeland for the sake of preventing the nearest Soviet infantry battalion from occupying the town of Helmstedt. In such situations certainty is not required that either side will use nuclear weapons. Any reasonable possibility that they might be used, either in controlled fashion or through the uncontrolled escalation of a lower-level conflict, is thought to constitute an unacceptable risk. Similar considerations might apply in a number of situations involving China. America's willingness to support an Asian nation that felt itself threatened by Chinese MRBM's would be diminished if it involved a potential choice between a U.S. pre-emptive strike against Chinese ICBM's and some risk of ten million American deaths. U.S. assessments of

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the value of interdiction bombing inside China in case of a renewed conflict in Korea would be influenced by whether or not China had ICBM's. The conditions for American protection of Taiwan or the offshore islands might be affected. And the Soviet Union would surely be more cautious about moving against China in border disputes and more circumspect about aiding India in case of a renewed Sino-Indian conflict.

Fifth, expectations, or even reasonable probabilities, along these lines would presumably cause significant changes in the diplomatic alignments of a number of countries. Third parties would reassess America's ability to deter *both* China and the USSR, albeit in somewhat different ways and to somewhat different degrees. A variety of America's allies would feel less confident about counting on U.S. nuclear, and many forms of nonnuclear, support or protection. This could lead to important alterations in the worldwide pattern of alliance relationships, fears and hopes that center on the United States. In the process, these changes could adversely affect not merely the maintenance of America's world position, but the possibility of securing any necessary adjustments in the great-power balance by means which are controlled rather than uncontrolled, and which produce a low level of violence and instability rather than a high one. Such uncontrollable changes might be of greater concern to the Soviet Union and the United States, with their global interests and their stake in the present structure of the international system, than to a China whose expectations of advantage are much more clearly geared to instability.

III

It may be objected that an analysis so structured overestimates the rationality and predictability of the political process. The Chinese, for example, could not reasonably bank on U.S. responses in the direction of moderation. No Chinese planner could altogether dismiss the possibility that the United States might, instead, respond to these dangers by lashing out. Even more uncertain would be the consequences within the United States of any Sino-American nuclear exchange. Moscow could not safely adopt an expectation of American war-weariness, or even the opposite assumption, as a planning factor. There is some truth in this. There can be no guarantee that a particular response will be made, or even that the strategies of the contending parties will be

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determined by strictly rational categories. Nevertheless, it would be dangerous to dismiss three general considerations.

First, the Chinese could reasonably expect to achieve an effective and politically usable measure of deterrence against the United States even without adopting unduly high-risk policies. Peking would be on safe ground in assuming that the United States was most unlikely to react offensively against the mere creation of a Chinese threat capability. Beyond that, the historical evidence is persuasive: the major thrust of U.S. policy in nuclear matters over the last twenty years has been not only to try to make irrationality less effective, but to ensure that nuclear weapons are not used at all. The U.S. reaction to the Soviet Union's acquisition of nuclear weapons and in various Berlin crises, the self-imposed limitations in Korea, Viet Nam and Cuba, much of the logic of the strategy of flexible response — all these have been part of a continuing American disposition to avoid the use or immediate threat of nuclear weapons.[13] A lashing out in the absence of direct and massive attack would be uncharacteristic, and politically expensive as well. Indeed, if the Chinese leadership fails to come to some such conclusion about the United States, this is more apt to be because of its own ideological preconceptions about aggressive capitalism than because of the genuinely unpredictable elements in American policy formulation.

One other more tentative suggestion may be made. At the conclusion of every major conflict in this century, the American mood has been to seek a settlement that would permit a U.S. withdrawal and make a renewal of war unlikely or impossible. In no case, not even following the stalemate in Korea, was there a disposition to turn and rend others in unpredictable ways. The prospect is that the situation after Viet Nam will not be dissimilar. The Soviets might therefore be tempted to assume that a Sino-American exchange would be followed, in the absence of deliberate and direct provocation by them, by an American search for reconciliation and a machinery to ensure peace, rather than any fresh confrontation.[14]

[13]The point here is not that American restraint has been mistaken, but that restraint, like other forms of behavior, carries certain consequences. The idea that a tradition of the non-use of nuclear weapons increases the opponent's freedom of maneuver has been much discussed. For a notable contribution, see Bernard Brodie, *Escalation and the Nuclear Option* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

[14]The conjecture is only marginal. A Sino-American clash would create a novel situation if it resulted in major physical damage to the continental United States. No other war in this century has done so. The subsequent American mood might therefore contain new elements.

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Second, there are some significant uncertainties about China's probable willingness to accept risks. The point must be stated with care. It has been frequently noted that China's military policies, as distinct from her verbal declarations, have been marked by considerable caution. There is little reason to suppose that Peking fails to understand the consequences of nuclear war. It has taken care to avoid provoking a U.S. strike. China's preferred strategies have been low-risk ones and her attitude to nuclear war has been predominantly defensive.[15] Nevertheless, a number of questions remain. To say that China prefers low risks is not to say that she will always refuse to take high ones, especially in situations where Peking believes major Chinese interests are involved, as in Korea in 1950. Moreover, additional uncertainties arise from the fact that we know comparatively little about China's criteria for assessing such risks. It may be inadequate to assume that her assessments would necessarily be the same as Washington's, or to suppose that her estimate of the risks she could sensibly assume in a particular situation, or of the losses she could reasonably incur, would always be the same as American estimates. There is also some likelihood that past Chinese caution has been in part the product of American containment. If so, the question arises how far China's acquisition of a strike capability against the United States, and any amendment to American containment policies, may change that Chinese disposition to caution.

Third, and in many ways most importantly, the central strand of the suggested Chinese strategy would in any case be an attack not upon American forces or American people, but upon American morale, and an effort to influence the expectations of others as to likely changes in that morale. Such an attack, if made, cannot be countered by mere superiority of weaponry and certainty of retaliatory damage. Though the details of China's future nuclear strategy cannot be predicted, it may be pertinent to see in these suggestions some distinct compatibilities with Maoist strategic doctrine. The essence of this is how to make political gains from a position of military inferiority. The emphasis on ways in which a weaker force can defeat or disrupt a stronger force, and especially on morale factors — both the maintenance of one's own and the undermining of one's enemy's — is part of standard Maoist

[15]Hsieh, *Communist China's Military Policies . . . , passim.* See also Lin Piao's call to the Chinese to prepare to meet nuclear war launched by others in his report to the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China, *Peking Review*, April 30, 1969.

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operational doctrines. In this limited sense the considerations here merely transfer to the nuclear field some of the recognized principles of revolutionary warfare.

IV

Four principal methods are available to deal with such tactics. One, clearly, is to do nothing. Various arguments might be advanced in favor of this. It can be said that the dangers are too oblique and uncertain to be worth worrying about. This seems a hazardous course. Or it might be said that China cannot throw serious doubt on the overwhelming power of American deterrence and that for all reasonable purposes this deterrence is enough. The difficulty here is that a combination of assured American vulnerability[16] and the necessary hair-trigger reaction posture toward China may not give to other nations the same confidence it does to its American proponents. Or it may be argued that the more the United States stresses nuclear dangers from China, the more China will be upgraded in Asian eyes. Yet other Asians' assessments of China are likely to be their own rather than mere copies of an American view. Nor will these assessments be made more reassuring by an American refusal to look at a threat if one exists.

If it is accepted that the United States cannot seek a solution through inaction, three other approaches may be feasible. The first would obviously be to seek a general political understanding with China of a kind that would devalue, and perhaps one day eliminate, the fears which must underlie a Chinese policy of deterrence. For the long term, this may be the only objective likely to rally serious support within the United States. The vision of an eventual reconciliation is powerful and morally persuasive. None of America's positive aims is furthered by the prospective deaths of several million Chinese or Russians. For the Soviets, too, genuine reconciliation with China would offer major attractions.

Nevertheless, the practical difficulties remain. The Maoist segments of Chinese opinion believe in a revolutionary posture which predetermines hostility to both the United States and the Soviet Union. China's presently dominant perception of the requirements of her revolution, as of her place in the world, implies

[16]The phrase has been used by, among others, Donald G. Brennan, "The Case for Missile Defense," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1969, pp. 433-448.

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a belief in revolutionary struggle as a verity in its own right.[17] Any abandonment of this struggle in favor of accommodation with either capitalists or revisionists would constitute an intolerable betrayal of the Chinese revolutionary state. Hostility toward America and the USSR is confirmed by a number of other considerations, ranging from U.S. support for the Taiwan regime, the war in Viet Nam and border conflicts with the Soviets in Siberia, to the consciousness of a century of foreign intrusion in China. It may well be that these attitudes are not all-pervasive. It is also quite possible that they will soften in time. But the timing and direction of any decline from these extreme positions is uncertain, and in the meantime all Chinese official attitudes toward the outside world — whether designed by Maoists or by others — are likely to be formulated in terms compatible with them. The Maoist core of these views is unlikely to be susceptible to major modification by anything the USSR or America can do. On the contrary. Attempts by American capitalists or Soviet revisionists to promote politically significant understandings are almost certain to be interpreted as efforts to encourage revisionism within China. Peking's reply to such counterrevolutionary subversion could only be redoubled vigilance and struggle. It follows that, while negotiations on minor matters, and mutually beneficial bargains, are always possible, a major initiative to secure a rapprochement risks being viewed as a hostile act and therefore could be directly counterproductive.

Genuine progress toward a political understanding, whether with China's present leaders or with their currently unknown successors, will surely take a long time. If the estimates about the appearance of a Chinese ICBM force by 1975 are correct, what happens in the interim?

The second possibility would be the announcement of a first-strike strategy designed to convince Peking — and third parties — that China would in the event be unable to get her missiles off their pads before they were hit by a pre-emptive strike. The length of time needed to ready for launching what will probably be unhardened and liquid-fueled missiles may make this possible. But important difficulties remain. Such a declaration would imply a shift of American purposes away from reliance on a second-strike retaliatory policy. The Soviets might well find this alarming. A

[17]See an interesting discussion of these matters in Robert Jay Lifton's *Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1968).

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Soviet disposition to move toward forms of capability or deployment which might indicate the desire for a first-strike option would arouse similar alarm in the United States.[18] Such mutual alarm would have grave consequences for the Soviet-American relationship, not to mention possible arms limitation agreements. Beyond that, there remain the well-known general objections that any first-strike posture is inherently incompatible with deterrent stability; that it accentuates the dangers of constant tension, accident or miscalculation. These dangers could easily become greater than those against which the posture was designed to guard.

Furthermore, the mere adoption of such a position would involve enormous political costs. Open American preparations to threaten a nuclear strike against a poor Asian nation, in circumstances where the need for action could not be proved beforehand in the court of public opinion (as President Kennedy was able to do in the Cuban missile crisis), would be certain to arouse the strongest opposition. The Soviet Union, too, would find the costs of such a policy toward another socialist country extremely heavy. It is far from certain that the strategy would be politically practicable in either case.

Finally, such a posture would be incompatible with the notion of reconciliation with China, even as a long-term aim. Its adoption could only make existing hatreds more enduring and be taken by China as proof of the worst that Maoists had ever said about American wickedness or Soviet treachery. In all, while a declaration of U.S. willingness to adopt a first-strike policy might have to serve as a measure of last resort, every effort should be made, and be seen by others to be made, to avoid it.

There remains the possibility of active defense. Most importantly, this should mean a system designed to hold damage and casualties from a Chinese strike to some very low figure. Proposals for such a system, called Sentinel, were advanced by the Johnson Administration. President Nixon has adopted a revised version, named Safeguard. Secretary Laird has stressed that, apart from its other roles, Safeguard would give the same degree of area cover against a Chinese threat through the 1970's as Sentinel would have

[18]Secretary Laird has repeatedly emphasized his belief that the Soviets are in the process of developing a first-strike option. Others have expressed serious doubt about whether such alarm is justified. There appears to be some dispute within the intelligence community as to the Soviet Union's precise intentions. See, for instance, the *New York Times*, June 9 and 18, 1969.

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done.[19] Laird, former Secretary Clifford and some of their senior officials have all at various times suggested that Sentinel and Safeguard would provide close to a damage-denial capability against China for this period.[20] It seems likely, furthermore, that once deployment of the system has begun, the lead-time for the extension of area cover will for some time remain less than the lead-time for significant refinements or additions to the Chinese strike force.[21] If this capability can indeed be achieved, the advantages would be substantial. It would deprive the Chinese force of that part of its rationale which sought deterrence of the United States, and the Chinese leadership of an important tool for destabilizing the Soviet-American nuclear balance. It would do so in ways which were visibly nonaggressive toward China and to that extent politically acceptable within America and reassuring to her allies.[22]

Though any U.S. measure to fend off a Chinese threat would cause frustration in Peking, an American ABM system would be less alarming than, say, a first-strike posture. Indeed, it would be evidence that America could afford not to act pre-emptively against China in a variety of situations. Yet its existence would reassure other nations, especially in Asia, that the United States would not be deterred from supporting them against China. It would not guarantee U.S. support. But if such support were withheld, the decision reached in Washington would evidently not be due to Chinese deterrence. An ABM defense system, so conceived, would therefore powerfully support current efforts to inhibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons: it would reassure allies

[19] *Senate ABM Hearings,* pp. 178-182.

[20] Laird, *House ABM Hearings,* pp. 17, 28; Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, *Senate ABM Hearings,* p. 262; *Clifford Statement,* pp. 54-55; former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, *Scope, Magnitude and Implications of the U.S. Antiballistic Missile Program, Hearings* before the Subcommittee on Military Applications of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 90th Congress, 1st Session, November 6-7, 1967, p. 2; the Defense Department's Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Dr. John Foster, *Hearings on the Department of Defense Appropriations for 1969* before a Subcommittee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, Part II, April 24, 1968, p. 455. See also the interview with Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, *Life,* September 29, 1967; and Laird, *Nonproliferation Treaty Hearings, op. cit.,* p. 391. Even one of Safeguard's more prominent opponents, Dr. Hans A. Bethe, has conceded that unless the Chinese succeeded in developing adequate penetration aids, the system would protect American cities against a first-generation Chinese attack. *Senate ABM Hearings,* p. 38.

[21] This is a controversial assertion, for the opposite has been strongly urged. For a brief discussion, see below.

[22] The suggestion here is not that a technical distinction between aggressive and defensive weaponry is possible. It is rather that public opinion will probably perceive an area defense capability as essentially defensive with respect to China, and judge it accordingly.

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that they did not need nuclear weapons of their own, and persuade others that nuclear weapons in the hands of secondary powers did not necessarily confer political leverage against the United States.[23] Such a defense would also be able to absorb an accidental or demonstration shot, whether from China or the Soviet Union, as well as one fired following some breakdown in command or discipline. To that extent, the system would reinforce deterrent stability.

In addition, Safeguard's light area cover capability (quite apart from the Minuteman protection which is the system's prime task) would complicate Soviet targeting against the United States. It would therefore compound for the USSR the difficulties of achieving a first-strike capability, without significantly degrading the Soviet second-strike capability against U.S. cities. Deployment of Safeguard would permit the consolidation and checking out of the system as a whole, opening the way to further technical and engineering developments. Production lines established in constructing it would shorten the lead-time for any subsequent elaborations of the system, whether qualitative or quantitative, against China or the Soviet Union. The process of deployment would give the United States essential operational experience for the deployment of any kind of ABM system. It would also train key operating personnel.

Obviously, to abandon the program after the Administration had committed itself to it would incur penalties. Outright unilateral abandonment of existing ABM proposals would signify a serious weakening of the United States and the relinquishment of a major diplomatic and military prize to the Soviets and Chinese. What is therefore more commonly proposed is that deployment should be held up pending arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. In the words of Dr. Carl Kaysen: "The future capacity to deploy, and perhaps to deploy a better conceived and developed system, is all the bargaining card we need."[24] But here, too, there are difficulties. A decision to suspend would lead to the dispersal of at least some of the technical and scientific teams engaged on Safeguard. Deputy Defense Secretary Packard has estimated that suspension now would cause a delay of two to three years in deployment.[25] In such a case, an initial Chinese ICBM

[23]President Nixon's statement of March 14, 1969, *New York Times*, March 15, 1969, p. 16; Laird, *House ABM Hearings*, p. 31; McNamara's interview in *Life*, *passim*.

[24]*Senate ABM Hearings*, p. 139.

[25]*Ibid.*, pp. 198, 276.

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force could become operational well before the revived Safeguard did.

Moreover, if a resumption of work on Safeguard was made to depend on the failure of arms limitation talks with the Soviets, this would amount to an invitation to Moscow to spin out unproductive talks. The United States might then find it difficult either to resume deployment or to break off talks without laying itself open to the accusation that it was sabotaging the last hopes for arms control. And though ABM proposals have aroused strong opposition, any U.S. administration which now rejected them might make itself dangerously vulnerable later on to charges that it had opted against the means of saving ten to twenty million American lives in a war whose avoidance could not be guaranteed. Finally, on Safeguard President Nixon has taken what has been publicized as the first major command decision of his period of office. Backing down could easily incur political penalties that would weaken his ability to conduct an effective foreign policy for some time to come.

It is important to note that many if not most of these strategic and political reasons for mounting an anti-Chinese area cover ABM system are equally valid for the Soviet leadership. Presumably, the Soviets have still another and compelling motive. They may well feel that their deterrence of a Chinese move outward from Sinkiang, in Mongolia, or against the Soviet maritime provinces, depends crucially on their ability to protect Moscow against a Chinese strike. Given the situation in Central Asia, the Soviet Union is likely to insist on maintaining its deterrent superiority in this respect. Washington has taken care to emphasize that the existing Soviet ABM deployment includes a specific anti-Chinese capability; that Moscow would scarcely agree to an elimination of its systems; that advanced Soviet ABM's, including some with a loiter capability, have been tested; and that deployment of such advanced systems is almost sure to go forward.[26] These Soviet attitudes will obviously narrow the scope of any ABM limitation agreement with the United States.

V

Four kinds of objections have been raised against this sort of reasoning: an ABM system would not work; it would be too expensive; it would be incompatible with other American obliga-

[26]President Nixon, *New York Times*, March 15, 1969, p. 16; Laird, *House ABM Hearings*, pp. 54, 55, 61, 88.

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tions, notably those under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); and it would trigger a fresh arms race with the Soviets, causing a net decrease in the security of all concerned as well as negating arms control efforts. The first three of these objections can be dealt with comparatively briefly.

It has been argued that a weapons system as complex as ABM, which cannot be fully tested in peacetime, would prove a complete failure in practice. The Chinese could and would equip their missile force with penetration aids to negate Safeguard. The system could be cheaply overwhelmed and would have to operate with an improbably high degree of efficiency if it was to hold casualties down to an insignificant level.[27] In addition, the Chinese would achieve a credible threat against the United States with a system giving merely low or medium confidence in penetration. But there is, in fact, considerable doubt whether the more far-reaching technical objections to Safeguard are justified.[28]

If they are not, the argument revolves around two issues. First, the speed with which China can be expected to develop penetration aids and other sophisticated equipment. My own view is that she probably cannot develop adequate penetration aids by the mid-1970's or perhaps even somewhat later. To do so would require not merely advanced missile and warhead technologies but, for example, the construction of radar systems comparable to those deployed in Safeguard and against which penetration aids could be tested. There seems to be no published evidence that China is within easy reach of such capabilities.[29] Nor is there evidence for supposing that a Chinese ICBM system operational by 1975-1980 will have an intrinsic reliability superior to that of a then operational U.S. ABM system.

[27]See, for example, Richard L. Garwin and Hans A. Bethe, "Anti-Ballistic Missile System," *Scientific American,* March 1968, pp. 21-31; George W. Rathjens, *The Future of the Strategic Arms Race: Options for the 1970's* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1969), especially the Appendix, pp. 41-44; Abram Chayes and Jerome B. Wiesner, editors, *ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Antiballistic Missile System* (New York: Signet Books, 1969), especially the chapters by Steven Weinberg, Leonard S. Rodberg and Hans A. Bethe; and *Senate ABM Hearings,* especially the testimony of Dr. Herbert York, p. 76 *et seq.*, Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky, p. 326 *et seq.*, and Dr. Rathjens, p. 356 *et seq.*

[28]For technical criticisms of the objections raised to Safeguard, see notably the testimony of Dr. Albert Wohlstetter before the Senate Armed Services Committee of April 23 and May 23, 1969, *Congressional Record,* Senate, May 1, 1969, pp. S4371-4373, and May 27, 1969, pp. S5732-5735. Also Laird, *House ABM Hearings, passim;* Packard, *Senate ABM Hearings, passim;* and Dr. Donald G. Brennan, *Senate ABM Hearings,* p. 348 *et seq.*

[29]For a different view, see Dr. Bethe, *Senate ABM Hearings,* pp. 35-41, and *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* May 1969, pp. 41-44; also Dr. Rathjens, *Senate ABM Hearings,* p. 356.

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Second, there is the degree of confidence in her own penetration capabilities which China would need to operate a strategy of the kind outlined here. In my view such a strategy would crucially depend on Peking's ability to prevent the United States from achieving damage denial against a Chinese strike. Given the small number of launchers of a first-generation Chinese force, this would require high confidence penetrability.[30] The point is not that Safeguard, or Safeguard-plus, is invulnerable, or that the Chinese cannot devise penetration aids, or that Safeguard is certain to function with impeccable efficiency. It is merely that the creation of an operational Chinese ICBM capability is likely to lag behind America's ability to deploy systems capable of coping, with a high degree of confidence, with any Chinese systems actually operational at the time. If, in order to ensure penetration of America's 1975 ABM system, China needs equipment which will not be operational before 1980, then ABM will "work."

With respect to costs, two issues are involved: First, the cost of an ABM defense as against the cost of penetrating it—the so-called cost-exchange ratio. Second, the justification or otherwise of the total systems cost considered as part of the U.S. defense budget and part of overall national resource allocation. The initial estimates for deploying the entire Safeguard system are from $6.6 to 7.1 billion, $2.1 billion being for Stage I. Together with these Department of Defense costs, $1.2 billion is to be spent by the Atomic Energy Commission for its part of the project.[31] These estimates may very well prove to be too low. Inflation alone will add substantially to the bill. So will technological changes and modifications made necessary both by further research in the United States and changes in the configuration of the threat against which the defense is aimed.[32] An eventual DOD cost for a system such as that presently proposed may be around $10 to 13

[30]For one differing view, see Dr. J. P. Ruina, *Senate ABM Hearings*, p. 33. It has also been suggested that, even if Chinese missiles were destroyed, Chinese submarines could fire retaliatory shorter-range missiles from close to the U.S. coast. This does not appear to be a serious problem. China has only one or two submarines capable of firing such missiles, and it is quite unlikely that, following an outbreak of hostilities, such boats would succeed in getting into a firing position off the U.S. coast.

[31]Packard, *Senate ABM Hearings*, pp. 292-295; Laird, *House ABM Hearings*, pp. 80, 81.

[32]There have been suggestions that Safeguard, like some other weapons systems, may come to cost several hundred per cent more than its original estimates. But apart from all other considerations, the Safeguard budget, unlike that for these other systems, includes land acquisition and building costs which can hardly go up by figures of that order.

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billion. If these figures, and some of the official estimates about system reliability, are reasonable, then there are grounds for considerable skepticism about the more pessimistic estimates on cost-exchange ratios.[33] It seems probable that at least in the face of an attack from a first-generation Chinese force, the cost-exchange ratio would be near unity. In some circumstances it might even be somewhat better.[34] But even if the ratio were two or three to one in favor of China, there would be strong political grounds for regarding the cost of defense as justified.

The second issue, whether the United States can afford expenditures of this order in view of competing claims for funds, is essentially a matter for broad political and social judgment. But it is worth noting that the costs projected here (themselves nearly double the official estimate) are between 12 and 14 per cent of the FY 1970 defense budget alone, though Safeguard costs would of course be spread over several years. Or, in different terms, the United States spent some $46 billion on its strategic forces (excluding R & D) in the six years from FY 1965 to FY 1970.[35] The Safeguard costs suggested here would mean spending between 21 and 26 per cent of that six-year investment to maintain the viability of the system in new circumstances. Again in different terms, the official estimates for Safeguard amount, in total, to only about three months' expenditure on the Viet Nam war.

In any case, while reasonable men may differ about what fraction of the national income should be spent on defense as a whole, it is much more difficult to justify an argument centered on one particular weapons system as part of national expenditure. The tendency here is to downgrade the proper measure of judgment, which should relate to a balanced defense posture within given budgetary limitations. Finally, it has been said that once an ABM system is built at all, it will mushroom in extravagant fashion. The problem of installing an arms system, however, is not the same as that of keeping it limited once it is installed. It is difficult to believe that the second problem need be insoluble.

Objections have also been raised that Safeguard is incompatible with that part of the Nonproliferation Treaty (Article VI) which calls on the great powers to seek negotiations on ef-

[33]See, for example, Steven Weinberg, in Chayes and Wiesner, editors, *ABM. . . , op. cit.*, especially pp. 86-93.

[34]See Brennan, "The Case for Missile Defense," *op. cit.*, pp. 435-436. See also a discussion between Dr. Panofsky and Dr. Brennan, *Senate ABM Hearings*, pp. 372-374.

[35]*Clifford Statement*, Table I, p. 157.

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fective measures to end the arms race. But that is a general measure of arms control. It would be difficult to construe the obligation in terms which compel the abandonment of any particular weapons system. Moreover, the treaty does not stand by itself. It must be read in conjunction with the proposals about great-power guarantees to nonnuclear powers which agree to remain nonnuclear. These smaller nonnuclear states therefore face a choice. They can assent to American measures that would make the maintenance of a U.S. nuclear guarantee against China more credible. Or else they can interpret the American obligation to pursue disarmament not only in the general sense in which it is spelled out in the treaty, but in terms of a need to avoid this particular system. They cannot have it both ways, though they will doubtless try.

As against this consideration, it is sometimes claimed that an American ABM system would be interpreted by Asians as a sign that the United States was isolating herself and withdrawing from Asian affairs.[36] Such an interpretation cannot hold. Its corollary would be that the fact of vulnerability would cause America to engage herself in Asia. This seems most unlikely. Decisions as to when, where and how far to engage the United States in Asia will presumably continue to be taken for a complex of reasons including formal American obligations, perceptions of American interest, and the willingness of Americans to support particular policies at particular costs. If these emerging decisions reflect decreased American interest in Asia, they are apt to be confirmed rather than reversed by any increase in U.S. vulnerability to a Chinese nuclear strike. Thus the real issue is whether a U.S. engagement is likely to prove more feasible, politically and otherwise, in circumstances where continental America is relatively secure or where it is insecure. The advantages of security seem evident.

VI

In many ways the most important criticism is that the installation of an ABM system would trigger a fresh round of the arms race with the Soviets. There are grounds for supposing that the Soviet Union in any case feels that it is in a period of increasing dangers. Moscow sees itself reacting in an essentially defensive way against a forward, not to say aggressive, American

[36]See, for example, Mason Willrich, "ABM and Non-Proliferation," in Chayes and Wiesner, editors, *ABM. . . , op. cit.,* pp. 203-204.

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foreign policy. The hypothesis of forward U.S. ambitions is supported, in Moscow's view, by a series of events from Viet Nam to U.S. support for Israel. The policy of détente in Europe has been to the USSR's disadvantage. The German policy of openings to the East has been seen as a policy of peaceful penetration by Western and pro-American political influences, likely to undermine both the cohesion and the pro-Soviet attitudes of the East European nations. Soviet sensitivity to these dangers, at home and in the West, must be increased by growing difficulties with China in Asia and in the communist world at large. Soviet reactions have included not merely the move into Czechoslovakia, but increasing conservatism and upgrading of police activity against dissent at home.

What, in this situation, would be the Soviet response to a U.S. ABM system? Safeguard would not be an adequate defense against a heavy Soviet strike. Nevertheless, it is argued, the Soviets would be compelled to react on the assumption that the system might operate with high efficiency. They would also have to treat any light screen as a potential building block in the construction of a heavy system. Their response would probably include increases in both numbers and penetrability of Soviet warheads targeted on the United States. Such increases would be perceived by the United States as endangering maintenance of the U.S. assured destruction capability against the USSR, and therefore as requiring a further counter. At the end of this action-reaction process both sides would, at great expense, merely re-establish the existing balance between them, possibly with some diminution to their real security.

Nor does ABM stand alone as a potential threat. The United States is also far along the road to introducing Multiple Individually Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV's), beginning with the Poseidon and Minuteman III programs. With each U.S. launcher carrying several warheads — figures over ten have been mentioned — the number of warheads U.S. ICBM's and submarine-launched missiles (SLBM's) could deliver against an opponent would multiply by as much as six.[37] From Moscow's point of view, this would raise the specter of a successful American first strike. The Soviets' reaction would include further increases in their ICBM and SLBM deployments and the accelerated development of a MIRV of their own. This would cause important

[37]Not all launchers are to be MIRVed, and not all of those MIRVed will have the maximum number of warheads.

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changes in the ratio of deliverable Soviet warheads to American land-based launchers, which would in turn be interpreted in Washington as a dangerous degrading of America's assured destruction capability.

The danger of destabilization would be greatest if the development of both systems were to proceed simultaneously. For the Soviets would then face the possibility that while MIRV had given the United States a substantial pre-emptive strike capability against Soviet land-based ICBM's, the U.S. ABM and air defense systems could give Washington confidence in the absorption of the retaliatory blow by any remaining Soviet SLBM's and aircraft. The American calculation, as seen by Moscow, could be that damage suffered in such an exchange would be much less than that suffered by permitting the opponent to strike first. This would be a powerful incentive to launch an American first strike in time of crisis.

Some aspects of this argument are overstated. In particular, Soviet leaders appear to be much more relaxed about defensive systems in general than ABM critics suppose. The Soviet Prime Minister, Alexei Kosygin, is on record in this sense.[38] One of the USSR's leading military writers explained some years ago that "the creation of an effective anti-missile system enables the state to make its defenses dependent chiefly on its own possibilities, and not on mutual deterrence, that is, on the good will of the other side."[39] There has been no serious criticism by the Soviet government or press of the decision to deploy Safeguard. Since the U.S. ABM debate has gone on for so long, it would be highly unusual for any Soviet response not to be already in train.

In at least one respect, moreover, far from contradicting arms limitation talks, a U.S. ABM deployment will probably encourage them. For if the Soviets wish to obtain an assurance that Safeguard will not become a "thick" system, this is unlikely to be available outside the forthcoming arms limitation discussions with the United States. In fact, the Soviet agreement to engage in such talks was originally given some days after the U.S. Senate voted funds for the Sentinel system. In general, the Soviet attitude seems to be imitative of U.S. practice, rather than reactive, and much more defensively minded than some American arguments have claimed.

[38]See Kosygin's London news conference reported in the *Times*, February 10, 1967.

[39]N. Talenski, "Anti-Missile Systems and Disarmament," *International Affairs* (Moscow), October 1964, p. 18.

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A U.S. decision not to deploy ABM could easily cause important difficulties. Principally, it would require the acquisition of many more deliverable warheads, presumably through MIRV, to compensate for force increments on the other side. It might also, at some point, compel the adoption of a fire-on-warning strategy, with all its manifest tensions and dangers of error or miscalculation. At the same time the Soviets would be bound to regard such an American offensive buildup as a much greater threat to their assured destruction capability against the United States than Safeguard would be.[40] Altogether, the Soviets are much more apt to be worried about MIRV than about Safeguard. The way in which the U.S. public debate has concentrated on ABM's may well be regarded by Moscow as a crude attempt to divert attention from the much more important area of MIRV's. Similarly, the Soviets are likely to suspect that American arguments about parity or "sufficiency" in missiles merely disguise a resolve, while accepting approximate parity in land-based launchers, to move back to massive superiority under the more realistic heading of deliverable warheads.

But a U.S. abandonment of MIRV's would also face important difficulties. There is as yet no evidence for supposing that, in the absence of an arms limitation agreement, the Soviets would be willing to accept any particular force level as a desirable upper limit for their offensive forces. An American MIRV abandonment would therefore probably lead to much more compelling demands for substantial U.S. ABM protection against real or even fancied force increments by the other side. Even MIRV limitation is most likely to depend on the presence of an ABM system capable of devaluing the consequences of any evasion of a limitation agreement. And unless MIRV abandonment, or unilateral limitation, was coupled with an increase in launchers, the U.S. retaliatory capacity might at some point become vulnerable to Soviet force increases, let alone to a Chinese strategy such as that outlined above. Finally, there is no way, short of a fairly detailed arms limitation agreement including some inspection provisions, in which the Soviets could be assured that America had indeed abandoned MIRV's. Unilateral verification, even of MIRV flight testing, is probably not possible.

On the other hand, the two sides do have common interests.

[40]This judgment would, of course, depend on their assessment of the combination of yield and accuracy that U.S. MIRV's or other re-entry vehicles were able to achieve.

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Each has an interest in convincing the other that its aims are both limited and nonprovocative. Each has an interest in avoiding actions that push the other in the direction of destabilizing forms of arms escalation. Each has an interest in preventing third parties, especially China, from using the disagreements between the United States and the USSR for their own benefit. Each must therefore wish to avoid any rigid arms limitations that might make the bilateral nuclear balance vulnerable to a third party. In consequence, the maintenance or restoration of a Soviet-American balance at a higher level of armaments, in a way which insulates that balance from destabilizing activities by a smaller nuclear power, might produce benefits of great value.

One additional consideration deserves mention. The need for each superpower to deter the other as well as China requires the maintenance of some particular assured destruction capability against *both*. Given the primarily rural character of Chinese society and the limited number of deliverable warheads of which each major power disposes, both the United States and the USSR may feel compelled to add to their stock of warheads in order to maintain this higher level of assured destruction.[41] If this is so, an assured destruction capability against two opponents might come to look like a try for a first-strike capability against one of them. Unless, therefore, there is some major reassessment of the entire assured destruction concept, the acquisition of some ABM defenses by both major powers may be the only way to reassure themselves that the other side's increment of offensive warheads does not, in fact, confer a first-strike capability upon it.

VII

In this situation, what U.S. action or response can combine the needs of America's alliance systems, the need to maintain the strategic balance against the Soviet Union, and the wish to counter looming difficulties from China, with the avoidance of an uncontrolled, open-ended and intolerably expensive arms race? Solutions will scarcely be found outside detailed and technical SALT (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks) negotiations – perhaps, if one is pessimistic, not even there. It may be possible to agree on ABM systems for *both* the United States and the USSR which provide a shield for each against China and each other's arms increments

[41]Secretary Laird has made some comments bearing on this point. *House ABM Hearings*, pp. 15-16, 60.

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without imposing crippling domestic costs, and yet are sufficiently limited to avoid endangering each other's retaliatory capability.[42] The matter of MIRV's is more complex, if only because it will be difficult to give either side assurance that the other is actually observing any restrictions, agreed or unilateral, formal or tacit, upon either testing or deployment. Neither agreed nor unilateral testing moratoria are therefore likely to work.

What may be possible is a tacit agreement to space out the testing program of each side, together with some technical actions that allow, or at any rate do not prevent each side from, monitoring the other's tests. This should buy time for more detailed discussions, as part of the SALT talks, which may be able to devise more adequate limitations. Perhaps these could be based on a combination of electronic and optical monitoring (with neither side jamming the other's monitors), and agreed limitations upon numbers of launchers, as well as their throw-weight and general configuration.[43] (One would also urge both sides to put increased efforts into developing nonnuclear ABM systems. There have been alarming reports that the long-term fallout effects from nuclear detonations may be much more serious than had been thought.) [44]

Such an approach may be in tune with the new formulation of "assured destruction," which rests on proportion — the proportion between the number of the opponent's *warheads* which can be expected to penetrate one's ABM screen in a sudden first strike, and the number of one's own *launchers* required to survive such a strike to ensure that enough warheads are sent in reply to guarantee sufficient penetration to inflict the desired degree of destruction. The problem, obviously, is how to assure each side that the other's development, whether of ABM's or of offensive warheads, will remain limited.

At this time, no fully workable solution seems to be in sight and it is not clear that any particular probe will be successful. The United States will have to carry its allies with it, including those whose own nuclear forces would be devalued by the parallel

[42]This has been variously suggested. For example, Laird, *Senate ABM Hearings*, p. 182.

[43]One published indication of the possibilities for verification which may be open without on-site inspection has been given by former Air Force Secretary Harold Brown, "Security through Limitations," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1969, pp. 429-430.

[44]See E. Sternglass, "Infant Mortality and Nuclear Tests," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, April 1969, pp. 18-20, and a comment by Freeman Dyson in *ibid.*, June 1969, p. 27.

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development of Soviet and U.S. armaments. The Soviets would not wish to furnish open proof of Chinese charges that Moscow was "ganging up" with imperialist America against socialist China. But the greater dangers for the United States surely lie in trying to cut off arms developments arbitrarily, in the absence of a clear and verifiable agreement with the USSR.

Even if such approaches are adopted, however, they are no substitute for attempting to establish lines of communication and mutually understood signaling arrangements with China leading, eventually, to some modus vivendi. On the contrary. Long-term stability must imply at least the ability to understand each other's language, intentions and modes of behavior. There are two considerations here. First, even if ABM's suffice against a first-generation Chinese strategic force, it is not certain that damage denial can be maintained against Chinese penetration aids and other capabilities after, say, 1985. It may, indeed, be possible for ABM developments to stay ahead of a Chinese offense. And in the still longer term new technologies, such as lasers, may supersede the whole nuclear missile concept as we have known it. But if this should not happen, and U.S. defenses do become vulnerable to a Chinese strike in ten to fifteen years, the ABM may have done no more, but also no less, than to provide the time needed to replace the concept of a bipolar balance with a tripolar one. What this will look like in practice cannot now be predicted. If the three powers remain mutually hostile, and if at the same time they develop flexible and well-understood communications arrangements between them, the situation might even become quite stable.

The second and more basic consideration is that the arms balance must, after all, remain subordinate to the accepted long-term aim of reconciliation. A nuclear balance may provide a safeguard on the way, but cannot be a substitute for that eventual political solution. Arms are good servants, but poor masters. Both the shorter- and the longer-term aims, of stability or genuine coexistence, therefore, presuppose a degree of understanding on nuclear matters between Peking and the other two capitals which is comparable at least to that which now obtains between Washington and Moscow. Clearly this does not yet exist. To bring China into the international debate on politics and strategy, including ways of communicating intentions reliably to opponents, is a matter of considerable urgency.

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DETERRENCE AND STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY*

by Brent Scowcroft

THERE are signs of considerable uneasiness among some groups in the United States over the character and future evolution of military relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union. One manifestation of this concern is an increasing reference to the concept of strategic superiority.

While the term is not new, its recent popularity appears related to fears of the possibility of adverse changes in the dynamic strategic balance between the two superpowers. Thus those who employ it, whether they be within the Department of Defense, the Congress, or the community of defense intellectuals, are unanimous in believing that strategic superiority has definite positive value for the United States and that it must be maintained with respect to the Soviet Union, or the Soviet Union in conjunction with any or all other communist states. There also seems to be general agreement on the importance of strategic superiority to the policy of deterrence. Most users of the term appear to feel that strategic superiority is the indispensable ingredient in deterrence of the USSR. This article will explore some of the apparent attributes of strategic superiority and examine the relationship between strategic superiority and deterrence.

I

In analyzing the concept of strategic superiority it is necessary to establish what portion of national power is customarily included within its frame of reference. There is unfortunately no unanimity on this point, and the abstract sense in which the term is normally employed does not facilitate precise analysis. One writer, for example, defines strategic superiority broadly as being "a condition in which we have a significant overall superiority in the vital elements of our strength over our principal adversaries. . . ."[1] He includes in these "vital elements" such nonmilitary factors as

*The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other department or agency of the U.S. government.

[1]Henry C. Huglin, "Our Strategic Superiority — Why We Must Continue to Have It," *Air University Review*, September 1967, p. 43.

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economic strength and education. After defining strategic superiority in this fashion, which suggests that it embraces most, if not all, of the elements of national power, he goes on to employ the term, at times in this broad sense, in other contexts as meaning military superiority and, in the operative portion of his analysis, as relating specifically and solely to strategic offensive and defensive forces.[2]

The broad concept of strategic superiority that includes non-military factors already is described by the term "strategic advantage." Since this phrase appears in the *Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage*[3] and the definition is not the subject of any particular controversy or confusion, there seems little point in coining a new phrase to convey the same idea. Similarly, the term "military superiority" adequately describes the comparative relationship between the total military forces of two powers.

There remains the context in which strategic superiority is most frequently employed and the usage for which there does not already exist an adequately descriptive phrase — the narrowest construction of the term. That is, strategic superiority refers to the comparative relationship of the strategic offensive and defensive forces (plus passive defense) of one power to those of another power. It is in this sense that the term will be employed here.

Described in this manner, strategic superiority appears as the positive goal for strategic military forces, essential to be maintained by the United States against what are commonly assumed to be strenuous Soviet efforts to achieve similar superiority for the USSR. The benefit its possession is assumed to confer is deterrence. This interpretation of strategic superiority was aptly summed up by General Bruce K. Holloway, Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command, when he declared that "We have deterred war by maintaining clearcut strategic superiority over the nuclear forces of any other nation. During much of that period [since 1949], deterrence rested exclusively or preponderantly on the bombers and missiles of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), supplemented now by the Navy's Polaris submarines."[4]

At this level of general abstraction, the import of strategic

[2]*Ibid.*, pp. 43, 45, 47-49.
[3]The Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage* (JCS Pub. 1) (Washington: GPO, 1966), p. 177.
[4]Speech before the 1967 Jaycees International Air Show Symposium, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 27, 1967. *Supplement to the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders*, No. 9-1967, September 1967, p. 7.

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superiority seems relatively clear. However, when one attempts to infuse it with specific form and content, the concept becomes clouded. While users of the term agree on the necessity for the United States to have strategic superiority, they experience considerable difficulty in defining precisely what this means, in measuring its components, laying out criteria to determine when it exists and when it is lost, and demonstrating persuasively the rewards of its possession and penalties of its absence.

In order to understand more fully the character and significance of strategic superiority in all its aspects, it is necessary to examine with care the nature of deterrence and the relationship between deterrence and strategic superiority.

II

The nature of deterrence is the key to any attempt to analyze strategic superiority. Advocates of strategic superiority customarily identify it as the vital ingredient in the deterrence of strategic nuclear war, and some feel that its deterrent influence extends considerably beyond this toward the lower end of the conflict spectrum.

It is difficult to improve, even today, on the penetrating analysis of the concept of deterrence made in 1956 by William Kaufmann.[5] Kaufmann identified the ingredients of deterrence as capability, cost and intentions. To be deterred, a potential aggressor must be convinced that (1) the United States has the capability to do what it threatens, (2) carrying out the threat would inflict costs on the aggressor which would exceed the value of his objectives, and (3) the United States would in fact act as announced. Yet, despite the precision implied by these criteria, deterrence is essentially a psychological phenomenon, not an exact science subject to mathematical analysis. Evidence regarding the existence of each of the elements of deterrence need not be complete for deterrence to be effective. Each element must be present in sufficient degree to raise grave doubts in the mind of the aggressor — how grave the doubts must be is again not susceptible of precise measurement. The actual existence of deterrence cannot be demonstrated in positive fashion in advance of a conflict. Deterrence can be measured only in a negative manner: should the conflict it was

[5]William W. Kaufmann, "The Requirements of Deterrence," in William W. Kaufmann, editor, *Military Policy and National Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956).

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supposed to prevent actually occur, it was then present to an insufficient degree.

Regardless of the imprecision with which the presence of deterrence can be ascertained, there is little argument over what makes it work. In the circumstances of the nuclear monopoly the United States enjoyed up to the period of the Korean conflict, the deterrent equation was a simple one. U.S. strategic capability and the consequent costs to the Soviet Union of its use were not at issue. The strategic superiority of U.S. forces was absolute, and no neat definition of the term was necessary. The pivotal element of the deterrent equation was intention, or the definition by the United States of the circumstances under which it would launch a strategic attack on the Soviet Union.

Many of our current attitudes regarding deterrence appear to stem from this early period of nuclear monopoly or near monopoly. Some of the fears about the current strategic balance seem to be primarily expressions of frustration at the passing of this golden era, and some current prescriptions appear aimed at its restoration, irrevocably changed circumstances notwithstanding.

Even during this early period, however, the experience of the United States with the concept of massive retaliation underscored the complexity of the psychology of deterrence and the indispensability of each of its elements. The existence of one or even two of the elements in abundance does not compensate for an inadequacy in the remaining element or elements. In the case of the concept of massive retaliation, announced in 1954, the existence of an unchallenged capacity to inflict unacceptable damage and receive little or no damage in return, coupled with the declaration by a high official of the intent to do so, did not automatically constitute deterrence. A U.S. intent to retaliate against the Soviet Union in the event of an aggression occurring, say, in Southeast Asia, simply was not believable.

This shortcoming of massive retaliation points up a crucial factor with respect to the elements of deterrence — they must be communicated to, and believed by, the potential aggressor. U.S. superiority in strategic forces and their ability to inflict unacceptable costs was obvious and had been communicated, but the intent to retaliate massively had also to be believed. And, insofar as deterrence is concerned, it was irrelevant whether or not the United States actually planned such retaliation. Enemy beliefs regarding intent are, apart from the conviction communicated by

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sincere intent or resolve, independent of an actual intent to carry out the threat.

In the period following the Korean War, as the Soviet Union began to acquire a substantial nuclear delivery capability, the character of the strategic nuclear relationship was altered. For example, in a surprise first strike, the Soviet Union would be able to inflict heavy, if not intolerable, damage on the United States. Deterrence of such an attack required an unmistakable U.S. capability to destroy the Soviet Union, even after receiving a first strike. In these particular circumstances, the U.S. intent to use its forces in retaliation was fully credible and the burden of credibility began to shift somewhat in the direction of the force capability factor.

At this stage, the United States still possessed a superiority sufficient to enable it, in a first strike of its own, to destroy enough of the Soviet strategic offensive forces to prevent devastation of the United States by a return Soviet attack. This first-strike capability was of great importance in maintaining the credibility of the U.S. commitment to NATO to defend Europe, if necessary, by a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. Without this first-strike, damage-limiting capability, the willingness of the United States to defend Europe at all costs would have become questionable and deterrence of a Soviet attack on Europe therefore less certain.

The beginning and the end of this particular phase of U.S.-Soviet strategic relationships is difficult to establish with accuracy. As the Soviet Union continued its missile-building program, however, the deterrent equation gradually was transformed once again. The increase in numbers and sophistication of Soviet missiles, together with hardening, dispersal and mobility, began to cast serious doubt on the first-strike capability of the United States to limit damage to itself satisfactorily. It is widely assumed that the United States has now lost this credible first-strike capacity and that the Soviet Union has the ability to wreak unacceptable damage upon the United States, even in a second-strike attack.

From this situation have arisen phrases such as "mutual deterrence," "nuclear parity," and "balance of terror." These expressions need not be construed as connoting literal parity or equality between the strategic forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. There is little question that the United States had, especially at the time they came into vogue, a demonstrable superiority over the Soviet Union in numbers and destructive

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potential of strategic weapons. What they actually signify is that there came to exist between the United States and the Soviet Union a state of functional parity — the deterrent equation assumed a character such that the effect, in this much more complex relationship, was that of a parity of forces in a more classic military relationship.

Seen in terms of Kaufmann's elements of deterrence, the United States still possessed an obvious capability to impose unacceptable costs on the Soviet Union, but the development of Soviet retaliatory forces had narrowed considerably the range of contingencies over which U.S. nuclear intentions were credible. The loss of the credible first-strike capability certainly destroyed whatever utility massive retaliation may still have possessed and created, as well, doubt in some minds that the United States would be willing to come to the strategic defense of Europe. The key element of the components of deterrence appears at this stage of relative force capability to have become a particular aspect of intention; that is, the objectives for which the United States would be willing to stake its survival. If the capability and cost elements of deterrence have become functionally equivalent between the United States and the Soviet Union, deterrence then hinges to a considerable degree on the valuation each side places, and communicates, on a particular objective in dispute. The significance of the issue or objective in establishing deterrence will be discussed in greater detail below.

It was at this phase in the evolution of the U.S.-Soviet deterrent equation that the terms "assured destruction" and "damage limitation" came to be employed, although the actual significance of damage limiting may have been greater during the previous stage when the United States possessed a credible first-strike capability. Assured destruction is customarily defined as the ability to destroy the social fabric of an opponent even after he has completed a well-planned and well-executed attack on one's homeland. This formulation represents, in a sense, a formal statement of the Kaufmann analysis of the elements of deterrence. Assured destruction requires a military capability sufficient to ride out a massive surprise attack and still make the costs to the aggressor out of all proportion to whatever gains he may have had in mind in making his attack. While credibility of intentions can never be so absolute as to be beyond question, the likelihood of response to an all-out attack on one's homeland is sufficiently high

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as to place doubt at an irreducible minimum. Therefore, a military capability for assured destruction has a high deterrent value, certainly as high as is necessary for the massive pre-emptive strike for which it is operative. The problem issue in this situation is not whether or not assured destruction will deter, but the exact constitution of assured destruction.

As was previously suggested, the utility of strategic offensive forces in the role of damage limitation was perhaps of greatest significance in that stage of strategic force relationships in which the United States possessed a credible first-strike capability. In the phase where both sides possess an assured destruction capability, the role of offensive forces in damage limitation is marginal because they are unable by themselves, even in a first strike, to prevent unacceptable damage by a return strike.[6] Offensive forces can blunt a retaliatory strike through pre-emption or clean up unfired enemy weapons after receiving a first strike, but they cannot fundamentally affect the nature of the strategic relationship. This is not to suggest that the United States, or the Soviet Union, lacks a great positive interest in saving the lives of its citizens, but only that those efforts cannot overturn the deterrent equation in which both sides possess an assured destruction force.

Damage limitation by defensive forces is at present restricted to defense against aircraft and to whatever passive measures are taken to protect population or industry from fallout and blast. It is the introduction of further defensive measures in the form of ballistic missile defense which gives promise of restoring vitality to the damage-limiting concept. But before exploring the effect of ballistic missile defense on deterrence, let us examine the relationship of strategic superiority to the deterrent equation as it is presently constituted.

III

What meaning can strategic superiority have in a situation where both the United States and the Soviet Union possess assured destruction capabilities? As mentioned above, there is at the outset difficulty in defining, not assured destruction itself, but its composition. The forces necessary to accomplish any given level of destruction, while subject to many uncertainties, are susceptible of measurement in broad terms. The chief variables are the reliability of weapons systems, their performance capabilities, and the

[6]See *infra*, pp. 444-445.

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attrition that can be anticipated from the first strike of an opponent. These uncertainties are accentuated because in evaluating missile performance we have practically no operational experience factor with which to temper drawing-board statistical calculations.

Much more uncertain than force capability calculations, however, is the level of damage an enemy will consider unacceptable — or, in terms of the assured destruction definition, which will destroy his society as a viable entity. Estimates of the amount of industrial damage and population loss the Soviet Union would consider unacceptable have not by any means remained constant over the years. This is a highly abstract and subjective problem. There seems clearly to be a need for serious analysis, from the point of view of the Soviets, of the extent of damage they would consider, prior to the outbreak of any hostilities, to be unacceptable.[7] Despite the formidable nature of the problems involved in analyzing the issue, it cannot be doubted that there is some percentage of destruction Soviet leaders would consider unacceptable. While it is in part a function of the damage they would expect to inflict on the United States, this level can probably be ascertained with greater precision than has thus far marked the figures put forth from various quarters.

Is the concept of strategic superiority relevant to consideration of U.S.-Soviet strategic relationships at the present time? A thoughtful answer must be in the negative. The amount of force necessary for assured destruction is obviously a function of Soviet force capability, but superiority itself is not at issue. U.S. forces must be adequate to perform their strategic task, but there is no innate requirement for superiority. It has been argued that relative force capability does have relevance to assured destruction, in the sense that the United States should maintain, or at least deny to the Soviet Union, relative advantage in numbers of people killed in a nuclear exchange.[8] This argument, in its basic elements, postulates that the Soviet Union can be dissuaded from a first-strike attack if it knows that, in retaliation, the United States will be able to kill a percentage of the Soviet population equal to, or preferably greater than, the losses suffered by the United States.

This is an attractive thesis, based on the proposition that the

[7]Once a conflict has begun, decision-makers may revise substantially their views regarding unacceptable damage to their countries.

[8]Richard C. Bowman, "Nuclear Strategy and the Arms Race," *Air Force and Space Digest*, April 1967, pp. 44-50, 98-99.

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Soviet Union would attack only if it could calculate some relative advantage to itself. It also appears to restore a yardstick by which to measure which side would "win" in a massive nuclear exchange. However, while the United States might consider a 20 per cent population loss completely unacceptable, the Soviet Union might calculate that it could absorb the loss of 30 per cent or more of its population and still maintain a cohesive political and social structure. Thus, while the criterion of relative damage may be of some utility in determining required levels of destruction, the crucial factor must remain the unacceptability of anticipated damage to oneself in a nuclear exchange. Even this is a relative consideration, in the sense that the USSR's calculation of the pain it could tolerate would be at least in part a function of the gain it would expect to realize, but should the Soviet Union estimate that it would emerge from a strategic nuclear exchange with its political and social fabric destroyed, it would be unlikely to look more favorably on launching such a venture simply because it felt that the United States would be equally or more "dead."

While relative force superiority may not be relevant to a situation where both sides maintain an assured destruction capability, there are several pertinent requirement factors, the accommodation of which may tend to result in the United States having a need for strategic forces larger than those of the Soviet Union. The first of these factors is the aggressive objectives of the Soviet Union, as compared with those of the United States. These aggressive ambitions can be expected to take the form of pressures and probes of various types, requiring the United States to maintain a force posture that will make obvious and unmistakable its capacity for assured destruction. The amount of destruction the Soviet Union would consider unacceptable, and the computation of force requirements dependent upon anticipated attrition to Soviet forces and reliability and performance of U.S. systems must therefore be calculated so conservatively that the Soviet Union will never be required to resort to careful computation in order to determine that there are no circumstances under which it could survive a U.S. strategic attack. The operative factor in communicating such a force capability, however, is not relative superiority but an unmistakable ability to achieve that level of destruction of the Soviet Union under the worst possible case of war initiation.

Another factor of asymmetry between the United States and the

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Soviet Union that makes demands upon U.S. forces is alliance and opponent relationships. The United States is committed to the defense of Western Europe. The credibility of this commitment is considerably enhanced by a U.S. ability to deal with any aggressive threat to Western Europe, including the neutralization of Soviet MRBM's and IRBM's, while maintaining undiminished the strategic forces deterring the Soviet Union from attack on the United States.

The United States also requires forces sufficient to deal with Communist China and the Soviet Union as separate strategic entities. That is, the United States must be able to wage a strategic nuclear conflict against Communist China while at the same time maintaining a full assured destruction posture with respect to the Soviet Union, and vice versa.

These various asymmetries may result in strategic force requirements for the United States which are different from, and perhaps considerably in excess of, those needed by the Soviet Union. They are, nonetheless, finite forces whose size can be measured with at least modest precision. Superiority to Soviet forces is not the criterion of this size; rather, it is based on the tasks, outlined above, which the force must be able to accomplish.[9]

If strategic superiority is not relevant to the assured destruction element of deterrence, what of its role in the damage limitation task of strategic forces? Damage limitation is a more elusive concept than assured destruction and criteria for measurement are more difficult to establish. In the period before the Soviet Union developed substantial nuclear delivery capability, the United States could limit damage to itself to acceptable levels by combining a pre-emptive first strike against Soviet delivery systems with an air defense system capable of attriting the surviving Soviet retaliatory forces, despite the absence of a pervasive system of civil defense. As Soviet strategic systems increased in number, sophistication and survival ability, damage limitation became more and more difficult. When former Secretary of Defense McNamara declared that the Soviet Union had achieved an assured destruction capability, he was in fact saying that the United States had lost the ability to limit damage to itself to an acceptable degree.

[9]For example, U.S. forces could be larger than those of the Soviet Union and still not able to accomplish these tasks. Conversely, it is conceivable that they could be inferior to Soviet forces and yet fulfill the requirements satisfactorily.

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Leaving aside for the moment the impact of ballistic missile defense, the constantly increasing magnitude of the damage-limiting task is easily demonstrated. If it is assumed, for illustrative purposes, that the Soviet Union has one hundred strategic nuclear weapons and the United States is able to destroy 90 per cent of Soviet deliverable weapons in a pre-emptive strike, the residual damage which could be inflicted on the United States might be considered tolerable. When the Soviet Union has developed its force to the point where it can deploy one thousand missiles, however, the picture is vastly changed, even if the 90 per cent attrition capability of the United States is maintained. When there is added to this already gloomy picture the great uncertainties involved in locating every Soviet weapon with precision and attacking it before it can be fired, the eventual hopelessness of adequately performing the damage limitation task by pre-emption becomes apparent.

It is difficult to visualize, therefore, just what significance a concept of strategic superiority can have in the present strategic environment. The defense literature in which the term is employed offers no great help. Perhaps the most direct attempt at a definition was made in a study produced for the House Armed Services Committee by a star-studded committee of the American Security Council, chaired by General Bernard Schriever.[10] This study measured strategic superiority in terms of relative megatonnage,[11] a measurement which immediately restricts its application to offensive systems. The Committee then went on to state what, in an operational sense, strategic superiority means for the Soviet Union. That meaning emerges as the denial by the Soviet Union of the assured destruction capability of the United States.[12] In reference to offensive systems, it has already been pointed out that the achievement or maintenance of such a condition is becoming increasingly unrealistic even for the United States, much less for the Soviet Union. The achievement of a strategic superiority of this character by the Soviet Union would seem to require the wholehearted cooperation of the United States.

The deterrent equation is a dynamic one, however, and it could prove fatal to rest on the strategic oars of the current situation. In-

[10]U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, 90th Congress, 1st Session, 1967, *The Changing Strategic Military Balance, U.S.A. vs. U.S.S.R.* Prepared for the Committee by the National Strategy Committee, American Security Council.

[11]*Ibid.*, p. 7.

[12]*Ibid.*, pp. 10-14.

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deed, some of the conceptual confusion of the present appears to stem from nostalgia for the strategic balance of previous eras and an unwillingness to acknowledge that the clock cannot simply be turned back. But is it possible that technology could provide the functional equivalent of turning back the clock? What does the development of ballistic missile defense, for example, do to the deterrent equation and the concept of strategic superiority?

IV

There appear to be definite advantages to the deployment of an area defense against ballistic missiles, although perhaps not for the stated reasons that accompanied the decision to deploy such a system.[13] With respect to deterrence, utilizing China as the rationale for the deployment of an ABM system has interesting implications. The rationale is based on the assumption that a strategic force which the United States declares with confidence will deter the Soviet Union, even though that country has a reciprocal ability to destroy the United States, is inadequate to deter the Communist Chinese, who will have only a relative handful of weapons to deliver. This assumption presumes an irrationality in international behavior of significant proportions on the part of the Chinese leadership. The Chinese regime has not, over the past eighteen years, given much evidence of such irrationality. On the contrary, Chinese international behavior, as opposed to admittedly bellicose utterances, has been in general remarkably circumspect.

Quite apart from the Communist Chinese aspects of the issue, a ballistic missile defense could be of positive value in adding to the stability of U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear relationships. For a number of years there has been concern over the possibility and consequences of an accidental or unauthorized firing of strategic weapons. Should such an event occur at the present time, it could initiate an immediate total nuclear response on the part of the victim. If, however, those missiles could be successfully intercepted and destroyed, the pressure for a retaliatory launch before the character and intent of the firing could be ascertained would be greatly reduced. From this standpoint, development of an ABM defense capable of dealing with a modest attack appears to be a

[13]Address of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to the Editors of United Press International on September 18, 1967. *New York Times*, September 19, 1967, p. 18.

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desirable development, both for the United States and for the Soviet Union.[14]

Development of an ABM system designed to cope with a full missile attack, however, would constitute more than simply a difference in numbers from the relatively limited deployment discussed above. Development of a full ABM defense would result in a qualitative change in the deterrent equation that could have profound consequences. The character of the U.S. response to such a Soviet move could itself be of considerable significance. Former Secretary of Defense McNamara, for example, declared on several occasions that one of the easiest and cheapest methods of countering a heavy ABM system would be to equip offensive missiles with multiple, hardened warheads and decoys, to improve penetrability.[15] Nevertheless, a strategic response limited to modifications of this nature could prove to be destabilizing.

At the present time, deficiencies in missile reliability and accuracy, together with factors such as target location and hardness, are sufficient to require the programming of more than one offensive weapon to give satisfactory assurance of destroying one known enemy missile. In view of weapons expenditures, therefore, it is costly to attack an opponent's missile systems, assuming that each missile constitutes a separate aiming point. If, however, through accurate multiple independently targeted warheads, each missile becomes, in effect, several missiles, and assuming that problems of accuracy and target location are solved, the cost equation could be altered to favor the attacker. The result could be an inducement to a first strike comparable to the instability which at an earlier period stemmed from ICBM deployment in soft sites.[16]

What effect might a heavy ABM deployment have on the concept of strategic superiority? On the surface, at least, a ballistic missile defense would appear to offer once again prospects of the eventual achievement of a credible first-strike posture. It might become possible to destroy, in a first strike, sufficient enemy weapons to permit the ABM system to cope satisfactorily with those which survived to counterattack. The converse does not ap-

[14]An ABM defense could also serve to inaugurate a new bipolarity, by making the two superpowers "super-superpowers" militarily, even with respect to other nuclear states.

[15]McNamara, *loc. cit.*

[16]Early ICBM's, deployed as they were aboveground at fixed sites, were extremely vulnerable to attack and even at large miss distances could be easily destroyed. This condition provided considerable incentive to a surprise first strike.

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pear to be equally possible; that is, that either the United States or the Soviet Union could deploy an ABM system able to defeat with defensive measures alone a determined first strike by the other. The relative ease of deploying large numbers of warheads with penetration aids makes it likely that the odds in this latter case will remain on the side of the offensive, barring some radical technological breakthrough.

Attaining a credible first-strike capability would, of course, be equivalent to denying an opponent his assured destruction capability in a second strike. The actual tasks involved in achieving such a capability are truly formidable, if possible at all, but there can be little doubt that their accomplishment would put specific content into the term "strategic superiority." Assuming that one side could deal with the problems of target hardening, mobility, location and destruction before launch, as well as offensive weapon reliability, penetrability and accuracy, well enough to permit its offensive weapons to attrite the enemy force to the point where it could not penetrate an ABM system in sufficient numbers to cause unacceptable damage, what situation would result?

The first consequence would be to restore to a first strike by either side a critical advantage — one which is not present in the current situation of mutual second-strike assured destruction capabilities. For the stronger side, a first strike would be an assured means of survival; for the weaker, it would be the only means by which it could destroy its opponent. The resultant situation could be dangerously unstable, with a considerable incentive on each side to pre-empt in a serious crisis. In turn, this could make questionable the value of this variety of strategic superiority for applying pressure or making threats over objectives which both sides considered to be of critical importance. A threat under these circumstances, if believed, would in effect offer the weaker side the option of deciding whether or not a particular objective was vital and therefore worth denying the stronger side the military advantage of strategic superiority by a pre-emptive attack. Since this situation appears to render minimal the political value of such superiority in crisis management, its principal benefit would be military — limiting damage to oneself in the event a preventive or pre-emptive strike were decided upon.

It might also be theoretically possible, should both sides develop heavy ballistic missile defense and rely extensively on multiple

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warheads and decoys, that each could acquire a credible first-strike capability. In this event it could be said that each side had conditional strategic superiority. The instability of such a strategic balance would be likely to exceed that where only one possessed strategic superiority.

While a first-strike strategic superiority may be a theoretical possibility, the tasks involved in assuring credibility seem so staggering as to require the virtual active assistance of the opponent. With ABM deployment on both sides, and an increasing diversity of offensive systems, the deterrent equation will have become immensely complicated. Besides the myriad offensive force uncertainties already discussed, there is the problem of mobile missiles, the question of the number of weapons one is likely to be able to destroy before launch, and the uncertain probability of ABM intercept. Compound this with the bomber threat, for which no sufficient defense has yet been developed, and one has an idea of the more important variables that must be considered. The equation will have become so complex that even though U.S. or Soviet military planners could calculate that a first-strike, assured destruction-denying capability existed, they would find it difficult to impart to their decision-makers sufficient confidence in their calculations to make that capability the basis of operational decisions. When one adds the possibilities of technological developments such as fractional orbital weapons, depressed trajectory or maneuverable weapons, and perhaps many others just over the technological horizon, the skepticism of the decision-maker is likely to be unshakable. And even should a credible first-strike capability be achieved, the relative ease with which the opponent can proliferate offensive warheads and penetration aids in order to overwhelm the defense is likely to render the capability a transitory one.

Whatever the practical merits of a strategic superiority made possible by ballistic missile defense, the addition of substantial defensive capability to the deterrent equation makes obvious the growing artificiality of the distinction between assured destruction and damage limitation in the calculation of strategic forces. One side's assured destruction forces are pitted against the opponent's damage limiting forces, and damage limiting forces help to assure the survivability of the assured destruction forces. While the advantages of emphasis on one or the other capability are by no means symmetrical, the intimacy of the relationship is un-

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mistakable. The realities of this interdependency would seem to require consideration of strategic offensive and defensive forces and the missions for which they are designed, as well as passive defense, as integrated entities.

V

The existence of a capability on each side to inflict catastrophic damage on the other narrows drastically the range of contingencies or objectives for which nuclear deterrence can be operative. The practical demands of credibility or intention limit the deterrent value of strategic forces to those objectives vital to the United States or the Soviet Union and for which one or the other would therefore be willing to contemplate devastation. It is with respect to credibility that the relative value of the objective to the United States or the Soviet Union becomes glaringly apparent as a critical factor. As we have seen, strategic force capability must be coupled with communicated intent in order to deter. Despite this, a number of writers seem to take it for granted that the possession of "superior" forces in itself permits the deterrence of a variety of contingencies of various magnitudes and types, an idea which harks back to the principle behind the doctrine of massive retaliation. Hungary was not as vital to the United States as to the Soviet Union in 1956, nor was Cuba as vital to the Soviet Union as to the United States in 1962. These asymmetries in attitudes will continue to exist with respect to virtually every objective and can, on many occasions, far outbalance the relative strengths of the strategic forces of the two powers.[17]

The nature of the objective is a key element in the communication of intent. The United States probably could not communicate a resolve to resort to strategic nuclear war over, say, Afghanistan. The criticality of the issue at stake for each side in any crisis is a factor too often overlooked by those who advocate force "superiority" as a panacea for the resolution of conflicts with the Soviet Union.

Narrowing the credibility of massive nuclear response to only those issues of overwhelming significance leaves three problem areas open. The first is the problem of responding adequately in a crisis where full nuclear attack is not appropriate but where response with general-purpose forces is unsatisfactory. The second

[17]At the same time, it must be recognized that relative force strengths may change the perception and attitudes about what objectives are vital.

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is a crisis where the United States is unable to communicate to the Soviet Union the fact that the issues are sufficiently grave for it to be willing to risk strategic nuclear conflict.

In addition, there is the possibility of the escalation of more limited forms of conflict, either inadvertently or by design. At the present time, the United States may not be prepared to cope with these situations, all dealing with the area of conflict between what is usually called limited war and unrestrained strategic nuclear attack. We cannot afford to be in a position where the only options available for these situations are total war or surrender of the objective. Restricting the credibility of full nuclear response solely to the most overwhelming and unequivocal of challenges creates a requirement for the development of limited and selective strategic nuclear options to deal with contingencies. This conflict level has variously been described in defense literature as "controlled general war" or "limited strategic war,"[18] and as requiring military capabilities for coercion, compellence, or similarly titled tasks.[19]

Coping satisfactorily with conflict at this level requires a range of options tailored to insure that U.S. decision-makers will always have at hand an alternative felt to be appropriate for the specific situation. The exact size and character of the forces required to carry out these coercive or demonstrative missions can be determined only after considerable study and analysis. One result of such analysis could be that strategic superiority could assume concrete significance with respect to forces for limited strategic operations. In any case, it seems apparent that the United States should develop an ability to deal effectively with threats at this level, without the necessity to resort to a massive strategic attack and without triggering such an attack by the Soviet Union.

The possibility of a nuclear demonstrative strike against the Soviet Union or a coercive game of "chicken" between the two superpowers may appear to be pure fantasy. However, while the mutual destruction of which the two superpowers are capable makes total nuclear war unlikely, it will not eliminate crises or confrontations between them. The assurance of deterrence at the top levels of conflict may even tend to insensitize them to prov-

[18]See, for example, Klaus Knorr and Thornton Read, editors, *Limited Strategic War* (New York: Praeger, 1962).

[19]An interesting analysis of the several terms employed to describe this type of operation appears in Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 78-86, 170-184.

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ocations which, in a previous era, might have sparked a full military response.

Small wars involving U.S. and Soviet interests can continue to occur. Escalation is always a possibility, and miscalculations of intent and resolve can be expected. Simple prudence, as well as the principles of deterrence, dictates that the United States improve its ability to conduct a variety of precise and selective strikes against the USSR. It is likely that war will result not from a single "yes-no" decision, but will develop, if it comes, from a lesser conflict or from a crisis where, by definition, neither side is in full control of events. Being prepared for the widest possible range of contingencies would best assure that, should a crisis arise, we would have at hand a military option appropriate for the circumstances.

It can be argued that making preparations to fight at levels less than total war and announcing these preparations to the Soviet Union — which would be essential in order to communicate intention and thus to deter at this level — would degrade the assured destruction deterrent and tend to make a limited strategic conflict more likely. It is true that this course of action could signal that the United States is not prepared to invoke its ultimate deterrent force for a less than total threat and that the Soviet Union may therefore engage at that level with relative impunity from massive retaliation. But against this possibility must be balanced a countervailing possibility: if the United States is not prepared at this "intermediate" strategic level, the Soviet Union could perceive this as a gap in force capability and undertake military action at that level. The United States would then be placed in the position of having either to back down or to respond with an unrestrained attack. On balance, making preparations for the possibility of limited strategic conflict would seem to be more in consonance with the principles of deterrence and to serve better the national interest.

VI

What can be concluded with respect to strategic superiority and deterrence? It is obvious that easy answers and simplistic solutions must be viewed with profound skepticism. From the time of the detonation of the first Soviet nuclear weapon, U.S. strategic relationships with the Soviet Union have constantly increased in complexity. There is no reason to believe that this process will be reversed. U.S. and Soviet objectives and requirements will con-

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tinue to be asymmetrical; this, as we have seen, may result in differing force requirements. There is no doubt that the United States has a profound interest in maximizing the chance of survival of its citizens, even under the worst conditions of nuclear exchange. There is also undeniably some psychic satisfaction to be derived from the feeling that one is stronger than one's opponent, however vague and ill-defined that superiority may be. What this latter factor actually contributes in confidence and reassurance to a decision-maker in a crisis situation, in an era of mutual assured destruction capability, may be worth careful psychological investigation.[20]

One of the fundamental difficulties inherent in the use of the term "strategic superiority" is the requirement it imposes for comparison. The necessary implication is that some marginal advantage in numbers (or perhaps quality) of offensive systems, defensive systems, megatonnage, missile "throw weight," or whatever categories one chooses to consider critical, will confer benefit to the holder of that advantage. But numerical tabulation does not necessarily contribute greatly to the resolution of the complex issues involved in U.S.-Soviet strategic relationships. Based on criteria such as these, was David superior to Goliath, or was Israel superior to the Arab states in 1967?

The numerical rendering of strategic superiority frequently results in the assumption that it can be functionally equated with resolve; that is, that the side with superior forces will prevail, *ipso facto*, in any conflict of objectives. As Schelling has described this idea, "the two sides just measure up to each other and one bows before the other's superiority and acknowledges that he was only bluffing."[21] Unfortunately, weapon superiority and resolve are not interchangeable commodities. Resolve is not a constant, always present in the same degree; rather, it is indissolubly bound up with the particular issue or objective at stake. It must be reestablished in every potential confrontation and communicated accurately anew to the opponent. Powerful forces assist in bolstering resolve in many crises, but one should never imagine that they somehow constitute "instant courage."

There are dangers in continuing to employ the term "strategic superiority" in its customary manner, without definition or gauge

[20]The contribution the image of strategic superiority (or any other kind) may make in enhancing prestige and influence in international politics is another important consideration.

[21]Schelling, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

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of measurement. Do its users have in mind, consciously or implicitly, the building of an offensive and defensive force posture, based on a heavy ballistic missile defense, which could restore to the United States a credible first-strike capability? If so, it would be better to face the issue directly and openly, in order that the awesome tasks and the probabilities of success can be examined on their merits. By continuing to invest strategic superiority with many of the attributes of motherhood, we are in danger of engaging in a form of psychological repression.[22] Strategic superiority is not, and cannot be, a panacea, and its loose employment as a cure-all for all the problems of competition and conflicts of interest with the Soviet Union serves primarily to obfuscate, rather than to clarify, the real issues and factors on which our dynamically evolving strategic relationships with the USSR are likely to hinge.

[22]For a discussion of this phenomenon with respect to massive retaliation, see Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 26-27.

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NEW DIRECTIONS FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: SOME THOUGHTS FOR MACROMODELING*

by Robert D. Crane

NEVER before in history, it seems, have we as a nation faced so many problems. Despite enormous resources devoted to solving them, they continue to grow in number and complexity. The basic problem is the simple process of rapid change, because it vitally affects all other problem-solving efforts. In the modern age, a solution that appears to be workable at the moment it is conceived may well be outdated and impractical by the time it is applied: more likely than not, the situation will have changed. If we adopt a static approach and try to apply past solutions that in most cases are inappropriate for our present and future needs, we may be overwhelmed by the challenge of a changing world. Our thinking must be flexible and anticipatory so that we can cope with fast-moving global developments.

A second problem is the difficulty the practicing statesman encounters in relating the interests and ideals of his country to the changing foreign policy scene. Every individual has selfish interests and unselfish ideals which serve as substantive premises for action. Human affairs can be defined as the shifting relationship of conflict and convergence between one set of interests and ideals and another set or sets. In addition, every individual has definite, if sometimes unconscious, ideas on how best to achieve his interests and ideals. These ideas serve as basic methodological premises for action. In the international arena the same holds true, but the actors are groups of people who have achieved nation-statehood or wish to do so. International politics can be reduced analytically to the interaction of more than two dozen basic substantive and methodological premises among different national actors. One task of the foreign-policymaker in a

*This article was prepared in 1968 as a condensation from the author's collection of position papers, entitled "Inescapable Rendezvous: Premises and Problems of American Foreign Policy." Dr. Crane developed the methodology suggested in the article at the Hudson Institute, where he worked from 1966 to 1968 on the systematic analysis and use of basic premises in the foreign policy process.

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democratic country is to understand these premises underlying the group-thinking of his country and to make policy in accordance with them.

By way of illustration, it is clear that one of the most important premises motivating the United States, the Soviet Union, and every other country is the need for at least a minimum degree of global stability. In the modern world of advanced weapons this is essential if each is to preserve its national existence. Stability as a foreign policy premise, however, takes practical meaning only in conjunction with other premises. Although both the United States and the Soviet Union share an equal interest in a minimum stability, the need for it is more important for the United States. This is true because American leaders, more than their Soviet counterparts, have been brought up to regard stability not only as a requirement of self-interest, but as an unselfish ideal and a means to achieve other ideals.

Stability in the sense of an absence of conflict is a self-evident good in the American scale of values. It is also a methodological prerequisite to achieve other ultimate values. American foreign policy is based on the belief that progress in promoting human welfare is inseparable from progress in conflict resolution. Conflict resolution, and the stability resulting from it, therefore are basic methodological premises of all American foreign policy thinking. Although U.S. strategists have developed a passion for the military superiority thought to be necessary for crisis control, the latter is considered to be merely a necessary means to stability and conflict resolution.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, bases much of its foreign policy on the contrary premise that all progress results from dialectical conflict, no matter what the sphere of activity. Real progress in promoting human welfare can come, therefore, only from Soviet superiority in managing such conflict. Although they have been educated by Western strategists to appreciate the importance of crisis control, the Soviets believe that facility in the orchestration of crises is merely a minor requirement for success in the vital international business of long-range political conflict management.

During the short but traumatic age of nucleophobia, when fear of nuclear weapons dominated the foreign policy of every major nation, many policy intellectuals elevated the control of conflict,

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encompassing either its resolution or its management or both, into an overarching framework of analysis. Other premises, both teleological or goal-oriented as well as methodological, became dependent variables in a macromodel limited to the goals and requirements of stability.

The unprecedented challenges of a rapidly changing and interacting global society, which threatened the traditional identity and even the physical survival of many of its members, produced an obsession for "law and order." Many positive goals relating to progress in improving men's social, economic and political environment remained important. But the principal independent variable was stability. The name of the game was not progress with maximum feasible stability, but stability with whatever progress was consistent with it. Caught in such a weighted and inflexible framework of analysis, many policymakers drifted into an open-ended commitment to preserve the status quo even in the middle of systemic revolution. This in turn created pressures to militarize American responses to foreign policy challenges.

The inevitable failures of such an approach to foreign policy have created pressures to systematize the policy process so that statesmen at all levels will have constantly available a rich mixture of basic premises and pertinent factual analysis. A macromodel specifically designed to maintain flexibility must provide whatever is needed to control short-run inter-nation crises at various levels of the conflict spectrum. But the overriding objective should be to provide systematic background research and analytical planning for a foreign policy, as well as a domestic policy, geared not primarily to the security of man but to the dignity of men. One of the most important by-products — and it should remain a by-product, not an independent goal — might be a significant demilitarization of America's role in the world community.

The ultimate objective of such a macromodel would be to systematize and improve the process of foreign policymaking. The model can be structured so that the data collection and analysis in the middle of this process can be quantified for computerization. The beginning of the process, when the task is the formulation of information requirements, is less susceptible to quantification. And the crucial terminal phase, consisting in actual policy

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formulation, is essentially unquantifiable because it depends so heavily on intangibles susceptible only to human judgment.

The most important of these intangibles, the basic premises underlying foreign policy judgments, cannot be effectively quantified. But they at least can be treated systematically. A separate macromodel can be designed to bring to bear on each policy problem and opportunity, in a systematic and balanced way, this nonquantifiable dimension of policymaking. The application of such a model to specific problems could serve not only to improve the judgment reached at the end of the policy process, but to clarify the information requirements at its beginning.

The first requirement for modeling basic premises is to recognize that they exist. The conscious or unconscious development of a uni-premise foreign policy, no matter how legitimate the premise may be, is a sure road to policy failure. Conversely, wisdom in the formulation and execution of foreign policy depends on maintaining in balance a rich mixture of many premises. American policy toward every area of the world and every functional issue should be rethought periodically to determine whether it is consistent with our basic premises both in concept and execution. Although a high degree of consistency between policies and premises is rarely possible, the goal of absolute consistency should be periodically measured in every area of U.S. foreign policy concern.

The object of this article is to select an important but little appreciated basic premise and to point out two of the many new policy perspectives that might result from giving it more weight in the foreign policy process. This basic premise is pluralism: the right of diverse peoples to develop their unique identities. Somewhat as a lawyer would in a court of law, the article advocates the case for pluralism as an important postulate for U.S. policy toward the Third World of Asia and Africa and toward Europe. A balanced weighting of this premise with others equally important would lead to substantial modifications in the foreign policies suggested here. The intention is not to advocate specific policies, but to suggest that the manipulation of basic premises in a systematic way and their application iteratively to the foreign policy process can provide additional perspective on the alternatives available in mid-range and long-range foreign policy planning. Such an exercise in "presearch," if augmented by critical research, might also help to clarify what our interests and ideals are.

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Pluralism: A Key to Peace and Progress in the Third World?

The primary determinant of postwar international politics, as seen through American eyes, has been the Soviet Union's threat to expand its influence over world affairs, and the attempt by the United States to prevent this. In this situation, the absence of other substantial centers of noncommunist power and influence forced the steady expansion of American commitments. Perhaps the biggest change in world affairs during the next ten years will be a reversal of this process, to the benefit of the United States. American and Soviet policy will no longer dominate the global environment. Rather, the global environment will be the primary determinant of American policy and the primary restraint on reactionary communism. In order to prevent an American retreat into isolationism resulting from her frustrations in molding the world environment, the United States therefore should promote those forces that support her basic interests without conscious American direction. The most important such force is global pluralism.

Three critical relationships will express American response to the forces of global pluralism and American influence on these forces. Each of these relationships will exercise a strong influence on the other two. The first is between the United States and the Soviet Union, specifically between the forces on either side which can transform their relationship from confrontation into negotiation. The second is between the United States and Europe, specifically between the United States and the European forces trending toward a new internationalism based on intra- and inter-regional cooperation.

The third important relationship in American foreign policy is between the United States and the forces for modernization and conflict among the peoples of the Third World. In a sense this one is the most important of the three, because American policymakers seem to have had a poorer understanding of Third World dynamics than they have had of developments in the Soviet Union and Europe. U.S. relations with the Third World take on added importance because the likelihood of serious policy errors is greater here than in any other region of the world.

The three main causes of conflict in the Third World are external communist exploitation of indigenous frustrations, the failure of local governments to meet the just social and economic

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demands of their increasingly enlightened peoples, and the attempts of essentially artificial states to maintain order by imposing centralized institutions on their multinational populations.

The Viet Nam war is a classic illustration of the potential of externally engineered communist global revolution to aggravate local conflict. It has stressed to us the importance of understanding the complexities of Asian and African development. But Viet Nam has also presented favorable opportunities for communist revolutionaries, and polycentric competition within the communist camp has fueled their efforts. Consequently, the conflict has impeded proper understanding of the range and subtlety of problems facing U.S. policy in the Third World. The unavoidable focus of American attention on Viet Nam has led many people to conclude that external communist conflict management, and particularly communist supply of armaments, poses the greatest threat to peace and welfare in the developing areas. U.S. policy can succeed in promoting the freedom of a pluralist world only when we recognize that in the Third World as a whole, global communism poses a relatively minor and probably decreasing threat to the well-being of the peoples.

The second type of conflict confronting U.S. policy toward the Third World is best illustrated by the failures and successes of socio-economic reform in Latin America. This region is unusually free of external communist aggression, chiefly because communist strategists have misjudged the subjective potential of revolution in specific areas, and because a stalemate among conflicting communist factions has undermined their collective ability to exploit whatever potential does exist. Latin America therefore presents in its purest form a conflict environment shaped primarily by the disparity between the great possibilities for regional economic progress and the widespread social injustice and poverty impeding this progress.

Latin America will provide the most favorable laboratory for testing the theory, advanced by the President of the World Bank, Robert McNamara, that conflict in the Third World is a simple product of economic backwardness, and that conversely "in a modernizing society security means development." There is a great temptation to project American managerial concepts to the solution of Third World problems, in the belief that organization will provide the elixir of peace and progress. In his book, *The Essence of Security*, McNamara summarizes this theory:

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The irreducible fact remains that our security is related directly to the security of the newly developing world, and our role must be precisely this, to help provide security to those developing nations. . . . If security implies anything, it implies a minimal measure of order and stability. . . . Law and order is the shield behind which development, the central fact of security, can be achieved. . . . When the people of a nation have organized their own human and natural resources . . . then their resistance to disorder and violence will enormously increase. . . . We must help the developing nation with such training and equipment as are necessary to maintain the protective shield behind which development can go forward.[1]

The theory receives superficial support from conflict statistics indicating a high incidence of violence in countries of low economic status. Thus, during the past decade, the twenty-seven rich countries of the world, with per capita annual incomes above $750, have experienced a total of only one major internal conflict, whereas the thirty-eight poorest countries, with a per capita income under $100, suffered thirty-two significant conflicts, most of them of a prolonged nature. On the basis of these statistics, McNamara concludes: "There can be no question but that there is a relationship between violence and economic backwardness."[2] He postulates further that the only way to overcome violence and to promote democracy in the Third World is to introduce better management methods into poor countries, because "paradoxical as it may sound, the real threat to democracy comes not from overmanagement, but from undermanagement." The derogatory view of decentralized pluralism inherent in this philosophy of development is underlined in McNamara's related dictum that "vital decision-making, particularly in policy matters, must remain at the top."[3]

Such a centralist philosophy, if pursued by American foreign policy throughout Asia and Africa, could result in catastrophic unrest. This is true because the third major cause of conflict in the Third World arises from the clash between the centralizing efforts of modernizing states and the upsurge of independence among ethnic and other subordinate communal groups which want to modernize in their own way and at their own speed.

The conflict between state and community has become the dominant source of disorder throughout most of Asia and Africa, where the new states inherited large colonial administrative territories. The immediate goal of those who replaced European

[1](New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 149-151.
[2]*Ibid.*, p. 146.
[3]*Ibid.*, pp. 109-110.

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rulers was to hang on to their new power. When the European imperialists created their colonies, they paid scant attention to ethnic boundaries, carving up diverse peoples who formerly were largely independent. These same peoples today often reject their new indigenous overlords as bitterly as they did the European imperialists.

This third type of conflict is endemic only in Asia and Africa. In Latin America the Europeans were so successful, and brutal, in their colonization that they almost completely replaced indigenous cultures and political loyalties with their own. In Asia and Africa, on the other hand, the loyalties of indigenous ethnic and cultural communities or nations often survived intact throughout the period of European control. During the past two post-independence decades, the spread of education and the advent of mass communications have served to make these peoples conscious of their own unique values and the comparative deficiencies of neighboring peoples who might claim jurisdiction over them. The individual and mass alienation that everywhere has accompanied the process of secular modernization has impelled them to seek individual identity and group solidarity in communal nationalism. This fact conflicts directly with the attempts of modernization theorists to achieve greater societal efficiency by assimilating peoples into large centralized states. Centralization in turn accelerates the drive toward communal nationalism, and in some areas has triggered movements toward confederal regionalism among communal nationalists extending beyond the confines of any single state. In effect, modernization, if it implies the centralized assimilation of politically conscious communities, is not an elixir of order and security but a cause of the very instability McNamara hopes it will cure.

The drive toward self-determination of independent-minded peoples and the growth of transnational solidarity among like-minded communal groups has given rise to powerful forces of revolutionary nationalism and supranational regionalism. Unless a corresponding rise of pluralist federalism can accommodate them, they will erupt into waves of conflict which may remake the map in parts of the Third World.

The importance of these forces is indicated by the fact that of 164 internationally significant outbreaks of violence between 1958 and 1966, only fifteen were military confrontations between two states. And of these nearly 150 major internal conflicts, more than

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half, including the most serious ones, resulted in large measure from state/nation conflicts. The fatalities resulting directly and indirectly from such conflicts between state and nation since the end of World War II have already exceeded five million, most of them unreported.[4] The trend toward communal nationalism and decentralization is developing so rapidly in many Afro-Asian regions that American foreign policies formulated to meet the conditions of a decade ago are now largely irrelevant. Moreover, the entire thrust of traditional American development theory supports the centralizing efforts of assimilatory "nation-building" which kindle communal nationalism and fan its growth into a powerful revolutionary force.

Since Soviet strategists share these same development theories, the emerging nations of Asia and Africa may equally oppose the United States and the Soviet Union and receive revolutionary support only from Communist China. The two superpowers may tend to disengage from direct confrontations, concentrating instead on promoting the security of their principal Third World allies against noncommunist revolution within and across their allies' borders. Although this relative disengagement would clearly be in American interests, the price in conflict and human misery for such a gain would be morally unacceptable.

If the leaders of the United States want to exert world leadership during the remainder of this century, they need only support the probably irreversible trend toward decentralized initiative and pluralist responsibility in the world. Americans can best provide global leadership simply by preaching abroad what we practice at home.

Americans are now entering a period of general reaction against the failures and limited successes of the development policies we have pursued for so long at great personal expense. If our commitment to help the peoples of Asia and Africa is not to become a casualty of this reaction, now is the time to consider whether some of the political forces we have helped to suppress and some of the economic forces we have deprecated or ignored may not have a positive potential in the development of parts of the Third World. Far from being anachronisms in a sophisticated world of mass society, the two forces of communal nationalism and local in-

[4]Robert D. Crane, "Postwar Ethnic/Cultural Conflicts: Some Quantitative and Other Considerations," in *Some Third-World Issues: Volume I, Context and Methodology* (Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Hudson Institute, HI-979/BN/1, March 4-8, 1968).

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itiative within a federal framework might prove more powerful in the Third World than all the military strength and economic aid the United States could possibly bring to bear either alone or in conjunction with its allies.

One of the most unfortunate consequences of this growing conflict between the artificial nation-state in the making and the existing nation which may want to become a state is the distortion in our perceptions of communal nationalism throughout much of Asia and Africa. The imposition of centralized state power as a method of modernization without the concept of community-based coherence and responsibility behind it, the propagation of atomistic individualism as a means to societal transformation without a moral recognition of the value of the individual, and the accompanying attempt to impose an omnivorous collectivity without an appreciation of the responsibility and value of free community, all combine to create a crisis in identity and authority that has profoundly unsettled the Afro-Asian peoples. The efforts of the mobilizing state to monopolize personal and group loyalties at a single level of the political spectrum, and to diffuse legitimacy downward from the corporate state rather than to permit loyalty and legitimacy to spread upward from the families and communities of individual men, have tended to cause a radical contraction of the individual away from nature and from other men into the material boundaries of the calculating ego. The primordial loyalties of communal nationalism in some instances have become a fulcrum either for a passive longing not to belong to any other group or for the blind aggression of defensive self-assertion.

By generalization from the abnormal, many modernization theorists conclude that the only way to cure the patient is to prescribe more of the medicine that made him sick. Concentration on communal groups' reaction to the imposition of the worst forms of Westernization makes it difficult even to raise the question whether in many areas the tensions that result from communal nationalism might be a symptom less of rampant separatism than of overcentralization and overmanagement. An a priori opposition to communal nationalism hides the fact that the problem of assimilation seems to arise most often when the ruling majority has decided that its rival or potentially rival groups must be assimilated and for all practical purposes destroyed. A cursory analysis of communal nationalism suggests that it reaches disrup-

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tive proportions only when modernization is taken to mean the imposition of centralized political power on an agglomeration of naturally independent nations, once administered collectively as a dependent colonial territory, and then elevated by the departing colonialists to the status of an independent but artificial state.

The assumption has become general that coercive assimilation is necessary in most of Asia and Africa for technological modernization. The time has come to question that assumption. We may find that only when policy is based on it do the traditional institutions of society become what many students of the modernization process believe them inherently to be: mere obstacles to progress and stability. We may also gain insights into the demonstrated potential of communal nationalism within a federal framework to channel the most powerful human drives into cooperative self-betterment.

Probably the best case study of the rights and wrongs in Third World development is Nigeria. The federalist approach of the traditionally decentralized Ibo people to political and economic development helped to transform Nigeria into an African showcase. Ironically, in 1966 the Ibos reacted to the natural tensions of a developing federal state by attempting to convert Nigeria from a federal into a unitary state. The perhaps inevitable result was a massacre of the Ibos, the deterioration of cooperation into civil war, and the beginning of what may turn out to be the first of a new type of genocidal war growing out of the global modernization process.

If more modernization theorists would shift the focus of their attention from the requirements of immediate industrialization to the unromantic but locally meaningful possibilities of first applying simple technology in rural development, we might see that the secrets of the most productive form of modernization lie not so much in centralized governmental programming as in the decentralized and unplanned forces of local initiative. We might then be able to listen more sympathetically to those who insist from long experience that the real task in modernization is not to marshal manpower by organizing human resources, but to release human energy by stimulating the natural entrepreneurial desire to achieve. We would then realize that modernization is not primarily a product of governmental structure, but of individual people working as members of and in the interests of a group with which they have a common sense of identity and solidarity,

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whether it is in their own family or its extension in a more diffuse moral community.

Economic counterparts to political pluralism have been investigated, perhaps most creatively by Louis Kelso. He suggests linking technology with the individual through the wide diffusion of capital ownership among the world's agricultural and industrial workers. He questions the long-range benefits of relying on financing growth through past savings, because this technique further concentrates capital ownership during an era when capital rather than labor increasingly is the producer of wealth. Instead he lists ways to finance new capital formation out of future earnings derived from the use of borrowed capital. Specifically, he recommends that at individual factories or agricultural enterprises a trust be organized to receive guaranteed loans for new tools, seeds or fertilizers. As the loan is repaid, all or most of the new "ownership" created through the use of new technology would vest in the workers who provided the labor input. Any defaults on repayment might be regarded as a relatively cheap form of foreign aid.[5]

The objectives of such radically new methods of financing capital formation would be to give workers a stake in the success of their own rural and urban enterprises, to stimulate the development of local management capabilities, to release the full potential of technology in socially acceptable ways, to make feasible sweeping reforms of land ownership in areas where economic considerations dictate the preservation of large farms, and to provide an administrative framework for decentralized foreign economic assistance. If adapted to the unique requirements of the various regions and peoples of the world, such economic pluralism could have a greater global impact over the next fifty years than the col-

[5]Louis Kelso, "Uprooting World Poverty," *Business Horizons,* Fall 1964. An adaptation of such an imaginative approach to community development has been highly successful in almost 400 pilot projects carried out by the Pan-American Development Foundation. A trustee of the Foundation and vice-president of Sears Roebuck & Company, John F. Gallagher, has advised the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee that this "self-starter guarantee" program for social and economic progress "is one of the most imaginative, nonpatronizing and risk-free forms of foreign assistance that has ever been proposed." The *New York Times* of July 27, 1969 reported its reception as "the only new idea about foreign aid since the Marshall Plan."

Governmental guarantees alone probably would not suffice to attract the necessary capital through the commercial banking system. Despite such problems, at the initiative of Representatives John Moss (D., Calif.) and Ogden Reid (R., N.Y.), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969-1970 is scheduled to include $15 million to finance further experiments in this radical approach to economic and political development.

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lectivist economics of Marxism and neo-Marxism have had during the half-century just past.

Perhaps the most hopeful sign in the Third World is an increasing recognition among its leaders, both Westernized and traditional, that the forces of political disruption and economic immobilism, endemic during the past decade, have resulted in part from their failure to distinguish the process of modernization from the Western secularized models in which it has been cast. The emerging generation of leaders in Asia and Africa is demonstrating a maturity beyond that of their elders and their elders' advisers by welcoming a resurgence of their own native cultures. They have seen the political, economic and cultural chaos that results when political leaders rapidly and unwisely reject the traditional values, customary law and social fabric of society without providing replacements acceptable to society's members.

Most importantly, this new generation of leaders is beginning to see that their traditional cultures can serve as suitable vehicles for technological modernization. They are trying, therefore, to fill the cultural vacuum left by the Westernizing phase of the modernization process by consciously resurrecting the best from their cultures. In particular, they are trying to strengthen the institutions by which men have always been mobilized to action and those elements that promote the discipline, honesty and general cultural infrastructure necessary for modernization. Their objective is not to borrow industrialism from the West, for this has proved to be either impossible or not essential to the material or spiritual well-being of their people. They have vicariously acquired the wisdom of the rich by observing the most advanced industrial countries, whose experiences demonstrate that a high rate of material achievement does not automatically provide dignity, a sense of achievement and happiness. Their aim is to create independent cultures sufficiently strong and self-reliant to bring out the character traits latent in the individual members of society so they can apply modern technology to raise their living standards.

The most striking feature of the emerging generation of leaders in parts of Asia and Africa is a new pragmatism, well-grounded in their own moral universe, which makes them critical of rigid or magical reliance on any form of political or economic order to solve problems that often are unique to each geographic area and society. Instead, they seek the political aggregate, the method of

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government and the economic methods that best can evoke the forces necessary to sustain the modernization process within a moral society.

The most important, if still tentative, result of their political experimentation is the slow transformation of their traditional nationalism, whether it be communally-based or state-based, into something greater than it has been in the past. They are experimenting with the diffusion of state sovereignty both downward and upward from the state level, so that their political loyalties can freely extend beyond the straitjacket so long imposed upon them by Western theories of state and nation. Independence from Western tutelage has given them the freedom and perspective to see the value of transcending the state system by allowing greater microregional initiative to solve problems below the state level, and by developing macroregional solutions to problems that can be solved only beyond it.

While accepting the frequent impracticality of eliminating artificial state boundaries without resort to the forces of chaos, the new generation of nationalists increasingly is looking for ways to reduce the dislocating effects of these boundaries. Their search for a new moral society has led many of them to accept the oldest society, the community or nation, as its most essential element, because rejection of the communal nation as a basic building block of political life has led in the past to pointless violence.

By acknowledging the legitimate moral suasion of the primordial communities below the level of the artificial state, and by emphasizing the advantages of conducting themselves as members of a functional community above the state level, many emerging leaders are simply ignoring the old colonial boundaries and thereby overcoming the artificial barriers they posed to modernization. The contrived state is losing significance in the Afro-Asian political spectrum. As a by-product of this development, African and Asian leaders may be able not only to ignore state boundaries but ultimately to realign them in the interests of natural political groupings above and below the state.

The new nationalism is a fragile development, as were all the historic forces that led to truly systemic revolutions in the organization of human political life. And like every systemic revolution — if such it be — this in the Third World may be accompanied by armed violence. Outside powers may attempt to exploit it in order to channel systemic change into a kind of dead

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end inimical to the material and spiritual growth of its individual participants. But the monolithic powers in the world may find that the independent spirit and increasing sophistication of the new leaders will thwart any such efforts at intervention. Some powers may dare to base their policy on attempts to help their Asian and African allies or would-be allies to suppress the ideative forces of justice, progress and group solidarity by preserving the status quo. These may find that they have hopelessly aligned themselves for the remainder of the century against a rising historical tide.

The seriousness of the dilemma this may pose to foreign powers interested in molding the world to their own centralist image is surpassed by the opportunity the new forces offer to imaginative foreign policies of the world's democratic nations, which alone can truly support the new Third World nationalism in its communal and broad regional manifestations. Americans, of all peoples, should welcome the essentially pluralistic and democratic nature of community-oriented or "nation-based" nationalism, and should encourage the new nationalism to move in the direction of political federalism and toward the peace and material progress it can help make possible.[6]

Pluralism: A Basis for Partnership with an Independent Europe?

The second of the three critical relationships which point up the importance of pluralism as a foreign policy premise is that between the United States and Europe. A stated premise of American foreign policy, at least since President Kennedy's call on July 4, 1962 for a new era of transatlantic relations, has been the American desire to work toward a true partnership with Europe. The United States has insisted, however, that partnership can become an operational policy premise only after the Europeans achieve political integration and economic strength more nearly comparable to those of the United States. U.S. insistence that the Europeans reform themselves to fit the American model created a paradox between our stated premise and our operational policy.

[6]Some of the associated problems still on the frontier of modern behavioral research are suggested in Clifton R. Wharton's "The Green Revolution: Cornucopia or Pandora's Box," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1969, and in the author's "Revolutionary Regionalism in Southeast Asia," *Survival*, September 1968, and "The Politics and Dynamics of Human Rights, A Review," *American Journal of International Law*, Summer 1969.

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Instead of following policies that would promote the conditions we ourselves had laid down, we undermined whatever incentives the Europeans had to form a closer union. Our economic policies toward Europe have been dominated by our belief that Europeans are inferior to us in the management techniques and mass education necessary for broad economic progress, and by our related but illogical belief that we therefore would have little to gain from partnership with the Europeans in expanding mankind's technological horizons.

American political policies toward Europe have been dominated by an unspoken fear that the Europeans are too irresponsible to be trusted with their own military defense, and by our more outspoken desire to impose on the Europeans a strategy geared to our own requirements of global arms control. These fears and desires in turn are based on the outdated belief that the military and technical requirements of strategic command and control in a bipolar world permit only two centers of decision-making, in Washington and Moscow.

American military policies toward Europe have been dominated by the notion that the challenge to Europe lies primarily in the threat of a conventional Soviet military invasion. Many Europeans familiar with Soviet thinking are convinced that the really long-run challenge to both Europe and America, which NATO has failed to face, is primarily technological. One of the most profound but little perceived dangers has been that the almost universal faith among Soviet leaders in the long-range dialectical processes of scientific and technological development gives the Soviets an asymmetrically favorable environment for advanced research and development. If the environment were favorable enough, the Soviets might overtake Western capabilities in advanced weapons and impose their will on Europe without major reliance on conventional arms.

As long as the Soviet Union and Europe were both weak, American attempts to monopolize strategic power and decision-making in the Atlantic Alliance could be rationally supported. These conditions no longer exist. The Soviet Union has almost reached parity with deployed American strategic military power. This alone should be no cause for concern, because U.S. deployed strategic power equal to that of the Soviets should be sufficient to protect the United States and provide for extended American deterrence to protect Europe. The real criterion of power suf-

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ficiency is relative progress in current research and development, because this determines future power. An American goal of parity in the requisites of future military power, given the intangibles of intelligence evaluation, could easily produce a degree of American inferiority sufficient to tempt an expansionist country such as the Soviet Union to adopt more aggressive policies. In this most critical of power indicators, the Soviet Union currently poses a technological threat to the United States and Europe. Unattended, this threat to surpass future American military strength could be translated some day into a political offensive against our allies and consequently against our own vital interests.

Fortunately, this revolution in the power equation between the United States and the Soviet Union has been accompanied by a revolution in European industrial and technological power and by European progress in basic scientific research. Some American experts now contend that the Europeans have already surpassed the United States in such key areas as fundamental physics. The Europeans have reached a crossroads in their development. Failure to cooperate closely among themselves and with the United States could eventually turn Europe into a technological and economic backwater. But they have reached the advanced takeoff stage where success in cooperation could transform the entire European continent. And collaboration between the United States and Europe can now begin significantly to increase the alliance's total deterrent and defensive strength at a substantial financial saving to the American taxpayer.

Administratively, such cooperation might best be accomplished through competition among private industrial firms. Competitive governmental acquisition programs would be designed not primarily to assist the Europeans or to increase alliance security, but to achieve maximum returns by both the U.S. and European governments on their mutual investments. An alliance decision to work toward an independent Europe would create enormous demands on European and American industry. U.S. industry is not about to give anything away to the Europeans. And the Europeans clearly do not want to rely on buying U.S.-produced aerospace systems, because this would invite trade deficits and an unhealthy technological gap. European industry could best gain the necessary access to American scientific and technological know-how if European governments would cooperate with the U.S. government in arranging for firms on both sides of the Atlan-

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tic to share the investments, industrial efforts, returns and markets associated with the technically complex systems that the Europeans and the Americans increasingly will need.

Research, development and production of advanced weapons systems, essential to building Europe into an independent power and to maintaining the U.S. status as an independent power, can best be accomplished by expanding the area and scope of international industrial competition. Government requests for new weapons proposals would continue to be sent to American prime contractors for U.S. weapons and to their national equivalents for British, French, German and Italian weapons. But increasingly the most successful bidders might be international prime contractors. Or they might be national prime contractors with instructions to organize international consortia of associates and multinational subcontractors geared to meet technical as well as other considerations, such as balance of payments. Thus European governments might wish to acquire 75 per cent of a particular type of tactical nuclear weapon, or of a particular follow-on bomber, mobile medium-range ballistic missile, or component of a ballistic missile defense system, whereas the United States might account for only 25 per cent of the particular weapons requirement within the alliance. The prime contractors then could be instructed to organize their consortia so that 75 per cent of the industrial requirements would be undertaken by European firms, and 25 per cent by American firms.

Individual governments could subsidize their industries to create new industrial capabilities necessary to close any technological gaps evident during the initial bidding process. Eventually such subsidies should become unnecessary as government contractors find that in many fields European industrial consortia and American industrial firms can compete as equals and can afford their own technical and economic development efforts to propose and compete for new programs.

There are many advantages in employing competitive acquisition programs to shift part of the European defense burden from American to European shoulders. Maximizing private initiative and responsibility of both European and American industry and maintaining a balance of payments are the two most important. The essential point is that American cooperation with an increasingly independent Europe is administratively feasible, as well as politically, economically and militarily desirable.

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The changes in relative military power and potential among the three industrially most advanced regions of the world, and the obsolescence of many premises underlying American strategy, provide important reasons for shifting American policy toward Europe from tutelage to cooperation. Great as would be American economic and military benefits from such a shift, the political and economic benefits for the Europeans would be even greater.

The political benefits from increased European independence would consist primarily of an improved environment for sovereign European states to build a working federalism out of the existing network of supranational European functional organizations. The Europeans share a universal fear of a single sovereign federator, particularly a non-European one, such as the Soviet Union or the United States. The fear of hegemony, even by a single European nation, will probably prevent them from adopting the American type of regional federalism, in which substantial yet strictly limited sovereignty is permanently delegated to a central government. Even if Great Britain is admitted as an intra-European balancing wheel to prevent French or German hegemony, the legitimate European fear of political centralism would probably prevent the European movement from achieving more than a confederal union, in which sovereignty would be selectively delegated to perform specific functional tasks. A prime objective would be to prevent the creation of an independent German nuclear force. Many proponents of European independence believe this could be achieved if the military authority necessary for regional command and control of advanced weapons systems were delegated in specially designed ways to the supranational Western European Union.

Cooperation between the European and American federal systems within the Atlantic Alliance, as well as cooperation among the European states within their own regional system, would demonstrate that peoples differing in language, history and national loyalties can multiply their talents and resources through the pluralist technique of functional internationalism.

The most important long-range effect of American cooperation with an independent Europe might be the extension of a loose federalism throughout all of Europe from the Atlantic to the Carpathians. The Soviet Union has long promoted the idea of a concert of Europe to include the Soviet Union but exclude the United States. The present reactionary phase of Soviet com-

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munism demonstrates that this is clearly incompatible with European independence, and informed leaders in both Western and Eastern Europe know it. An independent Europe must restrict its membership to Europeans, and its success in doing so will determine the extent and permanence of its independence. European independence in turn would reduce the fear of each superpower that the reduction of its own influence in Europe would increase the influence and global power of the other.

When the Soviet Union again enters a liberalizing phase in its development, as it almost inevitably must at some indeterminate date in the future, the peoples of Europe should be ready to transform the Soviet-European relationship from confrontation to cooperation. In addition to laying the foundation for such an epic development, they must build sufficient strength as an independent European regional grouping to deter any attempts of a subsequent reactionary Soviet communism to weaken or destroy such independence by the use of military force.

Pluralism: A Path from Confrontation to Negotiation

The application of pluralism in our relations with Europe and with the Third World would also help to move the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States from confrontation to negotiation. The growth of a truly independent Europe, free to choose its international partners, would help to destroy the bipolar structure of the world and replace it with a macroregional global structure probably more stable than the inherently unstable confrontation of two genuinely incompatible superpowers. By reducing these superpowers in practice to regional powers, such a reconstellation would facilitate a pluralist framework of interregional negotiation and cooperation. This shift would make possible the beginnings of truly interregional and international problem solving. And it would separate such problem solving from the overweaning interests of the two superpowers, which have aggravated tensions all over the world by looking at local problems as if they were instruments of their own bipolar confrontation.

The creation of such a pluralist world of independent nations and cooperative groupings of nations not only would promote our basic long-range global interests, but would destroy more surely than any other development the expansionist opportunities and ambitions of reactionary communist leaders. While building such

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a pluralist world, the United States hopefully would continue its policy of peaceful engagement with all communist countries, which has been a basic premise of U.S. foreign policy. An American foreign policy founded on this combination of basic premises would encourage communist elites, not only in Eastern Europe but in the Soviet Union and even in China, to humanize communism so the people living in these states could freely support their countries' national and international goals.

The Czechoslovak attempt to strengthen world communism by example, rather than by subversion and force, presented a far more formidable global challenge to the forces of pluralism than the totalitarian communism now resurgent in the Soviet Union. Humanized communism is still not democratic pluralism, so the challenge to pluralist societies, e.g., the United States, would continue. But the challenge would be a contest on the merits between the organizing principles of pluralism and modified collectivism. We could welcome this kind of challenge, because we could lose such a contest only if we did not deserve to win.

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SOVIET POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD IN THE 1970'S: FIVE ALTERNATIVE FUTURES*

by Walter C. Clemens, Jr.

THE approach of this essay represents an adaptation of methods employed by Herman Kahn, Lincoln P. Bloomfield, and others who have sought to outline the likely contours of political, technological and cultural change in decades to come.[1] It seeks first to outline a finite number of alternative worlds which are both conceivable and reasonably likely for a given time frame — the 1970's. The pictures presented will resemble a series of still shots rather than dynamic scenarios. We shall analyze what appear to be the decisive factors that will determine which alternative model comes to the fore, and try to suggest what changes in each of these parameters will produce what results. We will then attempt to rank-order the likelihood of the alternative futures, based on the probability of change in each of the controlling factors studied. This approach will also suggest implications for U.S. policy, on the assumption that American action would influence the nature of change in at least some of these parameters.

The crucial factors likely to shape the future of Soviet policy in the Third World may be analyzed under three main categories: (1) military — strategic and technological; (2) external political; and (3) domestic — economic and social. The particular Gestalt and intensity of these factors are important variables. We shall see that certain trends may function to strengthen contradictory models, or that a factor such as the level of Soviet consumer goods may work to support a particular model — no matter whether the level of intensity is high or low. On the one hand, this illustrates that some factors are more important than others in shaping cer-

*A longer version of this article, with further methodological discussion and bibliographical reference to the content of Soviet policy, will appear in an anthology on Soviet policy in developing countries, edited by W. Raymond Duncan and published by Blaisdell Publishing Company.

[1]Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, *The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-three Years* (New York: Macmillan, 1967); Lincoln P. Bloomfield, *Western Europe to the Mid-Seventies: Five Scenarios* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Center for International Studies, 1968). For a Soviet criticism of the Kahn-Wiener book, see Gregory Ratiani, "The Futurology of Mr. Herman Kahn," *Soviet Military Review*, No. 7 (1968), pp. 49-51.

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tain models. But it also shows how crucial are variables such as the rate and intensity of the salience of a particular factor. Most important, it underlines the importance of the total configuration of these factors: given one context, a factor such as Soviet affluence may support an inward-looking isolationism; in another it may further a development orientation; in still another, a hard-hitting forward strategy.

Five alternative futures will be examined. The first — what we call the "standard" world — amounts to a continuation of patterns that have characterized Soviet policy for almost two decades. The other four models are defined as "canonical" variations of the first.[2] The main characteristics of each variation have already appeared in Soviet policy — indeed, they have constituted its basic content — but none of them has achieved predominance except perhaps for a short time, e.g., during or immediately following a crisis. But if one of these characteristics were to emerge as the main theme of Soviet policy, a significantly different situation from the standard world would result. These canonical variations may be defined as: (1) a forward strategy, (2) a stability or status quo orientation, (3) a development or aid orientation, and (4) isolationism.

Each of the five models can be broken down into various submodels and variations, depending, for example, on the admixture of competition and cooperation with other powers involved. We should be clear that each model could express itself primarily in military, political, economic or cultural dimensions — or in all these senses. Geographical extension is another important variable: Does a particular model apply to all Third World regions and countries or only to some?

Considering these and other possible variables, we should be aware that there may be no uniform Soviet policy throughout the Third World. Nevertheless, it is theoretically possible that some major theme may surge ahead to characterize Soviet policy. Even if a theme such as forward strategy prevails in one region but not in others, the general principles suggested in this essay can be adopted and made relevant in a more limited context, although East-West cooperation in one area will be less feasible if a tense confrontation persists in another.

The five models are presented in terms of their relative prob-

[2]These terms are used in a slightly different sense from that developed by Kahn and Wiener, *op. cit.*

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ability. Virtually by definition, the standard model appears most likely for the near and even the middle-range future. On the other hand, as Bloomfield has warned, to expect "more of the same" may turn out to be the least realistic approach, because of the contingent nature of history.[3]

The Standard Model

The standard model of which the other scenarios suggest significant variations is one that has existed throughout the 1960's, going back even to several years before Stalin's death when Moscow moved toward a more flexible line. It is a world that embodies what a dialectician would immediately recognize as a unity of opposites or, to be more precise, many unities of opposites. It is a world of contradictory impulses, cross-pressures, conflicting goads and restraints, where progress toward one objective undermines movement toward another desideratum.

The term "standard" applies in three senses. First, it suggests patterns that extend back a decade or more. Second, the existing model provides a norm by which future change may be considered and evaluated. Third, this model is the one deemed most likely to characterize Soviet policy for the next five or ten years. Precisely because the standard model is a response to many factors — all pushing and pulling in different directions — it seems unlikely that any of these conflicting impulses will increase so greatly as to bring about a clear-cut trend in Soviet policy, a trend that would override the ambivalence inherent in a strategy seeking to obtain the best of several possible worlds.

The forward strategy theme in Soviet policy toward the Third World combines both revolutionary and anti-imperialist motives, deriving from *Realpolitik* as well as ideology. The meshing of the two objectives was seen in the early 1920's when Moscow supported Kemal Atatürk's military and diplomatic campaign against Greece, France and Britain. The Kremlin's policy reflected security concerns like those that inspired centuries of Tsarist policy, but now it was rationalized as support of a nationalist, anti-imperialist regime which could be transformed into a socialist government at a later stage.

Following the 1927 debacle of Stalin's support for another national bourgeois leader, Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet policy in the Third World became less forward and more isolationist. After

[3]Bloomfield, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

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World War II, Moscow even applied the two-camp doctrine to such Third World leaders as Nehru and dubbed them capitalist lackeys. In 1954-1955, however, the pendulum of Soviet policy swung away from frontal pressure on the West to exploit once again what Moscow perceived as a vacuum in the developing world. From the beginning of the Khrushchev decade through the first years of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, elements of a forward strategy have again influenced Soviet policy. These have been manifest most troublesomely in Soviet-bloc military assistance to President Nasser and in vastly increased military aid to Hanoi since late 1964 (Khrushchev's successors apparently having reversed his general hands-off policy). But there have also been sharp limits to Soviet military involvement in the Third World, as we saw, for example, in the departure of Soviet planes from Egypt as soon as the 1956 war began, and in the contrast between Moscow's and Peking's views of U.S.-Hanoi negotiations to end the Vietnamese war. In general, Moscow's support for wars of national liberation has been more vocal than actual, inspired no doubt by a concern not to be outdone by Peking.

The Kremlin's forward strategy since 1954 has not been limited to military programs. For purposes of this analysis, any Soviet policy aimed at winning over leaders or peoples in the Third World and turning them against the West (or Peking) falls under the rubric of "forward strategy." Thus, economic assistance as well as cultural and propaganda programs could serve these objectives. In some cases, of course, the motivation behind a particular program is not clear — perhaps even in Moscow — for economic aid might help to influence an emerging nation toward the USSR, but it might also contribute to stability or development that would be welcomed by the West. Similarly, the training of African students at Lumumba University in Moscow might be conceived as a way to turn them into revolutionary or at least anti-Western elites, but in practice could prepare them for a status quo or even anti-Soviet orientation. Thus, the results of a program may not square with its supposed objectives.

In the last decade, a tendency to cooperate with the West in maintaining order in the Third World has been threaded into Soviet policy, though it has played a subordinate role. This tendency rests on parallel if not precisely mutual interests in maintaining peace, thwarting Chinese inroads, and — to a degree — preserving agreed spheres of influence. U.S. and Soviet policy in

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the 1956 Suez crisis functioned to curtail the hostilities and protect Egypt from further advances by Israel, France and Great Britain. Subsequently, Washington and Moscow found themselves on India's side in her frontier conflicts with China, not only in 1962 but even as early as 1959, despite Moscow's neutrality proclaimed at that time. While these instances of parallel action were probably not consciously coordinated, Washington appeared content to support Premier Kosygin's good offices in arranging the Tashkent settlement of Pakistan-Indian differences over Kashmir. More dramatically, the superpowers have clearly formed a common front to prevent nuclear proliferation in the Third World.

Against this common front to uphold the status quo there are profound counter-tendencies, deriving from Moscow's desire to appear as the leader of the revolutionary movement and its reluctance to pass up an opportunity to gain influence at the expense of the United States or other Western countries. The main indicator of Moscow's reservations about collaboration with the West has been the Kremlin's policy toward United Nations peacekeeping operations. Only in the initial stages of the Congo operation, when the Soviets expected that UN activity would help to expel Western economic interests, have UN peacekeeping actions received Soviet support. Otherwise Moscow has seen them as instruments of U.S. foreign policy, thanks to Washington's influence on the votes of UN member nations. The Kremlin's response has been logical in terms of its interests, but deleterious for the cause of peacekeeping: a demand that no UN operation be launched without Soviet permission. Paradoxically, Moscow's crippling of UN peacekeeping activities may have contributed in the early and mid-1960's to a U.S. determination to intervene unilaterally where necessary to uphold the interests of law and order (and of the United States).

A third theme in Soviet policy, parallel or joint action with the West to promote economic and political development in the Third World, has operated to date, unfortunately, only in low key. The major manifestations of this theme — like parallel efforts to maintain the status quo — have not been coordinated by Moscow and Washington. To the contrary, most of their aid programs have been inspired more by competition than by cooperation. Each has conceived of its economic aid as, *inter alia*, an instrument for winning over the new nations to its foreign and domestic policy orientation or, at a minimum, denying these coun-

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tries to the sphere of the other side. As a result, the action (or inaction) of each superpower has helped to promote similar policies by the other. In fact, the amounts (and rates) of economic assistance from Moscow and Washington to the Third World have declined in the mid- and late-1960's. Even in the few instances where Washington and Moscow have contributed, with other nations, to joint ventures — as in the space research program at Thumba, India, or in the UN Institute for Training and Research (which offers professional training for Third World students) — U.S. and Soviet motivation has been in large part competitive.

Nevertheless, even though Soviet aid programs may have been partly inspired by a forward strategy, their net impact may be, as in India, to strengthen the forces of progress and evolution rather than those favoring chaos and revolution. To this extent, Soviet contributions to the economic, cultural and political development of emerging nations may coincide with the true interests of the United States. As Millikan and Blackmer have pointed out, the goal of U.S. policy should not be to make the new nations capitalistic or to ally them with the United States, but to put them on the road to development so that they will have the inner resources for political self-determination and self-perpetuating economic growth.[4]

Implicit in the foregoing is the fact that Soviet policy, despite its activist leanings, has also displayed inward-looking, cautious, even isolationist tendencies. The term isolationist fits the withdrawn, xenophobic posture of Stalin's policies toward the Third World. But it likewise fits the Kremlin's reluctance since 1953 to commit Soviet troops to the Third World; Moscow's disillusionment in the early 1960's about the prospects of winning over the emerging nations of Africa and Asia; Soviet reserve deriving in part from doubts about the reliability of a Latin temperament such as Castro's, and anxiety lest an engagement such as Viet Nam escalate to catastrophic proportions. Although "wars of national liberation" are termed "unavoidable," Soviet spokesmen have cautioned about the great dangers of escalation. Unlike the Chinese, who tend to extol the merits of purgation by fire, Soviet ideologues have tended in the 1950's and 1960's to treat violence as at best a necessary evil. While Moscow grants that "national liberation" must be achieved by force of arms, the Soviet line is that the

[4]Max F. Millikan and Donald L. M. Blackmer, *The Emerging Nations: Their Growth and United States Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961).

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transition from a bourgeois to a socialist regime can be achieved by nonviolent as well as by violent means. Such revolutions, both Moscow and Peking agree, cannot be "exported," but depend on internal forces within the country in question.

"Standard" Soviet policy in the Third World, then, has reflected contradictory commitments. Ideology and power politics point to a forward strategy, but this is curtailed by the dangers of war, limitations on Soviet economic and military power, disappointments in the Third World, and lack of enthusiasm for overseas ventures among the Soviet people. By the same token, however, a strictly isolationist posture has been untenable because challenges as well as opportunities have been present. Moscow has sought to handle some of these problems by parallel or even coordinated policies with the United States, but continued competition between the superpowers and continued Soviet aspirations to the mantle of revolutionary leadership have severely inhibited this relationship. Moscow has engaged in relatively large aid programs, chiefly in competition with the United States, but the Kremlin has tempered these not only because its resources are limited but because the political payoffs have not been sufficiently rewarding — most of the emerging nations have demonstrated their ability as well as their desire to play off the great powers to local advantage.

The standard model of Soviet involvement in the Third World, as suggested at the outset, seems likely to endure, at least into the mid-1970's, if only because Moscow will continue to ride several horses in different directions at the same time. Although expecting "more of the same" may prove to be unrealistic, it nevertheless appears — if we analyze the key determinants of Soviet policy — that the standard model will prevail for the next five to ten years, if not longer. Militarily, the present strategic balance of power seems likely to persist, at least to the degree that neither superpower gains a usable advantage over the other. Neither Washington nor Moscow is apt to obtain the kind of leverage that would lead one to attempt nuclear blackmail against the other, or to take great risks (such as Khrushchev's Cuban missile venture) to redress its bargaining position. While Moscow's air- and sea-lift capability for military intervention abroad will continue to grow, the extent of this growth is uncertain. In any event, Soviet practice is likely to be conservative, due to continued fears about escalation, even if Soviet theorists

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talk increasingly about the need for an ability to fight limited wars. An adventurist spirit arising from improvements in Soviet conventional forces would also be tempered by the growing pragmatism of Soviet decision-makers, in contrast to the more "subjective" behavior of Chairman Khrushchev. Equally important, the growing threat posed by Communist China's strategic and conventional force would tend to rein in Moscow's involvements in the Third World.

Contributing to this standard world will be a persistence of conflicting foreign policy priorities: on the one hand, a desire to drive the West (and China) from the Third World and to uphold Moscow's claim to lead the revolutionary movement; on the other hand, a desire to live in peace and to improve relations with the West for economic and other reasons. Furthermore, while soft spots in the Third World will present tempting power vacuums to the Kremlin, the new nations on the whole will seek to resist domination by any foreign power.

Economic developments in the Soviet Union will permit Moscow to maintain or even increase assistance programs, but a substantial accretion will be ruled out, not only by the objective limits to Soviet growth, but by mounting consumer demands in the USSR for something more than "goulash communism." Moscow will see no clear economic reason to alter the current patterns of trade and investment in the Third World, for the incentives to increase these activities will be neutralized by other reasons to curtail them.

The orientation of Soviet political elites and the public at large will be to build a great society at home rather than abroad. Now that the USSR has approached the threshold of consumer affluence, the pressures of rising expectations, coupled with democratic stirrings across the society, will direct attention toward internal construction rather than external adventures. Whether or not the Kremlin leadership remains basically unified, there will be no powerful constituency for political or economic activism in the Third World. Nevertheless, since the costs of maintaining the current levels of involvement are not high, there will be few overriding domestic pressures — elite or mass — to alter these levels. To the extent that the Soviet military gains a stronger hand over decision-making, their attention would probably be aimed more at changing Soviet policy toward China or toward the West than toward the Third World. Assuming that the strategic balance

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remains roughly similar to that of the mid-1960's, there will be little pressure to use some point in the Third World as a bridgehead to improve the USSR's position vis-à-vis the West.

The standard model of Soviet policy has become familiar. In a sense we can abide it, for the problems it raises have to date been managed without approaching the brink of major war. To be sure, the Cuban missile crisis arose in part from Moscow's activities in the Third World, including a commitment to protect Havana against a putative threat from the United States, but the main cause of that confrontation probably derived from Moscow's desire to alter the strategic balance of power quickly and inexpensively — an aim which a Cuban missile base would conveniently serve. Other superpower engagements in the Third World have been limited to date because only one side (usually the United States) has entered in force. Clearly, however, the standard model has many shortcomings. It might easily give rise to pressures that could lead U.S. and Soviet forces to join combat in some trouble spot, perhaps catalyzed by protégés in Tel Aviv and Cairo. Further, the standard model is not adequate for coping with such problems as (1) the rise of a nuclear-armed and possibly territorially revisionist government in Peking; (2) nuclear spread to other powers, many of them capable of precipitating a conflict between the larger powers; and (3) the widening gap between the have and have-not nations.

The Forward Strategy Model

The next most likely scenario is also the most undesirable from the standpoint of world peace. If the variables that account for a "standard world" are modified but slightly, a Soviet forward strategy seems highly plausible. Several Soviet scholars have commented that this scenario seems the least likely of those presented here, yet its probability derives largely from a kind of materialist argument Soviet spokesmen have sometimes used to portray the dangers of the arms race.[5] The main assumption of this argument is that, if means exist, it is only a question of time until they will be used, particularly in the volatile political climate foreseen in the Third World for years to come.

This assumption is then linked with what intelligence analysts deem to be an incontrovertible fact: the growth in Moscow's

[5]See N. M. Nikol'skii, *Osnovi vopros sovremennosti* (Moscow: *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia,* 1964), pp. 318-383.

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capability to initiate and sustain military and economic intervention in far-flung parts of the globe. Even if the USSR seeks only parity and not superiority in such forces, the result may be that, for the first time in history, two superpowers will possess overlapping capabilities for intervention on a global scale. U.S. interventions from Greece (1947) to Lebanon (1958) to Viet Nam (1960's) were facilitated because Moscow had no comparable capability that might be used to pre-empt or engage American forces. Moreover, for much of this period U.S. strategic superiority provided a shield which added to Washington's confidence that its intervention would go unchallenged.

Today, however, both Washington and Moscow are cognizant that neither side can mount a first strike capable of destroying the other's retaliatory forces. Anti-ballistic missile defenses, whether "thick" or "thin," will not alter this picture. The result is that Moscow, like Washington in the past, can intervene in the Third World with little fear of a U.S. strategic attack, since the stakes would hardly justify the risk of a retaliatory strike against the United States. Rather than being sobered by the brinkmanship already experienced in Viet Nam, the Middle East and elsewhere, strategists of both sides may come to believe that the record since 1945 indicates that war in the Third World can be localized and limited — despite involvement by one or more great powers. If nuclear weapons do not spread to many additional states, and if China remains a clearly second-rate nuclear power, the superpowers may feel still fewer inhibitions about carrying out limited combat in the dueling grounds of the Third World.

The next most important ingredient for the development of this scenario is chaos in the Third World itself. Moscow may believe that the outcome of a crisis can be favorably directed by the injection of Soviet military, economic or political force. The Kremlin might decide that, even though the new nations generally resist foreign domination, several key areas would serve as useful footholds, in the manner of Cuba or Egypt. The area might be particularly attractive for its economic, political, strategic or other assets. Moscow might devise some pretext for intervention, or its involvement might be invited by indigenous forces.

A Soviet forward strategy is compatible with wide fluctuations among other key variables. It could be motivated by ideological renaissance in Moscow and/or by power politics. It is compatible

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with a high degree of U.S.-Soviet-Chinese competition in the Third World or with the withdrawal of other major competitors so that the area was left without external defenses. All might be quiet on the Western front, or there could be tension in Europe which Moscow would somehow exploit to carry out decisive actions in another arena. China might be allied with a Soviet forward strategy or constitute one of its targets.

True, economic and political developments at home place limits on the extent to which Moscow can mount a forward strategy. If interventions are surgically quick and precise, their economic and political costs may not be prohibitive. As Moscow has already learned in Cuba, the long-term expense of subsidizing the economy as well as shoring up the defenses of a client state can be gigantic. Cost factors such as these, however, manifest themselves over a medium- or long-range time span, and might not be decisive, given the perceived threat or gain of a particular moment.

A forward strategy is also compatible with a variety of political developments within the Soviet Union. Assuming few serious internal challenges, the Kremlin leaders will retain a relatively free hand to decide the basic thrust of foreign policy. But should internal rivalries or domestic pressures increase, and key leaders seek to override opposition and build cohesion by mounting a bold policy abroad, the area of the Third World would present the fewest dangers and the greatest opportunities. Problems with minority nationalities within the USSR, for example, might be manipulated by selective applications of a forward strategy abroad, particularly in the Middle East.

The forward strategy model clearly presents the greatest dangers to world peace of all the scenarios envisaged here. Soviet penetration of the Third World is likely to generate counteractions by other interested nations. It is not clear how to avert the rise of such a strategy. Third World chaos that breeds temptation is beyond the control of great powers standing outside it, at least in the short run. The development of a powerful Soviet capability for intervention is also beyond the control of other governments, except to the degree that Moscow may be trying to emulate U.S. successes or to constrain Washington's future activities. On the other hand, for Washington to stand by while Moscow adopts an interventionist policy might only lead to an increase in Soviet intervention.

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Three policy guidelines may be suggested: First, Washington should refrain from challenging the Soviet Union by unilateral U.S. interventions in civil strife (as opposed to cases of aggression across frontiers). Second, programs should be carried out to promote the kind of stability that will reduce chaos in the Third World. Third, UN machinery for peacemaking as well as peacekeeping should be strengthened, and in a manner that elicits Soviet (and if possible, Chinese) support.

A Status Quo Orientation

The third-ranked model for Soviet policy in the developing world is an orientation toward maintenance of the status quo, probably by parallel or joint actions with the United States and other like-minded powers. To take in the broad spectrum of possibilities, however, we should note that a preference for the status quo could conceivably have several important variations. Like all the alternatives presented, a status quo approach could be of long or short duration; it might be a tactic or a strategy. It could be directed toward (a) limiting violence across national frontiers; (b) limiting violence within Third World states; (c) containing a military threat by the Third World against the industrialized nations; (d) limiting the influence of other external powers, such as China, within the Third World; (e) limiting social and economic change in the Third World, even though it is pursued by nonviolent means; (f) thwarting attempts by the Third World to make inroads on the political or economic advantages of the northern "have" nations.

What conditions would favor an accentuation of the status quo orientation so that it became the predominant theme in Soviet policy? Such an orientation requires not only a basic satisfaction with the present order, but a concern lest it be upset by unwelcome developments. Fear of nuclear proliferation has already provided a strong incentive to support the status quo. If the Nonproliferation Treaty is generally successful, the Soviet commitment to help secure the nonnuclear nations against nuclear threats may generate a series of behavior patterns entailing U.S.-Soviet collaboration that could form an important component in a status quo orientation. Even if the treaty fails and nuclear proliferation does occur, the Soviet Union may still find itself leagued with Washington in an attempt to cope with actual

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threats of nuclear wars initiated by smaller powers rather than with merely the potential threat of such wars.

Regardless of what happens with respect to India and other potential nuclear-weapon countries, however, a growing Chinese threat — conventional as well as nuclear — would probably serve to strengthen U.S.-Soviet cooperation, unless one of the superpowers teamed up with Communist China against the other superpower. For Moscow to cooperate with Washington in such a manner would probably imply Soviet acceptance of either nuclear parity or inferiority vis-à-vis the United States. Were the Soviet Union to entertain a hope of nuclear superiority over the United States, relations between them would doubtless be too strained and laden with distrust to make duopoly work. On balance, it might be useful for neither side to feel that it was protected against smaller nuclear powers by an anti-ballistic missile system, for without an ABM defense the superpowers' interest in preventing catalytic wars would be higher. On the other hand, an ABM defense would give them a stronger bargaining hand in case they did have to deal with a series of smaller nuclear powers.

Apart from a nuclear threat, it is possible that a growing division of the world into haves and have-nots might force the superpowers into collaboration to defend the status quo. Already Peking claims that the focus of revolutionary struggle lies in the conflict between the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the traditional centers of White Man's imperialism, with which the USSR is associated. The Soviet Union refutes this, maintaining that the revolutionary struggle is primarily between the socialist camp (which Moscow still claims to lead) and the capitalist camp. For the present, the nations of the Third World do not pose a serious, active danger to Soviet interests. Yet, if Peking does succeed in mobilizing these nations against the superpowers, the Soviet Union might fear that the general threat to the security and stability of the present order was undermining her own position.

The condition that would do most to produce a status quo orientation in Moscow would be a growing indifference to the Soviet Union's image as leader of the communist movement and the revolutionary peoples of the world. In the mid-1960's the maintenance of this image has apparently been an important policy priority, as witnessed by the Kremlin's concern over the "bombing of a sister socialist state, North Vietnam" and — more to

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the point — Moscow's recurrent efforts to hold a "unity" meeting of the communist movement. Nevertheless, the Soviets have for decades taken action to promote the interests of Soviet security at the expense of local communist parties, ranging from France to India. Given a sufficient security threat, Moscow's political and ideological aspirations might again be shunted to one side. A downgrading of revolutionary aspirations could be considered appropriate if events in the Third World continue to indicate that this area is not amenable to a high degree of Soviet influence. Thus, if events in the Third World seem to threaten the Soviet Union or if the area appears to be unripe for the advance of Soviet interests directly, Moscow is more likely to adopt a status quo policy.

The prospects for a status quo orientation would seem to improve as Soviet-U.S. relations improve. Continued competition in some domains such as outer space, or even in key geographical regions such as Western Europe, might be consonant with U.S.-Soviet collaboration to maintain the existing order in the Third World. Certainly, positive ties between the superpowers, including economic and technological interdependence, would favor their taking a common front against Third World threats. If Soviet security interests in Eastern Europe seem to be threatened by policies of the United States, it might be more difficult to achieve a common front in dealing with geographical regions more remote to Soviet interests.

At home the status quo orientation would be favored by a growing sense of economic and political satisfaction, although it might also be strengthened by a sharp preference for radical improvements in Soviet living conditions. The tighter Soviet resources become, due either to a slow growth rate or mounting consumer demands or both within the country, the more reactionary and rigidly status quo might be Moscow's orientation to the Third World. Moreover, the more meager the Soviet resources for coping with Third World problems, the more the Soviet leadership would disregard ideological considerations in favor of cooperation with the United States. If Soviet resources did appear meager, the model of Soviet development would be less appealing to leaders of the Third World, and Soviet leaders would be more inclined to view the area as unreceptive to Soviet influence.

A domestic political situation in which the power of public opinion was growing simultaneously with mounting consumer

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demands might be the most favorable to a status quo policy. If consumer demands rose, but mass influence on the decision-making process remained weak, a more activist orientation might be possible. Nevertheless, a degree of stability in the Soviet state would be useful in promoting a status quo outlook insofar as this encouraged the government to concentrate on its own internal development, while trying to hold the line on challenges from the Third World.

We must, as suggested earlier, distinguish a status quo orientation with respect to economic development in the Third World from an orientation concerned primarily with maintaining the existing political-territorial system free from international violence. But the two may be coupled. Thus there have been signs that Moscow has pressed the UAR to negotiate a reasonable settlement with Israel, and that the Kremlin has used economic as well as other influences to this end.

A Development or Aid Orientation

By definition, a development orientation could not go hand-in-hand with a strategy aimed at preventing economic and social change, even if the rationale for the former was to thwart disruptions that could lead to cross-national aggression and external intervention. But an orientation in Soviet policy toward development is not incompatible with a strategy of maintaining international peace. Indeed, it may be that in the most profound sense the best way to maintain "stability" is by "development," in the Third World as elsewhere. If positive adjustments to changing technological, psychological, and other patterns are not made, the pull is toward revolution and chaos rather than orderly progress. Thus, from a practical as well as a moral standpoint, a development orientation in Soviet policy to the Third World — particularly if parallel policies are pursued by the other major powers — is the most desirable of the five scenarios.

This canonical variation itself has two important variations: a development orientation could take place either in competition or — less likely — in coordination with the West. The first variation might resemble the "peace race" urged, for example, by Seymour Melman as an alternative to the arms race.[6] Soviet leaders such as Khrushchev have also urged that the struggle between the "socialist" and "capitalist" systems be waged in a nonmilitary

[6] *The Peace Race* (New York: George Braziller, 1962).

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arena, in a competition to demonstrate which system is superior, both in the developed and in the developing countries. The outcome of this competition presumably would be determined by the appeal of each system. Other authors—not so concerned with gaining points for either system—favor competition between the two on the ground that it would be more conducive than East-West cooperation to (a) the generation of large resources for development and (b) strengthening the independence and self-determination of Third World countries.

If pushed with great vigor, a development orientation could be a major aspect in a Soviet "forward strategy," particularly if Moscow sought to exploit primarily nonmilitary instruments of foreign policy. This approach, however, might not prove to be long-lived, or, more generally, conducive to superpower allocation of significant aid resources to the Third World. If Moscow and Washington envisaged a "peace race" mainly as a way of defeating one another, the accompanying tensions would probably lead each to place a high premium on a powerful military posture as well — both in the Third World and in the bipolar confrontation. If these assumptions are correct, it may be that in the longer run the best prospect for a powerful aid orientation on the part of the major powers would derive from a basically cooperative rather than a competitive approach.

A cooperative approach to development of the Third World could be carried on by parallel courses of action, by multilateral actions (e.g., through United Nations agencies), or — most awkward politically — joint programs. Elements of competition could continue, of course, for there is a theoretical spectrum ranging from pure competition at one extreme (the notion of a zero-sum game) to pure cooperation and harmony at the other, with various mixes in between.[7]

For either a competitive or a cooperative strategy to prevail, the strategic military balance would probably need to rest at a relative equilibrium, at a level where each superpower perceived that neither could easily achieve a meaningful advantage over the other. Under these circumstances there would be something to gain and little to lose from directing more resources toward aiding the Third World. An aid orientation could conceivably persist

[7]Such an approach has been formulated, e.g., by A. D. Sakharov, whose manuscript appeared in the *New York Times*, July 22, 1968 and, with commentary by Harrison E. Salisbury, as *Progress, Coexistence & Intellectual Freedom* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968).

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even though Moscow and Washington maintained powerful conventional forces for intervention, assuming that these were not actively engaged but were kept mainly as a form of mutual deterrence. But it would be helpful if United Nations forces could be built up so as to prevent cross-national violence in the Third World and hence discourage intervention.

As regards the external political climate, tension between the superpowers might be conducive to a competitive aid strategy if the two were checkmated elsewhere, while a cooperative orientation would profit more from a broad sense of détente. Before the United States and the USSR would divert large resources to the Third World either competitively or cooperatively, however, they would have to feel that no serious threat to the peace was likely to arise in Europe. A dynamic and united Europe could contribute to a Soviet aid orientation by sparking a competitive effort or by joining in a grand coordinated design on the part of the industrialized, northern states to assist those of the southern hemisphere. A widely perceived threat from China could also spur efforts to make the Third World more "satisfied." Japan is already in a strong position to assist other nations' development, and has been making useful contributions for some time, as has Taiwan. In time, other developing nations such as India and Argentina might — like China — be able to contribute to, as well as profit from, a wide-scale development orientation.

A cooperative orientation would be favored by an increase in Soviet trade with the West, while the prevalence of restrictions on such transactions might lead to more competitive relations in the Third World, where trade as well as aid might be employed as an instrument for winning over potential allies. To the degree that important Third World countries appear vulnerable to domination by external powers politically or economically, the chances of competitive aid programs gain. Competition could also be spurred by the developing countries playing off one major power (or bloc) against the other. In contrast, cooperative programs would be more likely if the superpowers see that they cannot dominate key parts of Asia, Africa or Latin America. Indeed, a threat from the have-nots of the south against the haves of the north might be useful in compelling the latter to adopt a significant cooperative aid program.

Massive assistance to the Third World would require continued and even increased economic growth in the USSR (and in other

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developed nations), since domestic requirements would limit the resources available to the Kremlin if it decided to embark on a development strategy. In any case, even though Soviet living standards lagged behind those in many Western countries, the USSR would have available certain types of surpluses — perhaps, for example, trained technicians who could contribute to development programs.

Sociological change in the Soviet Union may also favor an interest in foreign aid, comparable to developments in the United States stimulating many young people to seek a creative outlet in the Peace Corps and other service programs. A sense of security and relative affluence at home — in contrast to the "depression" mentality of their elders — may spark in the young a wider interest in humanities and social service instead of more practical careers such as engineering. The milieu may induce a cosmopolitan instead of a chauvinistic outlook, beginning with a deeper interest in and greater opportunity for foreign travel.

Either an authoritarian or a more democratic government could preside over an aid orientation in Soviet policy. An authoritarian regime might wield the necessary resources for competition or even — presuming a kind of enlightened despotism — at least tacit cooperation with the West. Greater public influence over foreign policy could — as in the United States — make it more stingy and inward-looking. Between these two extremes, however, is a plausible development that could improve foreign aid prospects: more power over government decisions by technocratic elites who are better educated, more affluent, and (except for the military) more internationalist than traditional party *apparatchiki* or the population at large.

To summarize, it appears that a competitive orientation to development is more likely than a cooperative one — at least by the familiar logic of the Cold War. A competitive development strategy can merge with a forward strategy generally. This could make the Third World more an object than a subject for development, and limit the degree of great-power economic aid to the area, because each power would seek to maintain high levels of military capability as well. To be sure, there is a danger that, if Soviet tensions with the West should diminish, the superpowers might turn inward and tend to neglect the Third World, dealing with it mainly through the apparently cheaper route of a status quo orientation or by strategic withdrawal.

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Isolationism

The Soviet posture deemed least likely is an accentuation of inward-looking tendencies in the direction of isolation and withdrawal from economic and political involvement in the Third World. This orientation resembles a status quo strategy in some respects, and could follow from some of the same underlying factors, but it differs in being more passive in regard to the developing countries. Whereas a status quo policy would intervene to prevent cross-national aggression and perhaps even to throttle social and economic change, an isolationist tack would allow the emerging nations to fight out their own battles and organize common if ineffectual fronts against the northern tier. Despite these conditions, Moscow — joined perhaps by other great powers — would rest content behind an overwhelming military superiority vis-à-vis the Third World and an economic strategy that ensured satisfactory growth for the USSR without involvement in the problems of the new nations.

The strategic bedrock for isolationism would be a Fortress Russia mentality. This attitude could flourish whether the strategic military balance registered parity or a slight Soviet disadvantage. If Moscow possessed a massive superiority over the West, it might well be reluctant to pass over an opportunity for global penetration; if it felt significantly inferior to the West, compensating actions might be attempted in the Third World. A Soviet ballistic missile defense would probably facilitate an isolationist attitude, although the existence of such a system could also encourage a forward strategy on the premise that a counterblow from the West or from China would not be fatal. An isolationist posture would be favored if Moscow did not possess a powerful conventional force, although frequent military interventions in the Third World by other external powers would tend to provoke Soviet countermeasures. Isolationist tendencies would also be strengthened if Soviet experiences and doctrine warned of the dangers of local war and set forth reasons why active Soviet support for such conflicts was neither necessary nor desirable.

Withdrawal from deep involvement in the Third World would be facilitated if Moscow felt that this would not leave the area ripe for takeover by hostile great powers which would exploit it to Soviet disadvantage. A sharp decline in Moscow's resolve to pose as leader of revolutionary forces would not necessarily lead to a decrease in Soviet involvement in Asia, Africa and Latin America,

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for Kremlin policies in these areas are probably dictated by *raison d'état* as well as by ideology.

Thus, if great-power competition ceased almost entirely, Moscow could afford to consider withdrawal from this one possible arena. But, if competition between Moscow and either Peking or Washington continued rather intensively across the board, this rivalry would probably spill over into the Third World. Only if tensions crossed a high threshold (e.g., in Europe or along the Sino-Soviet frontier) would the Kremlin feel compelled to withdraw from peripheral areas of interest, as in Africa, to defend vital interests closer to home.

Withdrawal would also be facilitated if the Third World proved itself highly resistant to domination — political, economic or other —by outside powers. If the area presented few opportunities to the USSR and little threat either from within or from external sources, Moscow would be more inclined to ignore the emerging nations. They might show economic stagnation or a capacity for take-off and growth, but if Soviet interests were not affected, the Kremlin might focus its attentions elsewhere.

Clearly, one variant of the isolationist model would be to withdraw from some areas but not from others. The Kremlin might attempt to dominate (and/or develop) a few key areas, such as the Middle East, while leaving others to work out their own destinies, e.g., Black Africa. Such a policy would make sense in that some areas are geographically more convenient, richer in resources, more significant strategically, and more amenable to Soviet influence than others. But it is extremely difficult to draw and maintain such a line, because the USSR as a superpower with interests to the east, to the west, and to the south, can hardly disregard political and economic trends in any part of the world. And if she should succeed in dominating one area, such as the Middle East, this would encourage her appetites elsewhere and, at the same time, generate competitive strategies on the part of other great powers.

Paradoxically, either failures or successes on the domestic economic front could strengthen isolationist trends. Failures would limit resources available for aid. Difficulties in foreign trade, either with the developed or the developing countries, might lead to a heightened priority on self-sufficiency. If other developed countries' economies moved ahead while the Soviet Union (and perhaps her East European allies) experienced difficulties,

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pressures would mount for channeling marginal gains to domestic consumption rather than to Third World development. Further, if East-West competition became intense, and assuming that America cut her involvement in Southeast Asian conflicts, a U.S. decision to seek clear-cut superiority in defensive and offensive missile systems could put tremendous pressures on Soviet economic resources available to the developing nations.

On the other hand, if the Soviet economy continued to expand and was accompanied by détente on the external scene, Soviet society might become fixed on its internal problems. The USSR might become one of the "increasingly Sensate (empirical, this-worldly, secular, humanistic, pragmatic, utilitarian, contractual, epicurean or hedonistic, and the like) cultures" anticipated in the "standard world" of Herman Kahn and Anthony Wiener.[8] There would be increasing affluence and leisure. "National interest" values might erode, but the humanistic and hence cosmopolitan influences would be countervailed by self-indulgence tendencies.

The stronger the popular influence over government policy, the greater the chances may be for an inward orientation. This tendency follows from the expectation that the Soviet people will be more interested in building a good life and catching up with living standards elsewhere, than in nationalist or internationalist adventures. A high degree of participatory democracy is unlikely to develop in the USSR, at least for a decade to come, but the government may have to reckon increasingly with popular sentiments, and hence reduce the resources devoted to competition in, or assistance to, the Third World.

Although isolationism has fairly strong prospects conditioned by the USSR's economic or political situation, the domestic forces inclining toward it will probably be neutralized by military and general foreign policy pressures to maintain the present level of involvement in the Third World. Hence, "more of the same" has a sounder basis than a distinct trend toward isolationism. Whether Soviet economic growth continues at a low or a high rate, and whether popular opinion comes to affect Soviet policymaking in a more direct or indirect manner, the costs of continuing the present level of involvement will not be painfully high. Indeed, these expenditures will probably decrease relative to the present allocation of resources, because the Soviet economy can easily grow at a faster rate than the volume of resources required for military

[8]Kahn and Wiener, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

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and economic penetration in Asia, Africa and Latin America (which can be accomplished in part by dumping surplus material not needed domestically).

Implications for United States Policy

If we examine the ways the standard model might be most easily altered so that one of its present components came to the fore, the forward strategy seems the most likely variation to emerge. This change in existing patterns might come by the early 1970's, assuming that Moscow has by then persisted in expanding its conventional air, sea and land forces for intervention in remote areas.

A status quo orientation might also come about more readily than some observers would anticipate, perhaps in response to such factors as a broad threat from China; a superpower accord to halt nuclear spread and to prevent disruption of the Nonproliferation Treaty; the removal of an interventionist challenge to Moscow by U.S. policies which aim at ending the U.S. influence in Viet Nam and elsewhere; or a diminution of Soviet concern about the USSR's image as leader of revolutionary peoples.

A development orientation might take longer to emerge, since it would require a much larger commitment of human and material resources — vast surpluses of which do not appear imminent in the USSR (or even in the United States) — although selective use of Soviet assets might make an aid orientation feasible immediately on a somewhat restricted scale. But there are also political obstacles that would need to be overcome, e.g., internal resistance as well as concern about tense Soviet relationships with Washington, Bonn, Peking and other powers.

An isolationist trend seems still less likely. The economizing advantages would probably be insufficient to make Moscow depart from the familiar standard model. After all, the present posture is maintained by virtue of the military-strategic and external political concerns of the largest country on earth, stretching across the Eurasian land mass as a key part of the "world island."

The five models outlined here vary considerably in their effect on the basic objectives of U.S. foreign policy. The model of Soviet policy least consonant with U.S. objectives is the forward strategy. The most desirable is a development orientation, particularly if carried out in coordination with other industrialized nations. The

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other three models have advantages and disadvantages, making it difficult to assign them a clear rank order.

The forward strategy is undesirable because it presents the clearest threat to peace; if it is not matched by effective countermoves, Soviet influence will probably spread and that of the United States diminish, weakening the economic and political independence of the Third World. It may be argued that in the long run Moscow would find that a forward strategy achieved little real or worthwhile influence abroad. Even if this is true, however, such a strategy still poses a strong immediate danger. The United States is not apt to sit back and take a philosophical view of unrestrained Soviet advance into regions with important economic, political and military assets which could strengthen the Soviet global position — particularly if Soviet successes should also revitalize the communist movement and even induce China to link forces with the Kremlin juggernaut. Since resistance from the United States (and possibly from Europe, China and Japan) is likely, there is a good chance of a confrontation with an explosive potential for escalation.

A Soviet orientation toward aid and development, however, would square with U.S. interests in stable economic growth and self-determination for the Third World. Even if the admixture of competition outweighed elements of cooperation in a Soviet policy of aid and development, the gains for the developing world and for international peace and security would be high — provided the competition did not take on a predominantly forward strategy aspect. The neuroses of the excessively hedonistic and self-indulgent societies might be partially cured by the same actions that helped the poorer nations to lift themselves and, in so doing, alleviated their tendencies toward self-pity, hate and fatalistic despair.

Either the isolationist model or the status quo orientation seems safer from the standpoint of U.S. interests than the "standard" (more of the same) model or, *a fortiori*, the forward strategy. If the isolationist model also permitted the United States to pursue her interests in the Third World, including aid and development, this approach need not exert a negative impact on economic and political development, except to the extent that Soviet contributions would be lacking. As we have seen, however, it is improbable that Moscow would elect to leave the field to the United States — and unfortunately it is just as doubtful that Washington

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would enter the field more vigorously for purely altruistic reasons.

These same considerations hold for the status quo model. While it presents little danger of U.S.-Soviet military confrontation, it implies little external aid for the new nations. By comparison, the standard world has the advantage that it calls forth some aid for development purposes (mainly by superpower competition), but it has the serious liability that it can easily shade into an aggressive policy leading to a superpower crunch, as one or the other moves to exploit an opportunity in the Third World.

The problem, then, is to encourage Moscow toward policies that minimize competition, particularly in the military realm, while enhancing its interest in promoting economic stability and growth in the developing areas. It would be to the advantage of all concerned if local arms races could be avoided, for they waste local resources while stimulating competition, regionally and globally, in unproductive ways. As noted earlier, a development orientation based on Cold War competition promises a bigger outlay by the superpowers in the immediate future than a cooperative effort, but such competition has important liabilities — mainly its impetus for forward strategy postures by both sides. Coordinated aid programs, whether bilateral or multilateral, have fewer undesirable side effects and greater potential for orderly development over the long haul.

If we review the range of factors on which alternative Soviet strategies may rest, some guidelines emerge as to the kinds of U.S. policies most conducive to favorable rather than dysfunctional trends in Moscow's orientation to the Third World. In the realm of strategic weaponry, it seems clear that neither U.S. inferiority nor superiority will be functional, for either may encourage Soviet activism — whether out of overconfidence or from anxiety. A stable strategic balance ensuring that neither side can gain a commanding advantage will help to deter Soviet adventures while at the same time reducing incentives for quick fixes to compensate for strategic vulnerabilities. A freeze or a turning down in the levels of Soviet and U.S. armaments might not only free resources for development programs but contribute to an atmosphere in which smaller nations perceive reasons to diminish local arms races and concentrate on development. An effective Nonproliferation Treaty and an effective system of guarantees for the

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nonnuclear nations will also promote both development and security.

The United States should seek to build up United Nations capabilities for peacemaking and peacekeeping and to do so in ways that elicit Soviet (and Chinese) support rather than opposition. In the meantime, until such machinery exists, Washington should try to work in concert with Moscow to maintain law and order as *between* states in the Third World, while avoiding intervention in basically internal disputes. Apparently the United States will have to maintain a conventional force capable of deterring Soviet (or Chinese) intervention, but this power should not be used loosely (as it may have been, for example, in the Dominican Republic) because this will tend to provoke Soviet actions of a similar nature.

In several of the scenarios it has been noted that vulnerabilities in the Third World may tempt Soviet intervention. It is in the U.S. interest, therefore, as well as in the interest of the countries concerned, for economic and political development to be of a kind that discourages attempts at domination by foreign powers. To the extent that the new nations are strong, Moscow should see that it cannot dominate them but that it should — for its own reasons — aid them.

The better the Kremlin's relations with the West, the more it can afford to take a positive attitude toward peaceful and prosperous development in the Third World. East-West trade and a reduction of trade barriers globally will be conducive to such an attitude. Soviet economic growth is welcome, not only because of its potential for Soviet living standards, but because it provides a margin of strength for aiding the new nations. While the emergence of an overly complacent and self-indulgent populace in the USSR is a possibility, it is also likely that some of the technocratic elite and intelligentsia will see both moral and practical reasons for assisting the developing areas.

This perception will be strengthened if the United States shows by her own example that it is feasible and worthwhile to channel resources to the Third World. We have already seen, for example, the galvanizing effect of the U.S. Peace Corps on West European and Japanese youth, many of whom have been influenced to carry out similar programs for their countries. Before the arrival of that better world in which cooperation outweighs competition, a U.S. lead in allocating much greater resources to aid and development

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will challenge Moscow — out of competitive instincts — not to leave the field to a major adversary. At the same time, while cultivating the habit of greater contribution to Third World development, the two superpowers as well as other industrialized nations may grope toward patterns which involve more coordination and less rivalry.

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GOVERNMENT AND THE COUNTRYSIDE: POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION AND SOUTH VIET NAM'S COMMUNAL GROUPS*

by Allan E. Goodman

ONE of the most perplexing problems facing the modernizing polity is that of the relation of village to state.[1] The existence of diverse economies and traditional social structures, generally isolated by poor communication systems or arrested in development by internal conflicts, presents governments with both opportunities for material and political support and the dangers inherent in organized opposition and pressure group politics. On the one hand, governments in the newer states tend to seek through political and military means a monopoly of power for their own preservation, and generally do so in the name of social and political order. On the other hand, they find it extremely difficult to bring traditionally autonomous areas of the countryside under complete government control. These isolated communities persist as tightly-knit, cohesive social and political structures, though they may never have been privy to or participants in government at the national level.

Practically speaking, the incumbent government can deal with such communities by denying them any form of political participation and self-government. Or, it can seek to balance the danger of opposition with the possibility of gaining support by permitting rural communities a degree of self-government and representation on some national legislative body. The community, for its part, can become a center of rural opposition, or it can, through the development of bases for political accommodation, function as an important mediating unit in the processes of

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Any views expressed herein are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors.

[1]For a statement of the theoretical complexities of this issue see Harumi Befu, "The Political Relation of the Village to the State," *World Politics*, July 1967, pp. 601-620.

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economic development, social mobilization and political institutionalization.[2]

As a topic of research the human community is a complex phenomenon; its subtleties are more often discernible to the intensive study of the anthropologist than to the political scientist's penchant for generalization. The community represents an ongoing process of environmental adaptation, an articulated and often complex social structure characterized by a unique set of demands and expectations, and frequently forms an important political context in which a certain consensus or political activism is evident. This latter constitutes a manageable object of research through which political scientists can come to know much about the developing polity and its capabilities by utilizing the anthropologist's patient insight into particular communities.

In Viet Nam politics has been traditionally based on "regionalism." A closer look at the components of regionalism indicates that ethnic and religious differences form the basis of such centrifugal tendencies. The survey portion of this article will characterize the nature of this pluralism which shows no signs of fading away and which current and past wars have in some measure preserved. Indeed, the resolution of the present war and future political developments will be determined, in part, by the role ethnic and religious groups may come to play. Pluralism does not necessarily bode ill for the Vietnamese polity. The interdependence that socio-political complexity involves may well promote cooperation similar in nature to the kind Durkheim postulated would arise from the diversity of modern industrial society.[3] In the case of Viet Nam, the war has made such cooperation essential; the villager, for whatever motives, has become dependent upon government (be it the government of the Republic or the National Liberation Front) and vice versa. Increasingly, "accommodation" has come to characterize the relationship between the countryside and government.[4]

Throughout this analysis, frequent reference will be made to two related phenomena, "communalism" and "villagism." Con-

[2]Cf. Morris Janowitz, "Converging Perspectives in Community Political Analysis," in Janowitz, editor, *Community Political Systems* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961), p. 13.

[3]Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1966).

[4]E.g., Gerald Hickey, "Accommodation in South Vietnam: The Key to Sociopolitical Solidarity" (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, P-3707, October 1967). See also Francois Sully, "A Kind of Coexistence with the Viet Cong," *New Republic*, August 5-12, 1967, p. 11 ff.

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ceptions of the term "group" usually begin with Tönnies' classic distinction between "communal" and "associative" groups or "gemeinschaft" and "gesellschaft." Such a dichotomy, however, may be misplaced:

> In the sense that although the societies at one pole of the distinction may be said in some cases to lack elements at the other pole of the distinction, the reverse has never been the case. Thus, although improbable, there might conceivably be *gemeinschaft*, mechanical, folk societies totally lacking in *gesellschaft*, organic, urban characteristics. *But*, there have never been, and never will be, any societies of the *gesellschaft*, organic, urban types totally lacking in *gemeinschaft*, mechanical folk characteristics.[5]

Associative groups are, simply, not totally lacking in some form of communal heritage or tradition. By way of distinction, one can classify groups on the basis of residence or kinship, or by the amount of voluntarism involved in membership. "A residential group *exists* . . . where certain people live for economic reasons, for political reasons, for biological reasons, and perhaps still others,"[6] while the Lowie-Service conception of a *sodality* suggests "a nonresidential association that has some corporate functions or purposes. . . ."[7]

What empirically appears to be a residential group may be valued by its members for the ability to perform corporate functions. The war in Viet Nam has made the performance of corporate functions such as accommodation to both the Saigon government (GVN) and the Viet Cong essential, and the traditional village has, therefore, become more important rather than less important as a social and a political institution. Individual survival is closely linked with survival of the village by war because of the various economies of violence used by insurgent and counterinsurgent alike, as well as by the growing emphasis on hamlet and village security. It is the village rather than the individual that accommodates to government and to the war.[8] The Hoa Hao of Viet

[5]Marion J. Levy, Jr., *Modernization and the Structure of Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 705-706.

[6]Cf. Elman R. Service, *Primitive Social Organization* (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 20 ff, and Robert Lowie, *Social Organization* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1948), p. 14 ff.

[7]Service, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

[8]Similarly, the village as a unit rather than just the people in it has been the target of both the GVN and the Viet Cong. The VC sought to win village loyalty through terrorizing influential individuals into organizing village support, while the GVN has attempted to "pacify" villages through offering a series of benefits, gained only by communal participation in an assortment of rural reconstruction programs. For a detailed discussion of the Viet Minh-Viet Cong approach to local institutions, see George Ginsburg, "Local Government and Administration in North Vietnam, 1945-54," *The China Quarterly*, January-March 1962, p. 174 ff.

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Nam, for example, are an aggregate of religion-oriented residential groups, but it has been the war and pacification that has made the "Hoa Hao village" a political entity.

To the communal expression of religion and religious duties within each village has been added the task of providing for its own survival — a burden that both the GVN and the NLF have been unable to assume fully. The Hoa Hao, then, are a sodality, whose members express their corporateness communally. In this sense, they constitute a communal group, perceiving their survival and corporateness through their villages and village activities.[9] In the Vietnamese case, war and residence seem to have reinforced the associative character of religious movements and ethnic minorities. Ethnic and religious institutions alike conceive of the village as the primary organizational ingredient. Similarly, both the government in Saigon and the Viet Cong cite the village as their principal target in pacification programs. The village has been extolled, variously, as the key to pacification efforts,[10] the basis for conflict resolution,[11] a contributing element to the demise of Diem,[12] the key to social and economic reform programs,[13] and the key to the success or failure of the present Saigon government.[14]

This enumeration of its pivotal roles suggests that the village performs a number of functions that, in turn, preserve and heighten the identification of groups and individuals within its context. This process of reinforcement is what is meant by villagism. Specifically, villagism involves the following interrelated processes: (1) the maintenance of village traditions as corporate expressions of religious or ethnic group identity; (2) the preservation of village security in the midst of war and the consequent "diplomatic relations" (i.e., accommodations) required with the Viet Cong, the Saigon government, and the U.S. forces; and (3) the preservation of village autonomy in the face of

[9]Of course, both the "style" and the degree of communal cohesiveness may differ substantially from one group to another.

[10]E.g., William A. Nighswonger, *Rural Pacification in Vietnam* (New York: Praeger, 1966), *passim*, and especially p. 8 and p. 234 ff.

[11]J. K. Galbraith, "The Galbraith Plan to End the War," *New York Times Magazine*, November 12, 1967.

[12]With respect to Diem's lack of understanding of the countryside and the subsequent failure of the strategic hamlets program, see Robert Shaplen, *The Lost Revolution* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 253 ff.

[13]George C. Tanham, *et al.*, *War Without Guns* (New York: Praeger, 1965).

[14]Rhetoric of this kind is evident in any of the National Rural Construction Programs or Field Directives as well as the Guidance Manuals for Revolutionary Development cadres or American advisory teams.

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government pressures for centralization, socio-economic reform and loyalty. The Vietnamese proverb that the Emperor's power stops at the village gate (*Phép Vua Thua le Làng*) is a statement about national government as much as it is about village autonomy. Vietnamese governments have traditionally organized their relations with the population as it resided in specific villages.[15] The present war, climaxing a quarter-century of political turmoil, has served to reinforce the village's existence as a political entity.

Within particular villages, villagism is manifested by levels of organization and cohesion generally unknown at the national level. This political integration can be fostered by a number of interrelated elements. Kinship may function through the extended family to unite the residents of the village into a single productive unit. Integration may be promoted by the selection of village "notables" and consequent obedience to the decisions of such personalities. Or, the identification of the inhabitants as members of a distinct minority group may cause them to "pull together" for the mutual livelihood and protection of all. The presence of an external threat to the village's existence may produce a similar reaction. The weakness of the state or any nominally higher political authority may heighten the villagers' sense of corporateness, and, in the absence of effective national government, the village may take on the character of a quasi-political and administrative entity.[16] Finally, the demands placed upon the village as an entity responsible for loyalty or revenue may tend to encourage village-wide rather than individual or "entrepreneurial" responses.[17]

The essence of the village's existence as a corporate entity lies in its significance to the villagers. Integration and cohesion, of course, can decay as social mobility within the larger society increases, as economies and needs differentiate, as different interests emerge, as a governmental presence penetrates the "little world" of the village. In short, as some form of "modernization" occurs or gathers momentum, the significance of the village as a meaningful political, economic and social unit may decline. Such decay,

[15]Cf. Roy Jumper and Marjorie Normand, in George McT. Kahin, editor, *Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964), p. 378 ff.

[16]Thus, even in Viet Nam there is hardly the frequently feared "political vacuum."

[17]Rapid political or economic development may also have the same effect, i.e., the persistence of tradition.

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however, is not evident today in Viet Nam, and the pressures of war and political turmoil have not eroded villagism.

II

In terms of human and physical resources, communal groups occupy almost 80 per cent of South Viet Nam's territory and constitute one-third to one-half of the country's total estimated population. They make up about one-half of the rural population. Table I indicates the estimated size of the communal groups and their principal geographical concentrations. These concentrations are depicted on Map I, while Map II indicates rural Buddhist and Viet Cong areas of concentration. A comparison of these various distributions suggests that in those areas where there is little Buddhist or communal group organization, the Viet Minh, initially, and the Viet Cong, presently, flourish. The largest Buddhist concentrations occur around urban centers — the Saigon-My Tho areas in the south, the coastal areas of northern II Corps, and around Hue in I Corps — while the rural areas are divided between the communal groups and the Viet Cong. This is not to say that there are no Buddhists in rural areas but, rather, that there is little Buddhist *organization* in these areas. Since the number of pagodas in a province is also a function of the population, in some cases few pagodas may serve sparse populations quite well. But what we are concerned with here is the lack of organizational ties to a larger Buddhist community, and the Buddhist experience in recent elections, coupled with the generally urban composition of the various "struggle" movements, seems to indicate that in the rural areas the Buddhists cannot and do not match the corporate expression of Viet Nam's ethnic and religious minorities. The void of organizational context is filled either by the communal groups or the Viet Cong.[18]

The following study of Viet Nam's communal groups is concerned with those that inhabit primarily rural areas and, thus, the

[18]An approximate plotting of Viet Cong-initiated incidents from 1967 to the present, based on information available in the public media, reveals that the following major areas were the scene of the greatest number of VC attacks: (1) the Upper Mekong Delta — Vinh Long, Dinh Tuong and Long An provinces; (2) the war zone areas north of Saigon — Hau Nghia, Binh Duong and Bien Hoa provinces; (3) Phuoc Long Province — Phuoc Binh provincial capital; (4) Coastal II Corps; (5) Coastal I Corps. Significantly, these areas are not characterized by permanent communal group concentrations; those areas where communal group concentration was high tended to have the fewest number of incidents. In addition, the high-incident areas had largely ethnic Buddhist concentrations with varying numbers of pagodas per province, ranging from 150 to 300. See Map II.

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TABLE I

SOUTH VIET NAM'S COMMUNAL GROUPS

Group	*Estimated Membership*	*Percentage of Total Population*[a]	*Principal Provinces and Cities of Concentration*
Religious			
Cao Dai	1,600,000	9.4	Tay Ninh Province (Holy See), Quan Long (Camau), Vinh Loi, Can Tho, My Tho-Dinh Tuong area, Capital Military District, Gia Dinh Province, Bing Duong-Phuoc Long border. Cao Dai settlements also exist in Ba Xuyen, Long Hu, Kien Hoa, Phong Dinh, Hau Nghia, Bien Hoa, and Vinh Binh provinces.
Hoa Hao	1,500,000	8.8	Chau Doc, An Giang, Vinh Long, Kien Giang, Dinh Tuong, Chuong Thien, Phong Dinh, Bac Lieu, Kien Phong.
Catholic	1,800,000	10.6	Five autonomous cities, Vinh Binh, coastal areas of I Corps.
Ethnic			
Khmer	500,000	2.9	Chau Doc, Ba Xuyen, Kien Giang, and settlements around Vinh Loi (Bac Lieu), Rach Gia and Ha Tien in Kien Giang Province, Phu Vinh, Can Tho, Tay Ninh, and Chau Doc.
Montagnard	700,000	4.1	Throughout the Chaine Annamitique.
Chinese	1,500,000	8.8	Saigon-Cholon, delta cities, and coastal I and II Corps cities.

[a]Estimates place total South Viet Nam population at 17 million.

Chinese are not included.[19] The aim is to indicate the organizational style of these groups and to illustrate their relations with

[19]The Binh Xuyen are not dealt with either, since they are no longer extant. Until their demise in 1955, the group operated clandestinely and later openly in an area bounded by the Baria-Long Thanh highway, the Soi Rap River, and the Phuoc An-Phuoc Thanh-Long Thanh road network. The principal objective of the Binh Xuyen was to control the Delta's and Saigon's economic resources, and it accomplished this by racketeering, organized vice and river banditry. There is some indication today that former members of the Binh Xuyen are now working with elements of the Viet Cong.

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MAP I—APPROXIMATE CONCENTRATIONS OF SOUTH VIET NAM'S COMMUNAL GROUPS



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MAP II—AREAS OF CONCENTRATION AND CONTROL OF THE BUDDHISTS VERSUS THE VIET MINH



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South Vietnamese governments. Much of the material presented is taken from field notes made on visits to seventeen provinces in all of Viet Nam's Corps areas. These were subsequently verified, where possible, with existing information on Viet Nam's communal groups. The unevenness of these surveys is a reflection of the lack of available data, complexities that are not immediately understandable to the Western observer, and the diversity of politicization of the various communal groups.

The Cao Dai

The Cao Dai religion was founded on October 7, 1926, when 28 leaders and 247 adherents applied to the then-Governor General of Cochin China for official recognition. Their formal institution was solemnized with three days of ceremonies in November 1926. At the height of the Cao Dai movement, there were an estimated two million followers, including an army of between 15,000 and 20,000 troops located in the Mekong Delta. It is generally acknowledged that during the wars of 1945-1954, the Cao Dai brought some measure of security and stability to those areas of the countryside under their influence. Officially known as "reformed Buddhist," Cao Daism represents a syncretic doctrine symbolized by the Third Amnesty of God (*Dai Dao Tam Ky Pho Do*), as concluded between God, Sun Yat-sen, Victor Hugo and the Vietnamese poet-laureate Trang-Trinh. The religion blends the doctrines of Mahayana Buddhism, Confucianism and Christianity (with as many saints) and, through the principles of familial love, preaches that the family should be the basis for the organization of all human groups.

Today the Cao Dai faithful are estimated at 1.6 million, but it is almost impossible to determine the religion's vitality, since records indicate only the number of families loyal to it. Though one would expect the number of young persons who embrace the discipline to decline, the familistic nature of Cao Daism argues against this position. The young are socialized into the faith at an early age and are required to attend its schools for religious and, often, secular education. There is little doubt after a visit to the Cao Dai areas of Viet Nam that the religion is still influential. The Cao Dai are strong organizationally because they participate in the security and development of their province; organizational cohesiveness, however, is demonstrated primarily by each village rather than at the national political level. Survival has not yet been linked to power or participation in an unwieldy and

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sometimes hostile national government, and, consequently, the Cao Dai survive as a set of independent villages.

Organizationally, the religion is administered from the Holy See in Tay Ninh city where three cardinals divide responsibility for nine quasi-governmental ministries — finance, supply, public works, education, health, agriculture, interior, ritual and justice. Paralleling and supporting this structure are a set of provincial committees that bring the directives and resources of the Holy See down to village level. Local faithful, in turn, are represented by a Popular Council consisting of one delegate for every 500 followers, which makes plans for the good of the order.

As a political organization, the Cao Dai enter national politics when their religious freedom or administrative autonomy is threatened. At different times, Cao Dai leaders supported the Japanese, the French, the Viet Minh and Ngo Dinh Diem when such support served their interests. In each case, the Cao Dai reached an accommodation with the government in order to protect their organization or solidify its position. When in 1941 the French closed the temples, forbade meetings, arrested prominent leaders and exiled their Pope, Cao Dai officials met secretly with the Japanese, who promised assistance, and by 1945 Cao Dai troops were instrumental in the Japanese "pacification" effort in the Delta. Though proponents of independence, the Cao Dai returned to alliance with the French in 1946, due to their distrust of and conflict with the Viet Minh. In return, the French agreed to the establishment of Cao Dai Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR's) or semi-autonomous zones, returned the Pope from his exile on Madagascar, and appointed a prominent Cao Dai leader president of the French-backed regime in Cochin China. The Convention of Cooperation of January 1947 made the Cao Dai responsible for eliminating the Viet Minh in their zones and provided for French military advisers and arms for the Cao Dai army.

The defeat of the French in 1954 and their withdrawal from Viet Nam led the Cao Dai to support Diem, and four Cao Dai leaders participated in Diem's first cabinet. Again, the objective was to preserve Cao Daism's administrative and territorial autonomy. By 1955, however, it became apparent that Diem was determined to crush the military forces of the Delta sects, and the Cao Dai joined with the Hoa Hao and the Binh Xuyen in an anti-Diem front. This collapsed due to factional strife and Diem's

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diplomatic duplicity, which provided the time to consolidate his national army. In January 1956 the Holy See was occupied by government forces, and the Cao Dai army disbanded. Until Diem's downfall, Cao Dai leaders remained firm in their demands for a liberalization of the government, though hampered by the lack of a military arm and formally outlawed under the Law for Protection of Morality of May 24, 1962, which forbade "spiritism" and "occultism" and, by implication, the Cao Dai religion.

Cao Dai relations with post-Diem governments have been generally accommodative — i.e., they supported subsequent governments in return for "amnesty," and their leaders participated in a number of cabinets. Prior to Nguyen Cao Ky's bid for the presidency, he returned to the Holy See those lands confiscated by Diem in an effort to win Cao Dai support. Until the autumn of 1968, the province of Tay Ninh was administered by an army colonel who was formerly a Cao Dai officer, and, despite the considerable threat posed by North Vietnamese divisions in the mountains just a few kilometers north and west of Tay Ninh city, the province is defended entirely by popular and rural paramilitary forces who are Cao Dai faithful.

The Hoa Hao

The Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao together claim nearly one-half of the six million people living in the ricelands south of Saigon. The latter are especially concentrated in the region between the Mekong and the Song Hua Giang rivers. The Hoa Hao religion was founded in 1939 by the mystic Huyen Phu So in what is now Chau Doc Province. By 1940 So's rather militant nationalism had alarmed the French authorities, who sought to curtail Hoa Hao activities and exiled him from his home to the My Tho area. So, in turn, sought Japanese assistance and arms for the protection of the religion and its followers. After Japanese withdrawal, the Hoa Hao fought with the Viet Minh against the French until So was murdered, presumably by the Viet Minh in 1947. This act of duplicity turned the Hoa Hao permanently against the Viet Minh and later the Viet Cong movements. Like the Cao Dai, in return for French weapons and official recognition the Hoa Hao pledged themselves to the destruction of the Viet Minh infrastructure and brought considerable security to their zones.

When the French withdrew, the Hoa Hao gradually turned against Diem, though for a time they participated in the 1953 Nationalist Congress and in the cabinet of 1954, hoping for the

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development of some form of mutually acceptable coexistence. Diem, however, sought to crush the sect and by June 1955 had defeated and disarmed the 8,000 to 10,000 Hoa Hao troops. As in the case of the Cao Dai, the Law for Protection of Morality of 1962 outlawed the practice of Hoa Hao Buddhism. Diem's fall brought a change in government policy, and all later governments have sought political and military support of the sect in return for their paramilitary activities against the Viet Cong. Both the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao have endeavored to preserve their influence over their areas of the Delta and secure autonomy from the VC and Saigon governments.

As religious devotees, the Hoa Hao have fashioned themselves into champions of the peasants, preaching a simplified version of Buddhism. The religion's founder institutionalized ancestor worship, an aspect of the animism of the Vietnamese farmer, and proclaimed: "It is better to pray with a pure heart before the family altar than to perform gaudy ceremonies in a pagoda." The family and the agricultural way of life thus form the cornerstone of the faith, which prescribes that one should practice Buddhism in the fields while growing rice. Accordingly, the Hoa Hao organized communities into production units, which the hierarchy administered and its troops alternately defended and extorted. In addition, the Hoa Hao organization controlled a portion of the ferry systems and river traffic in the Delta.

Outwardly, Hoa Hao Buddhism seeks simplification and, in the initiates' view, modernization of the religion. It teaches honor to parents and love of country but forbids the building of new pagodas, the use of astrologers, or expensive rituals and funerary rites. Instead, the doctrine prescribes that money normally devoted to the "pomp and circumstance" of Buddhism should be set aside for social welfare projects. Each Hoa Hao hamlet and village has an elected Board of Managers, and each province is governed by a similar Central Council. Beginning with the hamlet-level popular election, each successive board or council is elected by the members of the preceding echelon. These boards and councils are charged with the administration of religious discipline as well as social welfare activities. As such, they function to express the peasant's desires, while the strength of the religion is fostered by its correspondence to and emphasis upon the family systems of the Delta.

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The Catholics

Catholicism has long played a role in Viet Nam's historical and political development, but its position in a predominantly Buddhist country has been ambiguous. Since the arrival of the Jesuit Father Alexandre de Rhodes in South Viet Nam in January 1625, Catholicism has had an uncertain tenure in Vietnamese politics. At times, priests and bishops were the confidants of the Vietnamese emperor; at other times, they were exiled or massacred. The United States' first involvement in Viet Nam resulted, ironically, from a request for help from an imprisoned bishop in 1845, which brought U.S. Marines from the U.S.S. *Constitution* then cruising in the South China Sea.[20]

But if Catholics have been politically insecure on occasion, the cohesiveness of their communal organization has insulated them from the hard times of disfavor and VC attacks. By virtue of a highly developed education system and their favored position during Diem's days, they dominate the officer corps, the higher echelons of the civil service, and the professions. While initially in favor of a Viet Minh government as a vehicle for Vietnamese independence, Catholic support waned as the Northern regime tightened its control over religions and demanded greater portions of village resources for military support. Taking advantage of the Geneva Accords in 1954, between 700,000 and 900,000 Catholics became refugees to the South, where they joined families or were resettled in parts of the central highlands and the Delta.

What is significant about this movement is that entire villages, led by their priests, made the difficult and often perilous journey south and then resettled as whole communities. Not infrequently, the priests (who later became archbishops) organized small armies that formed the nucleus for present-day South Vietnamese divisions. It is not uncommon today to hear some priests addressed as "General." In cases where such *in toto* resettlement was not possible, smaller groups of Catholic families moved to largely urban or provincial cities and, while maintaining cordial relations with the population, still preserved their identity and close, in-group feeling. The cohesion of the Catholics is particularly evident in the rural areas, where they have been instrumental in suc-

[20]See Truong Buu Lam, *Patterns of Vietnamese Response to Foreign Intervention* (New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph No. 11, 1967), p. 4 ff. Part of the irony in this bit of history is that the United States' first involvement, like the current one, was in support of a minority group.

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cessful pacification efforts as well as in local and national elections.

The Khmer

The Khmer ethnic minority has not figured prominently in Viet Nam's politics, not even during the turmoil of the 1945-1954 period, though the existence of a *Khmer Serei* (Free Khmer) movement along the Cambodian border has vexed Vietnamese relations with both Cambodia and Thailand. Nor have the Khmer living in South Viet Nam been extremely militant defenders of their cultural identity. Depending on the immediacy of the threat to their settlements, Khmer were recruited into the French and the Cao Dai armies as district units and continue to serve today with rural and popular forces in defense of their territory against the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese regular forces. Generally, they have sought to avoid any military or political confrontation with the Saigon authorities or their Hoa Hao and Cao Dai neighbors, though in the recent elections for the Constituent and National assemblies Khmer politicians stated that their goal was to get the assemblies to assure by law a guaranteed number of seats in universities for Khmer students. This is not to say that the Khmer have little sense of villagism, only that they are less elaborate about it than some of their neighboring communal groups. Actually, they provide a rather dramatic illustration of villagism in operation.

The population of Vinh Binh Province in the Delta is about one-quarter ethnic Khmer. One observer of the pacification program in 1964 stated that the Viet Cong had made substantial inroads in the province and that the bulk of the rural population remained "disinterested and neutral. They cooperate with the group that maintains the military preponderance in their area. The exception is the ethnic-Cambodians who resist the Viet Cong and generally cooperate with the government whenever possible." The report also noted that the Viet Cong had won control over Tieu Can District, an ethnic-Cambodian and Catholic settlement. Twenty-six months later, the same observer noted the following:

> The most significant accomplishment in Vinh Binh is the authentic improvement in Tieu Can District. This was accomplished by capitalizing on the ethnic-Cambodian and Catholic antipathies toward the Viet Cong in Tieu Can. Since December 1965 Tieu Can has outstripped its pacification goals by organizing and arming the local population. The local popu-

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lation has supported these efforts as demonstrated by their effective resistance in six attacks against them, including one attack purported to exceed a battalion in size. . . . In contrast, two years ago the main Tieu Can road was relatively insecure and the district [security] was deteriorating. . . .

Tieu Can's success was attributed to an energetic and honest district chief who won the support of the local Khmer and Catholic groups and the fact that "these groups needed only organization and arms to mobilize a social movement toward the GVN."[21]

The Montagnards

The aboriginal peoples who inhabit most of Viet Nam's mountain areas constitute less than 5 per cent of the total population of the country, but occupy approximately 60 per cent of the total land area. Generally referred to as *montagnards* (though Vietnamese often use the word *moi,* i.e., savage), they represent the Mon-Khmer and Malayo-Polynesian linguistic stocks, and their migration and settlement in Viet Nam's highland areas reflect the vagaries of extinct empires and the Indochina war. For purposes of analysis, they are usually divided into the northern mountain region, where all groups speak some form of Mon-Khmer, and the southern mountain region, where both linguistic stocks are present. In all, they are believed to comprise between thirty and forty distinct linguistic groupings.

Montagnards and governments have never gotten along well, their relations having been characterized by bitterness and distrust. Little effort has been made to integrate the mountain peoples into Vietnamese life in any meaningful way by South Viet Nam,[22] and what relations there were with governments since 1945 represented, to the Montagnards, threats of extermination and loss of any possibility for the autonomy they enjoyed under the French. On the government side, relations with the mountain peoples have been marred by much bad faith, and, as a result, the Montagnards responded positively to the promises and offers of independence and autonomy made by the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong. Given the kind of war now being waged in South Viet Nam, the present government can ill afford to continue a policy of

[21]Quotations taken from personal notes on a conversation with the provincial adviser.

[22]This is in sharp contrast to the record of the northern Vietnamese government. See Peter Kunstadter, "Vietnam: Introduction," in Kunstadter, editor, *Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 648 ff.

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duplicity, as McAllister's study of the role of the Montagnards in the Indochina war comprehensively demonstrates.[23]

In the highland areas, the village is the largest unit of political organization. It is governed by a headman or chief with the assistance of an elected council of village elders.[24] Each village is generally independent and often hostile to any neighboring settlements, though in time of emergency they have been known to work in concert. By and large, the mountain peoples tend to avoid any political confrontation with the South Vietnamese government or the Viet Cong. Unfortunately, Montagnard villages are often close to or astride VC supply lines, and both the communists and the government have sought to win Montagnard support. The present war in the highlands, direct U.S. military assistance to the Montagnards, and the record of past dealings with Saigon governments have stimulated a certain amount of political awareness.

Under the French, the mountain areas were dealt with separately from the rest of Viet Nam as the PMS — *Pays Montagnard du Sud* — and the colonials were interested in utilizing the mountain country for plantation agriculture. The routine affairs of the territory generally came to be administered by a group of French-trained Rhadé,[25] and, on the whole, such an arrangement proved a cordial one, though there were revolts against the French from 1931 to 1933 and 1936 to 1938. After 1954 the Southern government sought to incorporate the highland regions into the central governmental administration and, thus, destroy Montagnard autonomy. Ethnic Vietnamese were resettled from the overpopulated coastal areas to the highlands, and Montagnards were forcibly settled close to the vicinity of the Vietnamese villages both for protection from Viet Minh guerrillas and for the purpose of fostering some cultural contact and, possibly, integration. Needless to say, the program created hostilities on both sides: the Vietnamese did not like the *moi*, and the Montagnards did not like the forcible resettlement. Often, too, the Viet Minh were able to penetrate the weak defensive perimeter. In all, the effort exacerbated Montagnard-Vietnamese relations. A short-lived

[23]See John T. McAllister, Jr., "Mountain Minorities and the Viet Minh: A Key to the Indochina War," in Kunstadter, editor, *op. cit.*, pp. 771-844.

[24]For a description of the operation of these village councils, see Arthur S. Abbott, compiler, *Research Notes on the Vietnamese Village Council* (Washington: American University, Special Operations Research Office, 1965), pp. 41-43.

[25]Cf. L. Sabatier, *Recueil des coutumes Rhadées du Darlac* (Hanoi, 1940), pp. 53-56.

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uprising occurred in 1958, and its leaders were immediately imprisoned. Two of the leaders, Paul Nur (now the government's Special Commissioner for Montagnard Affairs) and Y Bham (a Rhadé, and current leader of the Montagnard independence movement), remained in prison until after the 1963 coup.

Another uprising occurred in 1964 with more profound effects. On August 1, Y Bham announced the formation of the United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races, or FULRO (*Front Unifie pour la Liberation des Races Opprimées*) and charged that the Vietnamese government had been following a policy of systematic suppression of the minority peoples. The declared purpose of FULRO was to work for the liberation of minority peoples from the "Vietnamese yoke." On May 15 the Vietnamese Joint General Staff ordered all the American Special Forces-trained Montagnard units integrated into the command of the regular Vietnamese army. As military instructors, U.S. Special Forces had been working with the Montagnards since 1961 and had gained their confidence, partly by insulating the militiamen and self-defense units from the Vietnamese army and the government. With this order, as Bernard Fall noted,

> The effects were not long in coming. Montagnard units deserted en masse in many places, sometimes after murdering lowland Vietnamese cadres, and often taking along their high-powered American weapons. Some camps were betrayed from within by disaffected tribal units; others were attacked by VC units backed by tribal deserters.[26]

By late September, a full-scale revolt was on, led by the Rhadé. On September 20 the radio station at Ban Me Thuot was seized, and the leaders demanded the establishment of an autonomous tribal state. A meeting was arranged between the Montagnard leaders and the Saigon government, at which important concessions were made to the Montagnards — titles were promised for village lands, tribal courts were to be restored, educational opportunities in South Vietnamese high schools and military academies were guaranteed, and tribal languages were to be taught in the primary schools. Approximately a year later, none of the concessions had been implemented, and another revolt occurred which lasted from September to December 1965. Promises again were made, and by mid-1967 the government's record had improved: law courts were in operation, indigenous language instruction had begun in the primary schools, and the Special Com-

[26]Bernard Fall, *Vietnam Witness: 1953-1966* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 195.

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mission for Montagnard Affairs had been staffed. In the midst of the 1967 presidential election campaign, Thieu and Ky signed a law providing for land titles as well as a version of the *Statut Particulier*, a Montagnard bill of rights.

From the record of the past few years, a number of trends are evident. The mountain people are beginning to develop supra-village identification and organization. Generated out of distrust for the government, this development reflects the inroads the Rhadé-led FULRO movement is making in the highlands. The uprising in December 1965, for example, occurred simultaneously in five provinces, despite the fact that none of the Montagnards had traditionally organized or communicated beyond the village level. The training and communication networks provided by American Special Forces are another important contributing factor; together with Rhadé leadership, they were probably instrumental in mobilizing the 1965 revolt. Montagnards are thus coming to recognize that they are a minority people whose rights may best be secured by some form of concerted action. During the 1967 presidential campaign the candidates' appearance in the highlands was the best-attended of all such campaign meetings. The war and the Viet Cong's brutal attacks against the Montagnards have also served to stimulate anti-VC feelings and discourage the notion that each village is an entity unto itself, since the VC have destroyed and attacked without regard for village differences.

The development of the Montagnards' corporate group identity is still in its formative stages. As such, it provides an opportunity for the Saigon government to be genuinely helpful. The electoral season of 1966-1967 may have served to institutionalize some of the Montagnard hostility to the government through the legislative assemblies. However, an era of Vietnamese-Montagnard "good feelings" has yet to emerge in South Viet Nam's politics.

III

The record of the communal groups' relations with Vietnamese governments and their organizational and village cohesiveness in times of crisis suggests a number of important lessons for government in Viet Nam's countryside. Two decades of war and the vagaries of politics have stimulated the communal groups' sense of identity and will to survive as distinct cultural and political aggregations. This sense of identity does not exhibit signs of decay,

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nor is it likely to in the future. In discussing the persistence of ethnicity in American cities, Parenti suggests that this phenomenon may actually be the result of the political system itself: "Rather than being a purely dependent variable, the political system, i.e., party, precinct workers, candidates, elections, patronage, etc., continues to rely upon ethnic strategies. . . ."[27] Even in communities characterized by strong pressures and opportunities for assimilation, Parenti found that cultural belief systems and ethnic group values persist independently of objective and material factors, that such plural and parallel structures of activities and values are remarkably vital, and that the psychological perception of minority identity tends to become internalized[28] and, presumably, passed on to successive generations.

Ethnic strategies and pluralism are quite evident in Viet Nam today and promise similarly to persist. Religious sects and ethnic groups have created and preserved parallel, quasi-governmental structures[29] to deal with the government, the Viet Cong and the war. The communal groups also demonstrated their ability to mobilize popular support in the elections for the Constituent and National assemblies, where Catholics and Hoa Hao were consistently successful in their bids in comparison with proportionately fewer Buddhist successes outside the urban areas. Ironically, the communal groups tend to form the backbone of government support, while the Buddhists tend to constitute the alienated opposition. To be sure, communal group support for the government was as much a product of Thieu and Ky's ethnic political strategy as it was a product of group cohesion and the desire to avoid any confrontation with the national government. During the 1967 elections for the Upper and Lower Houses, conversations with ethnic and religious leaders throughout South Viet Nam revealed the tension between a desire to remain uninvolved in politics (and, hence, less vulnerable) and making sure that particular groups would not be isolated from the political and financial benefits of public office. At first, communal leaders posed only as individuals running for office rather than as leaders of any ethnic or religious group. Subsequent conversations with various Vietnamese politicians, however, invariably evoked the remark that if the national assemblies proved effective "it would

[27]Michael Parenti, "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification," *American Political Science Review*, September 1967, p. 717.

[28]*Ibid.*, pp. 722-724.

[29]Structures that may well be as authoritarian as either the GVN or the VC.

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be in the interest of the group to be represented. In Vietnam, politics is like the smallpox; in order to be immunized, you have to be exposed."

In this discussion of Viet Nam's communal groups, there has been no mention of factionalism. Their reputation for factional strife is well known, but precise details are not well documented save for official and semi-official reports, which are not always available for or appropriate in scholarly research. Actually, factionalism may have contributed to expanding the political spectrum in Viet Nam. In the 1967 hamlet and village council elections, for example, candidate-to-position ratios were generally higher in those provinces where communal groups were more factionalized than in areas where factional strife was less prevalent. A larger number of candidates enables the local electorate to exercise considerable choice among competing blocs and interest groups. On the other hand, too much factionalism within a particular organization may paralyze its effectiveness, and Saigon governments could follow an ethnic strategy that would seek to divide and then immobilize the potential of the communal groups as the French did with the Montagnards during the Indochina war.[30] Clearly, such a policy could have disastrous results and, instead, foster the erosion of what appears to be the government's only effective base in the countryside.[31] The wiser course would appear to be for the government to increase its accommodation to the communal groups, encouraging them to consolidate their leadership.[32] The more the group participates and is called upon to participate in a national political life, the closer it may identify national interests with its own.[33]

In Viet Nam, the communal groups have sought to accommodate themselves to both the Saigon government and the Viet Cong. In other Southeast Asian nations, ethnic and religious minorities often are a source of opposition to the government. To-

[30]Cf. McAllister, *op. cit.*

[31]For example, Diem attempted to destroy the communal groups in order to eliminate opposition and consolidate his control over the countryside; yet, as this strategy unfolded he also forfeited the basis of rural security. By 1958, an operative casually remarked that Viet Cong strength was increasing in the Delta. "These areas had been non-Communist because of the Binh Xuyen, Cao Dai, and Hoa Hao. With the destruction of these groups by the government, there is no strong force to withstand the Communists who have been collecting support among the various discontented people."

[32]This has been argued by Hickey, *op. cit.*, and other American consultants.

[33]Cf. George Simmel's concept of "organic cohesion" in his *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations*, translated by Reinhard Bendix (New York: The Free Press, 1955).

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day, the Vietnamese situation is just the reverse: the communal groups tend to support the government, which itself represents a socio-political minority, while the urban and rural Buddhists constitute the alienated opposition. The record of communal group-government relations suggests that, particularly since 1945, the following process has led to political accommodation: a *consciousness* of communal group identity is heightened by internal conflict; as the conflict proceeds, the groups become involved in *confrontations* with the government in which they tend to be unsuccessful and subsequently *withdraw* their support from a particular government; finally, an *accommodation* is reached with usually a "new" central government. Increasingly, the war has made accommodation the key to survival.

A similar pattern of accommodation is evident when relations with the Viet Cong are necessary. A few years ago, sojourners in Viet Nam found it relatively easy to "get in touch" with the Viet Cong: one merely had to leave behind a personal belonging at a morning ceremony marking the opening of a "pacified hamlet" and return for it alone in the evening. Usually, the Viet Cong officer in charge of the dusk-to-dawn roadblock would gladly serve as escort to the hamlet, and there at evening, traveler and Viet Cong alike would receive the same hospitality accorded the government representatives in the morning. The war of the "good old days" was considerably more relaxed and less intense than it is today. But the accommodations existing a few years ago have not, by and large, ceased to function; they are rather more subtle. The Viet Cong may have faded into the jungle, but the process of accommodation as a way of life has not. Now, simply, no one goes to the pacified hamlet at night.

As the war has expanded, so also has local accommodation and, hence, the bases for accommodation.[34] The villager may now be mobilized into the RVNAF (Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces) or the Viet Cong, but the substance of accommodation has remained the same: it is still a function of the dominant military force in the area, incentives, past experiences, leadership, and the perception of individual survival as intimately tied to a particular residential unit. As one observer suggested, "American officials are reconciled to the fact that in many villages, the local ARVN outpost coexists with the Viet Cong officials who control the

[34]See, for example, Samuel P. Huntington, "The Bases of Accommodation," *Foreign Affairs,* July 1968, pp. 642-656, where he suggests that internal village security proceeds from communal organization rather than vice versa.

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villagers." The villagers cooperate because they want to survive, the ARVN soldiers because they do not want to die in the night, and the Viet Cong survive because the GVN has given the villagers few if any incentives to turn VC in.

The provision of incentives is crucial to winning the countryside. By now, it is clear that what has been called "pacification" depended primarily on the provision of adequate security, and villagers would participate in it to the extent that they felt sure (i.e., secure) the Viet Cong could not harm them. In one of the pacification program's success stories, the villagers of Long Huu (Long An Province) requested that the village be "occupied" by a battalion instead of the scheduled company. Long Huu had been Viet Cong for over three years, and in the spring of 1967 it "defected-in-place." Yet what had to be made clear to other nearby Viet Cong was that the "pacification" was only the result of being saturated by massive numbers of the "enemy." By the end of the summer, Long Huu was still billed as a success story, but the battalion had been replaced by a Popular Forces company, and visitors reached Long Huu via helicopter which maneuvered above the landing zone, reduced engine power, and by auto-rotation rapidly descended a thousand feet in order to "minimize the risk of small-arms fire." If incentives to be "pacified" are not provided and maintained, the road to rural security will be paved by accommodation instead. Given the lack of adequate security coupled with the failure of the government to relate to the countryside, villagers will continue to find security in established patterns of accommodation rather than through participation in national governments or their programs.

Conversely, for the Saigon government the dangers involved in self-help support of, and local autonomy for, these groups now appear minimal in return for their support of pacification and rural construction programs in the countryside.[35] Notably, the only lasting successes of the pacification program to date, i.e., the ability of the area to remain "secured" after Revolutionary Development cadres and regular military forces move on, have occurred in areas of communal group concentration; there, pacification has succeeded by combining the organizational resources of the groups

[35]Those who currently suggest that if the GVN armed the minorities in self-defense groups they would then fight the GVN may well misread the lesson of the Diem era. The minorities fought Diem because he sought to control them by curtailing their religious freedom. The history of GVN-communal group relations suggests that the groups fought for administrative and religious autonomy and fought only when their freedom was seriously threatened.

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with the sensitivity and creativity of a dynamic district or province chief. Lasting security is a product of group identity and a government presence which stimulates villagers to defend themselves, rather than the imposition of external and temporary authority or reforms.

In addition to political support, the government may win a measure of legitimacy by aiding the preservation of traditional communal groups. Rousseau cited the institution of urban *as well as rural* tribes by Servius as the element that contributed most to the preservation and growth of the Roman Empire.[36] Experience with the *prijaji* in Indonesia or with the role of caste in Indian politics suggests that traditional social structures and values may not conflict with and may even reinforce or legitimate modernization efforts and programs.[37] In his examination of the implications of modernity and tradition, Gusfield found that

> The role of traditional values in the form of segmental loyalties and principles of legitimate authority are of great importance in understanding the possibilities for the occurrence of unified and stable polities at a national level. The contemporary Indian political process utilizes caste, village, and religious community as basic segmental groups through which the individual and the family are drawn into modern political institutions.[38]

In South Viet Nam, similarly, communal groups and villagism could function as institutions of unification and nationalization as well as of accommodation. The elected government now has an opportunity to disperse decision-making and support these groups considerably more than governments in the past have done, and with considerably less risk of strife and opposition. It is vital, therefore, that the authorities in Saigon, and those who advise them, place high on their agenda a survey of the bases of accommodation. In the case of Viet Nam, it would appear that the government must now accommodate to the countryside.

[36]"The Social Contract," translated by Sir Ernest Barker, editor, *Social Contract* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 278.

[37]Clifford Geertz, "Social Change and Economic Modernization in Two Indonesian Towns," in Everett Hagen, editor, *On the Theory of Social Change* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1962); Lloyd and Suzanne Rudolph, "The Political Role of India's Caste Associations," *Pacific Affairs,* March 1960, and Joseph Gusfield, "Political Community and Group Interests in Modern India," *Pacific Affairs,* Summer 1965.

[38]Joseph R. Gusfield, "Tradition & Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change," *American Journal of Sociology,* January 1967, pp. 351-362.

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AUSTRALIA'S NEW SEARCH FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY*

by Justus M. van der Kroef

AT the end of August 1968, a "top secret" eighty-page "fundamental strategic reassessment" of Australia's defense policy, prepared by the Defense and External Affairs Departments in Canberra, was distributed for study among the members of Prime Minister John Gorton's cabinet.[1] The document, the essential points of which will be summarized presently, was designed to serve as a basis for the government's position in future parliamentary debates and national elections, culminating a period of incisive interministerial discussions, augmented by extensive press and other public comment, on Australia's new defense and foreign policy needs in Southeast Asia. These discussions and commentaries, though part of the seemingly endless and often intense public discussion about Australia's proper relationship with her northwestern neighbors that has enlivened the Australian political and academic scenes since the end of World War II, had in recent months been quickened by a number of factors. Among these, Britain's accelerated military withdrawal from Southeast Asia had been perhaps the most important.

As late as February 22, 1966, a defense "White Paper" issued by the Wilson Government in London had stated that Britain "for as long as the Governments of Malaysia and Singapore agree that we should do so" intended to keep her military installations in those countries. Although there would eventually be reductions in the British military force in East Asia, as conditions permitted, and the White Paper stressed that Britain would not undertake new major operations of war except in cooperation with allies, the same document categorically asserted that "We believe it is right that Britain should continue to maintain a military presence in this area."[2] Moreover, during his visit to Canberra late in January

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[1] *The Bulletin* (Sydney), September 7, 1968.

[2] The *Times* (London), February 23, 1966.

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1966, the British Defense Minister, Denis Healey, had said that "it would not make any military sense at all for us to leave Singapore unless we had to," and that "from every point of view I think it is in our interest to stay in that part of the world with our present facilities so long as we can do so with the consent of the local peoples."[3]

Still, there was uneasiness in the Australian press, including comment that the British military withdrawal might take place far more quickly than after the fifteen-year period estimated in official Australian circles.[4] This apprehension proved prophetic. On July 18, 1967, in a new defense policy statement, the Wilson Government, faced with a continuing financial crisis, indicated that by the middle 1970's it expected "to withdraw altogether from our bases in Singapore and Malaysia" and to reduce its forces in the latter areas from 80,000 to 40,000 during 1970-1971.[5] Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt admitted the next day that "some aspects" of the British government's announcement "of course are disappointing to us," but still professed to see in the new statement an indication "that Britain will play a continuing

[3]United Kingdom Information Service (UKIS), Canberra, G.30/a/SUB, February 3, 1966, pp. 1, 5.

[4]See, e.g., *The Australian* (Sydney), February 23, 1966, and *The Bulletin*, March 5, 1966. The latter periodical argued that the White Paper pointed to "the need for a revision of the Southeast Asian time scale in Canberra, where Australian defense planners may be less than realistic if they assume a comforting British presence in the area for the next 15 years." This viewpoint seemed to carry particular relevance since Healey, during his Canberra visit, had also suggested that if the Singapore and Malaysian facilities had to be abandoned, alternative facilities, possibly including arrangements in Australia, might have to be considered. In a commentary on the White Paper on February 3, 1966, Prime Minister Holt indicated that he was not unaware of these press apprehensions, saying that "it makes sense to us to examine together what practical arrangements would need to be made in the event of the British presence there [i.e., in Malaysia and Singapore] becoming untenable at some point of time. This we see as a contingency and perhaps a remote one, but it makes sense at least to examine what problems are involved in coping with that situation if it were to arise and so we have authorized various people to have an exchange of information, to look into a variety of possibilities." *Current Notes on International Affairs* (Department of External Affairs, Canberra), February 1966, p. 78.

What result, if any, this "exchange of information" and looking into various "possibilities" had prior to the July 18, 1967 London announcement of accelerated British military withdrawal from Singapore-Malaysia is not known. One Australian specialist on international affairs has said that Australia "did nothing throughout 1966 and early 1967 to suggest that she would be prepared to finance Australian facilities. . . . Instead, we tried to shame the British into staying in the Malaysian area." A. L. Burns, "Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, July-December 1967," *The Australian Journal of Politics and History*, April 1968, p. 7. See also T. B. Millar, editor, *Britain's Withdrawal from Asia: Its Implications for Australia* (Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, Australian National University, mimeo., 1967?).

[5]Cf. *Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy 1967* (Cmnd. 3357) (H.M. Stationery Office, London, July 1967).

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military role in the area."[6] By early January 1968, however, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, George Thomson, had informed Malaysian and Singapore leaders, as well as the new Australian Prime Minister, John Gorton, that his government now aimed at an accelerated and complete military withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia by the end of 1971. In Gorton's words the decision amounted "to drastic alterations of previously understood arrangements as to the continuing availability of British forces in the region."[7]

Notwithstanding these announcements Britain is hardly expected to disengage herself totally from the Southeast Asian area. The oil-rich Sultanate of Brunei, formally a British protectorate, or the colony of Hong Kong, are certain to preserve directly or indirectly a measure of continuous British military cover. The base at Gan, in the Maldive Islands, likely will also remain a major British staging area. Moreover, as the Malaysians have pointed out, their 1957 defense agreement with Britain will remain in effect even after the British forces leave, although more distant staging areas than those on Malaysian soil will then have to be used in the event of an attack on Malaysia.

The concern over Britain's decision to accelerate withdrawal expressed in Singapore and Malaysia, as well as in New Zealand and Australia, led Britain to join in discussions with representatives of these four states in a five-power Commonwealth Defense Conference in Kuala Lumpur in early June 1968. Although at the conclusion of the conference Malaysian Premier Tunku Abdul Rahman assured the Malaysian House of Representatives (*Dewan Ra'ayat*) that his Australian counterpart, Prime Minister Gorton, in "heart to heart" talks had affirmed that Australia's future was "tied up" with the region,[8] and although both Australia and New Zealand in effect agreed to maintain forces in Malaysia at least until 1971, it was evident that neither Canberra nor Wellington seemed eager to fill Britain's place. As one leading Australian daily subsequently put it: "Military involvement overseas by a nation with a very limited defence capacity is dangerous unless this involvement is backed by the positive and continuing assurances of a major power that it will come to the rescue in an emergency."[9]

[6] *Current Notes on International Affairs*, July 1967, p. 295.
[7] *Ibid.*, January 1968, p. 30. On the British military withdrawal see also H. G. Gelber, *The Australian-American Alliance. Costs and Benefits* (Ringwood, Victoria: Australian Pelican Books, 1968), pp. 131-135.
[8] *The Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur and Singapore), June 13, 1968.
[9] *The Courier-Mail* (Brisbane), September 18, 1968.

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There is no question in Australian minds who that "major power" must be, and it is not surprising that the Australian press subsequently gave banner headlines to the announcement, reportedly made by American delegates in the course of the U.S.-Japanese conference on security issues in Tokyo in mid-September 1968, that the United States intended to keep substantially the present system of American bases in the Pacific after the Viet Nam war had ended.[10] This announcement was said to have challenged directly a widespread view attributed to Japanese military analysts that the new U.S. Poseidon missile, and improvements in air and sea transport, would lead to the gradual elimination of the need for the expensive and politically controversial U.S. military installations in Japan and other Asian countries, particularly in the Philippines and Thailand.

Still, Australian opinion on a future U.S. defense role, even within circles of the dominant Liberal Party, often continued to appear sharply divided. On the one hand there is the view exemplified by then External Affairs Minister Paul Hasluck, known to be committed to an activist role for Australia in regional Southeast Asian matters. In a radio interview with Hasluck on June 3, 1968, the following exchange took place:

Q. On the question of the Presidential election in America, though, Mr. Hasluck, do you think Australian foreign policy will change radically or otherwise according to who becomes President of the United States in November?

A. (Hasluck): No, I do not think so. I mean our continuing interest in this region is something that will last despite any domestic changes in the United States, and I would like to make this point very firmly that United States policy fundamentally cannot change. Presidents can come and Presidents can go and there may be variations in interpretation and variations in method but the underlying needs and interests of the United States and the responsibilities of the United States as a great power, they will still be there. The United States will not cease to be a great power simply because it gets a new President.[11]

On the other hand, in the middle of September 1968, a Liberal Party policy planning working paper, prepared by the party's secretariat and reportedly designed for use in forthcoming elections, had a somewhat different view of continuing American interests in Asia:

After Vietnam the American people will increasingly oppose U.S. military intervention in Asia unless the security of the U.S. is directly

[10]See, e.g., *The Australian*, September 14, 1968.
[11]*Current Notes on International Affairs*, June 1968, p. 247.

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threatened. The British retreat from Singapore appears final and rules out anything but token British participation in Southeast Asia conflicts.

It would be unreal to assume that the United States, in a mood of disillusionment about helping small nations in Southeast Asia, will accept strategic responsibilities in the Indian Ocean. Thus Australia finds herself in an area from which Britain has absolutely retired and in which the U.S. will obviously make new assessments.[12]

Leaked to the press, the above document is said to have caused considerable embarrassment to some Liberal Party leaders, including Prime Minister Gorton, and there is good reason to question whether its somewhat jaundiced view of America's future interest in Asia was shared by the party's leadership. It is noteworthy, however, that in its conclusion the document, by stressing Anglo-American indifference, also suggests that external security be made a key issue in future elections and seems to urge a significant Australian commitment to Southeast Asia. Thus the working paper tends to come down on the same side as the "activist" view of Hasluck, and the need for an Australian regional commitment is in effect recognized in both cases, whether or not U.S. policy in Asia changes. The extent and nature of that commitment is the point now in contention in the ruling Liberal Party, as also in the ranks of the principal opposition, the Australian Labor Party, and in the smaller, more conservative (and strongly anti-communist) Democratic Labor and Country parties.[13]

The controversy invariably and not unnaturally swirls around the role of the United States, and the careful search to find a tenable middle ground of interpretation is perhaps nowhere so apparent as in the "fundamental strategic reassessment" of August 1968. What the press had been able to learn of this reassessment suggests that, on the one hand, the United States was expected to maintain some kind of military presence on mainland Southeast Asia, focused presumably on Thailand, as the situation in Viet

[12]*The Bulletin,* September 21, 1968.

[13]In the present 124-member Australian House of Representatives, the ruling Liberal Party holds 61 seats; its chief parliamentary ally, the Country Party, 21; and the opposition Australian Labor Party, 41. There is one independent. In the Senate the Liberal-Country Party coalition has 28 seats; the Labor Party, 27; and the Democratic Labor Party, 4. (The DLP often has a variable and unpredictable position but, being strongly anti-communist, generally sides with the Liberals on Southeast Asian policy issues.) There is one independent Senator. The 5,000-member Australian Communist Party, formally split since 1964 into Moscow and Peking factions, has no parliamentary representation. The last elections of the House were held on November 26, 1966; those for one-half of the Senate body on November 29, 1967. A useful introduction to the Australian party system is Louise Overacker, *Australian Parties in a Changing Society, 1945-1967* (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1968).

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Nam meanwhile progressively became "fuzzier," with neither side achieving its objectives. On the other hand, the "reassessment" argued that, with the exception of Laos and South Viet Nam, relatively stable and essentially nonaggressive nationalist regimes now prevail in Southeast Asia, and that Communist China's revolutionary messianism (while directly threatening) is comparatively contained at present, so that the region's potential for future stability and growth is considerable. Hence the "reassessment" optimistically concluded that in the absence of any immediately significant dangers to Australian security no major step-up in defense preparations or increased outlay in military expenditures seemed warranted. While continuation of the American regional presence was appreciated, it was not considered likely that a new, major and compellingly necessary demand would be made upon that presence in the near future.

II

Much the same cautious middle-ground interpretation of Australian defense needs marked the Australian contribution to the June 1968 five-power Commonwealth Defense Conference in Kuala Lumpur. The conference was held in an atmosphere of pessimism and uncertainty, produced by the confluence of such factors as: (1) Britain's seemingly uncompromising determination to accelerate her military withdrawal from Southeast Asia and disengage herself from the area as much as economic interest permitted, (2) expectations in some (by no means all) conference quarters that the United States would not soon become involved in another Viet Nam-type hornet's nest and would shortly begin to veer toward a cautious semi-isolationism, (3) doubt that Malaysia and Singapore would be able quickly to forge a meaningful military alliance in view of the volatile political and communal relations between them which had led to Singapore's departure ("expulsion" might be the better word) from the Malaysian Federation in August 1965, and (4) the obvious physical limits on Australian-New Zealand defense capacities and reluctance to extend them too deeply or at all into Southeast Asia. London's most prestigious daily flatly predicted that the Kuala Lumpur talks were "unlikely to produce even the beginnings of a plan." It emphasized in particular that Australia could justly claim "a world of difference" between her military commitment to Viet Nam, made in conjunction with other powers and especially the

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United States, and a general "stationing of forces elsewhere in Southeast Asia when neither Britain nor the United States is similarly involved."[14]

The Australian press, meanwhile, speculated that Gorton would demand a formal defense treaty between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur before agreeing to any defense cooperation, including the stationing of Australian units in the two countries after 1971.[15] It was noted that there had been virtually no military cooperation between Singapore and Malaysia since they parted in 1965. Also, the need for Canberra to keep several options open at the conference was emphasized. These included: (1) the possibility of total Australian military withdrawal from Singapore-Malaysia after 1971, (2) retention of naval and air force units, but withdrawal of the Australian army battalion stationed at the Commonwealth Brigade camp in Terendak, near Malacca, (3) a regrouping of the Terendak battalion, along with the two Royal Australian Air Force jet fighter squadrons stationed in Butterworth, a British-built base opposite Penang on the West Malaysian coast, so as to form a new unified Australian command, and (4) possible transfer of the Australian army battalion to Singapore and retention of the RAAF squadrons in Butterworth.

Reportedly, the Australian Defense and External Affairs Departments advocated the retention after 1971 of the total 3,500-man Australian contingent now in the Singapore-Malaysia area, first because of its general psychological effect on the region, and more importantly because, should Australian forces be withdrawn altogether, it would be more difficult to accomplish their return if unforeseen circumstances demanded it. In the latter point the "activist" foreign policy view of External Affairs Minister Hasluck and his colleague, Defense Minister Allen Fairhall, seemed to be particularly evident.

During the conference and in private conversations with Malaysian and Singapore leaders, Gorton managed to convey to his listeners a reassuringly profound concern for the development of an effective regional security system, comprising both the Southeast Asian countries and Australia and New Zealand, while remaining vague about the specifics of the Australian contribution to such a system. At a state banquet given in his honor by Singapore Premier Lee Kuan Yew on June 10, Gorton spoke of

[14]The *Times* (London), June 10, 1968.
[15]See, e.g., the commentary of Christopher Forsyth in *The Australian*, May 20, 1968.

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Australia's concern, in common with that of other Southeast Asian states "including Vietnam," to halt the "kind of aggression" that would deny "the citizens of any particular area the right to be arbiters of their own destiny." He illustrated Australian concern with a story that seemed to place him far indeed from the relatively isolationist stand of an earlier day which had tended to identify him with "little Australianism" (i.e., stress on Australia's inability to play an active regional role and need to seek protection from the United States):

> A little less than a week ago I was in Darwin, one of our northernmost Australian cities, and as I stood there, I was closer to Saigon, and I was closer to Singapore than I was to the southern regions of Australia in Hobart, in Tasmania. There are no longer these great geographical divisions there used to be. There are no longer these great differences in time and in travel that there used to be. We are getting closer and closer together in point of time; we are getting, I hope, closer and closer together in point of understanding.[16]

Nevertheless, in the sixteen-point communiqué issued on June 11 at the conclusion of the conference, there are few hard Australian commitments. Yet, in light of their expectations, the Australians must have been pleased at the declaration of the Singapore and Malaysian governments that they conceived of their defense as "indivisible" and requiring "close and continuing cooperation between them."[17] The conference recognized the need for "an integrated air defense system," covering both Singapore and Malaysia, and Singapore outlined its plans to raise an air force, including a squadron of Hunter Mark 9 jet fighters, to become operational before the British departure. Australia declared in the communiqué that "as a contribution" to the integrated Malaysian-Singapore air defense system she "would be prepared to provide a Royal Australian Air Force component based on Butterworth" with elements deployed to Tengah, the military air base in Singapore. However, this contribution was in no way conceived as limiting future Australian options, since "The arrangements to operate beyond 1971 would depend on a decision to be taken by the Australian Government on the part which Australia would play in the defense of the area after that date."

Australian (and New Zealand) flexibility in formulating new

[16] *The Mirror* (Singapore), June 17, 1968.

[17] *Current Notes on International Affairs*, June 1968, pp. 249-250; *The Straits Times*, June 12, 1968.

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defense policies was a point repeated later on in the communiqué, where these two governments merely promised to "take into account" the five-power conference proceedings "in formulating their longer-term defense policies" and in determining what part their forces would play in any future collective defense. Meanwhile, and implicitly until the end of 1971 at least, the status quo would continue, and Australian and New Zealand forces would remain in the area "to assist" the Malaysian and Singapore governments in the "training" and "development" of their military establishments.

Still, other decisions of the conference indicated a careful movement toward a defined responsibility of each of the participants — including Britain — in a new collective security system. While the Commonwealth Brigade stationed at Terendak, consisting of one battalion each from Australia, New Zealand and Britain, and serviced by 2,000 additional British support forces, would not survive 1971 in its present form, the question of a new Australian-New Zealand ground force commitment seemed still open, despite some speculation that future Australian commitments might only involve an air force.[18] Even Britain promised expert personnel to participate in (though not to direct) the further operations of the important Jungle Warfare Training Center in Kota Tinggi, in Johore, on a "multi-national basis," and shortly Singapore, Australia and New Zealand, along with Britain, indicated a readiness to contribute to this facility under Malaysian army direction. Malaysia also assumed responsibility for the northern radar station near Butterworth air base, and, in cooperation with Singapore, agreed to maintain and "to use the Woodlands Naval base and such other facilities in Singapore" as might be mutually acceptable.

All conference members agreed that there should be joint army exercises in the Singapore-Malaysia area after 1971, and that to this end "joint exercise planning" and joint participation in a jungle warfare training school should be achieved. A "major exercise" in which all five powers will take part is now slated to be held in 1970, and in this connection Britain agreed to make service technicians available on contract to various installations after 1971.

The principal British delegates, Healey and Thomson, seemed to be at pains to stress British mobility from European bases in the

[18] *The Sydney Morning Herald*, September 11, 1968.

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event of a Southeast Asian emergency, and intimations that the Maldives would bolster this mobile capacity heightened speculation over the true nature of the vaunted British withdrawal. One observer asked whether "Mr. Healey had been even more reassuring in private than he was in public? Certainly the failure to answer the numerous queries the withdrawal and the conference raised, prompted some observers to wonder along these lines. After all, for example, who would ever know if, even after 1971, British *Polaris* submarines were east of Suez or not?"[19] And what might be expected from a return to power in Britain of the Conservative Party, whose leader, Edward Heath, in the course of August and September 1968 spoke of a "restoration" of the British position East of Suez, including a new defense partnership with Australia, and a reversal of the Labour government's alleged policy of "ratting on foreign commitments to friends and allies"? Such statements raised Malaysian hopes that somehow Britain would still retain her Singapore and Malaysian military installations.[20] The possibility that the Conservatives might come to power in Britain before the end of 1971 further contributed to this optimism.

For Canberra, however, the British withdrawal is now a central strategic reality — whatever the present or future significance of Hong Kong, Brunei, the Maldives, the Jungle Warfare Center in Kota Tinggi, or joint training exercises like the "Coral Sands" operation in Queensland, Australia, in early October 1968, or whatever Heath may promise. The real issue today is the extent to which Australia would be justified in exploring and concluding on her own, as well as in partnership with her allies, a new pattern of collective security arrangements in Southeast Asia, with due regard for the divisiveness among the Southeast Asian nations. More and more, the Australian criterion is becoming the willingness of Singapore-Malaysia and their neighbors to help themselves, and this is increasingly recognized in the countries concerned. Britain "and even Australia" will not "sit on the

[19]Harvey Stockwin, "Suspiciously like Nothing," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 11, 1968, p. 118.

[20]A headline in *The Malay Mail* (Kuala Lumpur), August 8, 1968 read: "Conservatives Believe United Kingdom Can Still Retain Bases." This was an unwarranted conclusion from Heath's admittedly sanguine, if vague, remarks, which never went into the specifics of the post-1971 British presence in Singapore-Malaysia. For Heath's promise of a new defense partnership with Australia see *The Australian*, September 13, 1968, and for Canberra's less than enthusiastic reaction see Hugh Armfield, "So What?," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 5, 1968, p. 465.

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fence" but "come forward to our aid" if "Malaysia and Singapore are closely cooperating with each other in defense," as one Chinese-language daily in Malaysia expressed it.[21] The nature of the cooperation Australia would like to see was revealed in Prime Minister Gorton's cautious assertion at the end of the five-power conference: if it would enhance stability, Australia would not only not stand in the way of a joint nonaggression pact between the countries of the Malaysian-Singapore region but would, if it were suitable, be prepared to join such a pact.[22]

This Australian ambition, it might be noted, seems sufficiently resilient not to be altered by periodic regional tensions. When Philippine-Malaysian relations reached a new low in September 1968, over rival claims on the East Malaysian state of Sabah, Australian External Affairs Minister Hasluck declared that his country did not wish to become involved should open hostilities break out between Manila and Kuala Lumpur, and (contrary to speculation) that the crisis over Sabah would not affect Australia's defense role in the region. Pending the British withdrawal, he said, "We will keep in the Malaysia area our forces at the present time."[23] There is, then, a readiness in Canberra to plan for the long haul, and it is here perhaps that the five-power conference made its most notable contribution. As one post-conference commentary put it: "What the conference has achieved . . . is the foundation of the process of continuing review essential if decisions over the next three years in Canberra and Wellington as well as London, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore are to be soundly based."[24]

III

Yet only a few months before the Kuala Lumpur conference Australian policies in Southeast Asia had seemed to be in considerable jeopardy, and beyond Canberra's present cautious forging of a new regional rapprochement there continue to loom alternative policy positions with significant popular and intrapartisan following in the country.

The policy evolution of Prime Minister Gorton, made during his first six months in office in the first half of 1968, is something

[21] *Nanyang Siang Pau* (Singapore), June 20, 1968.
[22] *The Straits Times,* June 13, 1968.
[23] *The Sydney Morning Herald,* September 25, 1968; *The Courier-Mail,* September 24, 1968.
[24] Hugh Mabbett, "Gauging the success of the defence talks," *The Straits Times,* June 13, 1968.

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of an index to these alternative positions and the considerations that shape them.[25] Gorton's assumption of the premiership virtually coincided with the January 1968 journey of Commonwealth Affairs Secretary Thomson to Kuala Lumpur, Singapore and Canberra for the purpose of announcing the accelerated British military withdrawal. After his talks with Thomson, he issued a statement that Australia "was not resigned" to the British intentions, and could not accept them without protest, and he subsequently expressed support for Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's journey to London seeking to alter the British decision. But it was already evident that the Australian government felt it had no choice but to acquiesce in British withdrawal and begin, or perhaps speed up, its own agonizing collective security reappraisal.

In the first instance this reappraisal, at least as voiced by Gorton, seemed to take a distinctly "retractionist," if not isolationist, direction, confirmed by the mounting opposition in the United States to the war in Viet Nam and President Johnson's decision, on March 31, 1968, not to seek re-election. The latter event, which caught Australian leaders wholly by surprise, in particular seemed to justify a drastic retrenchment of Australian regional commitments, now that the United States appeared increasingly uncertain of its Southeast Asian role. As one leading Australian commentator argued: "Our extreme caution over committing a military presence to Malaysia and Singapore is now extremely well justified. There may be very little we can do, but one thing we must do is to stop talking as if our great and powerful friends are immutable parts of the scenery where we live, with permanent, unchangeable attitudes and commitments."[26] In the context of American uncertainties, the rapidly rising cost to Australia in blood and treasure of her own Viet Nam commitment occasioned a new wave of opposition, particularly in the left wing of the Australian Labor Party and its crypto-communist allies.[27] In

[25]For a useful survey of Gorton's evolution see George Westbrook, "Foreign Policy Review, January-June 1968," *The Australian Quarterly*, September 1968, pp. 92-96.

[26]Peter Hastings in *The Australian*, April 3, 1968.

[27]Australian forces in Viet Nam increased from 30 army instructors in 1962 to 1,250 combat troops in 1965, to 8,100 in 1968. Casualties in the war were a little over 1,200. (*The Sydney Morning Herald*, September 10, 1968.) Total Australian armed forces numbered 80,962 on June 30, 1968, and according to a statement by Defense Minister Fairhall in the Australian House of Representatives on September 25, 1968, this figure was scheduled to rise by 3,400 by June 30, 1969. Meanwhile the cost of the Viet Nam war to Australia grew from A$73,000 in mid-1963 to A$76.3 million on June 30, 1968.

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March and April, the Gorton cabinet's inept handling of a charge of Australian mistreatment of North Vietnamese prisoners, and the domestic "credibility gap" this opened, further called into question the soundness of past and present defense policies.[28]

Following Gorton's declaration on January 17 that Australia would not fill the void produced by Britain's withdrawal from Singapore-Malaysia, reluctance to undertake an expansion of defense commitments had become publicly apparent — e.g., from the Prime Minister's statements that Australia would not raise her troop levels in Viet Nam and, shortly thereafter, that Australia did not intend to become involved in a new Korean conflict. During the Higgins by-election in February, Gorton asserted that whatever role Australia might play would depend on "alliances with some friendly and significant ally having the same approach to life as we in Australia have." The clear implication seemed to be that if such an ally had lost zest for its own active foreign commitments, then "little" Australia would also have to pull in its horns. The Australian Prime Minister seemed determined to push his own foreign policy concepts to their natural conclusion even as External Affairs Minister Hasluck, quietly backed by Defense Minister Fairhall, was pursuing an anti-isolationist and active regionalist policy apparently at variance with them.

On May 8, 1968, in a much-publicized address to a meeting of government parties, Gorton declared that the idea of active Australian regional commitments — i.e., the "forward defense" concept of former Prime Minister Robert Menzies — while legitimate in its day, might have to be abandoned as no longer suitable to the new realities of the Asian region. Unless Australia could get absolute guarantees that the United States would come immediately to the assistance of the forces in Singapore-Malaysia in the event of hostilities, Australia should seriously reconsider maintaining her forces there, he argued. As an alternative, he broached a new tactical concept, involving a highly mobile striking force based on Australian soil, and suggested the feasibility of an Israeli-type defense system in which an easily mobilized, well trained reserve of military personnel in civil occupations would be capable of sustaining "the first shock of any attack" on the country. During this same period Gorton articulated the profound pessimism suffusing all these suggestions by saying that Australia

[28]Colin A. Hughes, "Australian Political Chronicle, January-April 1968," *The Australian Journal of Politics and History*, August 1968, pp. 240-241.

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now was "for the first time in its history relatively defenseless," and, in a BBC interview, that "We haven't got the capacity to be ourselves a power in Asia or anywhere else. We are 12,000,000 people. What is the population of London?"[29]

Another element contributing to Gorton's pessimistic approach was the feeling — shared by some members of the Country and Democratic Labor parties as well as some in his own Liberal Party — that in light of recent American decisions in Viet Nam "Southeast Asia should be written off," and the Australian fortress made as viable as possible within its own perimeter. This would require not only a new concept of primarily home-based defense, but also close attention to the development of domestic economic strength. The government's May 1968 defense review statement (reportedly dictated by Gorton over the considerable objection of Defense Minister Fairhall) warned: "Clearly there is a point beyond which allocation of resources to military activities becomes counter-productive. The ordinary purposes of growth will be prejudiced if too much manpower, equipment and materials are devoted to defense purposes."[30] From this standpoint Treasury Secretary and Deputy Liberal Party Leader William McMahon, one of the most influential figures in the cabinet, who has long pressed for a definite limit on defense expenditures as a percentage of gross national product, appeared to have some sway on the Prime Minister's defense philosophy in this period.

Whether Gorton's isolationist views were designed to provoke private or public American or Commonwealth assurance that would justify retention of existing Australian foreign and defense policies and commitments, is difficult to say. However, within days of his May 8 speech and the defense review statement a serious revolt against his defense views by backbenchers of his own party in the House of Representatives was inducing the Prime Minister to begin a shift in the direction of the Hasluck-Fairhall "activist" position. Lieutenant-General Sir John Wilton, chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the Australian Defense Department, told Liberal backbenchers that Australian military strategists viewed "with dismay" abandonment of the "forward defense" policy concept. Sir John noted that an eventual American withdrawal from Viet Nam did not necessarily mean

[29]*The Bulletin*, September 7, 1968. See also *The Canberra Times*, January 24, 1968.

[30]Commonwealth of Australia, *Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives* (Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, 1968), May 2, 1968, p. 1082.

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abandonment of the American military presence in Thailand, and added that while Australia would be unwise to keep her forces on mainland Asia in the event the United States pulled out, there was no need to help the domino theory along by an unnecessary advance Australian commitment to withdraw.

Liberal backbench support for a continuing Australian military and regional involvement often seemed emotional: "The heart of Australia," Liberal House member Jeff Bate declared, "says that we will go into [Southeast Asian] countries, spend those enormous sums of money, and deny ourselves many of the things we want, so that we can defend this country." Yet it also had an unmistakable undertone of thoughtful concern that the Prime Minister seemed embarked on a policy of denigrating not only traditional defense commitments but a sound defense posture generally, in favor of domestic economic requirements: "First and foremost I wish to reject the heresy that anything is more important than our survival as a free nation. It is for this reason that our defense policy is and must remain a matter of first priority in our thinking and in our budgetary appropriations," exclaimed Edward St. John, another prominent Liberal backbencher.[31]

Unquestionably the backbench revolt received muted encouragement from Gorton's "loyal opposition" in the cabinet, Ministers Hasluck and Fairhall. Hasluck, during a February 1968 visit to Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Djakarta, had said that while Malaysia and Singapore would have to rely mainly on their own resources, Australia would be prepared to maintain her present military commitment in the area; he was even said to have gone out of his way in talks with Malaysian-Singapore leaders to emphasize that the impending British military withdrawal was irrelevant to Australian action.

Ever interested in an extension of regional security arrangements, Hasluck must also have been heartened by Indonesian assurances, in the course of March and April, that Indonesia had no objection to a continued Australian military presence in Singapore-Malaysia, and, though not wishing formally to join a defense pact herself, might be prepared to enter into active "military cooperation" with other nations. During a brief visit in Canberra in mid-April, Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik suggested that his country and Australia could cooperate in the defense of West New Guinea and stressed again that Indonesia

[31] *Ibid.*, May 7, 1968, pp. 1157-1158, 1169.

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was interested in concluding bilateral defense agreements rather than broad, multilateral ones.

Malik's suggestion may well have been actuated in part by the difficulties Indonesia was facing in West New Guinea, where popular resistance against the Indonesian role had continued to erupt in the past two years. Trading on Australian concern for new collective security agreements, a joint Indonesian-Australian defense system for West New Guinea would, in effect, have implied Australian support for Indonesian retention of the territory.[32] It should be added, however, that a number of top Indonesian military commanders, remembering the abortive communist-inspired coup in Indonesia, in the assistance and perhaps even planning of which Communist China appears to have been closely involved,[33] have for some time been strongly in favor of Indonesian adhesion to a regional defense pact.

But, as Hasluck pointed out to the Australian lower house on March 26, 1968, Indonesia's Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (*Madjelis Permusjawarataan Rakjat Sementera*), the country's highest policymaking body, had in 1966 adopted the view that Indonesia by "tying itself to any world bloc or becoming involved in military pacts" would prejudice her "free and active foreign policy." At the same time, Hasluck noted, the Indonesian government "is cooperating in practical ways [not further specified] with neighboring countries for mutual security and has indicated that military cooperation with neighboring countries can develop." Amid doubt that Prime Minister Gorton would look upon these Indonesian views with the same expectation as his External Affairs Minister, Hasluck kept affirming Australia's "direct and special interest" in Southeast Asia, the Western Pacific and even "the Indian Ocean" ("for this is where we live"). He also asserted that "the guaranteed security" provided by the United States, both by means of separate bilateral treaties in Southeast Asia and under the ANZUS pact, did "more than any other single factor to give a sense of security in the East" and welcomed the "growing movement toward regional cooperation in Asia."[34]

[32]For Malik's statement see *The Australian*, April 17, 1968, and on Indonesian difficulties in West New Guinea see Justus M. van der Kroef, "West New Guinea: the Uncertain Future," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 8 (1968), pp. 691-707.

[33]Cf. Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Sino-Indonesian Rupture," *The China Quarterly*, January-March 1968, pp. 17-46.

[34]Commonwealth of Australia, *Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives*, March 26, 1968, pp. 446-457.

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The latter movement, Hasluck subsequently implied, provided still further reason for active Australian commitments to Southeast Asia. Neatly turning the argument of Australian Labor Party critics, who had contended that he and Liberal Party policy generally were too one-sidedly and militaristically involved with the country's neighbors and had insufficient regard for their social and economic development,[35] Hasluck in a noteworthy address to the West Australian Chamber of Manufactures on May 18, 1968, stressed that the great disparity in income and in levels of welfare between Australia and her neighbors might, if the latter's expectations were not realized, lead to "considerable increase" in political instability. (In 1966 Australian per capita income was almost U.S. $1600; in the developing countries of Southeast Asia, apart from Singapore, it was nowhere more than $250.) Australia, he noted, through all manner of assistance and tangible expressions of concern, was aiding the developing regions, and whatever opportunity Australians might have in their own country for a better life depended on the manner in which they met the challenges of the world "from which we cannot in any way isolate ourselves."[36]

But besides the pressures from within his own party, Gorton's personal contacts with other world leaders were inducing a change in his foreign policy concepts. Toward the close of May 1968, the state visit of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the first by an Indian Prime Minister to Australia, was generally understood as evidence of a new and active projection of Indian interests in the Southeast Asian region, made at a time when Japan, for some considerable time, had been showing similar concern. Members of the visiting Indian mission reportedly not only kept saying that "We are a part of South-East Asia, too," but talked "specifically of the need to cultivate a tripod Indian-Australian-Japanese framework within which the smaller countries of Southeast Asia can achieve greater cohesion and progress" (a concept also adumbrated by U.S. Defense Secretary Clark Clifford late in September 1968).[37]

At about the same time, Gorton's own visit to the United States seemed to have been reassuring to him. Upon his return, in a

[35]Representative of this Australian Labor Party approach is the pamphlet by the party's opposition leader, E. G. Whitlam, *Beyond Vietnam — Australia's Regional Responsibility* (Victorian Fabian Society, 1968).

[36]*Current Notes on International Affairs*, May 1968, pp. 185-189.

[37]*The Bulletin*, June 1, 1968; *The Australian*, October 1, 1968. See also J. D. B. Miller, editor, *India, Japan, Australia. Partners in Asia?* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1968).

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parliamentary statement on June 4, he declared that discussions with President Johnson, and with Humphrey, Rockefeller and Nixon as well, had persuaded him that there would be no fundamental alteration in the American concern for Southeast Asia: "America will not withdraw." Meanwhile, Hasluck had again emphasized a few days before, "Australian security is an outcome of regional security," and without the latter Australia would be in a condition of "uncertainty" and "threat."[38] Accordingly, Australian defense planning had to be based on cooperation with the free nations of Southeast Asia.

By mid-September 1968, Defense Minister Fairhall, in a new parliamentary report that almost certainly had the foreknowledge and approval of Gorton, asserted that the communist threat to Asia had not diminished; that while various Southeast Asian countries had moved significantly ahead toward greater internal stability and cohesion, thus developing their capacity to contribute to the security of their own area, communist pressure backed by military force was continuing in other countries and Chinese military power was also increasing.[39] Certainly by this time Gorton had moved far from his original "retractionist" position. While still cautious in projecting Australian commitments, and tending toward *ad hoc* policy responses in contrast to the grand strategy approach of Hasluck, he had begun to acquire something resembling the basic regionalist outlook of his External Affairs and Defense ministers. "The Fortress Australia conception is by no means dead," wrote one of Australia's leading commentators in early September 1968. "It has simply lost a powerful proponent in the Prime Minister, Mr. John Gorton, who in his early days freely and carelessly floated notions of continental-based defense and such exotica as an Israeli type of defense force."[40]

IV

Gorton's foreign and defense policy evolution thus seemed to have traversed the distance between the two basic positional alternatives that have endured as Australian conceptions of international relations since before World War II, usually designated by the terms "fortress Australia" and "forward defense." Operationally, adhesion to either of these poles is rarely

[38]*Current Notes on International Affairs,* June 1968, p. 247.
[39]*The Courier-Mail,* September 26, 1968.
[40]Peter Hastings in *The Australian,* September 5, 1968.

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absolute in Australian political life, although support for them cuts across most of the domestic party and ideological spectrum. There are those primarily tending toward one or the other position in both the ruling Liberal-Country Party coalition and the Labor Party opposition, and the motives for their views differ and tend to shift over time.

The "fortress Australia" concept, for example, finds supporters in the political Right and, in somewhat modified form, among the Left. For the former, the indecisive course of the Viet Nam conflict produced a critical re-evaluation of Australia's heavy defense reliance on the United States and her "forward" commitments in Southeast Asia. The conclusion was that both the reliance and the commitments had been serious mistakes, that Australia must now rely more — if not wholly — on her own defense (at least in the early stages of a military involvement), and that an accelerating step-up in defense expenditures and highly necessary new weapons systems development inevitably would mean "less butter," requiring policy geared to this unpleasant reality. Among the Left, i.e., in the ranks of the divided Communist Party, as well as in the left wing of the Australian Labor Party, the view prevails that all the defense Australia essentially needs is home defense. Deliberate involvement in regional Southeast Asian and other security arrangements is considered both dangerous and immoral due to its virtual *carte blanche* dependence on the United States and the latter's "imperialist" ventures, particularly in Viet Nam. As the Australian Communist Party (Moscow wing) puts it:

> The Communist Party calls for a break with the present policy of subordinating Australian independence to such dangerously vague slogans as the "need for an American alliance." We ask, Alliance with which part of America?—Those who want to "bomb Vietnam back to the Stone Age," or the large and growing number of Americans who oppose the aggressive policies of the White House and Pentagon Chiefs?
>
> We believe that the interests of our country are not served by tying ourselves to the USA or Britain. The ruling circles of these distant countries have imperialist aims in Asia, seeking to maintain economic, political, and strategic interests in the region. These aims cut across the aspirations of the Asian peoples to build a new and better life in their own countries.
>
> A new approach to our security would give rise to a defense system based on true defense and not attack on any other country. The idea that we must fight "over there" instead of "here" would bring chaos to international relations if everyone practised it. . . . A true defense system

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would be concerned with repelling an invader and would not be primarily concerned with "first strike weapons". . . .[41]

With some variation, identical views are increasingly expressed in the Labor Party left, where armed neutrality and political self-containment in the Swedish manner, or even "unarmed neutrality," are seriously considered to be desirable defense posture alternatives. Along related lines, Australia's present identification with the United States is viewed as "ideologically provocative" and hence likely to bring unwanted retaliation.[42] In these left-wing quarters the Soviet Union's recent charge that Australia is using Papua-New Guinea as a military base for its own aggressive ends has also found a sympathetic echo.[43]

One hastens to add that in the center and right of the Australian Labor Party there is opposition to the neutral isolation and "fortress" defense concept met with in the left wing. Again, center-right Labor circles (dominated by such principal party figures as Arthur Calwell and the Federal Opposition Leader Gough Whitlam) deem that, certainly under the ANZUS pact, Australia's alliance with the United States must be preserved. However, they also criticize a too-heavy military dependence on the United States and diplomatic involvement in U.S. policies, while specifically condemning Australian participation in the Viet Nam war. As early as 1957, the Australian Labor Party attacked the SEATO treaty because it tended toward the "bolstering" of "reactionary regimes," e.g., allegedly in Thailand.[44] Moreover, as we have noted, these same circles view Australian regional involvement as lacking in constructive social and economic assistance and as being too one-sidedly militaristic. On the latter point all segments of the Australian Labor Party and the rest of the Left too are probably agreed, so that the self-contained "fortress" concept must be considered somewhat modified by the stance emphasizing redoubled aid for regional reconstruction and development.

To a significant degree the same observation applies to "fortress" adherents on the Right. Such staunchly conservative

[41]*Looking Left. An Introduction to the Policies of the Communist Party of Australia* (Sydney: D.B. Young, Ltd., 1968), pp. 13-14.

[42]Max Teichmann, *Australia — Armed and Neutral?* (Victorian Fabian Society, 1966), pp. 21-22. See also Michelle Grattan, "Armed Neutrality—A Foreign Policy for Australia?," *The Australian Quarterly*, December 1968, pp. 44-56.

[43]*The Australian*, September 13, 1968.

[44]D. W. Rawson, "Foreign Policy and Australian Parties," *World Review* (Brisbane), July 1962, p. 20.

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and bitterly anti-communist Liberal Party backbenchers as former Interior Minister Sir Wilfrid Kent-Hughes are frequently viewed — and not altogether without justification — as among the more extreme advocates of a "retractionist" policy centering on a massive buildup of Australia's own defenses. But neither Sir Wilfrid nor any other member of the governing Liberal-Country coalition's right wing seriously advocates the abrogation of Australia's existing defense treaties, despite questioning their reliability. Sir Wilfrid, though interminably concerned in his speeches with "the Communist downward thrust in Southeast Asia," also has stressed the need "that we assist in regional cooperation and the development and raising of standards of living in these areas."[45] There are, however, among the advocates of the "fortress" concept on the Right some who are supporters of Rhodesia and South Africa (e.g., Magnus Cormack, the veteran Liberal Party Senator from Victoria) and popularizers of a policy that would establish closer relations with these "outposts of Western civilization" (among which Australia is included) rather than with Britain, the Commonwealth, or even the United States. In these circles the "fortress" idea is intricately tied to Australia's essentially "white only" immigration policy, and it is not surprising to hear the leader of the Australian Natives Association (a white-only immigration pressure group) argue that Australia is not part of Asia and never will be, and that to lower the immigration color bar would cause "the destiny of this great country" to "slip from our grasp."[46]

Still others who gravitate toward the "fortress" idea do so, it would seem, primarily for military and strategic considerations. Among these is a leading Liberal Party defense specialist and Navy Minister in the Holt cabinet, Don Chipp, who has stressed from the military angle that "we are not part of Asia." According to Chipp, for Australia to become militarily committed to the "forward defense" of Malaysia-Singapore or anywhere on Asia's mainland would be folly: "What happens if the battalion you have there is not enough to cope with the emergency? Can you then tell your Malaysian friends 'Sorry, this is the extent of our commitment' and pull out?" Another of his arguments is that anti-Chinese sentiment among Southeast Asian peoples is a "priceless" Australian asset in obstructing China's "downward thrust." Hence

[45]Commonwealth of Australia, *Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives,* May 8, 1968, p. 1209.
[46]*The Australian,* March 19, 1968.

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Australia needs to and should primarily preserve her ANZUS pact protection, while also maintaining her home-based military strength.[47]

But while the "fortress Australia" notion and its "retractionist" policy dynamics will — like isolationism in the United States — probably continue to exercise appeal in varying degrees and forms for many years to come, a study of the evolution of Australian foreign policy shows that over the past generation its supporters are in the minority. The real debate today tends to revolve around the kind of internationalism Australia ought to pursue,[48] if we allow for caution against too rigid perception of the internationalist approach. The Australian "consensus," as reflected, for example, among most of the Liberal-Country Party coalition and in the center and right of the Australian Labor Party, would abandon neither the ANZUS treaty nor the principle that Australia has a legitimate stake in the development of a friendly and stable government in Papua and Eastern New Guinea. Nor, again, would it disavow the desirability of the United Nations, which has come under severe attack from some elements on the Australian Right because of its decisions on South Africa and Rhodesia, and from the small Maoist wing of the Australian Communist Party because of its alleged domination by the "U.S. imperialists." Nevertheless, there are subtle but significant differences in emphasis among "forward defense" adherents.

Though the "forward defense" idea draws nourishment from many different historic taproots, one major source is what might be called the "Kokoda complex" in Australian strategic considerations, stemming from the nearly successful Japanese thrust along the Kokoda trail to Port Moresby in East New Guinea during World War II. The serious possibility of an actual physical occupation structured postwar Australian sympathies toward Asian nationalist aspirations as a kind of insurance of future friendship. It also gave meaning to the proposition that the first line of Australian defense ought not to lie in the vicinity of the Solomon Islands but rather well beyond it, in a system of regional security backed by bilateral or multilateral treaties of alliance. "Forward defense" has therefore meant the bisecting of two lines of strategic

[47] *The Courier-Mail*, September 21, 1968.

[48] For a perceptive analysis of this evolution by a former senior Australian External Affairs Department officer and diplomat, see Sir Alan Watt, *The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938-1965* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967). See also Edward D. L. Killen, *Pacific Security Alternatives Seen Through Australian Eyes* (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1954).

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thought: (1) development of distant "bastions," well away from Australian shores, to whose maintenance Australia is committed, and (2) reliance, through treaties, on those major powers whose political culture is similar to Australia's, i.e., Britain and increasingly the United States. The day-to-day differences among "forward defense" adherents in and out of government tend to lie in the relative thickening of or emphasis to be placed on each of the two lines — in the degree of the Australian commitment, say, or in interpretations of the reliability of treaties with the major powers.

In 1951 the ANZUS treaty (Pacific Security Pact), signed by the United States, Australia and New Zealand, provided for (1) regular consultations between the parties in the event of any danger to the security of the signatories, and (2) recognition that an attack on one of the parties would be considered "dangerous" to the peace of the others and would lead to appropriate retaliation in accordance with each signatory's constitutional procedures. Consolidation and refinement of these provisions has steadily proceeded over the years, and today Australia, through the treaty, has obtained "a continuing and permanent access to the top echelons in the State Department and the Pentagon."[49] There is little doubt that the ANZUS treaty was eagerly sought by the Australians. Moreover, according to a top Australian diplomat, the offer of Australian ground forces to the United States at the start of the Korean War greatly assisted in creating a climate in Washington favoring the "Australian diplomatic initiative" for an alliance.[50]

The latter point is worth making, since the continuing Australian commitment on the side of the United States in the Viet Nam war — like the earlier commitment in Korea — is viewed in Canberra as a kind of premium that must be paid by Australia on the insurance efficacy of the ANZUS treaty, as well as a contribution to her own "forward defense" system in Southeast Asia. Back in the late 1940's Australia had participated with New Zealand and Britain in defense coordination in the Malayan-Singapore area, in an effort which came to be known as ANZAM.

[49]Norman Harper, "Australia and the United States," in Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper, editors, *Australia in World Affairs 1961-1965* (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, for the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1968), p. 338. See also J. G. Starke, *The ANZUS Treaty Alliance* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1965).

[50]Sir Alan Watt, "Commentary," in John Wilkes, editor, *Australia's Defence and Foreign Policy* (London: Angus and Robertson, 1964), p. 35.

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In 1954, with the development of the SEATO alliance, all these strategic concepts and commitments became still further entrenched. They reached something of a culmination in 1955 when the Menzies Government decided to base Australian ground forces in Malaya to assist in combating the communist guerrilla insurgency there, even though technically this was a time of peace.

The reasons for this extended involvement, which was climaxed by Australian association with the United Kingdom-Malaya Defense Agreement of 1957, and the solidification of the ANZAM system, lie beyond this analysis.[51] But it was clear that the Menzies declaration of April 20, 1955,[52] which sought to develop some basic Australian policy attitudes toward the new states of Southeast Asia — among them nonintervention in one another's internal affairs "so long as they pursue the same principle," and preservation of peace with justice (but also development of alliances with powerful friends) — would not deter further commitments to the ANZAM "forward" bastion if the need arose. For example, in 1963, during worsening relations with Indonesia, resulting from the latter's successful campaign to acquire Dutch-held West New Guinea and the Indonesian "confrontation" of the new Malaysian Federation, Menzies took a firm stand. In unequivocal terms he stressed Australia's determination to defend the Australian territories of Papua and East New Guinea "as if they were part of our own mainland," and to do the same for Malaysia in the event the latter was subjected to an "armed invasion or subversive activity — supported or inspired from outside Malaysia."[53]

Before this, in a unilateral pronouncement on September 17, 1963, Menzies had declared that Australian commitments under the Anglo-Malaysian Defense Agreement and the ANZAM system would henceforth be applied to the whole Malaysian Federation. Though all the while attempting to retain her diplomatic flexibility toward Djakarta, Australia, under pressure from Kuala Lumpur and London, augmented her forces in Malaysia in early February 1965, reflecting Hasluck's contention expressed nearly a year and a half before that by defending Malaysia "we are maintaining the political and territorial integrity of nations against

[51]For details on ANZAM see especially T. B. Millar, *Australia's Defense* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1965), pp. 69-76.

[52]*Current Notes on International Affairs*, Vol. 26 (1955), p. 282.

[53]J. A. Nilsson, "The Australian Position on the Malaysian Issue," *World Review*, March 1964, pp. 6-7.

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whom aggression may rise in any form."[54] The latter statement has also been the rationale of the Australian government's support for U.S. bombing of North Viet Nam and the gradually growing commitment of Australian forces to South Viet Nam. The conviction is that (1) Communist China is basically aggressive and expansionist, however indirect her methods may be from time to time; (2) in the context of these Chinese pressures Hanoi's threat to South Viet Nam, if it were successful, would place all of Southeast Asia and thus Australia's own "forward defense" in jeopardy (the "domino theory"); and (3) given Australia's weakness, she needs to build up a "credit balance of good will" with the United States by coming to America's aid. These have all been normative considerations in the Liberal government's "forward" policy in the Viet Nam war.[55]

Without a doubt the leading Australian theoretician of the "forward defense" concept is former External Affairs Minister (now Governor General) Hasluck. Australian policy, according to him, should operate within the realities of the contemporary international power struggle which is perhaps most acute in Asia, especially Southeast Asia. An aggressive communist bloc, centering on China, is the critical element in the Asian power struggle. It must be contained. But Southeast Asia is not merely a defensive frontier for Australia; rather, as Australia's "Near Northwest" (the term "Far East" has no meaning from the vantage point of Australians), it is an area that requires independent growth and development in its own right, and with this process Australia's economic and military strength is inextricably intertwined. "Forward defense" is thus more than a military idea; it also embraces broadly regional development.

Australia's continuing commitment to Viet Nam should be appreciated in this light. Such a commitment may be dictated in part by a desire to please the American ally, but it is central to Australia's role in the international, and particularly the Asian, power struggle. Therefore, unless the Labor Party comes to power, or a total repudiation of "forward defense" occurs — and both are

[54]Commonwealth of Australia, *Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives,* September 25, 1963, p. 1378. See also P. King, "Problems of Australian Foreign Policy," *Australian Journal of Politics and History,* December 1964, p. 286.

[55]Robert Cooksey, "Assumptions of Australia's Vietnam Policy," *World Review,* October 1966, pp. 42-48. On Australian concepts of dependence on the United States see especially Norman Harper, editor, *Pacific Orbit: Australian-American Relations since 1942* (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1968), and Gelber, *op. cit., passim.*

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unlikely developments — Australia will no doubt retain her forces in Viet Nam as long as the United States does. While support for the United Nations remains essential, it should be recognized that that organization cannot be relied upon to preserve the peace of the world. Australia, as a small power, has had to choose sides. Now, as Britain's direct military involvement in Asia steadily diminishes, her choice has narrowed to the U.S. side, specifically on the basis of the ANZUS and SEATO alliances, and always within the context of accepted principles of international conduct and law.[56]

But the ever-changing international scene has produced new nuances in these postulates. To be sure, in most of the Democratic Labor Party, in leading Roman Catholic circles closely identified with the DLP, or among the membership of the influential Returned Services League, the principle of resolute confrontation of communism's "downward thrust" continues to color all foreign policy and defense considerations.[57] In these quarters the desirability of preserving existing forward defenses in the form of troops, aircraft and naval units, whether stationed in the Singapore-Malaysia or Viet Nam areas, tends to be accepted with little question. However, their demand for a strong Australian defense establishment is so insistent sometimes, and the correlative assertion that only a strong Australia can win political and military allies is so determined, that one wonders whether this way of thinking may simply be a variant of the "fortress Australia" idea.

Others see the times demanding a different "forward defense" approach, one geared increasingly to the self-reliance of Asians themselves. They consider the likely U.S. reluctance to become in-

[56]This summary of Hasluck's policy is based on Gordon Greenwood, "Australian Foreign Policy in Action," in Greenwood and Harper, editors, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-36.

[57]Representative of this "back against the wall" point of view is B. A. Santamaria, *Determined to Survive* (Melbourne: The Hawthorne Press, 1966). Early in September 1968, the Democratic Labor Party called on the government to establish a permanent army of from four to five divisions (about 100,000 men), which would also assist Southeast Asian governments in combating local insurgencies. It declared that escalation of the war effort in Viet Nam would be "inescapable" if no meaningful results were produced in the Paris negotiations. Finally, the government was urged to make the Indian Ocean its responsibility, and as a first step in this direction the DLP demanded the development of bases along Australia's western coast. In DLP thinking, a "go it alone" view has steadily become more popular. "The Democratic Labor Party publicly questions how long the United States will remain committed to the defense of mainland Southeast Asia and how important Australia will be to it if and when it decides to leave," writes T. B. Millar, *Australia's Foreign Policy* (London: Angus and Robertson, 1968), p. 241.

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volved in another Viet Nam in the future, and note the slow but not insignificant efforts being made by Southeast Asian nations toward regional cooperation, exemplified in the three-year-old Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN). They view India and Japan, and possibly also Taiwan and South Korea, as Australia's natural regional defense partners, whose collective security network encloses and lends support to the smaller, weaker, or more neutral-minded nations of Southeast Asia. To these circles Australia's interdependence with Britain and the United States has always looked too much like "a white man's club," and in the perspective of the future "the interests of at least two major Asian Powers, India and Japan, must be engaged sooner or later," as well as those of the lesser Asian powers.[58]

V

Speculation over the pattern of collective security that will develop in Asia after the Viet Nam war comes to an end may be considerably premature, but has nevertheless already become a major preoccupation of Australian political leaders and analysts.[59] To attempt a "firm fix" on the drift of these speculations would be equally premature, yet a few of the areas of seeming controversy and certainty may be summarized briefly.[60]

To begin with, SEATO and ANZAM are generally no longer regarded as viable in Canberra. The former is viewed as being of future value primarily to Thailand; for Australia "SEATO is little better than fly specked window dressing," as *The Australian Financial Review* phrased it editorially on October 11, 1968. ANZAM, whatever the continuing value of the 1957 Anglo-Malaysian Defense Agreement, is considered to be in need of a thorough metamorphosis after 1971. But the ANZUS treaty is still esteemed as the inviolate cornerstone of Australian defense which

[58]A. L. Burns, "Some Implications of Interdependence in Southern Asian and Indo-Pacific Security," in *Proceedings of the Seminar on Commonwealth Responsibilities for Security in the Indo-Pacific Region* (Defense Studies Project, Department of Political Science, Australian National University, Canberra, March 1966, mimeo.), p. 47.

[59]One of the most perceptive of these "post-Vietnam" analyses is contained in articles by the Australian journalist and Asian specialist, Denis Warner, in *The Courier-Mail*, October 7 and 8, 1968. See also E. G. Whitlam, *Beyond Vietnam — Australia's Regional Responsibility, op. cit.*

[60]For this analysis I am indebted to the insights provided by two senior officials of the Australian Defense Department, whom I am not at liberty to identify. I have also benefited from comments by specialists at Australian National, Melbourne and Queensland universities.

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not even the great majority of the government's opposition in the Labor Party would wish to tamper with.

There is also a consensus on the necessity of having some kind of "forward defense," notwithstanding vague press generalizations about the alleged " 'get out of Asia' trend in American politics" and Australian academic predictions that all of Viet Nam will be communist in five years.[61] As Hasluck pointedly observed early in October 1968, the American Presidential election would not vote Asia out of existence. Moreover, skepticism, if not hostility, to the idea that an India-Japan-Australia defensive alliance is feasible or even desirable, or that the Asian Pacific Council, so strongly supported by South Korea, can or should become more than just a regional economic mutual assistance organization,[62] has not curtailed a growing awareness that some Asian countries are making a realistic effort to develop their own defense posture and that Australia has a major interest in such development. For example, Singapore's September 1968 announcement that defense expenditures would be about tripled by the end of 1969 from the present $100 million level (pegging defense costs at about 10 per cent of the gross national product) and that higher taxes would therefore be necessary, along with South Korea's insistent desire for closer, including military, cooperation with Australia, are viewed in Canberra as signals that cannot be safely ignored.

By the same token the continuing threat of internal communist subversion and the depradations of guerrilla bands in Eastern and Western Malaysia,[63] and the resulting increase in Thai-Malaysian and Indonesian-Malaysian military cooperation, including "hot pursuit" agreements across each other's frontiers, are matters to which, in the existing "consensus," Australia cannot remain indifferent. In some respects the communist insurgency problem in Malaysia is as dangerous today as it was in 1955 when the Menzies Government decided to base Australian troops on Malayan soil in order to assist in quelling the insurrection.

In the Malaysian-Philippine dispute over Sabah, Australia has

[61]Editorial, "Hawk among all the Doves," *The Courier-Mail,* October 7, 1968; *The Australian,* October 4, 1968.

[62]Cf. Robert Duffield (*The Australian*'s Foreign Editor), "Let's Leave Arms out of ASPAC," *The Australian,* September 21, 1968.

[63]On these communist guerrilla insurgencies see Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Sarawak-Indonesian Border Insurgency," *Modern Asian Studies,* Vol. 2 (1968), pp. 245-266, and *Communism in Malaysia and Singapore: A Contemporary Survey* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), pp. 99-108, 129-175.

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remained carefully neutral, i.e., in favor of the status quo, thereby pleasing the Malaysians and angering the Filipinos. The dispute has not bettered the position of the isolationists and the "fortress Australia" adherents, but rather has led to a demand that Australia carefully determine the exact nature of her future "forward defense" commitment in Malaysia, on the grounds that possible embarrassment would be avoided "if the limits of Australia's obligations were clearly and formally defined."[64] That Australia continues to have, or should have, "forward" obligations was apparently not in question. To the recent emergence within Malaysia itself of a few voices advocating a "neutralized" Malaysia after 1971, Canberra and defense planners in Kuala Lumpur have paid little heed, regarding such advocates, with justification, as being but a small minority.[65]

In significant degree Australia's position today is analogous to that of the late 1940's, when the pattern of defense consultations and security arrangements eventually known as ANZAM was beginning to evolve. Now that the shock of the announcement of the British withdrawal by 1971 has begun to pass, a new defense concept seems to be taking shape. An Anglo-American "ultimate deterrent" in the area is still taken for granted, and Malaysian confidence in the continuation of the 1957 Anglo-Malaysian defense agreement remains strong, even though British forces will no longer be physically present on Malaysian soil.[66] Neither is a total U.S. military disengagement from Southeast Asia foreseen, although the base structure of the American presence is expected to shift. Meanwhile, reported Philippine pressure at the third ministerial meeting of the Asian Pacific Council in Canberra last August to turn ASPAC into a military alliance — subsequently denied — is viewed as being a straw in the wind. The same may be said of Indonesian denials regarding press reports on the planning by a so-called Defense Liaison Group within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations: it had been alleged that plans looked toward the construction of various military bases in Indonesia which would be linked to bases in Thailand, the Philippines and

[64] *The Sydney Morning Herald*, September 30, 1968.

[65] On these Malaysian "neutralist" proposals, notably the view of Internal Security Minister Tun Ismail, see the editorial "Guaranteeing Neutrality and Defence," *Daily Express* (Kota Kinabalu), June 12, 1968, and *The Straits Times*, June 12, 1968.

[66] Cf. the interview with Malaysian Premier Tunku Abdul Rahman in Frances L. Starner, "Search for Survival," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 19, 1968, pp. 553-555.

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Australia as part of a U.S. Defense Department strategic concept known as Strategy for the Sixties.[67]

Despite continuing skepticism that Australia, Japan and India can work together toward a new regional security arrangement for Asia; that the Indonesian commitment to an "active, independent foreign policy" can be changed to provide for participation in regional defense; and that the Philippine-Malaysian quarrel over Sabah will not continue to obstruct defense integration efforts, Australia is increasingly aware that she is groping with her neighbors toward a new collective security system, and that this would unmistakably involve an Australian "forward" commitment.[68] It may be an unexpected boon of the accelerating British withdrawal, and the prospective reorientation of the American military presence in Asia after Viet Nam, that today, from Canberra to Bangkok, the formation of a new collective security system is a matter of increasing concern to the parties most directly affected.

[67]On this ASEAN "Defense Liaison Group" see *Antara Daily News Bulletin,* July 25, 1968.

[68]Slowed by Malaysia's internal racial tensions, the Australian "forward" commitment to that country has nevertheless gone forward. After announcing on November 19, 1968 that Australian forces would remain in Malaysia-Singapore until the final British departure at the end of 1971, Prime Minister Gorton subsequently declared, on February 25, 1969, that subject to the pleasure of the Australian government and with the concurrence of the host nations, some 1,400 Australian troops, two squadrons of 42 Mirage jet fighters and one warship would be stationed in the Malaysia-Singapore region after 1971. For these developments and related Australian policy considerations see my forthcoming articles, "The Gorton Manner: Australia, Southeast Asia and the US," *Pacific Affairs,* Fall 1969, and "Australia and Southeast Asia: The Limits of Strategic Commitment," *Southeast Asia Quarterly,* Volume 4 (1969), Number 2.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE WHITE AUSTRALIA POLICY

by Herbert I. London

EVENTS in the twentieth century have demonstrated that immigration policy is linked to foreign relations. Its characteristics, and particularly its racist connotations, can cause international disequilibrium. Even though it is not a *casus belli,* it is a potentially inflammatory factor that can interfere with a whole range of relations between states, including strategic defense decisions, trade, diplomacy and international agreements.

Soon after the White Australia policy became federal legislation it interfered with Australian-Asian relations. When the Japanese flexed their military muscle before and during World War I, Australian diplomats responded by firmly endorsing "White Australia." After Versailles Sir John Latham said "The principle of White Australia is almost a religion in Australia. . . . Any surrender of the policy is inconceivable."[1] A fear persisted throughout the post-World War I period that the Japanese would attempt to win a victory by diplomacy that they could not achieve with weapons. Hence their proposal at Versailles for a "racial equality" amendment in the League Covenant was rejected by Prime Minister Hughes as an infringement of Australia's domestic purview and the right of every state to determine its demographic composition.[2] Lord Casey expressed the nation's abiding concern when he wrote: "Fear existed that taking tariff and immigration issues out of domestic arenas might ultimately threaten Australia's restrictive immigration policy, 'the heart of our being.' "[3]

Combining with the Australian fear of "Yellow Hordes" and the "Yellow Peril," which manifested a belief in imminent Asian invasion, was the threat to security posed by a nonwhite minority group within the country. It was argued that this minority could exert diplomatic pressure on the government or could provoke tensions that would weaken the national security. "Populate or

[1]Sir J. Latham, *The Significance of the Peace Conference from an Australian Point of View* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1930), p. 9.
[2]A. Yarwood, *Asian Migration to Australia: The Background to Exclusion 1896-1923* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1964), pp. 96-97.
[3]R. G. Casey, *Australia's Place in the World* (Melbourne: Robertson & Mullens, 1931), p. 13.

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Perish" thus became an early national slogan. In order to convince Asians that settlement was not feasible and the land was extensively utilized, Australia needed a much larger population, predominantly British and homogeneously white. This was considered the most effective way of preserving and securing the nation.

I

World War II shattered the isolationist assumption of Australian foreign policy and questioned the exclusiveness of the "White Australia" principle. The bombing of Darwin and the fires of Singapore were indications of Australia's vulnerability, the decline of British strength, and the beginning of dissolution in the Empire. Compounding the difficulties caused by these considerations, the anti-colonialism of Asia was assertive and sensitively conscious of racial separateness. Australia was faced with the task of adjusting her foreign and immigration policies to the postwar period or jeopardizing her security and economic viability. This was no simple task. It was obvious that old formulas could not solve the new problems.

To most experts in foreign affairs it was palpably clear that separation could not be maintained by physical barriers. Some modus vivendi with Asia had to be found and some protection had to be provided against the assumed Asian penchant for communism. One aspect of the inchoate policy was developing "good-neighborliness" with Asian states, and the other was a collective security arrangement based on American strength and directed at a possible Asian communist force. This strategy was much easier to create than to implement. The United States could provide the security, but the alliance with Americans and the escalation of military preparedness put increasing strains on Australia's alleged rapprochement with Asia. Reconciling the competing tendencies of peace and militarism was difficult. Asians suspected both Australia's motives and "the neo-colonial ambitions" of the United States.

Australia's association with Great Britain and the United States and its own Caucasian population caused distrust in every Asian area sensitive to the intrusions of nineteenth-century white colonialism. It was also assumed by Asian states that Western opposition to indigenous left-wing political movements was a reflection of neo-colonial predilections. When Australians associated their fear of the "Yellow Peril" with the communist menace,

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many Asians viewed this as an effort to constrain political factions unacceptable to Western interests. Australia's historic restriction of Asians, united with her more recent fear of communist aggression, appeared to make her notably unsympathetic to Asian political movements.

Within Australia political ideologies of the Left and the Right offered different solutions to the problems associated with an Asian policy. The Left was willing to compromise the security aspects if the "good-neighbor" policy was encouraged; the Right was more inclined to sacrifice good-neighborliness if it could solidify the collective security pacts. But on one issue there was a fundamental agreement: immigration policy had to be liberalized or at least purged of its racial stigma so that it did not curtail Asian faith in Australia's friendliness and interfere with military pacts that could unite the free people of Asia and Australia against the communist threat.[4] That the White Australia policy hampered relations with Asian countries was clear. As Professor Tregonning contended. "This racial policy is repugnant to Asians and stands as a very strong barrier to Australian acceptance in Asia."[5]

But the government failed to consider the population's emotional tie with the White Australia policy and its resistance to change. It was not until 1959 that the Gallup Poll indicated a majority of Australians were in favor of allowing even a small number of Asians into the country. This opposition to reform was referred to by Minister of Immigration Downer when he said:

> I do not believe that Australians, certainly not at this stage of their development, either desire or are ready for an East-West pot-pourri. Indeed, on the basis of other nations' experience and from my knowledge of the temperament of our own people, there is a strong possibility that an inflow of Asians would defeat the very object of our foreign policy toward our Asian friends. Instead of relieving misunderstanding it would provoke tensions. It would create internal social problems which fortunately we have hitherto escaped. These in time would engender animosities which would ripple sensationally throughout every country from Arabia to Japan.[6]

Faced with this internal resistance and the perceived foreign policy requisites, the government chose to: (1) liberalize the immigration policy moderately while it retained a rhetorical ap-

[4]Werner Levi, *Australia's Outlook on Asia* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1958), pp. 199-200.

[5]John Wilkes, editor, *Australia's Defence and Foreign Policy* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1964), p. 39.

[6]Sir A. Downer, *Influence of Migration on Australian Foreign Policy,* Roy Milne Lecture, Sydney, 1960, pp. 7-8.

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proval of the traditional principles; (2) convince the populace of the need to change attitudes toward Asia, i.e., "bridges to Asia"; (3) explain in Asia the rationale for the policy and the attempt to eliminate racial stipulations; and (4) stress diplomatically the value of closer relations between the two continents. This strategy, reputedly for cooperation and closer ties, was actually designed mainly to prevent threats to Australia's domestic sovereignty. While mass media and politicians disseminated the notion that Australia was an "Asian state," the cultural orientation of the nation remained distinctively British and Western. And even if one suggested that the British tie was weakening, there was little evidence of Australia becoming Asian. Downer once again put it well when he noted:

> Today it is fashionable to say that Australia is part of Asia. Geographically, millions of years ago the two continents may have been joined, but there the nexus ends. Our population, with the exception of a fractional percentage, is European. Our social origins are European, our religion and ideas are European. In a more particular sense, of course, this is still a British country with many of the virtues and faults of our northern ancestors. One of the merits of the infusion of three-quarters of a million settlers from the European Continent, as distinct from the United Kingdom, in the last fourteen years, is the possible eradication of some of our inherited, and locally acquired, defects which we exhibit in good measure. But those who would classify Australia with Asia confuse a state of being with an object of policy.[7]

II

Australia in the postwar years was thus grappling with a serious public relations problem: how to project an image of friendliness and mutual concern to countries whose citizens were not acceptable as permanent residents. To meet this challenge the government developed a series of programs whose ostensible purpose was to dissociate Australia from the racial overtones of its immigration policy without making any substantial changes in the policy itself. After 1950 attempts were made at regional cooperation in order to demonstrate Australia's good will. Participation in the Colombo Plan, ECAFE, ASPAC, Regional Banking Programs, and other regional organizations, attested to Australia's Asian interest. But in spite of these gestures, her position as a white, prosperous, westernized society with an exclusive immigration policy made her preoccupation with "closer relations" appear transparently self-conscious.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

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The government, because it does not want to offend its Asian neighbors, has often been put in the position of defending a policy which it denies really exists, and it has been forced into embarrassing circumstances as a result. At the San Francisco Convention in 1945, Dr. Evatt argued vigorously for a Charter resolution which prohibited United Nations authority from interfering in the domestic policy of member states. This was largely a reaction to the possibility that pressure would be exerted to change the White Australia policy. But it unwittingly forced Australia into "the racialist camp." When in October 1952 the General Committee of the United Nations considered whether *apartheid* should be put on the agenda, South Africa and Australia protested, claiming that the matter was essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the South African government, and, therefore, by article 2 (7) of the Charter, beyond UN authority. Lord Casey argued at the time that if the UN created a "precedent" and censured South Africa or attempted to put pressure on the government in an effort to eliminate *apartheid*, Australia's immigration policy would not be safe from a similar scrutiny and denunciation.[8]

This was the position adopted by the Menzies Government in the United Nations and at Commonwealth meetings. Menzies insisted that the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs be respected in both councils in order to preserve what he considered the essential character of international associations. This explained in part his reluctance to discuss the Sharpeville incidents at the 1960 Prime Ministers' conference and his determination at the 1961 conference to work out a formula whereby South Africa could remain in the Commonwealth. He argued that complete self-government was "a right which we properly insist upon for ourselves in all matters within our jurisdiction, and therefore one which we must recognise and defend for other Commonwealth countries."[9] When South Africa decided to withdraw from the Commonwealth, Menzies spoke of the portent of Commonwealth fragility.

Even though there has been a great deal of international agitation this is still a matter of domestic policy in South Africa. South Africa does not seek to apply that policy to any other country. It is as much a matter of domestic policy as Australian immigration policy is a domestic matter for us. And to have a member of the Commonwealth virtually excluded on a

[8]G. Greenwood and N. Harper, *Australia in World Affairs, 1950-55* (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1957), p. 264.

[9]*Sydney Morning Herald,* April 12, 1961.

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matter of domestic policy presents, in my opinion, a rather disagreeable vista of the possibilities for the future.[10]

The equation of South African *apartheid* with Australia's immigration policy aroused bitter criticism from the Australian Labor Party (ALP). Mr. Duthie, a Labor member of the House of Representatives, noted that Menzies

> cannot grasp the concept of a multi-racial society within the Commonwealth. He was born in the nineteenth century and does not seem to have got out of it. If my memory serves me rightly, he once recommended that there should be an inner cabinet of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, consisting, I assume, entirely of white men. Today, the colored races are arising from the colonialism of the past and claiming a rightful place and voice in the affairs of nations. The Prime Minister does not seem to grasp this fact. . . .[11]

None of the ALP speakers in the debate indicated that Menzies equated *apartheid* and the immigration policy only as domestic issues. They stressed the international repercussions of his remarks and the harmful effect they would have on Australian links with Asia. And, indeed, when this matter was reported in Asia, Menzies' name and Australia's reputation were damaged. One Asian observer wrote: "Of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, Mr. Menzies emerged clearly as the least committed against apartheid."[12] A report from Hong Kong indicated that Menzies' statements did "grievous harm to Australian interests and good will in the Far East."[13] The usually moderate *Straits Times* noted: "Mr. Menzies . . . is no apostle of apartheid. Yet he had spoken as strongly as Dr. Verwoerd himself on the outcome of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference."[14]

Perhaps the only exception to this view came from Malaya's leader. Tunku Abdul Rahman advanced the opinion, widely lauded in Australia, that the White Australia policy, unlike *apartheid*, was "for the protection of Australians," while "the other is for the repression of Africans." He added, "The White Australia policy, as it is called, is not racial discrimination. It is to protect the Australian people. If Australia's doors were wide open they would be swamped. Why create problems in Australia that would be difficult to solve?"[15]

[10] *Age* (Melbourne), March 22, 1961.
[11] *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates,* Vol. 30, 1961, p. 714.
[12] Bruce Grant, *Age,* March 31, 1961.
[13] R. Hughes, *Courier-Mail* (Brisbane), March 25, 1961.
[14] *Straits Times* (Singapore), March 24, 1961.
[15] *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates,* Vol. 30, 1961, pp. 660-661.

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The legalistic position taken by the government, as an expedient to prevent intervention in its domestic affairs, had severe ramifications. It had the effect of limiting Australia's influence with newly emerging states in Asia by seeming to put her on the side of reactionary and colonial forces, and it drew attention to the immigration policy, which Menzies was admittedly trying to protect with his noncommittal posture.

Until 1960 Australia consistently voted with South Africa every time the issue of *apartheid* was raised in the UN General Assembly. In 1961, however, the government, amid the heralding of a shift in policy, voted for resolutions condemning *apartheid.* This "shift in policy" was a calculated move. At the first draft session of the Special Political Committee, Australia refused to condemn the South African treatment of Asians on the ground that it would be an infringement of domestic jurisdiction.[16] When Australia's representative, James Plimsoll, learned "that the Charter expressly set a limit to intervention by the United Nations in matters essentially of domestic jurisdiction, and that it also set limits to the General Assembly's powers,"[17] he voted for the resolution. In this way Australia appeared to be joining the anti-colonial states without in any way threatening her own domestic sovereignty. Menzies explained the vote as an effort to avoid being "misrepresented all over Asia about our attitude."[18] This was only part of the explanation.

Before and during World War II, foreign affairs, and particularly Japanese expansion, reinforced the principles of "White Australia." Since the war, however, if episodes in the UN are representative examples, foreign policy has been influenced by "White Australia" implications. A desire to secure Australia as a Western, European, and predominately white democracy, which keeps Asia at a friendly distance, has been the guiding principle of contemporary foreign policy. Former Minister of Immigration Downer, cognizant of this aim, suggested that "national growth and our international relations will best be serviced by continuing our present policies," oriented toward Europe, Great Britain and the United States. It is these "well-tried" policies, he noted, that preserve "homogeneity, readiness of absorption, familiarity of religion, the same fundamental attitudes to living."[19]

[16]United Nations Special Political Committee, *Official Records,* 227th Meeting, March 21, 1961, pp. 5-6.
[17]*Ibid.,* April 7, 1961, p. 85.
[18]*Sydney Morning Herald,* May 1, 1961.
[19]Downer, *op. cit.,* p. 8.

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III

The immigration aims in foreign policy have been manifested in Australia's administration of Papua-New Guinea. When Australia received the territory of New Guinea under a League of Nations mandate, Prime Minister Hughes negotiated terms that permitted administering it in accordance with Australia's own policies. The primary objective of this negotiation was to obtain the authority to regulate immigration to New Guinea, since, as Hughes argued, "those islands which lay like ramparts along our coast should not be in the hands of an actual or potential enemy."[20] The vital point was the prohibition of Japanese immigration — as in the victory Hughes had won at Versailles when the League rejected the Japanese amendment for racial equality in immigration policies. The view of New Guinea as a first line of defense is still accepted by many Australians who believe "an attack on New Guinea is an attack on Australia." This opinion was reinforced by the West Irian dispute and the contemplated Indonesian invasion of Papua-New Guinea in 1961. It also had some relevance during World War II when a Japanese invasion of New Guinea preluded an invasion of Australia. Military factors have, therefore, played an important role in the maintenance of Australia's New Guinea immigration program.

When the government decided to allow naturalization eligibility for Asians already in Australia (1957-1958), Asian residents in New Guinea were offered the same privilege. By the end of 1962 approximately 1,623 Asians were granted territorial citizenship.[21] Yet despite these naturalizations Paul Hasluck, as Minister of Territories, said in 1957 that "all possible measures would be taken to prevent the build-up of a multi-racial community in the Territory."[22] This, he claimed, was compatible with the aspirations of the indigenous people. On another occasion, he stated that

> Those who will be affected by the decision are people living wholly in the European manner alongside, or integrated with, the European community. They have no home except the Territory, and in all the implications of the term they can be regarded as good citizens. They have English education, are of Christian religion, and in every way are fitted by cultural and general social background to live on equal terms with other Australian citizens.[23]

[20]Quoted in Sir Grenfell Price, *Australia Comes of Age* (Melbourne: Georgian House, 1945), p. 79.
[21]*Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 39, 1963, p. 868.
[22]*Sydney Morning Herald*, June 19, 1957.
[23]*Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 16, 1957, p. 714.

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Plausible though this statement may be as a defense of the present restrictions on immigration to New Guinea, it poses serious questions concerning the policy adopted in regard to migration *from* Papua-New Guinea *to* Australia. Persons born on Papua, an external territory, are Australian citizens by birth. Persons born on New Guinea, a Trust Territory, are "Australian protected persons." But for the purposes of migration neither Papua nor New Guinea is part of Australia. As a matter of policy "natives of Papua and New Guinea are not normally eligible to enter Australia for residence (unless immediate family relationship with a resident of Australia is involved)."[24] For purposes of immigation Papuans and New Guineans are regarded as Melanesians and are admitted to Australia "under conditions similar to those applying to non-European people generally."[25]

In addition to the military justification for this restrictive migrant program, Sir Grenfell Price contends that the application of "White Australia" in Papua-New Guinea saved the indigenous population "from the sufferings and corruption which the inflow of Asiatics had inflicted upon the natives of Tahiti and other islands of the Pacific."[26] It was this line of defense that the Department of Territories used in the General Assembly. Several Asian states argued that Australia's migration program in Papua-New Guinea was interfering with the expansion of such key industries as tea growing, copra and pearl diving, in which non-Europeans had greater expertise.[27] The Department justified its policies by referring to the unrestricted entry of Indians into Fiji in the nineteenth century and the consequent racial problems once the Indians outnumbered the native Fijians. It also noted that an extended stay for these non-Europeans would ultimately lead to intermarriage. If this occurred, a representative argued, it would make it almost impossible to deport non-European workers when the local population no longer needed their services.[28]

Since 1960 several members of the United Nations have criticized Australian administration of the Territories. Liberia accused Australia of "inadequately" administering New Guinea and M. Eastman, the Liberian delegate, alleged that segregation existed in

[24]Reply to press inquiry by Jack Stanaway, *Sydney Morning Herald,* August 6, 1965.
[25]Reply to press inquiry by Stan Hutchinson, *ibid.*
[26]Price, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
[27]J. R. Hall, "Asian Labor Ban Holds Up N.G. Growth," *Australian,* December 27, 1966.
[28]Christopher Forsyth, "Firms Say Racial Ban is Slowing New Guinea Growth," *Australian,* December 12, 1966.

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the colonies. "We all know how Australia feels about races," he asserted; "just because Australia adhered to a 'white policy' gave it no rights to impose it in New Guinea."[29] Both the United Arab Republic and Togo called for "immediate free elections" in the Territories. Tanzania warned that the Australian government would not incorporate the Territories as a seventh state "simply because of racial considerations."[30] The Tanzanian representative also accused Australia of exploiting the resources of Papua-New Guinea and "using the Territories as a military staging area to support the war in Vietnam."[31] Seydon Diallo of Guinea told the Trusteeship Council that "Australia was guilty of criminal colonialism in its two Pacific Territories," adding that it "was the most backward nation when it came to meeting the dictates of the conscience of the world."[32] Consistent with these denunciations, the Afro-Asian bloc led a campaign for a series of resolutions recommending that Australia grant independence to Papua-New Guinea "as soon as possible."[33] The resolutions also called upon Australia to remove "all discriminatory electoral qualifications" in the Territories and to "hold elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage."[34]

When Australia escalated her commitment to Viet Nam in 1965-1966 the Soviet Union voiced the sentiments of several communist states, charging that she was moving lethargically to terminate her colonial situation in order to use the areas as staging zones in her "struggle against the national liberation movements in South East Asia, and in particular against the people of Vietnam."[35] In a 1967 statement the Liberian representative joined the Soviet Union in expressing disapproval of the slow pace at which Papua and New Guinea were being prepared for independence.[36] This criticism was substantiated by a special committee report submitted in late 1967 which noted "some political, economic, and social advances" in the Trust Territories but stressed the point that these advances were considered "inadequate

[29]*Canberra Times,* December 12, 1966.
[30]Peter Hastings, "Copper and Cargo Cult," *Australian,* December 31, 1966.
[31]*Canberra Times,* December 16, 1966.
[32]*Ibid.*
[33]*Ibid.*, December 22, 1966.
[34]*Ibid.*
[35]Soviet representative Shakov at "Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," United Nations General Assembly, *Official Records,* 486th Meeting, October 11, 1966.
[36]"Report of Trusteeship Council," General Assembly, *Official Records,* Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 4(A/6704), July 27, 1966-June 30, 1967, p. 11.

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for a consistent and rapid implementation" of independence.[37] Similar dissatisfaction with Australia's lagging pursuit of independence for Papua-New Guinea and alleged racialism in the Trust Territories was expressed in 1968 by representatives from several African states.[38]

Partially to silence its detractors in the United Nations, the Federal Cabinet decided to relax immigration restrictions in Papua-New Guinea for Africans and Asians with specialized skills and to accelerate its program of economic modernization. According to the new regulations specialists would be allowed to work in the Territories for periods up to two years.[39] In conjunction with changes in economic policy, a Japanese company was permitted a lease for a shipbuilding industry in Rabaul, and it was reported that twelve Japanese technicians arrived in May 1967 to commence employment on their two-year contracts.[40] By 1968 the Japanese community in Papua-New Guinea had grown substantially and the prospects for further expansion of Japanese investments and concomitant migration were good, despite the fact that many Australians were worried by Japan's growing economic role in the Trust Territories.[41]

These moves by the Holt and Gorton governments have been a radical about-face from previous policies employed by Menzies. In 1965 when Charles Barnes, Minister of Territories, allegedly approved of moderate Japanese migration to New Guinea, Menzies told the Minister to repudiate the suggestion. In no uncertain terms, he said "There is to be no migration of Japanese—you had better make that clear."[42]

As regards future administrative policy, Australia must reckon with the eventuality of New Guinea's independence, at which time the island will cease to be an Australian base and will become a potential military ally. But the possibility that New Guinea

[37]"Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," General Assembly, *Official Records* (A/6700/Add.13), November 24, 1967.

[38]"Report of Trusteeship Council," General Assembly, *Official Records*, Thirty-fifth Session (T/SR1335-1339, 1341), July 1967-June 1968. In the report filed by a visiting mission of the Trusteeship Council in 1968 it was noted that Mr. Tambi, president of a municipal council in the Western Highlands of New Guinea, "believed that the United Nations was 'pushing' Australia to give the Territory independence." "Report of United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of New Guinea 1968," *ibid.* (T/1678), May 22, 1968, p. 14.

[39]*Canberra Times*, December 30, 1966.

[40]*New York Times*, December 25, 1968.

[41]*Ibid.*

[42]*Sydney Morning Herald*, May 19, 1965.

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will opt for independence raises serious questions about defense. As an independent state controlling her own foreign and defense policies, she will have to decide on neutrality, a bilateral alliance with Australia, or participation in a multilateral defense agreement in the South Pacific. If she chooses to be allied with Australia or a South Pacific defense community she would probably do so as an "equal member." In that case the Australian government might find it embarrassing to maintain restrictions on territorial migrants to Australia while basing its "first line of defense" on an association with a sovereign New Guinea.

IV

Postwar Trust Territory policies and strategic considerations, while not directly influencing immigration policy, point up that exclusion is an increasing source of tension hampering the formulation of Australian-Asian agreements. As a member of SEATO and a participant at the Honolulu and Manila conferences, Australia has been united with Asian states in several strategic agreements. However, these arrangements do not assure Australia's role in area defense pacts. One American correspondent argued that racial animosities in the South Pacific make a "New Asia" concept "farcical." "Just how trustworthy, loyal alliance could be fashioned out of a group of nations who are divided by such racial feelings, defies imagination," he added.[43] Several Australian columnists (e.g., Denis Warner, Douglas Brass) have noted that participation in the Malaysian and Viet Nam struggles in order "to protect the democratic instinct of the people" is pure hypocrisy when one considers Australia's restriction on Malaysian and Vietnamese migrants. Not only has the immigration policy made Australia's military stand in Southeast Asia appear indefensible, it has also acted as an ideological tool for communists in the area. O. O. Trullinger summarized the problem in the following way:

> One of the outstanding examples of the Red appeal to Asian humanity outside the sphere of economic wellbeing is that of the color question. . . . While the present restrictions on immigration by Asiatics into Western territories are maintained, so long will the undeniable basic hostility between Asia and the West endure.[44]

Australia's Asian policy has been based on two main assump-

[43]Clayton Fritchey, "Whites Only," *New York Post*, December 31, 1966.
[44]O. O. Trullinger, *Red Banners Over Asia* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1951), p. 207.

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tions, both of which have been attacked at one time or another by government critics: (1) China is an immediate threat to the stability of Asia and ultimately to the stability of Australia; and (2) communist insurgency can best be controlled by uniting with the "free nations" of Southeast Asia and the United States as a countervailing force. The long-range fear of Chinese communist infiltration in the South Pacific and the immediate fear of instability in Southeast Asia have prescribed Australia's alliance with the United States and her attempt to "build bridges of mutual interest" in Asia.[45] Specifically, these prescriptions result from the need to fill the European power vacuum left by the post-World War II ferment in Southeast Asia and the Australian realization that independence cannot be protected by Britain's rapidly dissipating strength.

Through her SEATO and ANZUS obligations Australia is formally committed, with the United States, to maintain the status quo in Southeast Asia. She is also emotionally committed by what is considered "a threat to self-preservation." The government has viewed these alliances as the prerequisite for peace in the area, and now abandonment of traditional British interests has ineluctably involved Australia in Asian affairs. As Britain began to disengage herself from military obligations east of Suez, Australia, supported by the United States, opted to take up the slack and aid in the creation of viable states that can protect themselves against anticipated communist encroachments. However, her immigration policy designed to exclude Asians, together with a maladroit handling of deportations, has created a legacy of suspicion in many of the states with which she desires military pacts. Her high standard of living, in an area conspicuously typified by poverty, causes additional strains. Even Australia's aid to Asia has often been construed as a rationalization for "White Australia"; by granting aid, it has been argued, she demonstrates her concern for Asians *if* they remain in Asia.

Australian statesmen realize, in spite of exhortations such as Harold Holt's "All the way with LBJ," that alliances with any state are not immutable. Australia cannot change her geographic position no matter how hard she wishes, but there are no guarantees that the United States will indefinitely elect to remain a Pacific power. In fact, if Henry Kissinger's recent comments are

[45]As Arthur Burns viewed this development, in his commentary in Wilkes, *op. cit.*, p. 59: "Australia's strategic involvement in South East Asia was very largely consequent upon her major alliances — with the United States and with the United Kingdom. They were our 'bridges with Asia.' "

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any guide, American forces in Asia will quite likely recede further. Prime Minister Gorton recognized this prospect as early as 1968 (after the TET offensive in Viet Nam), and visited President Johnson in an effort to determine the earnestness of the American commitment to Asia and the Pacific area generally. By his own admission he was trying to extract assurances that the United States will: retain some troops in the region as a manifestation of its "special" association with Australia; encourage firm multilateral area pacts through economic and military assistance to Southeast Asia; and continue to supply sophisticated "military hardware" to Australia under ANZUS agreements.[46] As a consequence of the last proposal Australia has been able to purchase several American F-111's. However, the increased cost of the planes over their initial estimate and their purported malfunctioning — they are known popularly in Australia as the "flying Edsels"— have caused the Gorton Government considerable political discomfort.[47]

In addition, the Nonproliferation Treaty has introduced complications into Australia's defense strategy. Since mainland China, which bristles with a nuclear arsenal and the potential for a sophisticated delivery system, will not be a signatory to the treaty, Australia may be chary of signing without American guarantees to protect her from possible nuclear blackmail. At this juncture these strategic considerations are dictating a more flexible Australian stance. On the one hand, the Gorton Government is interested in encouraging its special relationship with the United States in order to employ American power as a counterweight against widespread insurgency and possible Chinese sabre-rattling; on the other hand, the imminent reduction of American forces and consequent strains in the Australian-American axis warrant less reliance on the United States and greater cooperation with Southeast Asian states. If geographic propinquity is a factor in foreign policy decisions, cooperation with Southeast Asia may ultimately serve Australia better than any alliance with a Western power.

The Philippines, with which Australia may logically participate in regional defense programs, is extremely sensitive to slights by the Australian Immigration Department. Notable cases of Filipino exclusion have caused widespread antagonism: it has been sug-

[46]*Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates*, 26th Parliament, June 4, 1968, pp. 1920-1922.

[47]Mr. Stewart (Labor MP) asked Minister of Defense Fairhall whether he believed "that the F-111 aircraft is a super battle bird and the greatest thing with wings since angels?" *Ibid.*, April 2, 1968, p. 640.

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gested that a whole generation of Filipinos know the name of Gamboa (an American citizen of Filipino parentage who was refused the right to enter Australia to reunite with his Australian wife and children after the war) as well as any of their national heroes, and, in retaliation for the rejection of Aurelio Locsin by the Immigration Department in 1966, Manila administered a "Brown Filipino" policy in respect to Australian migrants and merchants traveling to the Philippines. As long as the expediencies of defense are given priority, national antagonisms will probably not stand in the way of regional defense pacts between the two nations. Nonetheless, many Filipinos regard Australian-Asian solidarity as a myth demonstrated by the perceived contradiction in the administration of immigration policy. A loyal alliance, it has been noted, cannot be constructed out of nations so divided by racial animosities. Filipinos may have exaggerated the so-called exclusiveness of the White Australia policy, but as long as it remains a galling affront to them nothing but synthetic solidarity is possible.

V

If Australia is to form strong Asian alliances, factors that have interfered with Australian strategic considerations will have to be scrapped or modified to suit Asian opinion. Presumably these will include the "offensive" immigration policy. Holt and his successor Gorton have hinted at a change by stating that "the [immigration] policy would not remain static." They have maintained a commitment to redefine it as Australia grows and the world changes. Prime Minister Gorton, in his relatively short tenure as government leader, has been particularly sensitive to the apparent contradictions of a White Australia policy that excludes Asians and a defense policy that relies on Asian good will.

Since it still may be politically undesirable to liberalize the policy drastically (on this point there is widespread disagreement), Australia has been trying to meet some of her Asian responsibilities by stressing regional trade, investment and diplomacy. The techniques employed are conspicuously designed to encourage interdependence and to avoid aspersions such as "neo-colonialism" and "white paternalism."

In his first year as Prime Minister, Holt visited Malaysia, Singapore, South Viet Nam and the Philippines. The following year he met with the leaders of Taiwan, Cambodia, Burma, Japan and Indonesia. He was plainly intent on making the geographic

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fact of Australia's location a political reality. After returning from his last tour of Southeast Asia before his sudden death, he remarked: "It became clear that Australia has been accepted as a member of the Asian and Pacific community. We are not on the outside looking in, but we are regarded as one of the countries of the area, involved in its problems. . . ."[48]

Complementing Holt's diplomatic overtures, Gorton has taken systematic steps to harmonize Australian-Japanese aspirations. Japan's growing interest in international affairs is believed to be the impetus for arranging some form of regular diplomatic consultation between the two countries. It has been contended that Australia would consider more consultations, even if they were not held regularly, in order to discuss regional problems of mutual concern.[49] Joint Japanese-Australian ventures can do much toward raising the standard of living in Asia and consequently toward improving Australia's Asian image. Increased diplomatic contacts with Asian states may also mean more Asians coming to Australia. If other factors do not illuminate the need for liberalizing the immigration policy, Gorton has noted, the exchange of ideas at the diplomatic level might.

In September 1966, Senator Raul Manglapus of the Philippines was invited to Australia to deliver the Dyason lecture, a biennial address on international problems. His theme was Australia's potential role as a bridge between East and West and her role in building "a truly multi-racial society."[50] The concept of Australia as a bridge between two worlds was not new. What made the Manglapus presentation different was its boldness and its reliance on "Australia's historic duty" rather than her self-preservation. This point has been dismissed as misguided idealism and "adolescent" optimism by some, but it has also provided a new dimension in the discussion of immigration policy. Since this speech, though certainly not because of it, there are signs that a moderate change toward multiracialism has begun. In 1966 approximately 400 non-Europeans were accepted for residence status in Australia. In 1968 it was estimated that approximately 1,500 non-Europeans were to be granted a similar status.[51]

[48]Christopher Forsyth, "Australia (and Mr. Holt) Turns to Asia," *Australian,* February 2, 1967.
[49]*Australian,* January 18, 1967.
[50]Julie Rigg, "Manglapus," *ibid.*, September 17, 1966.
[51]*Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates,* 26th Parliament, June 13, 1968, p. 2307; *New York Times,* January 7, 1968. It should be noted that the 1,500 non-European migrants constitute approximately one per cent of Australia's annual immigration total.

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As the concern for Asia has increased, so too has the discussion of aid programs. A pamphlet distributed by the Department of External Affairs noted that "Australian aid abroad was not only given for humanitarian reasons but also because the countries of South East Asia are our very near neighbors, that what happens in Asia directly affects Australia and that Australia's own interests are best served by politically stable and economically prosperous neighbors."[52] Obviously the government intends to use foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy, and in view of the growing involvement in Southeast Asia, increased aid seems the logical extension of policy. Former Prime Minister Holt announced, "As we grow nationally so our contribution in both of these directions [military and civil aid] can be expected to grow."[53] Thus far, however, this rhetoric has been an exaggeration of Australia's aid allowance. Total foreign aid expenditure, including that to Papua-New Guinea, has been the equivalent of a little more than 0.6 per cent of the nation's gross national product. When the appropriation for Papua-New Guinea is excluded, the figure is approximately 0.2 per cent, and this has remained fairly stable over the last six years.

Even though Australia conceives of using foreign aid to enhance her standing in Asia, she wants to avoid being saddled with huge contributions which might neutralize the advantages of trade. This is one reason why she has been much more generous with technical assistance programs and student exchanges than direct financial aid. Nevertheless, as long as money remains the most important influence in aid programs, the government will have to consider a more flexible approach to appropriations. If regional stability is regarded as the *sine qua non* of foreign policy, the amount of aid will have to be calculated in respect to the challenges to Australian self-interest. E. G. Whitlam, Leader of the Labor Party, put this point well when he said: "We will have no secure future until the people in our region are confident that we will help them to achieve the same objectives that we insist on having for ourselves."[54]

Stability was without doubt one of the main considerations in extending aid to Indonesia after the defeat of the attempted communist coup in 1965. Officials in the Department of External Affairs decided that almost $700,000 in aid was not too high a price

[52]Quoted in *Australian*, October 11, 1966.
[53]*Ibid.*
[54]*Ibid.*, November 17, 1966.

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to pay for an Indonesian entente and the security of Papua-New Guinea. Similar logic was applied to Australian aid for India. Since India is the largest noncommunist state in Asia and a presumed counterweight to Chinese communist influence, it is in Australia's security interest to be on friendly terms with her. This, despite government disclaimers, partially accounts for the allocation of one-quarter of Colombo Plan aid to India.[55]

The irony is that aid, which can be one of the most effective tools of foreign policy, has been used by the government as a rationale for retaining its immigration policy. Too often the Department of External Affairs has been willing to contribute financial aid in order to fortify an Asian economy and reduce the possibility that many Asians will want to emigrate to Australia. There is also a danger that the government will begin to rely on the positive effects of aid programs as a substitute for significant changes in the immigration laws. However, this tendency could be moderated by the influences of diplomatic relations and trade.

VI

Under the impetus of the European experiment in economic cooperation, Australian attention since 1960 has been drawn to the question of intraregional trade. One of the factors responsible for this change of focus is the conjectured acceptance of Great Britain into the Common Market and the concomitant loss of Australia's preferential access to the British market. In preparation for this eventuality, Australia has begun to rethink and reorder her trade and financial policies.

Indirectly, British entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) might also affect Australia's immigration policy. If British economic growth is accelerated as a result of participation in the Common Market, the English will be less inclined to migrate. As migrant sources in the United Kingdom and the thriving economies of Southern Europe decline, Australia might be forced to reconsider the luxury of restricted immigration. Rapid economic growth throughout the Australian continent is not possible without a substantially increasing work-force, for a population of only eleven and a half million growing at the rate of 1.9 per cent a year is not sufficient to meet development needs.

In order to meet this economic challenge the Australian government has given businessmen a free hand to determine new courses

[55] *Canberra Times*, August 20, 1966.

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of action, but rational trade policies, particularly between Australia and Japan, have been negotiated in order to make up for the diminution of British trade and to increase the possibilities for expanded regional trade. Although most of the countries in ECAFE (Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East) continue to focus their trade on the "developed world," the Commission itself attests to increasing mutual cooperation in and concern for the area.

In time, economic solidarity elsewhere in the world could intensify Asia's export-import price squeeze, making the continent dependent on a few commodities whose export prices decline while prices of necessary capital imports regularly increase. The disadvantages of this situation, already evident throughout Asia, are forcing countries, Australia included, to rely more heavily on intraregional trade. The development of Western trading blocs may either back Australia into an Asian trade community or force her to supplicate for associate membership in the European Common Market — contingent, of course, on whether Britain is accepted as a member.

At present, the Department of Trade is adjusting to the shrinking Western market by concentrating its energies on Asian trade. Since the signing of a trade agreement in 1957 — the same year non-European naturalization was permitted for the first time — Australian exports to Japan have almost tripled: they were worth $172.9 million in 1956, and less than ten years later were $471.4 million.[56] By 1966, Australia displaced the United States as the largest supplier of coal to Japan, thus accounting for 93 per cent of her coal exports that year.[57] In view of increasing sales of iron ore and other products to the Japanese, and Britain's austerity measures, it was no surprise that in 1967 Japan replaced Great Britain as Australia's best customer. By the end of 1968 nearly one-fifth of all Australian exports—principally primary materials — went to Japan,[58] and if Japanese ambition is any guide this trade will be expanded in 1969. A touring team of government financial advisers recently announced that Japan is prepared to buy or trade for all of Australia's surplus cotton "from now on." That surplus is expected to reach 280,000 bales by 1970.

Similarly, Australia's exports to Taiwan from 1964-1965 to 1967-1968 increased by more than 50 per cent, and exports to the

[56] *Australian*, August 29, 1966.
[57] *Ibid.*, October 28, 1966.
[58] *New York Times*, December 25, 1968.

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Philippines, despite a threatened trade boycott because of the 1966 Locsin case, increased by more than $20 million. At the same time, Australian exports to and imports from Europe declined. The trend is obvious.

But exports only partially indicate the drift in Australia's financial fortunes. Since 1960 Japan has invested $100 million in money and material in Australia. Having become the financial giant in the South Pacific, she has not only invested considerably in Papua-New Guinea, but has already developed three automobile assembly plants on Australian soil and has been enthusiastically encouraged by the Australian Department of Supply to invest in the Woomera communications satellite project. Moreover, the Japanese have placed their imprint on the entire range of Australian industries. According to official sources, there are more than seventy Japanese companies in Australia in fields as varied as textiles, shipping, mining and chemicals.[59] By 1968, Japanese automobiles, which entered the Australian market in the mid-1960's, accounted for 11 per cent of Australia's total automobile sales, including home-produced and imported vehicles.[60]

Yet for all the trade and investment with Asians, Australians are incredibly ignorant of their new financial partners. Exchange visits, study groups, communication, and migration schemes still have to contend with Australia's immigration policy. R. W. C. Anderson of the Associated Chamber of Manufacturers, suggested that the government make a full-scale examination of this problem. He added: "Broadly the issue is this: the tides of Australian trade are running less strongly to Western Europe and more strongly to Asia. Should not therefore the direction of our national energies of all types, political, business and cultural, be changing correspondingly?"[61]

A common market of Australian-Asian states, a frequently discussed goal of participants in regional trade, necessitates the free movement of men and materials. But many Japanese industrialists have long considered Australia's racial laws a major barrier to full development of two-nation cooperation in capital investment projects and regional financial schemes. The discussion leader at the 1964 meeting of the Australia-Japan Business Cooperation Com-

[59] *Ibid.*

[60] *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates,* 26th Parliament, March 27, 1968, p. 482.

[61] *Canberra Times,* January 9, 1967.

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mittee, F. Doko, cited the Port Hedland Copper Mining Project as an example of Japanese capital loss due to prejudicial hiring practices. The venture, which was terminated because of technical difficulties, was plagued in the beginning by "Article 291 of West Australia's mining laws," which hampered Japanese operations by ruling against the employment of Asians and Africans in the area. Revision of the law in 1963 permitted hiring of Asians and Africans subject to ministerial approval. "But," Doko indicated, "the situation is still unstable since the Minister is empowered to revoke the approval at any time."[62] Since 1966, however, a small trickle of Japanese migrants, primarily businessmen, have been able to settle in Australia without incident. A few hundred were naturalized during 1966-1968 and it was estimated in 1968 that Sydney had a Japanese community of about 850 residents.[63]

VII

The formulation of foreign policy, strategic considerations and trade agreements are not usually intentionally designed to vitiate "White Australia" principles. Neither are the events of recent Asian history and the European migration program consciously intended to prepare public opinion for a radical change in the immigration policy. But all of these factors have made "White Australia" an embarrassment and, more importantly, a deterrent to the smooth functioning of foreign affairs. At present the policy is not enough of an embarrassment or an obstacle to foreign dealings to warrant its complete abandonment. Only recently have foreign considerations reached parity with the historic dedication to "White Australia." Thus far, their effect on the content of the policy, albeit open to disputation, has been, in this author's opinion, only marginal. But relations with Asia in commerce, diplomacy and strategic arrangements are only beginning to have important implications for the national interest.

If the recent past is any guide to future policy decisions, foreign affairs will soon surpass immigration policy as a government priority. When this occurs the immigration policy, which was initially a safeguard for the defense and the economy of the body-politic, will be an indulgence endangering the very safety and prosperity it was designed to protect. Former Minister of Immigration Downer once said: "If Australia is to survive in the

[62] *Financial Review*, September 4, 1964.
[63] *New York Times*, December 25, 1968.

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form which most of us would like, it can only do so, paradoxically, by undergoing alterations in outlook and customs which our European migrants will bring."[64] In the not too distant future statements such as this may have to be revised to include non-European as well as European migrants. If Australia sees her future role as a leader of regional development, she has to learn that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.

[64]Downer, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

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TOWARD THE RECONCILIATION OF TRADITIONAL AND BEHAVIORAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL THEORY

by Ronald J. Yalem

CONTEMPORARY American political science is rent by the conflict between traditional and behavioral approaches to the study of politics. Yet critical evaluations of the conflict's implications for the international field have largely been limited to articles which defend the virtues of one approach or the other or assume the inevitability of their separation.[1] A more desirable undertaking may be one that attempts to point the way toward a possible reconciliation and what this might produce in the way of new insights and knowledge of the international system. For if the trend toward separatism continues, the confusion that has marked international studies in recent years can only increase.

I

To bring about a more effective understanding of the strengths and limitations of the traditional and behavioral approaches, we will examine the basic tenets of each and look for some grounds for reconciliation. An appropriate starting point might be a review of some of the criticisms against the traditional approach advanced by Richard Snyder and his colleagues in *Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics,* generally accepted as a benchmark in the development of the discipline.[2] Published in 1954, the Snyder monograph coincided with the appearance of *The Political System* by David Easton.[3]

[1]For the traditional approach see Hedley Bull, "International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach," *World Politics,* April 1966, and the rejoinder by Morton Kaplan, "The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations," *ibid.,* October 1966. A more conciliatory statement, which still assumes continuing separation, is James Rosenau, "Games International-Relations Scholars Play," *Journal of International Affairs,* Volume XXI, No. 2, 1967. See also Michael Haas, "A Neotraditional Plea to Some Political Behavioralists in the Field of International Relations," *International Studies Quarterly,* December 1967, and James Rosenau and Klaus Knorr, editors, *Contending Approaches to International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).

[2]Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, *Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics,* Foreign Policy Analysis Series, No. 3, Princeton, N.J., 1954.

[3](New York: Knopf, 1953).

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While Easton's critique was devoted largely to the deficiencies of political science rather than international relations, it was fundamentally similar in prescribing an urgent need for more systematic and rigorous research and methodology.

Snyder and his associates noted four basic weaknesses of the field: a confusion of purposes; an implicitness of intellectual operations; the absence of operational definitions of key concepts; and an overemphasis on description to the neglect of analytical categorization of the general uniformities of state behavior.[4] Briefly, the first weakness related to the failure of traditional scholars to differentiate sharply between objective analysis and reformist advocacy, resulting in the tendency to assume that what was desirable was also possible. The second and third limitations arose out of their failure to explicate key concepts of the study of international relations through clear definition and the precise articulation of assumptions on which definitions were based. Finally, the profusion of descriptive writing tended to overstress concreteness and neglect systematic analysis of general patterns of recurrent state behavior.

These criticisms, based on an examination of leading textbooks, have since gained acceptance by a large number of international relations specialists. In the opinion of the behavioralist, the solution to such deficiencies requires a fundamental reorientation in outlook and method. In short, if the limitations of the traditional approach are to be overcome, the behavioralist maintains, the study of international relations must become more "scientific."[5]

What does becoming more "scientific" mean in this context? Professor Easton's more recent authoritative statement of the behavioral approach to political science has relevance for international theory since the great majority of behavioralists in the international field employ similar research techniques.[6]

The following exercise compares the assumptions of the behavioral approach outlined by Easton with those of traditional scholars. It does not pretend to be comprehensive or representative of individual variations of emphasis.

[4]Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-20.

[5]For an articulate exposition of the case for a "scientific" approach, see J. David Singer, editor, *Human Behavior and International Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 1-20.

[6]David Easton, "The Current Meaning of 'Behavioralism' in Political Science," in James C. Charlesworth, editor, *The Limits of Behavioralism in Political Science*, American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, October 1962, pp. 7-8. See also Singer, *op. cit.*, p. 4, who asserts that the "scientific" approach involves the development of "a discipline capable of accurate description, comprehensible explanation, and statistically reliable prediction."

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(1) *Regularities:* To the behavioralist, political phenomena are not unique but exhibit certain uniformities or patterns that can be analyzed and compared by the thoughtful observer. From such observed uniformities may develop generalized explanations of political behavior in the form of systematic theoretical propositions with predictive possibilities.

The traditional approach is primarily the opposite. Largely descriptive and institutional, it perceives the uniqueness of political events much as historians do and is cautious of the development of broad-range theoretical explanations of political behavior. In the view of John Herz, "the trouble with international politics was—and is—that in international affairs most relationships and sequences of events seem to be unique, connected as they are with the particular character, needs, and consequent policies of a relatively small number of entities and agents."[7] The traditional approach therefore has not been preoccupied with the search for regularities or patterns. Exceptions include, however, Hans Morgenthau, who offered the explanatory concept of endemic power competition among nations as a theoretical attempt to reduce the complexity of the field.

(2) *Verification:* Behavioralists insist that the scientific method of the physical sciences can be made applicable to the study of politics. Generalizations or hypotheses of political behavior may be tested by reference to empirical phenomena.

The traditionalist largely eschews the strict canons of science in the study of politics. Generalizations may be formulated, but they are a priori assumptions and are not susceptible to strict verification. Traditional scholars believe empirical verification is possible in only the most limited and tangible sectors of political behavior:

> . . . the gap between what we can explain to our full satisfaction with respect to small-scale problems or precisely definable situations and what we need to know in large complex problem settings with numerous and disparate variables will be disappointingly large.[8]

(3) *Quantification:* The commitment of the behavioral approach is toward precision in the collection and interpretation of data. Such precision is not obtainable under the traditional framework because the meaning imputed to various political expressions and concepts varies from one scholar to another. A

[7]John Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 4.
[8]Emmette S. Redford, "Reflections on a Discipline," *American Political Science Review,* December 1961, p. 758.

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more reliable measurement is quantification in statistical or mathematical form. In the international field, quantification has been applied in the study of international trade flows as an indicator of ongoing integration, voting blocs in the United Nations General Assembly, arms races, and the escalation of international conflicts, to cite only a few examples.

The traditional approach is highly critical of the use of quantitative methods on the assumption that most political behavior is contingent and intangible and is therefore not susceptible to precise measurement. A further objection is that even where quantitative measurement of disparate variables is possible, it cannot be combined into meaningful generalizations.[9]

(4) *Values:* Scholars should not confuse empirical reality with their own value preferences. Normative inquiries are permissible, but they should be explicitly specified as such. In empirical analysis the observer should scrupulously refrain from injecting his own values into the analysis of political phenomena. His primary purpose is to concentrate on the analysis of political behavior as it is and not as it ought to be.

Those who rely on traditional methods of scholarship would today, for the most part, agree with this. The behavioralist critique has forced traditional scholars to be more aware of the need for separating fact and value statements in scholarly writing. Yet traditionalists are more skeptical about the possibility of expunging values from scholarly research: ". . . the researcher is never so objective—so culture free, so oblivious to utility that he chooses his subject, organizes his data, and draws his conclusions without intrusion of value assumptions."[10]

(5) *Systematization:* Behavioralists insist on a close relationship between theory and research on the assumption that theory without empirical data to support it is apt to be sterile, while masses of factual data without ordering conceptual frameworks are meaningless.

Traditionalists largely accept this canon of behavioral inquiry. For example, more than ten years ago Kenneth Thompson asserted that "theory without verification is metaphysics. Mere empiricism without theory cannot but be aimless."[11]

(6) *Integration:* The behavioral approach stresses the need

[9]Stanley Hoffmann, "International Relations: The Long Road to Theory," *World Politics*, April 1959, p. 359.
[10]Redford, *loc. cit.*
[11]Kenneth Thompson, "Toward a Theory of International Politics," *American Political Science Review*, September 1955, p. 746.

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for an interdisciplinary orientation to political research. This arises out of the conviction that a number of the variables that affect and are affected by political forces are economic, psychological and sociological in character. In addition, the behavioralist is attracted to these disciplines because they have utilized quantification, verification and prediction more effectively than has political science.

The traditionalist, although not denying the relevance of other disciplines to domestic and international politics, is skeptical about the application of the findings of the behavioral sciences to entities as large and complex as the nation-state or the international system. The difficulty of transferring knowledge derived from small groups such as labor unions, pressure groups and the family, and relating it to the study of international conflict, is considered a formidable and as yet unsolved problem. Behavioralists are less pessimistic about the transferability problem.

The major aspects of the behavioral approach, thus delineated, should be taken cautiously, for Easton has reminded us that his categorization

> helps us less in understanding its meaning than in appreciating the nature of the kind of questions we must begin to ask. For, even if we were to have little difficulty in obtaining formal agreement to this list, there can be no doubt that major differences would immediately well to the surface . . . about the relative prominence of one or another of the articles.[12]

Similar qualifications may be adduced regarding my characterization of traditional viewpoints. Nevertheless, the comparisons developed above indicate the fundamental variations between the two approaches.

II

We turn now to Hedley Bull's 1966 critique of the behavioral approach, which he has characterized as "a theory of international relations whose propositions are based upon logical or mathematical proof, or upon strict, empirical procedures of verification."[13] In discussing it, we will substitute traditional and behavioral for his classical and scientific delineation.

Bull accurately depicts perception and intuition as the major tools of the traditionalist, who operates by placing "explicit reliance upon the exercise of judgment and by the assumptions that if we confine ourselves to strict standards of verification and proof

[12]Easton, "The Current Meaning of 'Behavioralism' . . .," *op. cit.*, p. 8.
[13]Bull, *op. cit.*, p. 362.

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there is very little of significance that can be said about international relations."[14]

Obviously, a reconciliation between the two outlooks is impossible, especially if one accepts Bull's statement that "the scientific approach has contributed and is likely to contribute very little to the theory of international relations."[15] This will serve only to inflame the ardor of the scientific theorists. On the other hand, his critique merits discussion because it is an effective if not wholly conclusive argument.

His major criticism of the behavioralists is that they are removing themselves from a consideration of the really vital issues of international relations by their insistence on strict verification of empirical propositions: ". . . the student whose study of international politics consists solely of an introduction to the techniques of systems theory, game theory, simulation, or content analysis is simply shut off from contact with the subject."[16]

Many scholars would probably agree with this contention. Yet it could be argued that students who are exposed to abstract materials in some of the newer techniques have usually had an introduction to the more conventional treatment of subject matter in leading textbooks. Even if it is admitted that the newer techniques are often far removed from contemporary events, the scientific theorist would maintain that behavioralist methodology offers better insights into the nature of the international arena than those provided by intuitive and descriptive analysis. At the present stage in the evolution of international relations theory, it is premature to accept or reject such a claim.

A more cogent criticism of the newer methods of study is that the environment of international relations is too vast and complex to produce verifiable generalizations applicable to the great variety of nation-states, international organizations, and private international corporate entities. Logical and mathematical tools may be useful in illuminating the nature of diplomatic bargaining, in more precisely delimiting the role of blocs and groupings in international assemblies through sophisticated factor analysis, and in probing the dynamics of international crises, but the number of hypotheses that may be verified empirically is likely to

[14]*Ibid.*, p. 361. Arnold Wolfers argues that "nothing can substitute . . . for that inscrutable composite of experience, common sense, and intuition on which the practitioner must ultimately rely." *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. xiii.
[15]Bull, *op. cit.*, p. 366.
[16]*Ibid.*, p. 368.

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be too limited to be expressible in a generalized theory encompassing all of the complex parameters of existing or past international systems. No scholar yet has been able to demonstrate how islands of middle-range empirical theories may be logically interconnected in a general framework that would meaningfully accommodate the infinite complexity of the international system.

However, this barrier to general theory would be applicable to traditional as well as behavioral analysis. For example, the struggle-for-power hypothesis of Morgenthau and the multiple-equilibrium framework of Liska appear too general to be verifiable in a precise sense, and both explanations ignore a major variable—the widely differing roles of nation-states and international organizations that affect the character of the international system. Similarly, while Morton Kaplan has suggested some important generalizations regarding the influence of the central variable of the balance of power in a number of different international systems, such hypotheses take on meaning only when related to the empirical performance of specific actors in specific systems. We are closer to reality, perhaps, when theorists then break up wholes into component parts, as Thomas Schelling did in bargaining theory, but Schelling's hypothesis on the mutuality of interests between adversaries explains only the strategic aspects of diplomacy; the numerous other influences that may deflect decision-makers from adopting a rational and maximizing strategy are excluded.

It is unfortunate that many behavioralists believe a Copernican revolution has been launched in the study of international relations which will ultimately lead to a scientific discipline. Quincy Wright has observed that

> international relations is a field extraordinarily difficult for science to enter. If sovereign states are considered the units of study, it deals with the relations of a small number of large entities, each of which seems to be independent and unique. Neither the statistical stability of large numbers nor the organizational stability of complex equilibria are therefore to be expected.[17]

Nevertheless, Bull is surely wrong in arguing that "if the fruits of their [the scientific theorists'] researches are so great and the prospects of translating them into action so favorable, this has not been accomplished by anyone before."[18] This judgment

[17]Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), p. 115.

[18]Bull, *op. cit.*, p. 376.

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ignores the cumulative growth of knowledge in all of the social sciences since 1945. In sociology, economics, psychology and political science, the trend toward greater systematization is unmistakable. Whether or not one is as optimistic as the scientific theorists about the achievement of a scientific discipline, it is necessary to recognize that the behavioral approach is here to stay. If one accepts the assumption that international relations knowledge is regressive rather than progressive, as Bull seems to imply, then scholarly research, both traditional and behavioral, is without purpose. Only a small minority would accept such an extreme view.

There is useful work to be done through both approaches, and the question of whether classical or scientific theory is the right approach is subordinate to a larger question that behavioralists and traditionalists alike seldom raise. It concerns the purpose of theory in the international field. If this question can be answered with a measure of consensus, the appropriateness of the scientific or classical method should be found to depend on the theory or research problems involved. Some may be more amenable to the newer techniques and others susceptible to the older methods. There is also the possibility, even the inevitability, that the seminal contributions of the future will embody elements common to both. Such a conclusion anticipates a discussion of the nature of theory in international relations, its limitations, and especially the interrelationship among empirical, normative and policy components.

III

Unlike Stanley Hoffmann, whose 1959 article [19] largely constituted a "wrecking operation" on various types of theory, both traditional and behavioral, the writer believes that an irenic effort to reconcile the differences between the two approaches is required in order to advance our knowledge of the international system. It may be reassuring to assert that we are all behavioralists in our concern with the description and analysis of the behavior of nations. While this observation has some generic truth, it overlooks the substantial disagreements described earlier in this article. There is little possibility that the gulf will be bridged through a combination of behavioral and traditional training superimposed on contemporary and future graduate students. Since the research perspectives of most scholars cluster around one

[19] Hoffmann, *op. cit.*

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orientation or the other, their outlook is likely to be transmitted to their students. It is the exceptional scholar who can combine the best of both approaches. The need is for a reconciliation that will justify the legitimacy of both traditional and behavioral methods of inquiry. How will this be achieved?

We must return to the fundamental question of theory and theory construction and elevate this concern to paramountcy instead of debating the priority of approaches. This necessitates a re-evaluation of the function of theory in international relations.

Despite the differences between philosophies and methods of behavioralism and traditionalism, consensus exists on the types of theory if not on the functions theory should perform. Thus Neal Riemer (traditionalist) in *Revival of Democratic Theory*[20] divides theory into normative, empirical and prudential components and Charles McClelland (behavioralist) suggests a corresponding delineation in *Theory and the International System:*

(1) theory as a means of organizing fact (empirical theory);
(2) theory as a guide to action (policy or prudential theory);
(3) theory as a statement of desirable ends (normative or philosophical theory).[21]

One way of reconciling classical and scientific approaches may be by demonstrating the manner in which they may contribute to these dimensions of theory. We may then specify in existing or future scholarly investigations the areas of convergence where research may be reinforcing and complementary. Such a reconciliation cannot be effected, however, without first asking that larger and troublesome question of the role of theory in international relations. The writer is well aware that numerous articles have been written on this matter and that "theorizing about theory" has been attacked as unproductive. Yet a brief re-evaluation, even at the risk of repeating commonly held assumptions, is necessary for a field still uncertain in scope and methods. From such a reappraisal may emerge a better understanding of the strengths and limitations of the behavioral and traditional approaches.

Aside from the empirical, normative and policy objectives of theory, theories may be classified according to their scope (general or partial) and their degree of elaboration (methodological questions, hypotheses to guide research, and explanations at high

[20](New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1962).
[21](New York: Macmillan, 1966), p. 6.

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levels of generality designed to provide answers to questions or hypotheses).[22] More fundamentally, the purpose of theory is to provide a deeper understanding of the nature of international relations. Thus we have single-factor explanations that attempt to account for the complexity of international behavior at a high level of generality such as Hans Morgenthau's (power) and George Liska's (equilibrium). Partial theories which rely on questions and hypotheses to orient research rather than providing answers are illustrated by the recent framework for the study of interstate integration suggested by Ernst Haas in *Beyond the Nation-State*,[23] and the decision-making frame of reference of Richard Snyder.

Whatever may be the strengths or deficiencies of such efforts, the object of the theorist is to achieve a more effective organization of the phenomena of international relations. He is trying to build a coherent framework for the purpose of isolating and analyzing the major variables that affect the structure and functions of the international system. As we have seen, this is a formidable undertaking since it involves a search for patterns of regularity in an environment where much activity is random and indeterminate.

Insofar as scientific theory is concerned, there has been increasing interest in the establishment of rudimentary techniques of prediction to aid in achieving more adequate controls for international conflict situations. At present and for the foreseeable future, however, the prospect of predicting and controlling international conflict is not bright. The international relations theorist operates under much more unfavorable conditions than his colleagues in the natural and physical sciences, where the number of units under observation is larger and the variables involved are few and controllable.

Despite these limitations, some traditional-behavioral convergence is discernible in mutual contributions to the following three aspects of empirical theory development: (1) concept formation; (2) the appraisal of contemporary and future change and stability factors of the international system; (3) international system comparisons.

Although behavioral scholars have assumed an important role in these research tasks, a number of classical theorists, such as John Herz, Stanley Hoffmann, Kenneth Waltz and Arnold Wolf-

[22]Stanley Hoffmann, *The State of War* (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 5-6.
[23](Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968).

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ers, have increased our knowledge through their incisive contributions. Their work is no less valuable than behavioralist investigations because they rely much more heavily on the exercise of judgment and intuition than on quantification, hypothetical formulation and abstract models. It is possible to show that both groups have been involved in the above categories of theory development:

(1) concept formation:
Herz (permeability and impermeability of the nation-state)
Liska (multiple equilibrium)
Wolfers (billiard ball model of multistate system)
Boulding (conditional and unconditional viability of states)
Snyder (decision-making frame of reference)
Haas (spillover in the integration process)

(2) change and stability:
Herz (decline of territorial state)
Manning (durability of "rules of the game")
McClelland (system transformation)
Waltz (stability of bipolarity)

(3) international system comparisons:
Hoffmann and Aron (historical sociology)
Rosecrance (systematic empirical analysis)
Kaplan (abstract systems analysis)

The problem of the relationship between empirical and normative theory has not received the attention it deserves. Perhaps some would assign normative theory to the traditionalist on the grounds that intuition and speculative judgment lend themselves more readily to discourses on the kind of international system statesmen should seek to promote. Behavioralists associate their work with the empirical tradition of analyzing the world as it is, not as it ought to be. But surely such a categorization is an oversimplification: many traditional writers are anything but idealistic in their approach to international relations. Quite a few critics of behavioralism insist that it produces scholastics who are as far removed from contemporary international relations as the traditional scholars who devise utopian schemes for world order.

Many scholars have recently come to recognize that the isolation of normative from empirical theorists, and vice versa, can only be detrimental to both. Hans Morgenthau has expressed dissatisfaction over a separation which leads political scientists to neglect the fundamental moral and ethical content of politics, and political philosophers to isolate themselves from a sensitivity

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to empirical knowledge.[24] Likewise, a leading behavioralist, Robert Dahl, has written that "empirical political science had better find a place for speculation. It is a grave though easy error for students of politics impressed by the achievements of the natural sciences to imitate all their methods save the most critical one: the use of the imagination."[25]

The legitimacy of both normative and empirical modes of inquiry may be quickly established for international studies. Hedley Bull argues that many of the central questions of international theory are moral and "can only be probed, clarified, reformulated, according to the method of philosophy."[26] He suggests that such questions as the legitimacy of force, the right of intervention and the attainment of universal human rights fall in this category. What Bull does not say, however, is just as revealing—namely, that moral questions cannot be divorced from either national or international politics.

The political philosopher who ignores the empirical environment of international relations can hardly offer an informed judgment on moral issues. Can anyone presume to speak with wisdom and authority on the nature of international force and violence unless he has an appreciation of the vast new dimensions of force available to nation-states and why there may be an absence of supranational power to rectify an unjust status quo? In one instance the use of nuclear weapons may be completely irrational, yet the use of conventional force by a small power may be the only method for overcoming a dispute that cannot be resolved peacefully. Is it possible to analyze the complex problem of modern intervention without being aware of the virtual disappearance of small state independence under such pressures as foreign aid, propaganda or subversion? How can one explain the diminishing effectiveness of the legal and moral strictures against intervention in the UN Charter without realizing that intervention into the affairs of smaller states is an inevitable concomitant of superpower rivalry?

The inseparability of normative and empirical thought is also discernible in the inability of empiricists to exclude values from the substance of their research. International relationists have recently become sensitive to the need to separate facts and values.

[24]Hans Morgenthau, *Dilemmas of Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).
[25]Robert Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach," *American Political Science Review*, December 1961, p. 772.
[26]Bull, *op. cit.*, p. 366.

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Yet the very selection of research problems, and especially the interpretation of empirical data, depend upon personal judgments. Further, in the social sciences, where research findings are never conclusively proved, validity depends on acceptance by colleagues who are often divided over the merit of particular contributions. In this connection, Quincy Wright notes the following similarity between social scientists and philosophers: ". . . social-science generalizations share the characteristic of many philosophic generalizations, that their truth depends in a measure upon their persuasiveness."[27]

On the other hand, if there is a need in the discipline for a number of speculative thinkers with the ability to ask large questions about the nature of the international system and its future course, it is safe to assume that the persuasiveness of their work will rest on their cognizance of "the difficulties which the very uniqueness of the international milieu poses and which frustrate the three conditions any political order tries to fulfill: security, satisfaction, and flexibility."[28] Empirical theorists have an important role in this regard by revealing to the normative theorist the potentialities and limitations for the achievement of security, satisfaction and flexibility within the international system. Thus, the inevitable division of labor in a field as large and unwieldy as international relations does not preclude mutual collaboration on the problems of world order. This leads us to discuss the third element of international theory: its application to policymaking.

IV

There is increasing evidence of a convergence between behavioralist and traditionalist in their mutual concern over the application of research to foreign and international policy problems. Examples of this concern are not hard to find. In a behavioral analysis of voting patterns in the United Nations, Bruce Russett expressed the hope that such research "may give information which can assist American policy-makers to increase their gains in the UN political process."[29] Several years ago, Roger Masters developed an elaborate model of a multi-bloc international system and suggested that the United States should orient its policies toward such a world system as an alternative to bipolarity,

[27]Wright, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-118.
[28]Hoffmann, *The State of War, op. cit.*, p. 20.
[29]Bruce Russett, "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations," *American Political Science Review,* June 1966, p. 327.

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which he assumed to be disappearing.[30] J. David Singer, a leading behavioralist, has asserted that "the application of social science methods, concepts, and data to the study of international politics might well provide . . . decision-makers with that additional increment of accuracy which could permit slightly less conventional policies, especially on the part of the major powers."[31] Singer believes that strategies plotted with the aid of such data may be serviceable in insuring short-term security and enhancing the security of all states.[32]

Kenneth Boulding, a well known systems theorist, has developed some highly provocative analyses of conflict systems within nations that recommend the resolution of conflict before such systems reach a "break boundary."[33] Depicting the international environment as a system without adequate control mechanisms, he reasons that as economists have been able to devise control systems to warn of impending trouble in the economy, so also is there a need "to perceive movements towards war in their early stages and to reverse them before they get too far to be reversed."[34] He calls for an information processing agency to collect economic and political data that could be utilized for this purpose.

Just how the collection of such data could be used to control international conflict, Boulding does not explain. It may be suggested that he is guilty of improper analogizing. Conflict control is a much simpler process within the environment of a national economic system than in the more complex and less manageable international arena. The availability of data forewarning of conflict might alert the possible victim, but it would be unlikely to deter an aggressor state from initiating a movement toward a "break boundary." Boulding's study implies a therapeutic and manipulative approach to peace—a method more appropriate in economics or medicine than in international relations.

The Boulding approach is in some way typical of a good many behavioralists who believe their research may ultimately help policymakers by revealing insights into more effective processes for the control of international conflict. In this respect their work reveals the interplay of empirical and normative concerns.

[30]Roger Masters, "A Multi-Bloc Model of the International System," *ibid.*, December 1961, p. 798.
[31]Singer, *op. cit.*, pp. 456-457.
[32]*Ibid.*, p. 456.
[33]Kenneth Boulding, "Is Peace Researchable?," *Background*, Winter 1963, p. 73.
[34]*Ibid.*, p. 74.

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But behavioralists have been more cautious than traditional scholars in assuming that what is desirable is not always feasible, and they have not always recognized the inherent limitations on predictability in social science.

Among traditional writers, Hans Morgenthau has urged theorists to develop an intellectual conscience "which reminds the policy makers as well as the public at large of what the sound principles of foreign policy are and in what respects and to what extent actual policies have fallen short of those principles."[35] The normative aspect of Morgenthau's own work is visible in *Politics Among Nations*.[36] In a chapter on the revival of diplomacy, he prescribed a number of principles statesmen should follow to maximize national power. For the academic theorist, however, Morgenthau suggests a strategy designed to achieve just the opposite: ". . . to prepare the ground for a new international order radically different from that which preceded it."[37] He states that the theorist should demonstrate how and by what means the organization of international society into obsolescent nation-states may be changed into a new system which will control the most revolutionary aspect of international relations—nuclear power.[38]

In the same series of essays dealing with the role of theory in international relations, Professor William T. R. Fox revealed a similar sensitivity to the problem of relating international theory to the real world. Fox stressed for theorists the promotion of increased rationality among foreign policy decision-makers: ". . . with the aid of theory facts can better be organized to portray the world in which political choices have to be made more accurately, to point to incompatibilities in policy goals and objectives which are being simultaneously pursued and thus point the way toward a reformulation which eliminates these incompatibilities."[39] In this purpose to bring about a clarification of means and ends in foreign policy, normative and empirical aspects of theory are intertwined.

The concern of both behavioral and traditional writers with the policy implications of international theory may be explained

[35]Hans Morgenthau, "The Intellectual and Political Functions of a Theory of International Relations," in Horace V. Harrison, editor, *The Role of Theory in International Relations* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1964), p. 115.

[36](New York: Knopf, 1967).

[37]Morgenthau, "The Intellectual and Political Functions . . .," *op. cit.*, pp. 115-116.

[38]*Ibid.*, p. 116.

[39]William T. R. Fox, "Theories as Forces in Modern World Politics," in Harrison, editor, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-91.

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in terms of the initial thrust of political science research in the United States: i.e., a pragmatic and utilitarian orientation directed toward the improvement of political institutions and processes. The distinguished political scientist, Emmette Redford, rationalizes the continuing preoccupation with policy science in a manner that is applicable to international studies: ". . . political science deals with the arrangements under which men live in political order; and hence, whatever may be required in knowledge about individual and group behavior, political science in its largest dimension will be focused on these arrangements for political order."[40]

Yet Redford admits the danger that policy science may erode the quest for "a durable science and an enduring morality."[41] Stanley Hoffmann has been much more critical of policy theory on the assumption that the main purpose of scholars is to seek understanding as an end in itself.[42] His intellectual caveat derives from the shaky foundation of the study of international relations: ". . . we should not rush back to the 'policy' periphery of our discipline until we know more about the theoretical center."[43] The preceding admonitions, however, have largely gone unheeded as more and more scholars have been drawn into the realm of policy theory in recent years.

A seldom discussed aspect of international theory is whether the research produced is actually utilized by policymakers. Is the work of theorists as vital as Fox and Morgenthau would have us believe? Does knowledge really contribute to policy?

We are all aware of the influence accorded in government circles to such intellectuals as Henry Kissinger, Robert Bowie, Thomas Schelling, George Kennan and Herman Kahn, as well as to quasi-academic research organizations such as the RAND Corporation and the Institute for Defense Analyses. But because of the highly classified nature of national security policy, we cannot know how much of the research produced by such individuals and groups is embodied in important policy papers and specific decisions. If we would acknowledge an increasing role for deterrence theorists, game theorists and civilian military strategists, are there intrinsic limitations on the utilization of their research and of nonpolicy-oriented international research? Evidence on these matters is not readily available.

[40]Redford, *op. cit.*, p. 760.
[41]*Ibid.*
[42]Hoffmann, "The Long Road to Theory," *op. cit.*, p. 349.
[43]*Ibid.*

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Some indication of the relationship between knowledge and policy was presented a few years ago by William Polk, formerly a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, and now a professor at the University of Chicago. Polk described the gulf that exists between scholars and administrators in the following manner:

> Without undue exaggeration, one can say that very little of the product of academic research reaches administrators. A major problem is the sheer bulk of the works produced in the social sciences today. . . . Even those who are temperamentally and intellectually receptive to it simply do not have the time—or one must admit, the energy—to read more than a fraction.[44]

Moreover, an obvious communication gap is created by the abstruseness and jargon in the scholarly literature:

> Like some modern art and poetry, the literature of the social sciences does not communicate efficiently or gracefully. . . . I do not suggest for a moment that scholarship need be popularized, but the clear, the sharp, and the vivid presentation of ideas need not damage those ideas and might help to cut down the large gap . . . between conceptions and influence.[45]

From the academic side, the limitations of social science research for public policy have been perceptively discussed by Professor Max Millikan, Director of the Center of International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, an organization that has been supported by substantial government contract research. Millikan acknowledges the utility of economic theory for the management of economic problems, but frankly admits that "the contributions of social science to the solution of the great international problems of our time have not been notable."[46] In his judgment, foreign policy decisions "must inevitably rest much more largely on intuition, particularly articulated insights, and informed common sense than on precisely defined propositions emerging from a clear theoretical model and supported by documented empirical evidence."[47] What is scientifically reputable is not apt to be of much use to policymakers since verifiable hypotheses are usually too narrow to be helpful.

Do such limitations foreclose the possibility of a meaningful contribution by scholars to public policy? Not necessarily. Milli-

[44]William Polk, "Problems of Government Utilization of Scholarly Research in International Affairs," *Background,* November 1965, pp. 253-254.
[45]*Ibid.*, p. 255.
[46]Max Millikan, "Inquiry and Policy: The Relation of Knowledge to Action," in Richard Falk and Saul Mendlovitz, editors, *International Law* (see note 50, *infra*), p. 94.
[47]*Ibid.*, p. 113.

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kan believes scholarly inquiry should be undertaken "to deepen, broaden, and extend the policy-maker's capacity for judgment—not to provide him with answers."[48] Research cannot replace intuition or judgment but it can greatly enrich them by illuminating the variety of forces operating on the international scene; placing limits on the range of possible outcomes of policy actions; and assessing the consistency of intuitive expectations held by policymakers.[49]

V

The preceding discussion has examined some of the major issues involved in the interrelationship between the empirical, normative and policy aspects of international theory. From it we can reason that while the gulf separating behavioralists from traditionalists is real and formidable, it is not irreconcilable. A recent enterprise initiated by the World Law Fund opens up interesting possibilities for collaboration that may also have policy implications.

Under the sponsorship of the Fund, Professors Richard Falk and Saul Mendlovitz have articulated a "strategy of world order" concept in a series of four volumes of authoritative readings. Their purpose is to encourage a dialogue on the feasibility of a relevant utopia—the achievement of a warless world through the adoption of the Clark-Sohn plan for limited world government.[50] A close relationship exists between these volumes and Stanley Hoffmann's proposal for a merger of systematic empirical analysis and political philosophy in the form of relevant utopias:

> By spelling out our views on the purposes, prerequisites, the possibilities, and the procedures of international order . . . we would meet the requirement of clarifying our personal value positions. We would avoid the twin escapisms of realism, which gloomily postulates the inevitability of the customary, and of idealism, which postulates an easy road to world order. It is not, and cannot be, our task to guarantee that utopia can be reached. Nor should we confine ourselves to proposals which are timid enough to be uncontroversial. Our task is to say what goals we want for the world, to explain what our "utopia" implies, to suggest methods for building it, and to show how such methods might appear and work in the world as it is.[51]

The Falk-Mendlovitz approach is controversial since it relies

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 102.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 101.
[50] Richard Falk and Saul Mendlovitz, editors, *The Strategy of World Order* (New York: World Law Fund, 1966): Volume I, *Toward a Theory of War Prevention;* Volume II, *International Law;* Volume III, *The United Nations;* Volume IV, *Disarmament and Economic Development.*
[51] Hoffmann, "The Long Road to Theory," *op. cit.*, p. 376.

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heavily on the acceptance of the Clark-Sohn model for international order and this model has been widely criticized by realists as utopian. Yet the plan does contain the theoretical prerequisites for a minimization of nuclear war through disarmament, the creation of supranational power to settle political disputes, and the gradual elimination of economic disparities through a world economic development authority.

Falk and Mendlovitz contribute to the study of world order through critical commentaries on the readings. These are designed "to clarify the nature of order in the existing international political system, to postulate the Clark-Sohn model as an alternative international system, and on this basis to analyze the techniques for transforming the one into the other and thereby achieve a transition to a warless world."[52]

J. David Singer says much the same thing in different language: ". . . the world needs a great deal more government than it now has at the international level, and probably quite a bit less government than it now has at the national level. To move in that direction would imply a fair degree of system (and subsystem) transformation."[53] Thus, there is some evidence of a convergence between traditionalists and behavioralists in their mutual concern for the problems of world order.

In this connection, though Falk and Mendlovitz were traditionally trained in law and political science, they have an awareness of the relevance of recent behavioralist contributions to the problem of system transformation. This problem was largely ignored by Clark and Sohn in their article-by-article revision of the United Nations Charter. Falk and Mendlovitz admit that their approach may be considered unrealistic by scholars who argue for improvements in the existing system rather than the study of a visionary constitutionalism.[54] Despite their reliance on the legalistic Clark-Sohn model, they recognize that the transitional process to a more effective world order cannot rely exclusively on the normative restraints of international law and organization. They see the transition problem in terms of a fundamental reorganization of national power which will reduce the possibility of violent interaction among major political units.[55]

There is ground for a reconciliation of traditional and behavioral thought on world order in their recognition of the role

[52]Prefatory note to Volume II.
[53]Singer, *op. cit.*, p. 453.
[54]Volume II, p. 6.
[55]"Towards a Warless World: One Legal Formula to Achieve Transition," Volume II, p. 11.

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behavioral theorists may perform in illuminating the nature of this transition process, particularly through systems analysis. Alluding to the writings of Kaplan, Rapoport, Schelling and Boulding, they assert that

> creative theorizing in the recent literature of international relations has deepened our understanding of the central events in the international arena. Systems analysis, game theory, conflict resolution studies, operations research, content analysis, and equilibrium approaches have emerged to supplement, if not supplant, the stock repertory of the theorist of world affairs: power politics, historical exposition and national interest.[56]

Presumably the talents of behavioral theorists may be employed to increase empirical knowledge of the five existing approaches to transition discussed by Falk and Mendlovitz: (1) use of existing conflict resolution techniques to solve major political crises on an *ad hoc* basis; (2) reduction of economic disparities between developed and less developed nations through the redistribution of economic resources; (3) disarmament; (4) development of a greater role for the United Nations in the solution of domestic economic or political problems to prevent their escalation into international conflict; and (5) creation of a more centralized world legal order within which the four previous approaches might be incorporated (the Clark-Sohn model).

The resources of the behavioralist approach have only begun to be tapped in furnishing new knowledge on these transition questions. It would appear that an appropriate basis for collaboration between behavioral and traditional scholars exists even if research findings should disprove the feasibility of system transformation. The research payoff may be limited in the form of suggested improvements in the present international system, but the effort will be worthwhile.[57]

VI

The writer is aware that, given the prevailing differences in outlook, the reconciliation of the diverse perspectives of the traditional and behavioral approaches to international theory is a formidable task. Further, while the dialogue between traditional and behavioral scholars on the problems of world order and peace suggested by Professors Falk and Mendlovitz provides a potential area for mutual cooperation, such an eventuality would not be proof that a conceptual reconciliation had been achieved. Never-

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

[57] Singer has suggested that an empirical basis for or against the assumption that global integration enhances state security "will not be long in coming"; *op. cit.*, p. 456.

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theless, there seems to be a growing appreciation among both groups that international relations scholarship continues to require both approaches.

Assuming that a resolution of conceptual and methodological differences between these two schools will not be possible in the near future, the problem of ascertaining which approach to apply in individual research remains. What criteria should guide the scholar in selecting a mode of investigation? The answer to this question would seem to depend on the nature of the subject matter to be investigated. Certain theory questions may lend themselves more appropriately to the intuitive and speculative insights of the classical theorist, while other questions may call for a more rigorous empirical approach.

In actual practice, however, significant research is likely to embody elements of both perspectives if only in an implicit fashion. This suggests that a rigid separation between the intellectual processes of intuitive judgment and logical rigor is impossible to maintain and that the most fruitful investigations will be those which combine both.

In a sense, the international relations theorist is confronted with what Kenneth Thompson describes as a dilemma between the search for rigor and the search for relevance.[58] Regardless of the subject matter chosen for analysis, the prevailing tendency is to adopt a behavioral or traditional orientation to research rather than a combination of approaches, and this frequently leads to a conflict between the two principles. The current debate, between traditionalists who accord priority to relevance and behavioralists who stress rigor of research design and empirical investigation, reflects this dilemma.

Prospects for effecting a reconciliation will depend on the extent to which the next generation of scholars is trained to respect both orientations and to combine the techniques of both where appropriate in their research. Unfortunately, however, today's trend toward a traditional-behavioral dichotomy in graduate instruction in political science may make eclecticism difficult.[59]

[58]Kenneth W. Thompson, "The Internationalist's Dilemma: Relevance and Rigor," *International Studies Quarterly*, June 1968, pp. 161-173.

[59]Norman Luttbeg and Melvin Kahn point out that a sample questionnaire received from the chairmen of 53 departments of political science offering the doctorate revealed that 46 per cent ranged from moderately behavioral to strongly behavioral while 37 per cent were considered strongly or moderately traditional. Only 11 per cent of the chairmen viewed their departments as both traditional and behavioral. "Ph.D. Training in Political Science," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, August 1968, p. 305.

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Certainly a synthetic fusion of methodologies and concepts is unlikely in the near future because the kind of intellectual capacity required for such a synthesis is rare:

> The internationalist's dilemma between relevance and rigor can be mitigated, if not resolved, occasionally within a single extraordinary mind, but more often through exponents of parallel but differing intellectual trends that together contribute to the sum total of wisdom and knowledge.[60]

However, research pluralism will not solve the question of which research now contributes to knowledge and wisdom. International relations is an academic discipline notoriously resistant to unification; a periodic evaluation of the increasing output of literature is needed in order to establish some coherence and unity in it.

In a comprehensive study of the field and its current problems, including the behavioral-traditional controversy, Dr. E. Raymond Platig plausibly argues "that the full value of any research will not be realized unless a conscious effort is made to assess its contribution to theory, action, and method."[61] Such an evaluative effort would also help to improve the quality of future research by informing the growing number of research scholars of investigations pertinent to their interests. Toward this end he suggests specific criteria by which to judge the contribution of individual efforts to theoretical, policy and methodological research and the publication of a *Yearbook of International Relations Research.*

It is possible that through such an enterprise we may be able to reduce if not eliminate the dangers of research pluralism, improve the evaluation and dissemination of the increasing flow of scholarly literature, and promote a more orderly growth of the discipline. In the process, we may also be able to diminish the controversy between behavioral and traditional orientations to international theory and develop a perspective that evaluates research in terms of its contribution to our knowledge of theory, policy or methodology.

[60]Thompson, "The Internationalist's Dilemma . . .," *op. cit.*, p. 173.
[61]E. Raymond Platig, *International Relations Research* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1966), p. 147.

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SMALL STATES IN ALLIANCES: ICELAND, THAILAND, AUSTRALIA*

by Donald E. Nuechterlein

DURING the past fifteen years scholars have devoted an increasing amount of research to the study of new states in the international community. Part of this research has dealt with the foreign policies of new states, but in most cases the emphasis has been on states that have chosen nonalignment as a policy. This article is concerned with the reasons why certain small states join alliances with great powers, instead of adopting nonalignment, and the factors that cause them to remain in alliance after the passage of time.

For purposes of comparison, three small states that are allied with the United States were chosen for discussion: Iceland (NATO), Thailand (SEATO), and Australia (ANZUS). All three decided between 1949 and 1954 to accept a military alliance with the United States, and other Western powers, rather than follow a nonaligned or neutralist policy, each for a different reason. Their reasons are analyzed in terms of seven major factors that influenced their foreign policy decisions: (1) historical, (2) geographic, (3) economic, (4) external threat, (5) internal security, (6) military capability, and (7) receptivity to foreign bases. A section entitled "Prospects for the Alliances" assesses the relevance of these factors to the foreign policies of these states today.

The approach used is similar to that employed by Professor Fox in her comparative study of the policies of small states during the Second World War.[1] Like Mrs. Fox's contribution, the present one makes no pretense of attempting a general theory of behavior of small states in international relations. However, it is hoped that this comparison of the policies of three dissimilar small states, which chose for differing reasons to join three separate alliance systems with the United States, will prove sufficiently challenging

*Adapted from a paper delivered at the 1968 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.

[1]Annette Baker Fox, *The Power of Small States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959).

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to encourage other scholars to make further explorations in this field.

Major Factors Influencing Foreign Policy

Historical Factors

Events that occurred in Europe and Asia more than twenty-five years ago have had a profound effect in determining the current foreign policies of Iceland, Thailand and Australia. Prior to World War II, none of these states was in the mainstream of international politics. Iceland was an unarmed neutral and continued in its centuries-old isolation. Its principal foreign policy objectives were to market its almost sole export product — fish — and to cast off the last vestiges of Danish rule and obtain full sovereignty.[2] Thailand had struggled for nearly half a century to rid itself of infringements on its sovereignty which various European powers had imposed during the nineteenth century. When this goal was attained in 1939, it seemed content to concentrate on domestic affairs. Australia had few foreign policy interests other than maintaining close economic and political ties with the mother country, Great Britain. During the 1930's Japan's expansionist activities in Northeast Asia were noted with concern, but so long as the British Navy dominated the South China Sea and the British base on Singapore was strongly defended, Australians felt no fear for their own security.

All this was changed by the German victories in Europe in 1940-1941 and the Japanese conquests in Southeast Asia and the Pacific in 1941-1942. Iceland, occupied by British forces in May 1940 in order to forestall a German invasion, became a strategic base for protecting the North Atlantic shipping lanes to Europe. Thailand, occupied in 1941, served as a food storehouse for Japanese armies in Southeast Asia, and as their invasion route to Malaya, Burma and India. Australia might also have succumbed to a Japanese attack in 1942 had it not been turned into a base for the buildup of U.S. forces in the Pacific. The fall of Singapore in February 1942 shattered Australia's confidence in British protection and prompted a re-evaluation of its foreign and defense policies.[3] World War II thus had a profound impact on the think-

[2]Under the Union Agreement of 1918, Iceland became an independent state within the Danish Commonwealth, but it had an option to choose complete independence in twenty-five years.

[3]The impact the fall of Singapore had on Australia's foreign policy is described in Sir Alan Watt, *The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938-1965* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), Chapter 3.

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ing of leaders in all three countries and caused them to seek ways in the postwar period to obtain protection from the great power with the greatest capability for defending them. This role eventually fell to the United States.

Other historical factors that influenced Iceland's and Australia's decision to accept a military alliance with the United States were their similar cultural and political heritage and their confidence that the United States would use its vast power to oppose tyranny and encourage freedom and democracy in the world. Thailand, while not sharing American cultural and political ideals, had learned through a century of dealing with Western powers that they constituted less of a threat to its security than did wartime Japan, Communist China, or the Soviet Union. In particular, Thailand sought U.S. protection in the early 1950's because it viewed the United States as a lesser threat to traditional Thai values and institutions than a united and hostile China.

Geographic Factors

Of the three states, only Thailand lies in close proximity to its principal enemy, Communist China. Iceland does not feel directly threatened by the Soviet Union or any other great power, but its location on the sea and air routes between northern Europe and North America makes it a strategic prize for both the United States and the Soviet Union in time of war. For the United States, Iceland is highly important to its continental defense system; this is not true of Thailand or Australia, located halfway around the globe. Australia, because of its position in the southern hemisphere and its continental proportions, would have had more reason to adopt a nonalignment policy after World War II than either Iceland or Thailand, or even the United States. However, Japanese penetration to their doorstep in 1942 and the more recent potential threat posed by Sukarno's Indonesia caused Australians to conclude that a "fortress Australia" policy, drawing only on the nation's small population and limited military capability, would not provide them protection against a powerful and determined enemy.

Each of these states has a relatively homogeneous population, although Thailand has a large Chinese minority and four of its provinces in the south are predominantly Malay-Muslim. Its nearly 34,000,000 people speak Thai as a common language, but dialects are also widely used. Icelandic is spoken by all 200,000 inhabitants of that island, most of whom are of Scandinavian de-

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scent. Australia's population of nearly 12,000,000 is almost exclusively European. Her rate of population growth is 2 per cent per year, about half being immigrants. Sparsity of population is probably the only limiting factor on her role as a potential great power: if the continent were adequately populated and its natural resources fully developed, Australia would not today be a small state requiring a great-power protector. Thailand, which currently has a population growth rate of roughly 3 per cent, is also one of the world's most productive agricultural nations. Iceland, with few natural resources except the fish in the adjacent seas, has a population growth of nearly 2 per cent.

Economic Factors

All three states are economically viable, but Iceland has the least natural resources. Iceland and Thailand are considered developing nations, and both have received substantial economic assistance from the United States and the international lending institutions. Australia has attracted large amounts of private foreign capital because of her more advanced technology and large untapped natural resources. Basically, Iceland remains a fish-producer, Thailand a rice bowl, and Australia a source of agricultural products and raw materials. All three have maintained impressive rates of growth in GNP in recent years, and give every indication of being able to sustain them in the future.[4] Thailand has been more dependent on the United States for capital investment than the other two countries, but the United States has had greater need for Icelandic and Thai real estate for military facilities than Australian territory. The amount of foreign exchange provided to Iceland and Thailand from the presence of U.S. forces and installations has been a considerable boon to their economies. In 1967, U.S. military expenditures accounted for roughly 3 per cent of Iceland's GNP; in the case of Thailand, they amounted to nearly 2 per cent.[5]

The significant fact about the economies of the three states is that all have shown marked progress since they became allied with the United States. They have made real efforts to modernize their economies and have channeled scarce resources and skilled manpower into the most productive sectors of the economy. Australia's

[4]Iceland, 5-6 per cent; Thailand, 7-9 per cent; Australia, 8-9 per cent.

[5]It should be noted that the United States has had a military presence in Iceland since 1951, whereas U.S. forces were deployed to Thailand for the first time in 1962 and largely withdrawn later in the year when the Laotian crisis eased.

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traditional dependence on Britain as the source of capital and markets has lessened in recent years, and the United States and Japan now play key roles in her economy.

External Threat

Until World War II, neither Iceland nor Australia was threatened by any external power. Iceland's relations had been almost exclusively with Denmark, which maintained the island under colonial control until 1918 and continued to conduct its foreign policy. Australia carried on relations principally with Britain. For Thailand, the situation was different. Until the mid-nineteenth century, her relations had been with neighbors and with Imperial China, to which she continued to pay tribute. Beginning in 1851, however, Thailand bowed to the pressures of European colonialism, first British, then French and other Western powers. In the 1890's she lost territories in Laos and Cambodia to the French Colonial Empire, and in the Malay Peninsula to the British. Although she escaped colonial conquest, the threat of further incursions into Thai territory persisted during the early part of the twentieth century, and the extraterritorial treaties imposed earlier by the powers remained a source of deep resentment until they were largely abolished by international agreements in the 1920's. But by 1941 Japan had penetrated into French Indochina, and the Thai government began to look for a protector.

During World War II, Iceland was occupied first by British troops in May 1940 and later by American forces that arrived in 1942. Thus the island escaped the ravages of German occupation experienced by Norway and other small European nations, but the impact of a large foreign force on its soil in wartime had a deep effect on its postwar foreign policy. The United States, for strategic reasons, needed to insure the security of Iceland; but in the early postwar period Icelanders, like their Danish and Norwegian cousins, saw no necessity for an alliance with the United States or protection by American forces. Only after the Soviet Union extended its control over Eastern Europe, particularly following the imposition of communist control over Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade, did public opinion yield to the need for U.S. protection under the North Atlantic Alliance. Yet Iceland was not prepared to accept foreign forces until 1951, when there was considerable fear that the Korean War might spread to Europe and General Eisenhower had been invited by NATO to organize Europe's defenses against a militant and

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powerful Soviet Union. In 1955 and 1956, the changed international climate resulting from the death of Stalin and the Geneva Summit Meeting again caused Icelanders to question the necessity of retaining a U.S. base on their territory; then the Hungarian Revolution and their growing realization that they could not risk being undefended in the modern world, led to a thorough reappraisal of the relationship with the United States and a decision to keep a U.S. defense force in the country under NATO auspices for an indefinite period. This decision, reached at the end of 1956, has not been seriously challenged during the past twelve and a half years.[6]

For Australia, during the early 1940's, the threat to her security was clearly Japan, and it was largely due to the buildup of U.S. power in the Southwest Pacific in 1942 that she was not invaded by Japanese forces. The Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942 was a turning point in the Japanese drive southward, and Australians have celebrated every anniversary of this event with a great outpouring of good will toward the United States. In the early postwar years, as worry about a resurgence of Japanese power continued, Australia sought a defense arrangement with the United States. The ANZUS treaty, signed in 1951, was the price she asked for her consent to a Japanese peace treaty. At about the same time she began to show concern over the threat of a united and hostile China under communist dictatorship. Thus, when the United States proposed in 1954 that interested nations form a Southeast Asia pact (SEATO) to prevent the spread of communist power in the area, Australia was among the first to respond affirmatively. As evidence of her interest in contributing to the defense of the Asian and Pacific region, she sent forces to Korea in 1950 and to Viet Nam in 1965, besides having helped in a Commonwealth effort in the 1950's to put down the communist insurgency in Malaya. It may be seen, therefore, that even though Australia is farther removed from the principal threat to her security than either Thailand or Iceland, she has maintained a forward defense posture in Asia because of concern that a Southeast Asia dominated by communist governments would seriously endanger her own security.[7]

In the case of Thailand, her leaders have never been in doubt, since the communists took control of mainland China in 1949,

[6]See Donald Nuechterlein, *Iceland: Reluctant Ally* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), Chapter 9.

[7]For a discussion of Australia's strategic interests, see T. B. Millar, *Australia's Defence* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1965), Chapters 2, 3.

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that China was a serious threat to her security. Although the immediate danger to her territory came from North Viet Nam, through Hanoi's training and support for Thai guerrillas, Thailand's concern was greatly heightened because Hanoi had Communist China's full political and substantial material backing. Furthermore, in 1953 Peking began talking about a Thai Autonomous People's Government in Yunnan Province and called for the overthrow of the Bangkok regime. Viet Minh incursions into Laos in 1953 and their occupation of Takek on the Mekong River were a principal factor in causing the Thai government to seek U.S. protection. In 1954, Thailand accepted without hesitation Secretary of State Dulles' invitation to join a defense pact against the communist powers in Asia.[8] Her fear of Chinese and North Vietnamese aggression has not diminished in fifteen years, and her strong support for U.S. policy in Viet Nam is based on the conviction that if communist power and influence are allowed to dominate South Viet Nam, they will quickly spread to Laos and Cambodia and then turn Thailand into a major battleground. Thai leaders therefore believe that the outcome of the war in Viet Nam is crucial to their country's security.[9]

The three states are thus in agreement with the United States on what constitutes the primary threat to their national security. This has been one of the strengths of the alliances in which they figure. However, each state has, during the past ten years or so, experienced a secondary threat which has caused it considerable concern, aroused fears among its people and, in the case of Iceland and Thailand, tended to divert public attention away from the primary danger. For Iceland, the trouble was a dispute with Great Britain over fishing rights. This grew into a "fish war" in 1958 after Iceland captured a number of British trawlers within her territorial waters and the British sent a warship to protect their vessels. Amid the Icelandic outcry against the British there was some talk of withdrawing from NATO. The issues were settled by mediation after some months of tension, but for a time the "fish war" threatened to ruin relations between Iceland and one of her oldest friends.[10]

[8]She offered to allow SEATO forces to be based on her soil and to establish a joint military command in Bangkok.

[9]The relationship of Laos to the defense of Thailand is described in detail in Donald Nuechterlein, *Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), Chapters 5-7.

[10]For a detailed account of this "fish war," see Morris Davis, *Iceland Extends Its Fisheries Limits* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1963).

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For Thailand, the secondary threat came from Cambodia. The latter's increasingly hostile policy during the late 1950's resulted in a break in diplomatic relations in 1961 which has still not been healed. A principal source of ill-feeling between these two nations is the fact that Thailand was obliged by a decision of the World Court in 1962 to cede a small but historically important piece of territory to Cambodia. When the court's decision was announced, the Thai public erupted in an outburst of emotional feeling unparalleled in recent times. Age-old animosities between the neighboring peoples boiled over and it was only with the greatest of effort and statesmanship that Prime Minister Sarit was able to effect the transfer of territory and calm public emotions. Although Cambodia itself constitutes no military threat to Thailand, Thai leaders charge that it is being used by communist forces as a base of operations against South Viet Nam and that the Cambodian government would give similar sanctuary to communist forces if they decided to launch an attack on Thailand. While the Thai recognize that China and North Viet Nam are the real menace to their country's security, they fear that Cambodia may be a vehicle by which these nations could attack Thailand if the situation were ripe.

For Australia, a secondary security threat emerged from the growing ambitions of Sukarno's Indonesia in the late 1950's and early 1960's. After Sukarno abolished the Indonesian Parliament and instituted "guided democracy" in 1959, Australia looked with apprehension on 100 million Indonesians under the sway of a charismatic leader who was more interested in making his nation look like a great power than in solving critical economic problems. These apprehensions were heightened when Indonesia began acquiring modern Soviet ships and aircraft and large credits from the USSR. In 1961 and 1962, when Sukarno put pressure on the Dutch to relinquish their control over West Irian, many Australians believed his threats should be met with force. However, the United States decided to support Indonesia's claim, and the Australian government followed suit by joining in a United Nations resolution that gave West Irian to Indonesia. On the other hand, when Sukarno decided a year later to apply similar "confrontation" tactics against the newly-formed Federation of Malaysia, Australia joined Britain and New Zealand in sending armed forces to counter his campaign of harassment. In this case, the United States gave political support to the Malaysian cause,

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and by 1965 Sukarno's policy failed. Following the Indonesian Army's rise to power in 1966, confrontation against Malaysia was officially ended. Australia thereafter established friendly relations with the new Suharto Government and has provided it with substantial economic assistance.[11]

Internal Security

The three countries have maintained internal stability for many years and have had the support of the major political elements of their populations for the foreign policies they have pursued, including alliance with the United States. Of the three, Australia's government probably has enjoyed the greatest degree of support for foreign policy decisions, with Iceland and Thailand following in that order. In Australia and Iceland, the opposition to the government's course comes primarily from communist and neutralist parties and groups operating within a legal political framework. In Thailand, the Communist Party is banned and neutralist groups are restrained by the knowledge that if they become too vocal, they risk being banned or their followers taken into custody under the government's broad police powers. In none of these small states, however, is opposition to the government's foreign policy a serious threat to the stability of the regime.

Iceland has enjoyed a high degree of internal stability since it became independent in 1918, despite the fact that a large Communist Party has operated there since the early 1940's. The Communists, who call themselves socialists, have deep roots in the Icelandic labor movement dating back to the 1930's, and they have polled between 15 per cent and 20 per cent of the popular vote in each general election since 1942. They have vigorously opposed membership in NATO and the stationing of U.S. forces in Iceland. The only occasion on which they resorted to mass violence, however, was when the Parliament voted in March 1949 to join the North Atlantic Pact. It is noteworthy that Iceland is the only NATO country that has permitted the Communists to share government power; this occurred during 1956-1958 when the Communist-dominated Labor Alliance Party joined in a coalition government with the Progressives and Social Democrats. Since then the Communists have not been in the government, and their opposition to NATO and the presence of U.S. forces has lost

[11]The relationship of this change in Indonesian politics to the security situation in Southeast Asia is described in Donald Nuechterlein, "Prospects for Regional Security in Southeast Asia," *Asian Survey*, September 1968.

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much of its appeal.[12] They continue to operate within the framework of the Labor Alliance, but constitute no threat to the security of Iceland at present. The current government, composed of the Independence and Social Democratic parties, has been in power since 1958 and has maintained a high degree of cohesiveness and stability.

The current regime in Thailand also began its rule in 1958, but the conditions under which it achieved and maintained power are in sharp contrast to the situation in Iceland and Australia where the parliamentary system determines the longevity of governments. The Thai Revolutionary Party, headed by the late Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, seized control of the government in October 1958 after a three-year period of political instability and popular dissatisfaction with political and economic conditions. It was also a time when China's foreign policy toward her neighbors began to harden. Sarit abolished the constitution and Parliament and ruled as a benevolent dictator until his death in 1963. Thereafter, the Revolutionary Party, and government power, were taken over by his lieutenants, Field Marshal Thanom and General Praphat, who continued the strong leadership characteristic of Thai military regimes since they first assumed power in 1939. However, the price paid for the tight control exercised over the political life of the nation was that opposition groups were driven underground, or into exile, and the expression of legitimate grievances against the government and some of its officials tended to be equated with communist subversion.

Therefore, although there has been remarkable political stability during the past ten years, there has also been a growing appreciation among a large segment of the ruling group that a political framework for the expression of opposition must be found if Thailand expects to progress as a modern, economically flourishing state. The question has not been whether this should be done, but when. In resisting the institution of constitutional government, the conservative elements within the Revolutionary Party held that Thailand was threatened by external and internal enemies and that the people were not sufficiently educated or politically astute to be trusted to make wise choices. Meanwhile the moderates believed, although not to the point of open defiance, that the only way Thailand could obtain the allegiance and

[12]One reason for this is that when the Communists participated in the coalition, they took no action to force the government to terminate the Defense Agreement with the United States.

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support of a large majority of its people was to give them a stake in the running of the state — or at least a chance to voice their honest complaints.

In June 1968 Thailand's new constitution was finally promulgated, and general elections were held early in 1969. These resulted in the retention of power by the military-led party of Prime Minister Thanom. The new constitution gives wide powers to the executive branch of government, but it does provide for an elected assembly and freedom of speech and press. Thus Thailand, after ten years of quasi-dictatorship, has embarked on yet another experiment in constitutional government. In the past such experiments have foundered largely because of a lack of cohesion and the corruption among some political leaders. It remains to be seen whether this long-independent nation can adjust to Western-type government and at the same time keep the communist-inspired insurgency under control.

The problem of communist insurgency in Thailand is well documented and there is little question about its origin. Peking warned Bangkok in 1965 that it risked a war of national liberation if it continued its alliance with the United States. A few months later, armed insurgency in northeast Thailand increased sharply. Training camps for Thai guerrillas have been operating in North Viet Nam, and the Mekong River has served as a highway rather than a barrier for infiltrating Thai insurgents. Communist terrorists have also become more active in the south, along the Thai-Malaysian border, during the last three years. The Bangkok government was slow at first to recognize the seriousness of this threat to its internal security, but now it is exerting a great effort to isolate and attack insurgents as well as to appeal to peasants in the disaffected areas, through various public works programs. Thus far, it has been able to contain the insurgents and maintain control over Thai territory without the intervention of U.S. or other foreign forces. If the communists do not succeed in taking over South Viet Nam, it is likely that Thailand will be able to cope with its insurgency problem and continue to grow and develop economically and politically. The ruling elites are much more united and effective than is the case in South Viet Nam, and the Thai national spirit and administrative apparatus are much more pervasive than in most Southeast Asian countries. Despite the imminent threat of a Viet Nam-type insurgency, Thai society has held together remarkably well and has given consistent sup-

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port to the government's pro-U.S. foreign policy. This situation could change radically, however, if security elsewhere in Southeast Asia were to deteriorate and Thailand became the major communist target.[13]

In contrast to Thailand, Australia has few internal security problems. The character of its people, the nature of its political system, the geography of the country, all contribute to making it one of the most stable political settings in the world. The current Liberal/Country Party coalition government, in power since 1949, increased its majority in the parliamentary elections of November 1966.[14] The Communist Party, although legal, has no seats in Parliament, and its political influence is negligible. The Communists carry weight in some of the labor unions, notably the longshoreman's union, but their economic power is not a danger to the government. Opposition to Australia's policy of alignment with the United States comes from groups that question whether it is necessary to change the traditional Australian policy of reliance on the Commonwealth for defense. This is strictly a minority view, however, and has never posed a threat to the government's decision to continue the alliance.

Military Capability

One of the key factors in the decision of a small state to join an alliance with a great power, and of a great power to accept an alliance with a small state, is the military contribution the small state can make to the common defense. In this respect, there is a marked difference in the contributions of Iceland, Thailand and Australia. What did the small states hope to gain by alliance with the United States? Why did the United States accept alliances with three states that were so obviously unequal in their capability for defending themselves and contributing to defense against the common enemy?

Iceland has no military forces whatsoever. There is a small coast guard to prevent smuggling and encroachment by foreign fishermen in Iceland's territorial waters. There is also a small police force of approximately 100 in Reykjavik and the principal towns. But the Icelandic government and public have never given serious attention to the possibility of raising a small security force.

[13]If a peace settlement resulted in a communist takeover of South Viet Nam, for example, this could well cause a sharp change in Thailand's foreign policy.

[14]The government coalition now has 82 out of 124 seats in the House, and 28 out of 60 in the Senate. The Democratic Labor Party, however, usually provides its four votes to the government on foreign and defense policy matters.

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Cost has been a major factor. Another consideration has been the question of effectiveness. Icelanders understand that collective defense is the only hope for a small state threatened by powerful neighbors; and in their case, collective defense means making territory available to their most powerful ally rather than contributing forces of their own. Normally, such an arrangement would not be acceptable to a protector great power; Iceland's real estate is of such great importance to the United States, however, that it has not required this tiny nation to organize a defense force of its own.[15] Therefore, Iceland is in the unique position of having her defense guaranteed wholly by a protector power without financial cost to herself. In fact, she not only gains security but considerable economic benefits from having 3,000 American servicemen (mostly Navy) as well as military facilities on her soil. Iceland is a good example of a small state that has used to the maximum its geographic advantages.

Thailand shares with Iceland a basic military weakness against powerful enemies. When it joined SEATO in 1954, it was a weak state militarily and thus no match for North Viet Nam or China. The Thai government had become alarmed over its poor defense posture when Vietnamese forces penetrated to the Mekong River in 1953. Similarly in the south, Thailand watched the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) with apprehension because communist terrorists operating in Malaya would certainly have turned their attention northward if their insurgency had succeeded. Thus, Thailand sought membership in the Southeast Asia Pact not only to gain protection from North Viet Nam and China but also to obtain modern weapons with which to build up her military forces to cope with communists operating in neighboring states and within her own borders. Her membership in SEATO has been a marked success, both in protecting her from external attack and in obtaining arms from the United States. Between 1950 and 1968, Thailand received $745 million in U.S. military assistance, and the Thai armed forces were increased in size from 45,000 in 1950 to 140,000 in 1968.[16] Today, she has one of the best trained and equipped military forces of any nation in Southeast Asia, and it is proving itself effective in dealing with insurgency at home as well as fighting in South Viet Nam. In 1967, Thailand

[15]This is not to say that the United States would not welcome any effort by the Icelanders to organize a small security force to help guard the defense facilities.

[16]Thailand's armed forces currently consist of the following: Army, 103,000; Navy, 6,000; Air Force, 25,000; Marines, 6,000. More than 8,000 Thai military personnel have been trained in the United States and its overseas bases since 1950.

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sent 2,000 of her best infantry to assist the allied war effort in Viet Nam; in early 1969, this force was increased to a total of 11,500 men. The Thai ability to fight both in Viet Nam and at home would not have been possible without the military assistance provided by the United States and other SEATO nations — or without the military efforts of the United States and other nations to prevent Hanoi from imposing its control over South Viet Nam.

From the U.S. point of view, the investment in Thailand's security has been worth the cost. Thailand has been the linchpin in the defense of mainland Southeast Asia since SEATO was founded. Without her active support, the U.S. strategy of containing Chinese and North Vietnamese power within the boundaries drawn at the 1954 Geneva Conference would have been impossible of attainment. With the full support of Thailand, this strategy became workable and has been successful in keeping communist power from overrunning all of Southeast Asia. Thailand's contribution to the defense of South Viet Nam is an important political as well as military factor because a key consideration in the U.S. willingness to defend South Viet Nam and Southeast Asia was the participation of its allies in the war.

The military contribution of Australia to its own defense and to its alliances with the United States is a significant one for a country with its limited population and military capability. By June 1968, Australia's armed forces had been expanded to nearly 81,000 including 42,650 Army, 16,980 Navy, and 21,335 Air Force.[17] This represented an increase of more than one-third in total forces over the level in 1964. Defense expenditures during the same period more than doubled, rising from U.S. $583 million in 1964 to U.S. $1.24 billion in 1968. In the latter year Australia spent nearly 5 per cent of its GNP on defense. The Defence Minister's Report for 1967 states: "As a result of the programmes carried through in the last 5 years, Australia now has the most powerful and effective defence forces it has ever had short of war-time mobilization."[18] These include the most modern destroyers and aircraft, many of them purchased in the United States, and nine well-equipped and trained infantry battalions. In addition to the regular forces, Australia has built up its Citizen Forces (Reserves) to 42,400. The program of expansion and modernization was undertaken during

[17] *Defence Report 1967*, presented to Parliament by the Minister of Defence, p. 12.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

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1964-1968 when the threat to Southeast Asia's security was growing in Viet Nam and in Indonesia. It is significant that the Liberal/Country Party coalition government which took responsibility for this buildup of the nation's defenses, and for the greatly increased costs, was re-elected in the general elections of November 1966 with an increased majority.

The Australian government has used its armed forces to support the nation's commitments to its alliances with the United States (SEATO and ANZUS) and its Commonwealth obligations in Malaysia (ANZAM).[19] It has maintained air, sea and ground forces in Malaysia and Singapore since 1955 as part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve. These were reinforced during the Indonesian confrontation in order to help defend Malaysia and Singapore against Sukarno's aggressive policy. At the end of 1968, about 3,000 Australians are stationed in Malaysia and Singapore. In addition to functioning in this important role in the Malacca Strait area, Australia has built up her forces in South Viet Nam since 1965 to just under 8,000, including a self-sufficient infantry brigade, several Air Force squadrons and a guided-missile destroyer operating with the U.S. Seventh Fleet. She pays the entire cost of these forces — no nation has given fuller support to the United States' policy in Viet Nam. The Defence Minister's Report of 1967 provides the rationale for Australia's willingness to make this significant military effort in several parts of Southeast Asia:

> There is no change in the Australian Government's view that the need in South-East Asia is for a period of security and stability during which the countries in the area could strengthen their political institutions, develop their economies, and ultimately play a much larger role in the provision of forces for their own defence. For the time being assistance by external forces is essential to withstand the pressures exerted against the area by communist expansionism. Australia will continue to play a part in collective security arrangements in South-East Asia as the best means of promoting the welfare and independence of the countries concerned and at the same time promoting our own fundamental interests.[20]

Receptivity to Foreign Bases

A major factor that a small state must take into consideration when it joins an alliance with a great power is the extent to which it may be obliged to forgo its freedom of action as a sovereign nation in order to obtain the protection it desires. Probably the

[19]The ANZAM commitment is to assist in the defense of the Malaysian area along with British and New Zealand forces.

[20]p. 10.

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greatest test of its ability to accept the requirements of a pact is its willingness to provide military bases or facilities to the protector power in peacetime. This question has been debated by all three of the small states under consideration, and all have come to the reluctant conclusion that any advantages gained by denying military facilities to the United States in peacetime are outweighed by the insurance of having U.S. forces present on their soil to defend them in time of danger.

When Iceland joined NATO in 1949, she specifically stated as a condition of membership that she would not accept foreign forces on her soil in peacetime. Two years later, however, the Icelandic Parliament voted to accept an American defense force because it had come to the conclusion that the danger of attack and occupation from the Soviet Union in the wake of the Korean War was too large a risk for such a tiny, defenseless state to take. Only the Icelandic Communists were opposed to this decision. By 1956 another reversal of policy seemed possible. Other political parties challenged the defense arrangements because the war clouds had lifted and the "Spirit of Geneva" seemed to herald a new Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence. Parliament therefore voted to ask the United States to withdraw its forces. An election campaign was fought on this issue, and the results showed greater public support for the presence of the Americans in Iceland than most political observers had expected. This fact caused the Icelandic government to ignore the parliamentary vote against the defense force and permit the United States to maintain a base at Keflavik for as long as the international situation required it.

The U.S. base continued to be a political issue, however, and it was a prominent concern in the general elections of 1959 and 1963. In both cases, the coalition of the Independence and Social Democratic parties, which strongly supported the American presence, retained a majority in Parliament. In the general elections of 1967, the U.S. force was not an issue, largely because the Progressive Party did not choose to make it one. Perhaps the most forceful statement on the subject, one indicative of the growing acceptance of the defense force, was made by Iceland's Foreign Minister Emil Jonsson in Parliament on April 19, 1968. Speaking of the current world situation, he said:

> While these matters are unsolved it is best to be prepared. It is clear that the defense force in Keflavik Airport can be of decisive importance, and it is hardly thinkable that it should leave. I mentioned before that the

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Government has no plans to resign from NATO and I consider the same to be true about the Defense Treaty. The time for renunciation is not at hand now. The world situation must change very much before that happens.

No doubt the change in Icelandic public attitudes over the past eighteen years has contributed to the growing acceptance of the U.S. military presence. Gone is the severe isolation that characterized Icelandic thinking about world affairs before and immediately after World War II. The new generation thinks less about Danish colonialism and U.S. encroachments on their sovereignty and more about the security of Europe and the North Atlantic area and the economic well-being of Iceland and its European neighbors. An important factor in this educational process has been the excellent relations maintained between the U.S. defense force and the population. Because of heavy restrictions on their movements outside the Keflavik base area, U.S. servicemen have avoided incidents that could be blown up by opponents of the base. Although Icelanders would prefer not to have foreign forces stationed on their soil, a majority seems to have concluded that keeping roughly 3,000 Americans on their island is not too high a price to pay so long as this force remains as unobtrusive as it has been during the past seven or eight years.

Another factor contributing to the growing acquiescence in the American presence is the economic benefits that have accrued from this relationship. In FY 1967, for example, U.S. defense expenditures affecting Iceland's balance of payments amounted to $22.6 million, and the figure was rising in FY 1968. Construction accounted for $6.4 million, and pay for Icelanders employed in connection with the defense force amounted to roughly $3 million. In 1967, 831 Icelanders were employed by the United States, 466 on direct hire and 365 by the Icelandic Prime Contractor which handled construction work. For a nation of only 200,000 people, this input to the economy attributable to the U.S. base is a significant asset. Hence the gain is on two counts: Iceland is not only relieved of having to maintain local military forces out of her own budget, yet benefits economically from leaving her defense in the hands of a protector great power. Obviously, this situation could only result from the fact that the United States prizes the island so highly in strategic terms that it is prepared to assume sole responsibility for its defense within a NATO framework. The economic factor should not be stressed too strongly, however, because it could easily be overshadowed by an emotional

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Icelandic nationalism if there were a serious confrontation between the defense force and the Icelandic government.[21]

Prime Minister Bjarni Benediktson paid the United States a considerable compliment when he stated in 1968 that she "never used the difference in strength which exists between the two countries to [her] own advantage but had fully respected Iceland's formal equality and sovereign rights."[22]

Thailand's attitude toward U.S. bases is somewhat different. When it joined SEATO, the Thai government expected that the United States and its allies would set up a joint command similar to NATO's SHAPE and offered Bangkok as the headquarters. However, at the SEATO Council Meeting in Bangkok in February 1955, Secretary of State Dulles stated that the United States did not envisage forces permanently based on the mainland of Asia, but would rely instead on mobile striking forces that could be used anywhere on the periphery of China if the need should arise. The U.S. refusal to station troops in Thailand contributed to the Phibun Government's disenchantment with SEATO and its subsequent effort to follow a more independent attitude in foreign affairs. When Marshal Sarit came to power in 1958, he strengthened the alliance with the United States without asking for the stationing of U.S. forces in Thailand. Later, during the Laotian crisis of 1961-1962, Sarit was prepared to grant the United States military facilities to prevent the communists from overrunning Laos and threatening Thailand; in May 1962, for example, he agreed to permit some 6,000 U.S. troops to be stationed in the country as a warning to the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese not to try to push their military offensive into the Mekong Valley of Laos. But he made it clear to the U.S. government that he did not want U.S. forces permanently in Thailand, particularly if they were not prepared to defend the Mekong Valley. For Sarit, the real test of the SEATO alliance was the determination of the United States to prevent Laos from coming under communist control.

When the theater of operations shifted to Viet Nam, Thailand again became apprehensive about Washington's determination to prevent a communist takeover. Once the Thanom Government, which had come to office after Sarit's death, concluded that the

[21]Such a confrontation occurred in 1959 when Icelandic police were prevented from arresting an American suspected of drunken driving on the Keflavik base. Icelandic police have traffic jurisdiction there.

[22]*Washington Post*, July 3, 1968, p. 20.

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United States was prepared to resist North Vietnamese and Viet Cong military attacks on South Viet Nam, it gave its permission for Thai soil to be used for a major buildup of air power against the communist forces. Despite this decision, Thailand refused to admit publicly until 1967 that such attacks were originating in Thailand. Furthermore, the Thai government has carefully refused to call the facilities U.S. "bases," emphasizing always that they are Thai bases being used by American forces. Thailand's official policy remains that these forces will be withdrawn when hostilities in Viet Nam and Laos cease, and it has reiterated that it does not desire the permanent stationing of U.S. forces.

In fact, there is a growing feeling that the price of permitting 47,000 American servicemen to be stationed in the country temporarily is nearing the point of diminishing returns. A *Washington Post* correspondent reported from Thailand in 1968 that anti-Americanism was beginning to be felt, and attributed this to the lack of restraints on U.S. servicemen posted near the provincial towns. He quoted the head of the Udorn Teachers College, located near the city of Udorn in the northeast where some 6,000 U.S. Air Force and other military personnel are stationed, as saying that "if the U.S. military finishes their business, we would like them to leave as soon as possible."[23]

Thailand is caught in a growing dilemma in her relationship with her protector great power. On the one hand, she desires to have a small but meaningful U.S. presence as a warning to hostile neighbors — China and North Viet Nam — that the United States will retaliate against any overt aggression on her kingdom; she also looks upon an American military presence as an insurance policy that the United States will not abandon her once the Viet Nam war is concluded and American forces are withdrawn from that theater. On the other hand, some leaders of this proud and independent nation are beginning to question whether the current large American presence, with its threat to traditional culture and institutions, and its impact on the economy, is not endangering the consensus within Thailand for the alliance. If the United States were to impose restrictions on its forces in Thailand similar to those it has accepted in Iceland, the main community-relations problem might be overcome. A significant reduction in the U.S. military presence would probably have the same effect. However, the Thai government lacks the bargaining power of the Icelanders

[23] *Ibid.*, July 2, 1968, p. 20.

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at this point; Thailand has the greater protection needs — at least in the immediate future.

Australia is in the happy position of not requiring foreign forces for the defense of her territory. She is able both to maintain a minimum defense at home and to make forces available for a forward defense posture in Asia. This has not always been the case. During World War II, she depended heavily on the presence of U.S. forces in the homeland, and in adjacent seas, for protection against Japan. The large forces were accepted without question by the Australian public, and there continues to be a great admiration and respect for Americans as a result of the wartime experience. In 1963 when Australia and the United States agreed to establish a U.S. Naval Communications Station at Northwest Cape, it was not the size of the U.S. facility but rather the fact that it was under the sole operational control of the United States that provided the opposition with its most important argument against the government's decision. The Labor Party tried to arouse public opinion by arguing that, because the station could be used to direct nuclear submarines, it would become a prime target for a nuclear attack in wartime. In the elections of 1963, the Northwest Cape facility was a major issue and the governing Liberal/Country Party coalition won out, increasing its strength in Parliament; thereafter, opposition to the facility declined markedly. Another example of Australia's acceptance of American forces is the large R&R (Rest and Recuperation) program for U.S. servicemen from Viet Nam. In the autumn of 1968, the number of American service personnel visiting Australia for R&R reached nearly 7,500 monthly. The program has been an outstanding success since its inauguration in October 1967.

As with Thailand, a principal concern of Australian leaders, and the informed public, is the possibility that the United States may not in the future choose to remain involved in the defense of Southeast Asia. Statements of U.S. political leaders to the effect that the United States is overcommitted in Asia and should draw back from direct involvement, such as in Viet Nam, cause deep concern. When the British government announced in the summer of 1967 that it intended to withdraw its military forces from Southeast Asia in the 1970's, Australia realized that her military position in Malaysia and Singapore would become untenable unless it were part of a regional security arrangement with other Southeast Asian nations, and had the support of the United States.

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Her contribution in Viet Nam and her willingness to accept U.S. military personnel and facilities on her territory are therefore part of an effort to draw closer to the United States in foreign and defense affairs so that she may have a greater opportunity to influence U.S. leaders toward continued involvement in the security of Southeast Asia.[24]

Prospects for the Alliances

Against this background, what are the prospects for a continuation of these security pacts after a decade and a half of experience? In the case of Iceland, the necessity of relying on protection from a great power, and even of the stationing of foreign forces in the country, is more widely accepted now than at any time since Iceland joined NATO. Three factors account for this: (1) greater appreciation of the facts of international life and of Iceland's exposed position; (2) the exemplary behavior of the U.S. military personnel and their acceptance of the severe restrictions imposed on their movements; (3) the economic benefits that have accrued to this tiny nation as a result of its defense relationship with the United States. In the opinion of this writer, the history of the defense force in Iceland is an outstanding example of how the interests of a superpower and those of perhaps the smallest independent state in the world can be brought into harmony by patience, restraint and accommodation.

SEATO has never been as important to Thailand as NATO has been to Iceland. Iceland needed association with other European countries to convince her people that they would not be dominated by one great power and that their defense was bound up with the defense of Western Europe. For Thailand, the membership of other Asian states in SEATO was only incidental to securing Washington's commitment to the defense of Thai territory. Until 1961, there was little doubt among Thai leaders that the United States would defend Thailand. However, the Laotian crisis in that year caused them to seek a bilateral arrangement which resulted in the Rusk-Thanat Declaration of March 1962. The United States pledged to come to Thailand's aid without the concurrence of all SEATO member states if Thailand were threatened with aggression. This reassurance of U.S. support, plus Washington's decision in 1965 to intervene massively in South Viet Nam to prevent a communist takeover there, made the

[24]Nuechterlein, "Prospects for Regional Security in Southeast Asia," *op. cit.*

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alliance between the two countries stronger than at any time since 1954.

Nevertheless, Thai leaders are deeply disturbed by what they fear is an isolationist trend in American politics, and there is apprehension in Bangkok over what the Nixon Administration may do about security commitments in Asia. If the United States maintains a significant military presence in the region after the Viet Nam war and continues to assist Thailand, Laos and Viet Nam to keep local insurgents under control, Thailand can be expected to remain a close and loyal ally. On the other hand, if U.S. policy shifts and there is evidence of unwillingness to assist Thailand and other nations of the area to withstand communist pressures that are certain to continue after Viet Nam, she will be one of the states most directly affected and the impact on her political life could be profound. The future of the U.S.-Thai alliance depends in large measure on the willingness of the United States to play a major role in the defense of Southeast Asia in the post-Viet Nam period.

For Australia, the importance of ANZUS is growing markedly as the British phase out their forces in Malaysia and Singapore and her destiny becomes more dependent on U.S. policy in the Western Pacific. But a withdrawal of American power, and interest, from Southeast Asia, while it would be deeply regretted, would not be catastrophic, as might be the case with Thailand. Australia could accept a decline in her SEATO relationship with the United States because she has ANZUS to fall back on. However, ANZUS does not include the Malaysia/Singapore area, and it is problematical whether Australia would maintain troops in that area if the United States did not keep a military presence in Viet Nam and Thailand after a Vietnamese peace is arranged. Australian policy, as enunciated by Prime Minister Gorton during his visit to the United States in May 1968, tied any future Australian military role in Malaysia and Singapore to American policy in Southeast Asia in the 1970's.[25] For this reason, Australia can be expected to continue reorienting her defense strategy and military equipment toward the United States and to seek a closer coordination of policy within the ANZUS framework.

[25]In the spring of 1969, Gorton announced that Australia would continue to station modest numbers of troops in Singapore and Malaysia after the British departure in 1971. However, this decision was carefully hedged so as to give maximum flexibility on when and how these forces would be used. Following the communal violence in Malaysia in May 1969, the Australian government indicated that it would not become involved in the internal problems of that country.

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Conclusions

Four general conclusions may be drawn from this study of three small states in alliance with a Free World great power:

(1) The failure of a previously followed neutrality policy is an important factor influencing small states away from neutrality and toward alliance with a great power when a new security threat arises. (Iceland and Thailand were neutrals prior to World War II. Australia was allied with Britain, but the failure of British forces to prevent a Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia caused her to re-evaluate her policy after the war.)

(2) The absence of a colonial tradition enhances a small state's willingness to accept an alliance with a great power. (Iceland became independent from Denmark in 1918; Australia was given Commonwealth status in 1901; and Thailand has been independent since 1771.)

(3) Agreement between a small state and a protector great power on the nature and source of the principal security threat increases the durability of the alliance. (Since the end of World War II Iceland has not questioned that the principal threat to her security came from the Soviet Union. Thailand has never been in doubt since 1949 that Communist China constituted a grave threat to her. Australia also considers China to be the primary threat but would look with concern on Soviet penetration into the Indian Ocean area.)

(4) The willingness of a protector great power to employ its military strength to deter and, if necessary, to defeat the common enemy is crucial to a small state's continued support of an alliance. (The willingness of the United States to go to war over Berlin, if required, to prevent the Soviet Union from extending its influence in Western Europe, is an important reason why Iceland has continued to show confidence in the U.S. pledge to defend her. Similarly, the determination of the United States to use its power to prevent a communist takeover in South Viet Nam has given the Thai confidence that Washington will not permit Thailand to be invaded by communist forces. Australia is convinced that the United States would honor its ANZUS commitment in case of an attack on Australian territory; however, she believes that a forward defense in Southeast Asia is the best strategy for containing communist power within its present borders and thereby keeping the threat as far as possible from her shores.)

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It should be borne in mind, though, that the policies of these small states in alliance with the United States could change radically if their leaders came to the conclusion that alliance with the United States was no longer in their national interest, i.e., if the cost of alliance proved to be larger than the benefits. This situation could result if the external threat diminished greatly, or if the United States adopted an isolationist policy, or if the presence of U.S. forces in their countries became intolerable. The uncertainties about future American policy have given all three states reason to pause, while hoping that the United States will continue to follow a meaningful alliance policy in future years. In the summer of 1969, Thailand appeared to have the most cause for concern over the course of U.S. policy and she exhibited, therefore, the greatest sensitivity over the presence of a large U.S. military force on her soil.

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Reviews

The Lessons of Czechoslovakia: Evolution or Stasis?*

by Benjamin S. Lambeth

In his major address of January 6, 1961, Khrushchev set forth a view of the communist state system that seemed strangely at odds with the traditional Stalinist model of Soviet repression and hegemony. In a rhetorical dismissal of the notion that Moscow somehow sought to "paternalize" its erstwhile East European allies, he asserted: "At present, when there is a large group of socialist countries, each confronted with its own tasks, it is impossible to implement the leadership of the socialist countries and Communist parties from some kind of center. It is both impossible and unnecessary."[1] Whatever may have motivated this pronouncement, it bespoke a new vision of the Soviet role in the bloc which implicitly recognized both the limits of dominance and the need for accommodation.

During subsequent years, the implications in Khrushchev's statement increasingly became the "conventional wisdom" among students of Soviet affairs. In most quarters, the East European communist countries came to be perceived less as imperial satraps of the Kremlin than as a dynamic system of states embarked on a course of irreversible evolution—a system in which the USSR, while still *primus inter pares,* could no longer manage events by edict alone.

This changing assessment of the East European scene, moreover, was far from being unsupported by the evidence of the time. To cite only two pertinent examples, Rumania's increasing pursuit of national autonomy under the leadership of Ceausescu and, more generally, the growing openness of certain East European regimes to Western "bridge-building" initiatives, encountered little more than concerted verbal disapprobation from Moscow, and both tendencies seemed fairly to underscore the arguments of those who saw "bloc fatigue" and disintegration as the salient characteristics of "communist solidarity" in the 1960's. Rumania's impertinence would have been almost unthinkable a decade earlier, yet when it finally surfaced the Kremlin could do little but agonize in its own frustration.

Similarly, when the new *Ostpolitik* of the Bonn coalition government struck such a responsive chord in Eastern Europe in 1966 as to hold out, for the first time, real promise of a modus vivendi between the divided regions, the Soviets appeared indisposed to go much beyond capricious harangu-

**Czechoslovakia's Blueprint for "Freedom"*. Edited by Paul Ello. Washington: Acropolis Books, 1968. 304 pp. $2.95 (paper).

[1]N. S. Khrushchev, "For New Victories in the World Communist Movement," *Kommunist,* January 1961, p. 34.

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ing against "German revanchism." Moscow had paid a heavy price for its bloody invasion of Hungary in 1956, and all signs seemed to indicate that it could no longer afford to take the "easy" way out in dealing with dissident allies. Diplomatic adjudication of differences had become the new imperative, and with it came sharp limits on the latitude of Soviet action. In short, so the prevailing assumption went, the communist bloc had perceptibly evolved from a Soviet empire into a more traditional alliance system, constrained to follow traditional alliance practices.

Seen against this context, it is not surprising that the abrupt ouster of neo-Stalinist party leader Novotny in Czechoslovakia in January 1968, and the sweeping political reforms set in motion by his successors under Alexander Dubcek, were so widely viewed in the West as a natural consequence of the changed reality of Soviet-East European relations in the "post-totalitarian" era. What *was* surprising, in retrospect, was that the "changed reality" itself proved hollow in face of the sudden Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia on the night of August 20-21. It was never doubted that Moscow had been profoundly agitated over the planned Dubcek reforms. For some time prior to the invasion, the Soviets had maneuvered troops near Czechoslovakia in a non-too-tacit warning to the Dubcek group that it was treading on sensitive political ground. Yet Western judgments of Soviet intent turned not so much on the presence of Soviet military forces as on the evident Soviet reluctance to commit those forces to action. There were few indeed who saw their significance as more than a symbol of Soviet concern and a symptom of Soviet frustration—in a word, as a crude, eleventh-hour threat which, in the crunch, would most likely prove empty.

That the ultimate Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia shocked the Western world so joltingly is a testament to what, with hindsight, we must now honestly recognize as a colossal fallacy of misplaced expectation: the assumption that Soviet tolerance of diversity in Eastern Europe would ever accommodate political change of such dimensions that the sanctity of the party institution and the cohesiveness of the bloc would be endangered. As one observer writing before the Czech crisis pointed out, the Dubcek government had sought the seemingly incompatible objectives of marrying "Communist rule with political democracy, a socialist economy with economic efficiency, [and] a Communist one-party political system with popular support."[2] To the Soviets, this chemistry posed a potentially explosive combination of ingredients that had to be neutralized, and military power in the end offered the only solution. The "new" (or more appropriately, perhaps, the "true") reality which the crisis finally drove home was the simple, pragmatic fact that things had not changed much after all. The Soviet invasion affirmed, in the words of another analyst writing

[2]Morton Schwartz, "Czechoslovakia's New Political Model: A Design for Renewal," *The Journal of Politics*, November 1968, p. 978.

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after the event, not so much "that time and evolution have failed to eliminate Soviet capacity for ruthlessness," which few argued anyway, "but rather that Moscow's conceptions of vital interest in East Europe remain essentially untransformed."[3]

For their own part, the Soviets had never explicitly drawn — through declaratory policy or otherwise—the outer limits of their willingness to accept political diversity within the bloc. The Dubcek reformers, operating in a realm of uncertainty, probed those limits at their farthest reaches. In doing so, they set in motion a spontaneous sequence of events that, if consummated, would have threatened the dissolution of party rule both in Czechoslovakia and, indirectly, elsewhere in the bloc. In a sense, one might postulate that their failure and our shock stemmed from a common cause: a tragic misreading of "objective reality." For it was only in the aftermath of the crisis that Moscow firmly proclaimed, in what the West has since termed the "Brezhnev Doctrine," the rationale which inspired the intervention and defined subsequent Soviet policy—that "any socialist state which is part of the system of other states forming the socialist community cannot be free from the common interests of this community,"[4] and that it is the obligation of the USSR, as the "senior" alliance partner, to intervene with whatever measures may be necessary if this limit is transgressed.

Czechoslovakia's particular transgression of the "common interest" was substantially an outgrowth of the "Action Program" submitted by the Dubcek reformers and adopted at the April 5 Plenum of the Czech Communist Party. This manifesto, undoubtedly the most detailed and exhaustive official exposition of the sweeping reforms Dubcek had contemplated, is presented—along with several other pertinent documentary materials — in *Czechoslovakia's Blueprint for "Freedom"*, edited by Paul Ello of Georgetown University.

Anyone seeking a comprehensive, descriptive analysis of the Czech crisis would be immediately advised to look elsewhere.[5] He will not find it here. While the Ello volume offers a brief introductory comment serving to place the documents in political context, it is not likely to carry the reader much beyond simply understanding what the Czech affair was all about. It suffers the problem, seemingly generic to such compendia, of trying to compress the broad sweep of a complex history into the space of less than a dozen pages. In doing so, the introduction glosses over significant events and processes, many of which are none the less

[3]Fritz Ermarth, *Internationalism, Security, and Legitimacy: The Challenge to Soviet Interests in East Europe, 1964-1968* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, RM-5909-PR, March 1969), p. 61.

[4]S. Kovalev, "The Sovereignty and International Obligations of the Socialist Countries," *Pravda*, September 26, 1968.

[5]See, for example, Ermarth, *op. cit.* See also Harry Schwartz, *Prague's 200 Days* (New York: Praeger, 1969), and Philip Windsor and Adam Roberts, *Czechoslovakia 1968: Reform, Repression, and Resistance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).

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important for their subtlety; it treads on that indeterminate, yet real, boundary separating the simplified from the simplistic; and in its attempts to condense pristine generalizations from a highly complex reality, it verges—at least some might feel—on substituting confusion for clarity. That this malaise may be commonplace does not necessarily make it any less unrewarding.

On the other hand, Ello is notably effective in his specific task; interpreting the significance of the documents and imparting some sense to their involuted rhetoric. Like most communist materials, these are far from being felicitous in style, and for those unaccustomed to such prose, they provide rough going. Yet their seeming internal inconsistencies, ponderous turns of phrase, and recurrent concessions to the conventions of the "party line" are all part of a vital communication process which, however esoteric, is meaningful to communist audiences. As Ello correctly points out, these Czech documents are not merely declarations of intent. Given the peculiar vagaries of communist political processes, they are also exercises in what might be called "cautious crowd-pleasing." The delicate problem their authors faced was simultaneously to satisfy the Czech *masses* that changes would be forthcoming in return for popular support; to satisfy the Czech *Party* that the changes would be orderly and party-supervised in return for party cooperation; and to satisfy the *Soviets* that the changes would not be "anti-socialist" in return for non-interference. In the end, this daring gamble to reconcile incompatibles, for all its shrewd calculation, failed to persuade its most critical audience, the Soviet Union.

The "Action Program" must certainly stand as one of the most significant documentary landmarks in the evolution of communist political systems. As turgid of form as it may be, its simple forthrightness can claim few equals in the archives of communism. Only Khrushchev's "anti-Stalin" speech of 1956 comes immediately to mind as being comparable in candor (and that speech has yet to be officially released by the Soviet government).

As Ello aptly suggests, the "Action Program" can usefully be read as an important "sign of maturity on the part of a developing political system" (p. 23), attesting to the flexibility of communist systems to adjust to changing socio-political imperatives while fully retaining their essential "communist" character. It is, at best, an indication of resilience and, perhaps, of cautious promise. If nothing else, it offers persuasive evidence that there is nothing inherently primitive about "communist political culture," and that indisposition to evolve does not necessarily imply incapacity to evolve. In the instance of Czechoslovakia, the crisis flowed only from a difference of view—irreconcilable at the time—between Prague and Moscow as to when a state in fact ceases to be "communist."

The Soviet Union is now marking time in Eastern Europe. While it effectively checked an ongoing process of reform it perceived to be threatening, it did not extirpate the

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underlying forces which gave rise to that process in the first place. Those forces persist, not only in the East European states, but, to a perceptible degree, in the more complex and structured Soviet society as well. As cautious as our past miscalculations should by now have induced us to be, hope still springs eternal that the evolution, modernization and "normalization" of the communist state system will continue.

To be sure, ex post facto rationalization of events is only slightly less lamentable than jumping to premature conclusions based on uncertain evidence. With the luxury of hindsight, Ello reflects that the "military intervention initiated on August 20 is not surprising. What is surprising is that it did not occur sooner." (p. 17.) He later concludes, after having examined the documents in their context, that "under the circumstances, the intervention was all but inevitable." (p. 300.) If this review has sought to make any point at all, it has been to temper the natural inclination for such Monday-morning quarterbacking with a reminder that *at the time,* the Soviet invasion was indeed surprising, and that prior to its occurrence it was deemed—at least in many respectable academic and government circles—as *anything but* inevitable.

There is nothing demonstrably static about Soviet "vital interests," any more than about anybody else's. They are the product of men, not abstract entities. They are derivative of perceptions, values, uncertainties and insecurities. As those qualities change, so interests may change. For the moment, it seems that the consensus of Soviet interests in Eastern Europe remains relatively unchanged from that which inspired Moscow's intervention in Hungary over a decade past. But it may be a more shaky consensus. There is a good deal of suggestive evidence (the only sort we can count on in such matters) that the decision to invade Czechoslovakia in 1968 only followed the most acrimonious of internal disagreement among the Soviet ruling elite. If the propensity for such disagreement, over matters of policy as well as power, remains a central feature of the Soviet political process, then there will always be forces in contention and thus prospect for change. The similarity in consequence between the Prague Springtime of 1968 and the Hungarian Revolution of 1965 tells us nothing, one way or the other, about the future except that circumspection must be our main guide to projection. If, indeed, there is anything inevitable about Soviet policy, it is that there is nothing inevitable about it. To say such bespeaks neither hope nor pessimism, but merely openness.

Czechoslovakia's Blueprint for "Freedom" provides a notable contribution to the vast body of documentary collections available regarding the communist world. It will no doubt provide useful background material for the research scholars who, when time permits sufficient historical perspective, will begin writing the more definitive accounts of the Czech crisis.

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Empirical Research in Foreign Policy Studies*

by Young W. Kihl

Among those who have developed an innovative approach to foreign policy analysis is Charles Wolf, Jr., of the RAND Corporation. In his scholarly but somewhat complex volume, *United States Policy and the Third World,* Wolf concentrates on two themes: the usefulness of empirical investigation as a basis for appraising U.S. foreign policy, and the possibility of interdisciplinary social science research in this area. An economist by training, he is interested in "political" questions and the application of political science to foreign policymaking and administration. Given the changes in the world environment wrought by the rise of the Third World, violence-ridden, military-dominated, and aspiring for political and economic development, what are the factors that constrain U.S. policymakers in dealing with the Third World? Is there a scientific basis for prescribing policies the U.S. government could follow? Although the author says he refrains from reaching definite policy conclusions, the answers to these and other policy questions may be drawn from a careful reading of the book.

The volume is essentially a collection of monographs that Wolf prepared over a period of time while serving at RAND. Topics include (1) the "value" of the Third World (to the United States, presumably), (2) political effects of military and economic programs (especially in Latin America), (3) insurgency and counterinsurgency, and (4) economic aid and development performance. There are two parts, "differing in style and content," the first *theoretical,* "concerned broadly with connections among political, military, and economic problems, and with their bearing on U.S. policies," and the second *empirical and quantitative.* The latter is methodological in style and topically more varied, and this reviewer finds it an imaginative and skillful development of empirical research in foreign policy, especially in the use of hypothesis-testing and proving methods.

A number of generalizations debated actively by foreign policymakers in the United States are tested for their validity. For example, the political effects of military aid programs are discussed, and their interaction is examined under the "erosion-of-democracy" and "support-for-authoritarianism" hypotheses. The points are that the conventional wisdom, which regards U.S. support of military dictatorship as causing the fall of democracy (say, in Latin America), is oftentimes unreliable, yet, paradoxically, that empirical testing fails to invalidate such a claim entirely. To demonstrate, Wolf carefully develops two methods of proof: logical analysis and statistical test.

On the basis of the statistical data on Latin American, Asian and African countries, Wolf first rank orders them from high to low in

**United States Policy and the Third World: Problems and Analysis.* By Charles Wolf, Jr. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967. 204 pp. $5.75.

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terms of the level of economic development and then contrasts economic standing with the degree of competitiveness of political structure in a competitive-semicompetitive-authoritarian differentiation. The result bears out other studies (e.g., Lipset and Coleman)[1] in finding that there is "a positive relationship between political and economic factors" but that it is "not sufficiently uniform to suggest a powerful relationship." (p. 26.) Wolf seems to be cautious in his analysis, however, as he avoids a causal inference and recognizes many exceptions. He argues that one must take into account situations in which "the process of economic development actually increases internal insecurity, at least in the short run" (p. 40), and that increased rates of economic development may produce a greater likelihood of external aggression. In fact, he says, "effective economic growth in countries on the Chinese periphery might actually increase the probability of Chinese aggression as a way of interfering with this growth." (pp. 41-42.)

Wolf's statistical analysis is also sophisticated. For twenty Latin American countries he obtains, first, the "political development" index (known as the "Fitzgibbon scale"), and then the U.S. military assistance program and economic aid fund indices. When these variables are subjected to the statistical techniques of correlational analysis (specifically, the Fisher exact probability test and Spearman's rank order correlation test), he discovers that a positive correlation prevails between the level of political development and the extent of U.S. military and economic aid. Similarly, Wolf concludes that "the change in relative political standing appears to be unrelated to total annual defense expenditures as well as to military aid" (p. 109), and that "there is no significant relationship between per capita GNP and political change" (p. 121). Hence, "hypotheses suggesting that higher growth rates lead to relatively higher political levels . . . are not supported by these results." (p. 126.)

The author is imaginative in his application of the latest systems concept. For instance, in discussing insurgency and counterinsurgency, he rejects the "popular support" doctrine as giving undue emphasis to psychological variables such as the loyalty of the peasant, his attitude toward his government and his future. The alternative approach Wolf advocates would view insurgent movements as "operating systems or organizations, requiring certain *inputs,* from either local or foreign sources, which are converted into the *outputs* characterizing the active insurgency" (p. 55), and would deny the insurgents access to certain inputs (e.g., food, recruits, information). Efforts at counterinsurgency, it follows, must be directed (1) "to raise the cost and reduce the availability of the inputs that the insurgency requires" and

[1]Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," *American Political Science Review,* March 1959; Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, editors, *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), especially the concluding chapter.

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(2) "to curtail the outputs of the system which include acts of sabotage, terror, kidnapping, etc." (p. 56.) "The main concern of counter-insurgency efforts should be to influence the behavior of the population rather than their loyalties and attitudes." (p. 68.)

This is admirably couched in systems language, but, expressed more conventionally, Wolf is really saying that an attitude change is the result of change in behavior rather than the other way around. Although he wisely makes a distinction between short-term and long-range policies, and indicates that attempts to influence behavior are confined to the former, his suggestion is essentially calculative and thus questionable. He may be challenged on two grounds. First, social science research is still inconclusive as to whether attitude determines behavior or vice versa. Second, the above prescription for counterinsurgency may come from an awareness that attitude change requires more time and patience and that brutal coercion and threat will work better in the present environment of the developing nations. The validity of the second assumption remains to be demonstrated.

This brings to mind another point. Does the fact that the author is associated with a semi-governmental research establishment impair the objectivity of the research findings? Is it conceivable that a pro-governmental bias is unconsciously reflected in the way questions are raised, problems defined, and results anticipated? Recently it was pointed out that in the process of advising the government as its client, the RAND Corporation might come to retain a vested interest in the successful operation of ongoing programs it had participated in developing, such as the U.S. overseas base program.

It can also be argued that some of the conclusions ascertained by empirical method and an elaborate set of statistical tests are obvious. This is especially so in regard to the two hypotheses mentioned, "erosion-of-democracy" and "support-for-authoritarianism." A mere testing of hypotheses may not have much meaning for policymakers who must constantly make choices among alternative courses of action. Unless one is prepared to probe more deeply into the core subject, decision-making, by asking questions to bring to light the motivation of policymakers, the public and so on, one is not really dealing with the fundamental problems of foreign policy. In this respect decision-making theory or game theory might be a more suitable framework for analysis.

Another of the book's underlying assumptions is that values can be quantified: the value of the Third World to the United States will presumably serve as a better guide for U.S. foreign policy when it is measured quantitatively. Fortunately, Wolf is more adept than to say that all values can be subject to measurement; for example, he differentiates between qualitative and quantitative value, assigning to the former the "political and psychological components of value" and to the latter the "military and economic components of value." In

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this reviewer's judgment it is debatable whether even all military and economic values can be quantified, and especially that value may be obtained in terms of "alternative cost," i.e., the resources required to achieve a given result when a particular policy is not pursued. At one point Wolf says: "The maximum military value of a country [Thailand would be a good example] can be estimated by assuming the country's loss; formulating several different military scenarios, and then asking what costs the U.S. would have to incur to offset the loss of the country if these military contingencies actually arose." (p. 5.) Economic components can likewise be estimated in terms of "the benefits (or opportunity costs) of the hypothetically lost investment, imports, and exports." (p. 12.)

Although the reader may not be convinced that the worth of Third World countries to the United States can be measured reliably by the alternative cost estimating technique, the author elsewhere performs a useful service by developing a quantitative measure of assessing the performance of the economy. To provide an empirical indicator for judging the efficiency of the U.S. foreign aid program, he develops a linear savings model to measure the expected level of a nation's development performance. When the data for the actual performance are compared with the expected level, the difference between the two furnishes an index that can be used as the criterion for giving aid. If the residual (actual savings minus estimated savings) is a positive number, Wolf reasons, the nation is helping itself (the idea of "self-help") and a continuation of the U.S. economic aid program is justifiable.

Some critics may question the relevancy of the empirical approach to foreign policy analysis, the heuristic value of model-building in the social sciences, the congruence of the model with the reality—but Wolf has demonstrated that empiricism works in this context, and in this sense he has blazed a trail in a still largely unexplored area. As behavioralism makes headway in the study of politics, so the study of foreign policy phenomena needs to be updated and lifted beyond the level of institutional, policy-centered analysis to that of empirical, behavior-oriented analysis. Others in the discipline had already provided the groundwork of typology construction and hypothesis formulation. But hypothesis-testing or statistical analysis had not yet been tried to the rigorous extent ventured by Wolf. In this sense his work may be taken as pioneering.

The Revolutionary Process: Ireland, A Case Study*

by J. F. Lehman

In the 280 months from the end of World War II to 1969, there have been 300 violent revolutionary movements involving every continent. During this same period 227 coups were attempted in 66 nations of the world, including such rela-

**The Imagination of an Insurrection: Dublin, Easter 1916.* By William I. Thompson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. 262 pp. $6.75.

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tively well-off states of the West as France, Greece and Turkey; of these, 80 were successful. In 146 attempted and actual assassinations, afflicting 57 nations, 23 national leaders and a larger number of prominent public officials were slain. The period also witnessed 1,270 separate incidents of civil violence on a mass scale.

A struggle for the mastery of this turmoil has been waged for five decades by diverse contenders. And even if the present major protagonists should decide tomorrow to cooperate, violence will continue to plague mankind for many years.

To understand the phenomenon it will be necessary to make a concerted effort to learn the mechanics of the revolutionary process, the stages and characteristics of ripening revolution, and the method of recruiting individuals to the revolutionary cause.

Useful contributions to our understanding of the problem of insurrection have been made by men like Crane Brinton, Stefan Possony, Erik Erickson and Eric Hoffer, but they are only a beginning, and there is upon us a tremendous urgency in this new age of sublimited conflict. While much recent work on the subject has been accomplished by teams skilled in the latest computerized methodologies of data processing and analysis, some significant offerings have come from individual scholars using more traditional research methods. *The Imagination of an Insurrection* is an excellent example. In his analysis of the causes and conduct of the Dublin Easter Rising, William Thompson has given us new insights into the global phenomenon of insurgency.

Thompson attempts to find out why an insurrection was instigated in Dublin on Easter Monday, 1916. Why did 1,100 untrained, ill-armed men, without the support of their countrymen, without hope of victory, challenge the armed might of the British Empire, then at the acme of its glories? And why did the Sinn Féin's total military failure make inevitable the subsequent war of national liberation culminating in independence for the Irish Free State five years later? His mode of analysis is not that of political trends, economic forces or civic institutions; he has chosen instead to investigate what motives acted within the individual participants to alienate them from the system and lead them to adopt the role of violent revolutionaries.

Nor are Thompson's conclusions the usual rubbish cranked out by "shrinks" and professors of psychology—they are plausible, almost always convincing, and occasionally brilliant. He finds his answers in that part of the human psyche wherein one feels rather than reasons, the sentient content that is imbibed, as they say, with mother's milk, or learned upon the hillside.

It is never easy to decide to what extent mental attitudes are conditioned by collective memories and unspoken feelings handed down through generations. But the evidence for this in Ireland is overwhelming. One has only to read *The Celtic Twilight* and walk the hills of Connemara and talk with semi-literate, visionary peasants to be convinced.

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Notwithstanding laboratories of white rats and sophomores, the only productive method of probing this portion of a people's mind is through that people's art, and specifically their literature. For Thompson, literature is not the dreary pedantry of the critical journals, but encompasses also a tale told by a warm turf fire. Unlike his predecessors in this genre, however, who clearly illustrate how easy it is to be seduced by the sentimental meditations-among-ruins characteristic of much native Irish literature, he remains remarkably unshrouded by the Celtic mists.

Concentrating on the writings of George William Russell (*"AE"*), William Butler Yeats, and Sean O'Casey, Thompson explains how their work became the medium for coalescing the mystic-romantic Irish nationalism, the Celtic tragedy, and the outrage of the oppressed against their oppressors. The Irish literary revival consciously related Ireland in the fullness of its contemporary politics to its ageless destiny and to history in its universality. And to Ireland, the message of history could be only one. Irish history, said Thackeray, is a "frightful document against ourselves [the English]—one of the most melancholy stories in the whole world of insolence, rapine—brutal endless persecution on the part of the English master."

AE, Yeats, O'Casey and a number of lesser figures of the revival took poetry, drama and ancient Irish myth and, through the alchemy of imagination, fused them into exhortation, revolution and finally bullets. Yeats with remorse was later to ask:

> I lie awake night after night
> And never get the answers right.
> Did that play of mine send out
> Certain men the English shot?

As convincingly provided by Thompson, the answer is overwhelmingly yes. Plays such as *Cathleen ni Houlihan* and John Synge's *Deirdre* are representative of the catalysts that brought together the elements necessary for revolution. It is in his clear presentation of how this was done that Thompson adds to the understanding of the revolutionary process.

According to the author, it is difficult to say precisely where the artistic messianism of Yeats, O'Casey and Company leaves off and the political messianism of James Connolly and Padraic Pearse gains predominance, but the movement upon reaching some threshold passed out of the hands of the seers and prophets into those of the "political fanatic who hears voices in the air, and who has distilled his frenzy from the work of some academic scribbler of a few years back." Crane Brinton and other students of revolution have noted this phenomenon in other settings. In the Irish case the disillusioned intellectuals and artists abandoned the movement as it gathered to itself more violent and activist members, thus leaving the revolution they themselves spawned to find a home among the lower classes.

When the firing began on Easter Monday in 1916, *AE,* O'Casey and Yeats were taken completely by surprise and played no part. They

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had ceased to be useful to the revolution and the revolution discarded them. They had become disqualified by being alive to the complexities of the debated issues, for the knowledge of complexity draws one back from dramatic action. The revolutionary agent must be a simplifier, rising to the purity of hating one thing. Thompson points out that, like James Baldwin today, Yeats, when he was howling revolution through the streets, was invited into the better salons of society and power, handed a pink gin and a Balkan Sobranie, and thereby rendered harmless as a revolutionary.

Thompson has written an outstanding book. Yet this assertion will find naysayers among the academic community because the author has not only failed to use a computer or even statistics in his research, but has the cheek to say he is proud of the fact. More, he argues that the new empirical fetishism of the American academic establishment makes it increasingly difficult for the intellectual to perceive reality, for under its dictates reality does not exist if a Fortran program has not been written for it. How frightfully *outré!*

Monnet and European Integration*

by Andrew Wilson Green

As one observes the recession of hopes for the political integration of Europe, it becomes evident that the success or failure of the integration movement is to be understood in the context of traditional diplomatic history and not of political science. The new book by the distinguished French journalists, Merry and Serge Bromberger, *Les Coulisses de l'Europe,* confirms the need for this reorientation of approach.

The Brombergers have ostensibly written a history of Jean Monnet's influence on Europe in the past twenty years, but their recital is the practical equivalent of a diplomatic history of the period, inasmuch as Monnet involved himself with all the facets of European diplomacy in striving for the realization of his concept of political and economic unity.

In the perspective of time it has become clear, as the authors establish, that such European integration as we have—most noticeably in the Economic Communities—is due more to the manipulation of the elements of power politics in the traditional sense than to the ideological force of the goal of European unity. Similarly, the failures the movement has suffered, such as the rejection of the European Defense Community and the Pleven Plan, are due to the intervention of practical interests rather than to the weakness of the European ideal. It is only when ideological forces are combined with practical interests, and the amalgam skillfully manipulated by diplomats in favorable historical circumstances, that changes in political structures take place by peaceful means.

For example, if the Brombergers are correct, the European Coal and

**Les Coulisses de l'Europe.* By Merry and Serge Bromberger. Paris: Presses de la Cite, 1968. n.p.

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Steel Community came into being because France had to arrive at an understanding with the new German Federal Republic, whose formation she opposed but was unable to prevent. Why was France thus obliged to renounce her immediate postwar policy of maintaining Germany in a subservient status? Because the United States made the unification of West Germany and its participation in European defense a condition of Marshall Plan aid. And why was the Marshall Plan undertaken? Because, as was borne out by the events in Eastern Europe leading up to the *coup de Prague* of 1948, the economic rehabilitation of Western Europe had become imperative to stop the march of communism.

In brief, the aggressive moves of the Soviet Union had as much to do with the Schuman Plan being accepted as the efforts of Monnet, although it remains Monnet's distinction that he could use the circumstances of history opportunely to advance the "Europeanist" cause. Without the adjunct of skillful diplomacy put to use in favorable circumstances, this and the further steps toward integration might never have been taken. The Union of European Federalists under the leadership of Henri Brugmans, Jean Buchmann and other (then) young Europeans might not have become an influence in drawing Europe together. The aphorism, supposedly discarded by political science, that integration requires an external threat or the will of a federator, seems confirmed by the Brombergers' analysis of events.

Similarly, the failure of the Anglo-French adventure in Suez precipitated the signing of the Common Market and Euratom treaties. The Brombergers believe France did not fully perceive the significance of the EEC treaty when she signed it in 1957 in exchange for the Euratom treaty. Euratom seemed more important to the French in view of the fact that the United States had withdrawn its nuclear umbrella from Europe while England and France persisted in the Suez gamble. When Louis Armand, the originator of the Euratom idea, facetiously proposed the erection of a statue to Nasser as "the federator of Europe," he was close to the heart of the matter.

In recounting the accomplishments of Jean Monnet, whose role as the grey eminence of European diplomacy in the past two decades is only beginning to be appreciated, the Bromberger book thus narrates the diplomatic history of the postwar era. It has the particular merit of bringing to light those elements of power politics and defense which, on the face of it, do not appear to be associated with European integration, and of tracing the fine thread of political integration that runs through the fabric of economic achievements in this period. It also places in appropriate contrast the conceptions of President de Gaulle and Monnet with respect to Europe's political and economic structure.

One could wish that the authors' grasp of the significant factors in current history and their ability to make a comprehensible narrative out of complex diplomatic develop-

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ments had been joined with a more scholarly presentation. It will remain for scholars to retell the story with adequate documentation and the omission of a few egregious errors—for example, that Dean Acheson is the son of a Presbyterian (sic) bishop. Whoever undertakes the task will find it hard to match the present book in clarity and perceptiveness.

The West German Electoral System*

by John W. Keller

The 1967 *Yearbook* published by the Research Institute for Political Science and European Questions based in Cologne, Germany, contains five articles that point up the advantages of a majority electoral system over the proportional system (PR) adopted in 1919 by the Swiss Confederation and the Weimar Republic. The PR system is still in use in the postwar German Republic, although it has been modified by adoption of the 5 per cent rule (10 per cent in certain *Länder*) to discourage splinter and extremist parties. German law provides that no political party will be represented in the Bundestag if it receives less than 5 per cent of the total national vote. The only exception is the case of a party which receives a direct mandate in three electoral districts, as was true of the German Conservative Party (*Deutsche Partei*) in 1961.

Each article examines the subject from a different angle, with references to constitutional theory, the lessons of Weimar, and statistical analyses of national parliamentary elections in the Federal Republic and state elections in the *Länder*. One writer draws on the electoral experiences of the new Asian nation of Malaysia. Individually and collectively, these essays make a powerful case for electoral reform, which many German political scientists regard as increasingly urgent because of the steadily accumulating gains of the right-radical NPD Party since the fall of 1966 in eight *Länder*—notably in the April 1968 elections when it received 7 per cent of the vote in Bavaria, 8.8 per cent in Bremen, and 9.8 per cent in Baden-Württemberg.

The first article, "A New Constitutional Beginning," by Professor F. A. Hermens, who is also the editor of the *Yearbook*, is a trenchant critique of the disastrous effects of proportional representation, based on his personal knowledge over a forty-year span of German parties and politics in the Weimar and post-World War II periods. His central thesis is that "the development begun with the Great Coalition could eventually lead to a stabilization of the West German Federal Republic." He warns that if this opportunity is missed, German party politics might well deteriorate in the image of Weimar and undermine the viability of the Federal Republic.

Citing a number of case studies of American, English, French and German political-constitutional development, Hermens argues con-

**Verfassung und Verfassungswirklichkeit Jahrbuch 1967*, Part I. Edited by F. A. Hermens. Cologne, Germany: Research Institute for Political Science and European Questions, 1967. 155 pp. $8.75.

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vincingly for a German decision to drop the proportional electoral law and adopt a majority system. He demonstrates how an absolute or a relative majority system would have spared the Weimar Republic the chaos and confusion caused by the unfortunate splintering of parties, which gave rise to extremist demands from the radical Right and the communists and later to the tragedy and holocaust of Hitler's Third Reich and World War II.

The author has probed the personal, political, economic and foreign policy factors that accounted for Adenauer's hegemonial rule and asserts that his strength rested on three pillars: personality, "fair weather" democracy resulting from the economic miracle, and a simple foreign policy based on a convergence of interests of the Western allies and the Federal Republic. These three pillars of the Chancellor's power fell one after another. First, Adenauer's image began to fade in 1959 when he suddenly abandoned his desire to become Federal President and proceeded to seek a fourth term as Chancellor, much to the dismay of Erhard. Second, the collapse of the foreign policy pillar came in the parliamentary elections of September 17, 1961 when the old Chancellor lost his absolute majority in the Bundestag with the decline of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Socialist Union (CDU/CSU) vote from 50.2 to 45.3 per cent. The Berlin Wall crisis challenged Adenauer's foreign policy, and certain West German papers called for a re-examination and re-evaluation of its basic tenets. Third, the financial crisis of 1965-1966 and the beginnings of an economic recession in the "Age of Rising Expectations" struck like a time-bomb.

Hermens seems to welcome the unique coalition crisis of 1966 as an opportunity to transform the German multi-party system—provided German parties can adapt to the Anglo-Saxon tradition of a smooth transition from Government to Opposition and from Opposition to Government. Such a development would eliminate the long delays and confusion of post-election bargaining over various proposals for great or small coalitions, reduce uncertainty, and increase political stability and confidence in German parliamentary democracy, both in Germany and abroad. Hermens overplays his hand a bit when he states that "What collapsed at the end of 1966 was a system, not simply a coalition." He concludes that the Great Coalition offers Germans an opportunity for a new constitutional-political beginning. Regarding the Kiesinger-Brandt Coalition as an anomaly in the pattern of the German parliamentary system, he argues that psychological consequences will test its durability. The potential danger that in a severe economic crisis the Germans would seek to create a new political order and throw parliamentary democracy overboard can be minimized if the Coalition Cabinet is firmly supported by German public opinion.

Vera Gemmecke and Werner Kaltfleiter, in a paper entitled "The NPD and the Reasons for its

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Success," note that the government crisis in Bonn and the NPD's electoral gains in Hesse and Bavaria in late 1966 raised doubts in foreign lands as to the democratic stability of the Federal Republic—this despite the consistent voting habits of 85 per cent of the German electorate who backed the CDU/CSU and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and thus cast their vote for parliamentary democracy. Foreign observers focused mainly on two questions: (1) How can NPD gains in Hesse and Bavaria be explained and what are the NPD's long-term prospects? (2) What is the sociological structure of the NPD, i.e., neo-Nazi or only a national conservative party?

The authors attribute NPD gains in six *Länder* in 1966 and 1967 to four basic factors: (1) general loss of voter confidence in the CDU/CSU, which suffered from internal division, Erhard's indecision, preelection subventions, and inability to control powerful subsidy-seeking interests; (2) failure of the SPD to perform its function, namely, to absorb discontented voters, as shown by election statistics in Hesse where SPD gains had been 8 per cent in 1962 but were only 5.3 per cent in 1966, and in Bavaria, where the figures were 5 and 2 per cent, respectively; (3) economic recession and pessimism at the turn of the year 1965/1966; and (4) the ability of the NPD to draw support from the same reservoir used by all previous splinter parties—the discontented—and to mobilize the nonvoters and undecided.

After 1961 all West German parties had shifted to the right, a consequence of several factors: (1) the decline of European integration as a primary political goal, thanks to the upsurge of nationalism in England and France; (2) the desire of some politicians to change the course of German foreign policy as pursued by Adenauer since 1949, by downgrading the goal of German reunification; (3) the unalterable nationalist goals of the refugees and displaced persons; and (4) the heightening of national consciousness by the Free Democratic Party (FDP), CDU and SPD. This shift to the right only confirmed what many foreign observers were reporting, i.e., increasing evidence of an underlying trend toward a more intensive German nationalism.

In 1962 the CDU/CSU leadership crisis led to a revival of splinter parties: the All-German Party (GDP) won 6.3 per cent of the vote in Hesse and the Bavarian Party won 4.8 per cent in Bavaria. In 1966 the NPD replaced these parties. Gemmecke and Kaltfleiter found that two-thirds of NPD voters were Protestant and middle class and included discontented farmers, refugees, displaced persons and many individuals in the 45-to-60 age group. Catholics and laborers were underrepresented.

Efforts to interpret the NPD as only a national conservative party, and thus harmless, proceed from an historical, traditional interpretation of the German party system—but overlook the fact that this system emerged from four isms: Conservatism, Catholicism, Liberalism and Socialism, whose incompatibility constituted one of the most

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severe burdens on the Weimar Republic, as noted by Max Weber. Such sharp ideological differences made compromises between parties increasingly difficult in the Weimar period and would have similar effects today if too many Germans turn to left or right radicalism.

Even if the NPD can be regarded as a national conservative party, it would still be responsible for splintering the major parties and preventing the development since 1953 toward an alternating two or "two-plus" party system. However, the leadership and policy of the NPD contradict such a naive interpretation. The German Reichs Party—the most important, extreme rightist party since the High Court in Karlsruhe outlawed the Social Reichs Party in 1952—dominates the NPD, overshadowing the German Party in Bremen, various FDP groups, the All-German Party, and the Hessian National People's Party. Of eighteen members of the NPD *Vorstand* (Executive Committee) twelve were Nazis prior to 1933 and held leading positions in the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP). The powerful position of Adolf von Thadden in the NPD is further proof that right-radical forces have gained preponderance over national conservative forces. Moreover, the NPD program opposes: (1) overexpansion of the German economy with the aid of American capital; (2) the subordinate position of the German Federal Republic in NATO; (3) employment of over one million foreign workers in Germany; and (4) the "sex-press" (the NPD believes women should wear long skirts).

This "negative policy" means that the party seeks to magnify the distance between itself and all other parties and voters—a goal not in harmony with the workings of democratic, parliamentary government, which depends upon inter-party competition and compromise. Only when the distance between parties and between their voters is so small that a switch between various groups is possible, is there any chance that elections can reverse the positions of Government and Opposition. The authors therefore label the NPD as a radical party insofar as it seeks to destroy the effectiveness of the German party system. But they conclude that, despite the existence of splinter parties in six *Länder,* the limited success of the NPD is no proof of the democratic immaturity of the German people.

Kaltfleiter and Gemmecke argue for (1) a functional constitution which will operate as a system of social control and (2) a majority electoral system to encourage the growth of large parties so that a majority party can provide stable rule and a well-organized Opposition has a real chance to win the next election. Such a reform is even more urgent in view of the formation of the Grand Coalition in Bonn in 1966, which left the parliamentary Opposition, the FDP, with only 10 per cent of the seats. This situation in turn is exploited by extraparliamentary groups, including young democrats and university students. While the authors do not predict that the Bonn gov-

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ernment will become another Weimar, they do urge political leaders to take steps to strengthen the constitutional system.

In their essay comparing the English Standing Order 78 with Article 113 of the Bonn Constitution, Hans Kammler, Ellen Wallenhorst and Joachim Wiesner show that the position of the German government in the case of budget control is, from a political and psychological viewpoint, definitely weaker than that of the English. Both Standing Order 78 and Article 113 are constitutional barriers to financial extravagance abetted by powerful vested interests and economic groups. Why is the latter less effective? Why was Chancellor Erhard reluctant to use this veto power? The authors answer that Erhard's problem with two coalition parties, the CSU and FDP, was far more complicated than that of the British Prime Minister for two reasons: First, the latter's power to dissolve Parliament gave him a ready means to enforce party discipline. Second, the Prime Minister has in Parliament, especially within the majority supporting him, a clear position of leadership because this majority corresponding to his Cabinet (on the basis of the relative majority system) is politically homogeneous. Unlike Anglo-Saxon parties, German political parties are plagued with differences due to religion, ideology, geography and historic traditions. Continental parties in general are more heterogeneous than Anglo-Saxon political parties. Homogeneity strengthens the two-party system.

The next article, "Democratic Stability in a Pluralistic Society: Elections in Malaysia, 1955-1964," carries forward the theme of the volume, namely, that democratic stability is promoted by a majority system as opposed to a proportional system. The author, Joachim Wiesner, states that the political process of the Federation of Malaysia supports the argument that democracy can be transplanted and thrive in socio-cultural environments other than the Western model. In the Confederation of Malaya, which includes eleven of the thirteen states, the results of three free elections held in 1955, 1957 and 1964 demonstrated considerable political cohesion among distinct racial, economic and cultural groups, and produced a capable, stable government which has remained in power to the present despite the split with Singapore and strong pressure from Sukarno's confrontation prior to 1966. Wiesner concludes that in this pluralistic society, a party seeking political power must work for a compromise initially in the social and political realm—not in the parliamentary arena, as in Germany, where since 1961 coalition crises have proved increasingly frustrating to the voters and have made the right radicals more impatient with parliamentary democracy. To achieve success, a party must look toward the center of the electorate for its strength and has to correspond as far as possible to the will of the majority. It will have no room for radicals or ideologues.

In his paper on the "Revision of the Swiss Federal Constitution," Klaus Schuman assesses the Swiss

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document as the result of political tradition and a deliberate effort to allow the greatest possible autonomy to racial, linguistic and religious groups. The Constitution of 1848, designed to prevent the emergence of strong political leadership, delegated supreme authority to the National Assembly, which in turn elects seven of its members to a Federal Council. The Council evolved into a sort of plural executive, the so-called Collegial System of Government. Over the years, the confrontation between constitutional theory and reality has brought about marked changes: a deterioration of the sovereign rights of the cantons, eager for federal subsidies in times of worldwide economic crisis; acceptance by Parliament of emergency laws to expedite the decision-making power of the Federal Council during World War II; delegation of more and more authority to an anonymous administrative bureaucracy, and the increasing influence of powerful pressure groups outside Parliament.

Above all, the introduction of proportional representation in 1919 prevented the formation of clear majorities in both the National Assembly and Federal Council, paralyzed the Council, and made it difficult for the Swiss voters to influence policies. The increasing role in government played by the administrative bureaucracy, acting as a "Fourth Power," aroused increasing opposition in Parliament and from the public, and produced the 1964 scandal, the "Mirage Affair," which acted as a catalytic agent for a wholesale parliamentary investigation. From it came various and often conflicting proposals for constitutional reform, but no solution has been reached.

Schuman argues that revision of the Swiss Constitution "must go hand-in-hand with the revision of the electoral system," and that the failure to entertain this aspect is a serious defect in the constitutional discussions. He concludes that "the attraction toward an alternating system makes possible a clear division between Government and Opposition and strengthens the decision-making power of the voters." All previous efforts toward a total revision of the Swiss Constitution from 1918, through the years of the world economic crisis, to 1942 and 1946 have been rejected by the National Assembly or the Swiss people, acting through the institutions of Initiative and Referendum.

The various authors have marshaled many theoretical and pragmatic arguments in favor of a relative or absolute majority system, yet none recognize that German voters, including elites, prefer by a formidable majority of nearly two to one to retain the present proportional electoral law. (This figure is based on results of 133 personal interviews I conducted in Bonn in June and July 1967.) Electoral reform is favored by the experts and by the CDU/CSU Party in Parliament, but not by the FDP or SPD parties. The SPD was divided on this issue until the spring of 1968, when a party convention rejected any change in the present electoral law prior to the parliamentary campaign of 1969. Despite the seeming German preference for

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PR, the political scientist and student of German politics will find these papers of great interest.

Brazil's Foreign Policy: Traditionalism vs. Nationalism*

by E. Bradford Burns

In *Política Externa, Segurança e Desenvolvimento,* Ambassador Meira Penna, a veteran of thirty years in Brazil's diplomatic service, frankly and ably defends the foreign policy of former President Humberto Castello Branco. The heart of that policy can be found in the President's speech of July 31, 1964, to the class of young diplomats graduating from the Rio-Branco Institute of Itamaraty (the Foreign Office). It proclaimed the return to a more traditional course based on close ties within the Western Hemisphere, and in particular with the United States, and denounced the "independent" foreign policy fostered by Presidents Jânio Quadros and João Goulart, which had given priority to improving Brazil's relations with the East and the neutral nations of Asia and Africa. Castello Branco believed that the world was irrevocably divided into two hostile camps, "Western democracy" and "Eastern totalitarianism," between which Brazil had to choose. Culture, tradition, economics, geography and *Realpolitik* demanded that she line up with the West, whose leader, of course, is the United States.

Meira Penna, who has studied and lectured in the Escola Superior de Guerra, a primary font of that ideology, concurs emphatically: "The planet not only is politically divided, but everything indicates that the division, with its profound philosophical roots, tends to become deeper and more permanent." (p. 205.) He devotes a long chapter (51 pages) to "East-West: The Polarization of the World and the Position of Brazil." The key to the formation of Brazilian foreign policy, he asserts, should be national security, and "The role of the United States in the guarantee of Brazil's security is fundamental" (p. 111); only American military power can deter Russia from attacking her (pp. 114-116). Like many high officials in both the government and military today in Brazil, he believes such an attack possible and probable without the protection of the North Americans. Hence, intimate relations with the United States form the axis upon which foreign policy turns.

For the past decade those ideas have been anathema to the majority of Brazil's intellectuals, who urge rather persuasively that their nation exert an independent leadership in Latin America and among the underdeveloped and uncommitted nations of the world—as Francisco de San Tiago Dantas did in *Política Externa Independente* and José Honório Rodrigues in *Interêsse Nacional e Política Externa.* With the publication of Meira Penna's study, there is now in print a forceful answer to the more widely known arguments and points of

**Política Externa, Segurança e Desenvolvimento.* By J. O. de Meira Penna. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Agir Editôra, 1967. 217 pp. n.p.

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view of the nationalists. This, in my opinion, is its principal value.

The ambassador seems to underrate the appeal of nationalism—that is, the desire among educated Brazilians for their country to play the role of an international leader rather than to be a docile ally of the United States—and to overemphasize the division of the world into two armed camps. This was perhaps truer a decade and a half ago than it is today. There now would appear to be other viable alternatives to a simple selection between East and West. Polycentrism has increased on both sides of the Iron Curtain. France and China, among others, have challenged the leadership of the United States and the USSR. I would incline more to the conclusions of the Chilean scholar Claudio Véliz in his excellent essay, "Centralism and Nationalism in Latin America," published in the October 1968 issue of *Foreign Affairs:* that as nationalism increases in Latin America the Latin Americans are assuming a "plague on both your houses" attitude toward East and West and want to decrease both economic and cultural dependence on the United States. Such certainly was the trend in Brazil between 1961 and 1964 when the nationalists were at the helm of Itamaraty. If we are to credit the current nationalist literature, such would be the policy to which they would return Brazil if and when they regain power.

Should Meira Penna's treatise be read by any of Brazil's neighbors, it is bound to call forth cries of protest. The ambassador boldly defends his country's right to intervene physically in the other republics in order for Brazil to avoid "contamination" by "extra-continental ideologies, harmful to our democratic order and security." (p. 24.) Nonintervention is a sacred principle in the rest of Latin America, as it once was in Brazil.

A comparison between this book and those by Rodrigues and San Tiago Dantas reveals that in contemporary Brazil two quite distinct foreign policies are advocated, one by the "traditionalists," the other by the nationalists. Never before in its history has the country had such diverse foreign policy alternatives. For the moment, the "traditionalists" hold power, and they have implemented the policy Ambassador Meira Penna ably defends.

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Books Received

NOTE—By special arrangement with the Foreign Policy Association, readers of ORBIS may obtain from the FPA's Book Center any books listed below published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Post free for domestic orders only. Send orders with check or money order to Desk O, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017. (This arrangement also applies to books reviewed in ORBIS.)

I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

Economic Cooperation in Latin America, Africa and Asia: A Handbook of Documents. Edited by Miguel S. Wionczek. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969. 566 pp. $15.00. A valuable collection of annotated documents on economic integration movements in the developing world. The editor hopes economic experts will use it as a source of information for comparison and analysis in their efforts to stimulate further development in these regions.

The Foreign Policies of the Powers. Edited by F. S. Northedge. New York: Praeger, 1969. 299 pp. $8.50 ($2.95, paper). After an introductory essay on the nature of foreign policy by the editor, seven specialists—Michael Banks, Geoffrey Stern, Coral Bell, F. S. Northedge, Dorothy Pickles, Philip Windsor and Peter Lyon—examine, respectively, the foreign policies of the United States, the USSR, China, Great Britain, France, West Germany and India.

How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy. By Louis Henkin. New York: Praeger, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1968. 317 pp. $7.50. Dr. Henkin, Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at Columbia University, focuses his attention on this question: "In what ways does international law determine, or govern, or modify, the policies of governments and how nations behave toward each other?" He examines the varieties and limitations of international law; the contemporary political forces that affect law, such as swift technological advances, the bipolar world, proliferation of new nations, and the United Nations; and the ramifications of several important contemporary events, including the Suez Canal crisis of 1956, the Israeli abduction of Adolf Eichmann from Argentina, and the Cuban crisis and quarantine of 1962.

The Hungry Future. By Rene Dumont and Bernard Rosier. New York: Praeger, 1969. 271 pp. $6.95. Predicting a Malthusian disaster before the end of the century unless effective steps are taken to retrieve mankind from the peril of mass starvation, the authors advocate three chief remedial measures: enforced population control, a world economic development organization, and drastic social changes in the developing areas. Specifically, the "commune" is recommended.

Law, Power, and the Pursuit of Peace. By Eugene V. Rostow. New York: Harper & Row, Colophon Book, 1968. 133 pp. $1.60 (paper). In this revision of two Roscoe Pound lectures given at the University of Nebraska in 1966, Mr. Rostow, Under Secretary of State during the last two years of the Johnson Administration, examines the problems of peace and the development of international law in the context of history, politics, public opinion, morality and custom. He discusses the current status of lawful and unlawful war; the Truman

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Doctrine and world law, 1945-1963; major challenges to U.S. foreign policy, including Viet Nam, the Middle East, and control of nuclear energy; and the task of building a new world order.

Politics, Law and Social Change: Selected Essays of Otto Kirchheimer. Edited by Frederic S. Burin and Kurt L. Shell. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. 483 pp. $12.50. As an introduction to these essays, Professors John H. Herz and Erich Hula trace the development of Otto Kirchheimer's ideas through his publications. Kirchheimer, a political scientist and, until his death in 1965, Professor of Public Law and Government at Columbia University, evidenced in his writings his concern with the interaction between legal norms and the social and political structures of societies. His later work reflects the unease with which he regarded the transformations affluence and a consumer-oriented industrial society wrought in the institutions and processes of Western democracies.

The Secret Road to World War II: Soviet versus Western Intelligence, 1921-1939. By Paul W. Blackstock. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969. 384 pp. $9.50. Blackstock's hypothesis is that one must study the constant battle between the secret intelligence services of the major powers to understand the real motives behind their foreign policies. In this thoroughly researched and detailed analysis of Soviet and Western intelligence successes and failures in the interwar period, he examines the establishment, development and collapse of the legendary Trust operation; the role of intelligence in the 1927 war scare; and the Tukhachevsky affair. The latter, set against the background of the Soviet-German search for security against each other, is a fascinating account of the interwar relations between these two countries, beginning with their military collaboration of the early 1920's and ending with the signing of the nonaggression pact by Stalin and Hitler in 1939.

Social Science and Social Purpose. By T. S. Simey. New York: Schocken Books, 1969. 255 pp. $5.50. In this historical survey of the impact of empiricism on sociology in Great Britain, the United States and Germany, Lord Simey criticizes sociological indifference masquerading as objectivity. He questions the ability of a social scientist to contribute to an understanding of and provide solutions to social problems unless he is concerned with the values implied in the nature of the problems themselves. He also assesses the influence of the works of Max Weber, Karl Mannheim and Gunnar Myrdal on modern sociology.

Toward a Mathematics of Politics. By Gordon Tullock. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967. 176 pp. $7.95. An effort is made in this work to utilize economic models to explain political phenomena. In particular, the author seeks to explain the rationale of voting behavior by individuals who are relatively ignorant of political issues. Based on his findings, he advocates reforming our representative system so as to permit proportional representation.

Towards World Community. Edited by John Nef. New York: Humanities Press, 1969. 153 pp. $4.00. Exploring the potentials and limitations of international functional cooperation in science, the arts, commerce and education as an approach to peace, the authors of the various articles design pertinent functional policies and assess their impact in advancing the idea of world community.

II. Military Affairs, Arms Control, Technology

The Bomber Offensive. By Anthony Verrier. New York: Macmillan, 1968. 373 pp. $8.95. This first unofficial account of the American and British strategic bomber offensive against Germany from 1939 to 1945 analyzes in great detail

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why the campaign was not decisive until the last months of the war when selective destruction of oil targets became possible, and describes how close the RAF and the USAAF came to failure and defeat. A key point is that doctrinal assumptions regarding the supremacy of air power were proved wrong in combat with a resolute, well defended enemy, so that bomber crews were stalemated in their attempt to carry out the missions they were designed and trained for: area bombing and daylight precision bombing. The book also traces the history of the RAF and the influence Lord Trenchard, its post-World War I Commander-in-Chief, had on the development of a long-range strike force and the evolution of strategic bombing doctrine.

Instruments of Darkness: The Struggle for Radar Supremacy. By Alfred Price. London: William Kimber, 1967. 254 pp. $8.95. This is a story of scientists and engineers pitting their wits against their counterparts to discover and exploit a weakness in the enemy defense system. As the British and the Germans entered World War II they each believed they possessed a unique advantage in radar and radio communications. Yet neither side appreciated the profound effect these scientific breakthroughs would have on air operations, and both were shocked to realize that their systems were vulnerable to interference, deception and manipulation.

Preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. A Pugwash Monograph. Edited by C. F. Barnaby. New York: Humanities Press, 1969. 374 pp. $9.50. First to be published of a series of monographs organized by the Pugwash Movement, this volume contains papers presented at symposia on such topics as the technical aspects of reactor development; civilian uses of nuclear explosives; prospects of breeder reactors; problems of safeguards and controls; the methods of acquiring nuclear weapons; the policies of reactor exporting countries; and the objections of small powers to the NPT. The views of the contributors are by no means unanimous, but represent a broad international body of expert opinion regarding a crucial question of our time.

Uses of the Seas. Edited by Edmund A. Gullion. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968. 202 pp. $4.95 ($2.45, paper). Essays by twelve economists, political scientists, foreign-policy experts and oceanographers point up problems connected with the exploration of the ocean floor. They report on the extent to which sea technology can benefit the developing countries, the feasibility of legislating the uses of the seas, the effect of sea technology on the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance, the consequences of British withdrawal from strategic waters, the meaning of recent Soviet attention to the high seas, and the need for national and international organization for the seas. Contributors include Louis Henkin, Eugene B. Skolnikoff, L. W. Martin, Hedley Bull, Marshall D. Shulman and Gordon J. F. MacDonald.

III. United States and Canada

The President and the Management of National Security. Edited by Keith C. Clark and Laurence J. Legere. New York: Praeger, 1969. 274 pp. $6.95. An examination of the search under four post-World War II administrations for a national security system that would allow rapid, precise reactions to fast-breaking crises without sacrificing orderly channels for consultation, liaison and follow-through. This study by the International and Social Studies Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses probes the organizational structures of the past to assess the worth of the system devised by each President, and then presents a detailed analysis of possible future ways of organizing and coordinating the White House national security staff and the Departments of Defense and State.

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The Strength of Government. By McGeorge Bundy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. 113 pp. $3.75. In this version of a set of Godkin lectures delivered at Harvard in March 1968, the President of the Ford Foundation argues "the need for stronger government in the United States—for government strong enough, at all levels and in all branches, to meet explosive needs that no other force can handle."

The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military. By Robert J. Art. Boston: Little, Brown, 1968. 191 pp. $5.95. Using material from technical and trade journals and Congressional Hearings, the author produces a case study of civil-military relations in the McNamara era in dealing only with that portion of the TFX controversy from 1959 to November 1962. He maintains that the period after 1962 is primarily of technical concern rather than political, and thus leaves unattended the many political issues surrounding this controversial aircraft. The book is organized into a chronologically arranged narrative section and an evaluation section, the latter focusing on the interaction of defense policy goals and procurement problems.

The United States and Canada. By Gerald M. Craig. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. 376 pp. $7.95. In this comprehensive study of Canadian-American relations, Dr. Craig, Professor of History at the University of Toronto, gives most of his attention to an historical analysis of Canada's development from colonial times to her present status as a middle world power. Additionally, he describes the land, people, political system and economic life of Canada, and discusses her role in world affairs, issues in her relations with the United States, and three domestic problems: economic policy, Quebec, and the search for a Canadian identity.

The Weapons Culture. By Ralph Lapp. New York: W. W. Norton, 1968. 230 pp. $4.95. This is one of the earliest indictments of the military-industrial-scientific-technological complex, which Dr. Lapp calls the weapons culture. Contending that it has fastened an insidious grip on the nation, he investigates the evolution of this culture and seeks to explore its impact on our democracy.

IV. Western Europe and the Atlantic Community

The Berliners: Their Saga and Their City. By Walter Henry Nelson. New York: David McKay, 1969. 434 pp. $6.95. A personal account of present-day Berlin and its citizens enhanced by the author's interviews with many of its people. Nelson describes the unique qualities of Berliners that contribute to the city's ability to survive in the face of political uncertainty.

The German Atomic Bomb. By David Irving. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967. 329 pp. $7.95. Was there a German wartime atomic research program? How close to success was it? These two questions form the basis for Irving's detailed history of German nuclear research efforts, from which we gain a case study of the politics and economics of science policymaking and R & D organization in the Third Reich. In conjunction with the author's earlier study of the V-1 and V-2 programs in the same vein of analysis, it illustrates one of the prime reasons why Germany lost the war: failure to organize her R & D resources adequately.

Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of a British Intelligence Officer. By Major General Sir Kenneth Strong. New York: Doubleday, 1969. 365 pp. $6.95. General Strong draws upon his vivid firsthand observations and involvement with people and events in recalling his experience as head of Supreme Allied Command intelligence during the Second World War. He is kind to Eisenhower, his

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boss, and critical of Montgomery, a fellow countryman, and deals in some depth with other major military figures on both sides, e.g., Patton, Bradley, Alexander, Taylor, Rommel and von Rundstedt. Most interesting are his chapters relating to the decision to land in Normandy in the face of poor weather conditions, and the negotiations for the German surrender.

On Borrowed Time: How World War II Began. By Leonard Mosley. New York: Random House, 1969. 509 pp. $8.95. A highly detailed and dramatic narrative of the diplomatic, political and military maneuvering that went on as Europe drifted slowly but inexorably into war, from the "incident at Eger" to the German attack on Poland in 1939. Mosley, who was chief European correspondent for the *Sunday Times* of London during this period, contends that the war might have been averted had it not been for the hypocrisy and weakness of Britain and France and the stubbornness and arrogance of the Poles. He traces the blundering of the British, French, Soviet, Polish and German statesmen and their duplicity; the battle of the respective intelligence services; and the crucial negotiations in London, Paris, Warsaw, Berlin and Moscow on the eve of war. Much of his effort is concentrated on the personality, motivations and behavior of the individual actors—Chamberlain, Churchill, Eden, Wilson, Daladier, Bonnet, Mussolini, Ciano, Lindbergh, Kennedy, Benes, Stalin, Molotov, Göring, Ribbentrop, and Colonel Beck of Poland.

Political Parties in Action: The Battle of Barons Court. By Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner. New York: The Free Press, 1969. 311 pp. $7.95. An interesting case study employing interviews, census data on the polling district level, canvassing data, and polling district figures on voter participation, of the competition between the Labour Party and the Conservative Party for the elector seat of Barons Court, a parliamentary district of London. The authors analyze the contrasting patterns of campaign planning and organization, the mobilization of resources and implementation of strategies, and party operations on polling day.

Politics in Europe: Comparisons and Interpretations. Edited by Arend Lijphart. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969. 335 pp. $4.95 (paper). A useful supplementary text for college courses on Comparative Government whose purpose is to introduce the student to comparisons and interpretations of politics in Great Britain, France, Germany and the Soviet Union. Included also are essays which seek to relate the four countries to the rest of the world's political systems.

Room 39. By Donald McLachlan. New York: Atheneum, 1968. 438 pp. $7.50. The author, who served on the personal staff of the Director of British Naval Intelligence during the Second World War, presents an absorbing but difficult to read study of how this branch of the British services functioned in Europe—its problems, operations, development, successes, failures and personalities, including Ian Fleming (creator of James Bond) and Admiral John Godfrey, the first wartime Director. A particularly informative section deals with sources for naval intelligence, while another chapter goes into the problems of cryptoanalysis, electronic intelligence and analysis of wireless traffic. Although it is rather technical, the book provides a realistic picture of wartime intelligence with all its tedious, painstaking attention to detail and the occasional dramatic success this vast labor produces.

The Secret War for Europe: A Dossier of Espionage. By Louis Hagen. New York: Stein and Day, 1969. 287 pp. $5.95. Incidents of espionage in postwar Germany are treated as separate case studies. The two best chapters deal with the Gehlen organization that went to work for the West after the war and the case of

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Otto John, ex-chief of West German counterespionage who "defected" to the East and then returned to the West a little over a year later.

The Unfought Battle. By Jon Kimche. New York: Stein and Day, 1968. 168 pp. $5.95. This revealing little book about the failure of the British and French to quash Hitler's war aims in the autumn of 1939 is a study of men with high moral concepts driven by good intentions into a course of action that brought disaster to the world. That their attempt to deter Hitler, in which they stooped to deception of their own people and their allies, failed because of deliberate psychological warfare efforts, misinterpretation of intelligence and reliance on faulty intelligence, may be taken as a lesson for today's deterrent situation, which could fail for similar reasons.

Unity in Diversity: Italian Communism and the Communist World. By Donald L. M. Blackmer. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1968. 434 pp. $15.00. An important and comprehensive study of the relationship between the Italian Communist Party and the international communist movement since 1956. Dr. Blackmer, Associate Professor of Political Science and Assistant Director of the Center for International Studies at M.I.T., examines the party's attempt to reconcile its national goals and interests with such events as de-Stalinization and upheaval in Eastern Europe, the Sino-Soviet split, and the evolution of Italian economic and political life. The author contends that the cumulative effect of these events was to push the PCI into a more autonomous and revisionist role while still striving to retain its ties with the communist world.

Western Europe Since 1945: A Short Political History. By Derek W. Urwin. New York: Humanities Press, 1969. 301 pp. $5.00. A useful survey of post-war politics in Western Europe, including such topics as the first postwar British Labour Government, the tripartite experiment, de Gaulle and the French constitution, Adenauer and the rebirth of West Germany, and the political roles of communism and Catholicism. In addition, the author traces the development of European integration and assesses Europe's role in international relations.

V. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Communism and the Yugoslav National Question. By Paul Shoup. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. 308 pp. $9.50. An analysis of the efforts of the Yugoslav Communist Party to deal with rivalries between national groups, and between national groups and minorities. Individual chapters treat of the national question and the Yugoslav Communist Party, 1919-1941; nationalism and the partisan movement; the national problem after World War II; the Macedonian question; Titoism and the national question; and economics and the national question. Dr. Shoup is Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia.

Czechoslovakia 1968: Reform, Repression and Resistance. By Philip Windsor and Adam Roberts. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. 200 pp. $7.50 ($2.50, paper). The first part of this concise study is Windsor's, in which he analyzes the development of Soviet-Czech relations between January and August 1968 and the Soviet decision-making process during August which led to military intervention, and suggests implications for the West with respect to political *warning of*—or the *way to live with*—future East European crises. Roberts, a lecturer in the International Relations Department at the London School of Economics, then discusses the display of national unity in Czechoslovakia and its impact in concentrating world attention on the fate of the Czech effort at reform. Appendixes include useful documents pertaining to the events of these crucial months.

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The Development of the Soviet Economy: Plan and Performance. Edited by Vladimir G. Treml and Robert Farrell. New York: Praeger, 1968. 298 pp. $8.00. This collection of articles surveys the fifty years of Soviet economic development in light of shifting policy objectives and alternatives. The authors attempt to find the most meaningful indexes of the efficiency and viability of the Soviet economic system.

Fifty Years of Communism in Russia. Edited by Milorad M. Drachkovitch. University Park: The Penn State University Press, for the Hoover Institution, 1968. 316 pp. $7.50. This book contains the papers presented at a conference sponsored by the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace of Stanford University in October 1967 on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. The contributors include Bertram D. Wolfe, Leonard Schapiro, G. Warren Nutter, John N. Hazard, Ivo J. Lederer, Raymond L. Garthoff and Sidney Hook.

The Red Orchestra. By Gilles Perrault. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969. 512 pp. $7.95. A documentary history of the notorious Soviet spy ring, the Rote Kapelle, which operated in the highest circles of the German General Staff, as revealed by its former members and foes. The chief characters are Leopold Trepper, a Polish Jew, and the Gestapo officer who tracked him down. The story of the ring being broken by the Germans, turned against the Russians, then used by Himmler to propose a separate peace with Moscow, and by the Russians against the Germans once they realized the latter's "game," has all the dramatic qualities of a novel. It includes an interview with Trepper, who, after 11 years in Lubyinka Prison, was rehabilitated by the Soviets for his war efforts.

The Soviet Economy: Structure, Principles, Problems. (Revised edition.) By Nicolas Spulber. New York: W. W. Norton, 1969. 329 pp. $8.95. An analysis of the management of the Soviet economy, its plan construction and coordination, pricing, market mechanisms and controls, demonstrated at the example of industry, agriculture, labor, trade, money and banking, and government expenditures and taxation. The revised edition presents a study of the "New Economic Model" and discusses the influence of Marxian theory on Soviet practice in the areas of national income accounting, monetary theory, the determination of costs and prices, the allocation of investment funds, and theories of economic development.

The Soviet People and Their Society. By Pierre Sorlin; translated from the French by Daniel Weinsborf. New York: Praeger, 1969. 293 pp. $7.00. Professor Sorlin is a member of the Faculty of Letters of the University of Lyon and the Institute of Political Studies in Paris whose previous books include *Lenine, Trotski, Stalin* and *Waldeck-Rousseau*. His present study analyzes Soviet society within the framework of six historical periods: Russian society prior to World War I; its collapse, 1914-1920; stabilization, 1921-1927; the birth of the new society, 1928-1938; World War II and postwar recovery, 1939-1953; and the post-Stalin era, 1953-1967. In each division he discusses demographic trends, agricultural and industrial production, and changes in the structure of social classes, the party and state bureaucracies.

Yugoslavia: The New Class in Crisis. By Nenad D. Popovic. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968. 240 pp. $7.00. The author asserts that "Yugoslavia is a good illustration of the processes and adaptations of Marxism that evolve within and between all Communist countries and parties. . . . Yugoslavia, rather than separating itself from the world Communist Movement, as many well-wishers believed, has in fact developed an internal power shift from the body of the

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Communist Party to its exclusive realm, the nucleus of Party command." He believes there is a "natural tendency of a communist or any totalitarian regime to develop and preserve its power at any price; in so doing, Yugoslavia's regime has created a 'new class' in direct opposition to the tenets of orthodox Marxism. . . ." After examining the characteristics and mentality of the new class and its record in foreign affairs and administration, he devotes three chapters to the economic situation, "to show how the new class seeks to subordinate economic laws to its needs, thus pushing the national economy into successively deeper crises." Before his defection to the West in 1961, Mr. Popovic was a Minister Plenipotentiary in the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs; he is currently Visiting Professor at the Maxwell Graduate School, Syracuse University.

VI. Middle East and Africa

Africa Yesterday and Today. Edited by Clark D. Moore and Ann Dunbar. New York: Praeger, 1969. 394 pp. $7.95. This book presents the story of sub-Saharan Africa, its problems and prospective future, by exploring Africa's history, with special emphasis on the slave trade, the early European scramble for land, the interwar period during which colonial administrations took their final form, and the emergence of African nationalism since the end of the Second World War.

Countdown in the Holy Land. By Lester Velie. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1969. 224 pp. $5.95. Velie's provocative analysis of the Arab-Israeli conflict of June 1967 and the subsequent Soviet rearmament of the Arabs contends that the Soviets engineered the war. He traces the origins of their Middle East policy, recalling their political interest in an independent Palestine and military and political aid to Israel before 1952, and the reversal of policy which changed their attitude from pro-Israeli to pro-Arab with a voice in Arab actions. There is an interesting discussion of the strategic and doctrinal evolution of Zahal and the crucial role played by Israeli intelligence in fashioning Israel's victory.

The Economy of Tanganyika. By Gilbert L. Rutman. New York: Praeger, 1968. 190 pp. $12.50. This volume in the Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development analyzes each sector of the Tanganyikan economy and pinpoints the main obstacles to rapid development: a tribal system of agriculture, lack of arable land, a small industrial base, few mineral resources, an unskilled population, and heavy dependence on foreign aid. Dr. Rutman, Assistant Professor of Economics at West Virginia University, also examines the efforts of the nation's leaders to stimulate economic growth, build a socialist economy and create a unified state. Tanganyika merged in 1964 with Zanzibar to form Tanzania, but this study is confined to Tanganyika.

The Silent Warriors. By Joshua Tadmor; edited and translated by Raphael Rothstein. New York: Macmillan, 1969. 189 pp. $5.95. A story of Israeli intelligence in the Middle East before the founding of the State of Israel in 1948 and afterward. From firsthand accounts and knowledge of the agents and operations involved, the author records their successes and failures and the political, psychological and military impact of intelligence gathering on Israel and her enemies.

Suez: De Lesseps' Canal. By John Pudney. New York: Praeger, 1969. 242 pp. $7.50. An account of the maneuvers behind the cutting of the Suez Canal that emphasizes the character of Ferdinand De Lesseps. The author contrasts the past glory of the Canal with its unusable condition, as a result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict, on the centenary of its construction.

The Tanks of Tammuz. By Shabtai Teveth. New York: Viking Press, 1969. 290 pp. $6.95. An Israeli war correspondent who spent three weeks before the June 1967

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war with General Tal's armored division and then accompanied it into combat in the Sinai describes the origin, development, evolution, training, doctrine and weapons of the Israeli Armored Corps. He follows Tal's division on a day-to-day basis during the Six Day War, and recounts the remaining operations on the Jordanian and Syrian fronts.

VII. East Asia and the Pacific

The Australian-American Alliance: Costs and Benefits. By H. G. Gelber. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968. 160 pp. $1.25 (paper). A study of the costs and benefits of the U.S.-Australian alliance for both sides and of the strategic and other interests that have drawn the two countries closer together in recent years. Primarily concerned with Australia's view of the alliance, the author examines her security concerns; the advantages she gains in terms of protection, weapons procurement, technological know-how, military training, improved intelligence, and greater political influence; the limitations and drawbacks accompanying partnership with the United States; and the alternatives within and outside the alliance. Dr. Gelber, on leave as senior lecturer in the Department of History at Monash University, Melbourne, is currently at the Center for International Affairs of Harvard University.

East Wind, Rain. By Brigadier General Elliott R. Thorpe. Boston: Gambit, 1969. 307 pp. $6.95. A readable, personalized account of a counterintelligence officer's experiences during the Second World War in the Pacific. Thorpe's reminiscences begin in prewar Hawaii and continue beyond the Pacific campaign through a period in occupied Japan, where he was MacArthur's chief of counterintelligence, to end in postwar Thailand.

Hong Kong: A Society in Transition. Edited by Ian C. Jarvie and Joseph Agassi. New York: Praeger, 1969. 378 pp. $10.00. Fourteen essays explore the economic, social and political aspects of Hong Kong society. Some of the topics are: structure of rural Chinese society in the New Territories; social structure and stratification; problems of Westernization; the role of savings and wealth among the Chinese; urban housing, 1945-1963; and riots and the future of Hong Kong.

The Myth of Independence. By Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. 188 pp. $7.00. An important and candid examination of Pakistan's foreign policy by the man who was her controversial and colorful Foreign Minister from 1963 to 1966. He takes a critical view of Pakistan's alliance with the United States and Washington's favoritism toward New Delhi, comments approvingly on Pakistan's improving relations with the USSR and Communist China, and traces Indian-Pakistani relations.

The War in the Far East, 1941-1945. By Basil Collier. New York: William Morrow, 1969. 530 pp. $8.95. As a Britisher, Collier's emphasis on British and Commonwealth contributions to the war in the Pacific is heavier than the American reader is used to, but he has produced a well balanced single-volume history of the Far Eastern phase of World War II. There is a detailed narrative of the early massive British defeats in Burma, Hong Kong and Malaya/Singapore, followed by a description of the reconquest of Burma by Field Marshal William Slim. An excellent section traces the rise of Japanese imperialism in the 19th and 20th centuries and the breakdown of negotiations between the United States and Japan which led ultimately to war.

War, Peace, and the Viet Cong. By Douglas Pike. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969. 186 pp. $5.95. Mr. Pike, a Foreign Service Officer making his career in

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the United States Information Agency, examines the nature of the Viet Nam war with emphasis on the strategy, interests and objectives of the Viet Cong. He describes the contenders and their basic goals and the social and political milieu of the struggle; suggests alternative directions events may take and outlines the major strategic options open to both sides; and comments on short-term and long-term prospects.

VIII. Latin America

Agrarian Reform in Colombia. By Ernest A. Duff. New York: Praeger, 1968. 240 pp. n.p. This is a case study of an agrarian reform effort in a modernizing society (Colombia) which is attempting to provide both economic development and social justice for its members. Dr. Duff examines the social, economic and political obstacles to change within this society, and provides insights into the methodology of social reform—i.e., the way a society goes about introducing peaceful social change into its system without disrupting or destroying that system. Colombia was chosen for this study in part because her agrarian reform program was the first enacted into law after the 1961 Punta del Este Conference which established the Alliance for Progress. The author is Associate Professor of Political Science at Randolph-Macon Woman's College, and was recently Visiting Professor of Political Science at the Universidad del Valle, Cali, Colombia.

The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1928-1945: Yrigoyen to Peron. By Robert A. Potash. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969. 314 pp. $8.95. An examination of the Army in the political life of Argentina from the re-election in 1928 of Hipólito Yrigoyen to the achievement in 1945 of complete political control by Colonel Juan D. Perón. Particular attention is given to the evolution of the Army as an institution; the influence of Army officers on policymaking; the treatment accorded the armed forces under various governments; and the social origins, basic attitudes and role conceptions of the officers. The author is Professor of History at the University of Massachusetts.

Political Trends in Brazil. By Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1969. 184 pp. $6.00. A study principally of the Quadros, Goulart and Castello Branco administrations since 1960. The author, Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, describes the institutions and personalities of the Brazilian political system: the coexistence of free elections and coups and of representative government and paternalist presidentialism; the multi-party system from 1945 to 1965; the election of Janio Quadros to the presidency in 1960 and his resignation the following year; the change to a parliamentary form of government in 1961 and back to a presidential system in 1963; the revolution led by the military in 1964, and the introduction of a two-party system in 1966. He also discusses Brazil's foreign policies, especially her relations with the United States and her aspirations to be an intermediate world power.

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Monographs and Reports Received

The Art of the Impossible: A Study of the Czech Resistance. By Milton Mayer. Santa Barbara: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, A Center Occasional Paper, April 1969. 47 pp. $1.00.

Britain and Latin America. New York: British Information Services, Pamphlet No. 86, 1968. 59 pp. $1.70.

Canada: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, March 1969. 50 pp. 80 cents.

The CCP's Persecution of Chinese Intellectuals in 1949-69. By Li Ting-sheng. Taipei, Taiwan: Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, April 1969. 67 pp. 70 cents.

The Chinese View of Their Place in the World. By C. P. Fitzgerald. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. 82 pp. $1.25.

Denmark: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, July 1969. 54 pp. 80 cents.

Foreign Policy Review, I. Future Roles for the Armed Forces of Canada. By James Eayrs. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Behind the Headlines Series, April 1969. 16 pp. 70 cents.

Foreign Policy Review, II. Canada's Role in Long-term World Perspective: A Proposal for a New Initiative. By Stephen Clarkson. *Non-Alignment.* By Michael Brecher. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Behind the Headlines Series, May 1969. 16 pp. 70 cents.

France: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, April 1969. 70 pp. 80 cents.

France: The Gaullist Era and After. By Mark Kesselman. New York: The Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No. 194, April 1969. 63 pp. 85 cents.

Important Documents of the Second WACL Conference. Taipei, Taiwan: World Anti-Communist League, China Chapter, February 1969. 42 pp. 50 cents.

The Law of the Sea: International Rules and Organization for the Sea. Proceedings of the Third Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, June 24-27, 1968. Edited by Lewis M. Alexander. Kingston: University of Rhode Island, March 1969. 464 pp. n.p.

NATO After Czechoslovakia. Washington: Georgetown University, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Special Report Series, No. 9, April 1969. 98 pp. $2.95.

Netherlands: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, May 1969. 58 pp. 80 cents.

November 7: "A Day of Mourning" for the Victims of Communism. Taipei, Taiwan: Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, December 1968. 89 pp. $1.00.

"People's War" and Export of Revolution. By King Ta-kai. Taipei, Taiwan: Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, China Chapter, December 1968. 76 pp. 90 cents.

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The Progress of Peoples: Toward a Theory and Policy of Development with External Aid. By Neil H. Jacoby. Santa Barbara: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, A Center Occasional Paper, June 1969. 36 pp. $1.00.

The Prudent Case for Safeguard. By William R. Kintner. New York: National Strategy Information Center, June 1969. 28 pp. $1.00.

The Role of Middle Powers in World Politics. By Altiero Spinelli, Adam Malik, S. L. Poplai and others. Bonn: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, April 1969. 161 pp. n.p.

A Selected Bibliography of Recent Works in English on Political Processes in Malaysia and Singapore (1963-1968). By Rene Peritz. Kingston: University of Rhode Island, Occasional Papers in Political Science, No. 14, 1969. 32 pp. $1.00.

The Socialist Republic of Rumania. By Stephen Fischer-Galati. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969. 113 pp. $2.45.

Soviet Sea Power. By Robert A. Kilmarx and others. Washington: Georgetown University, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Special Report Series, No. 10, June 1969. 131 pp. $2.95.

The Warsaw Pact. By Andrzej Korbonski. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, International Conciliation No. 573, May 1969. 73 pp. 60 cents.

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Peace and the Strategy Conflict. By William R. Kintner. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. 264 pp. $6.95.

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